Choong Mun-keat (Wei-keat)

The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism

A comparative study

Beiträge zur Indologie 32

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A comparative study based on the Sūtrāṅga portion of the Pāli Saṃyutta-Nikāya and the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama

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FOREWORD

Unlike many publications whose titles contain the words "Early Buddhism," this book can legitimately purport to be concerned with Buddhism as it was before the schisms (beginning about a century after the Buddha's death) whereby the tradition divided and subdivided into many different schools.

All too frequently one finds that an author who claims to be investigating early Buddhism is actually investigating Pali Buddhism. The view that the Pali canon is the only reliable basis for a study of the early development of Buddhist teachings is still widely held. But, as is pointed out in the first chapter of this book, a study based exclusively on the Pali canon is in fact a study of one particular Buddhist school. Despite the claim implicit in the appropriated title, Theravāda, Pali Buddhism is just one of the many schools (said to have numbered eighteen) into which the Buddhist tradition had divided by the time the various versions of the canon were first written down. It is not necessarily more representative of early Buddhism than the other schools produced by the schisms.

There is, admittedly, a good reason for the heavy reliance usually placed on the Pali canon: this is the only canon in which all four of the principal nikāyas/āgamas (sutra collections) are preserved intact and in an Indic language. However, the canons of the other schools are not entirely inaccessible; though the Indic source texts have been largely lost, there exist complete Chinese translations of all four āgamas. It is true that these translations were done by different hands and at different times (during the fourth and fifth centuries), and that they represent not a single Buddhist school but at least three different schools. Nevertheless they are indispensable sources for the study of early Buddhism. As is gradually being recognised in Buddhist studies, any attempt to explore the teachings of early Buddhism requires that the accounts contained in the Pali sutras be compared with the parallel accounts found in the Chinese counterparts of those sutras.

Such a comparative study is what CHOONG Munkeat presents in this book. His research is based on the major part of the Pali Saṃyuttanikāya (SN) and its counterpart in the Chinese canon, a translation of a now lost Sanskrit Saṃyuktāgama (SA). The Chinese SA text, thought to be either Sarvāstivādin or Mūlasarvāstivādin, is systematically compared with the Pali SN, with a view to determining which elements of doctrine are shared by the two texts/schools and which are unshared. Choong rightly sees this procedure as providing a basis for assessing the likelihood that any particular element of doctrine was present in the common ancestral collection from which the two extant texts are presumably descended.

Unless there has been borrowing between the two branches in question (the Sarvāstivādin and the Vibhajyavādin), it is likely that shared elements of doctrine date from the period before the division that produced those two branches, and that unshared elements developed subsequently in one branch or the other.

The comparison covers that portion of SN and SA which is identifiable as sūtra-aṅga, the first of the nine (or twelve) aṅgas or categories into which the Sūtrapiṭaka contents are traditionally said to be classifiable. The remainder of SN/SA, not dealt with in this book, evidently belongs to the second and third aṅgas, namely geya (mixed prose and verse – the Sagāthavagga of SN) and vyākaraṇa (detailed explanation – including sutras delivered by Śāriputra and other prominent monks). This focus on the sūtra-aṅga portion means that the book deals exclusively with those saṃyuktas that are defined by their doctrinal content. It gives the study a natural coherence and consistency, since the material dealt with is already grouped by doctrinal topic in a fairly logical sequence.

In thus taking account of the aṅga classification, the author is giving due recognition to the work of the eminent Chinese scholar-monk, Yin Shun. Though little known to Western scholarship, Yin Shun's findings regarding the structure and significance of SN/SA deserve close attention, and the emphasis laid on those findings in the present book is appropriate. Briefly put, Yin Shun's claim is that the distribution of the sutras into four nikāyas/āgamas did not take place at the First Council; initially the sutras were grouped in a single collection, whose structure is largely preserved in the extant SN and SA. The other three principal nikāyas/āgamas were developed subsequently, probably at the Second Council, in response to a substantial increase in the number and size of the remembered sutras that had taken place during the intervening century. These conclusions are based in large part on a demonstration that the contents of SN/SA fit the first, second, and third categories in the traditional aṅga classification (sūtra, geya, vyākaraṇa), i.e. that SN/SA is structurally archaic. It follows that SN and SA are of special significance both historically and doctrinally – which helps explain why the author of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* saw fit to include in his great treatise a lengthy commentary on the sūtra-aṅga portion of SA.

The above considerations enhance the significance of the present study, based as it is on the sūtra-aṅga portion of the extant SN and SA. When Choong Munkeat first indicated to me his interest in doing such a comparative study for a PhD dissertation, I immediately welcomed the proposal. Conscious of the value of THICH Minh Chau's earlier comparative study of the Pali Majjhimanikāya and the Chinese Madhyamāgama, I encouraged him to proceed with the project and gladly took on the role of

supervisor. I was well pleased with the resulting dissertation, and I now particularly welcome its publication in Harrassowitz's prestigious Beiträge zur Indologie series.

Readers with an interest in the teachings of early Buddhism will find in this work a wealth of relevant data. The sections translated from the Chinese SA represent, in most cases, the first appearance of this material in a Western language; and the arrangement according to saṃyuktas will make for easy reference by anyone wishing to undertake more detailed research into particular doctrines. On matters of doctrine the study reveals a high degree of agreement between the two source texts, but also some significant areas of disagreement. The implications of these findings have yet to be fully worked out. What has, however, been demonstrated beyond doubt is the usefulness of the comparative method adopted, and hence the indispensability of the Chinese texts in any study of early Buddhist teachings.

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PREFACE

This book originated as a doctoral dissertation submitted in 1998 to the Department of Studies in Religion at The University of Queensland. It expresses my personal spiritual and academic interest in seeking out "the original teachings of the Buddha".

That interest began when, as a Buddhist monk, I was studying in Buddhist institutes in Taiwan during the period 1979 to 1981. It was then that I realised for the first time that the various existing traditions of Buddhist doctrine and practice are not entirely true to the teaching of the historical Buddha, and that in some cases they are actually misleading. The most important aspect of my Buddhist intellectual training in Taiwan came from reading the works of Yin Shun. That made me gradually realise what kinds of research methods and languages I had to master in order to study, understand, and eventually teach regarding the Buddhist teachings in which I was so deeply interested. Then began my long, difficult but rewarding personal journey. I went to Paramadhamma Buddhist Institute to study Pāli (Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, 1982); completed a BA in the Faculty of Buddhist Studies at Komazawa University (Tokyo, 1990) and an MA in the Department of Studies in Religion at The University of Queensland (1994); and was then able to focus on my particular area of interest by entering the PhD research environment.

This book presents a comparative examination of the main teachings contained in the Sūtra-aṅga portion of the Pāli *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (SN) and its Chinese counterpart, *Saṃyuktāgama* (雜阿含經 Za-ahan-jing) (SA). The SN and SA are essentially two different versions of the same collection of discourses. This study builds on the work of Yin Shun, which demonstrates the historical importance of SN/SA in the formation of the early Buddhist canon. In particular, it is based on Yin Shun's recognition of the three-aṅga structure of SN/SA, and of the status of its Sūtra-aṅga portion as of prime importance in the historical formation of this nikāya/āgama, and as containing the most fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The aim of this research is to reveal and clarify the similarities and differences between SN and SA, with regard to the principal Buddhist teachings contained in their Sūtra-aṅga portion. It is pointed out that SN/SA particularly lends itself to such study because of its organisation into collections, or saṃyuktas (P. saṃyutta, Ch. xiangying 相應), each of which is made up of discourses dealing with a specific doctrinal topic. For example, the Khandha-Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart, Yin Xiangying (陰相應) of SA, deal with the important topic of the five aggregates (khandhas).

After presenting, in Chapter 1, an overall picture of the structure of SN/SA, particularly its Sūtra-aṅga portion, the book goes on to examine, in succeeding chapters, the following major doctrinal topics: the *five aggregates* (khandhā), the *sense spheres* (saḷāyatana), *feeling* (vedanā), the *realms of nature* (dhātu), *causal condition* (nidāna), and the *path* (magga, bojjhaṅga, etc.).

The comparative study of the two versions (SN and SA) finds them to be largely in agreement on essential points, but also reveals some significant areas of disagreement. This is seen as demonstrating the importance of the methodological principle employed here. It supports the assertion that any attempt to identify the teachings of early Buddhism should not be based on the Pāli texts alone, but should entail comparative study of the Pāli texts and their Chinese counterparts.

I would like here to express my deep gratitude to the many people in Malaysia and Singapore who gave support to my study in Australia, in some cases over a long period of time. They include: the late Venerable Master Xiu-jing (修靜) of Foguang Monastery (佛光精舍); Ven. Miao-sheng (妙勝), Ms. SUN Jin-lian (孫金蓮) and her family of Agama Buddha Da-Bei-Lian-She (佛敎大悲蓮舍); Ven. Hui-siong (慧雄), Ven. Yuan-zhen (圓振), and Ven. Chuan-guan (傳观) of Lian-Chee-Kek Buddhist Temple (蓮池閣寺); Ven. Fa-zhao (法照) of Golden Pagoda Buddhist Temple; Mr. Lim Zhiyuan (林志源); Mr. Seah Wong-chi (謝汪智); Ms. AW-YONG Mui-yin (欧阳梅英) and her family and friends; Ven. Wei-seng (唯成) of Chook Lim Sean Si (竹林禪寺); Ven. Ri-heng (日恒) of Kek Lok Si (極樂寺); Ven. Wu-feng (悟峰); Ven. Ming-yi (明义) of Foo Hai Ch'an Monastery (福海禪院), secretary of the General Singapore Buddhist Federation and chairman of Ren Ci Hospital; Ven. Zhen-ding (眞定) of Fa Hua Monastery (法華禪寺); Ven. Pu-zhen (普振); Ven. Wei-yan (惟俨) of Shuang Lin Monastery (雙林寺); Ven. Wei-yi (唯宜); and many other friends and devotees too numerous to list here. Without their support I would not have been able to work single-mindedly to complete this study.

I would also like to acknowledge gratefully the help of my supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Roderick S. BUCKNELL, of the Department of Studies in Religion and the Department of Asian Languages and Studies, at The University of Queensland. He spent many hours carefully checking my drafts, and suggested many improvements in style and presentation. Without his academic support this study could hardly have been completed in its present form.

The appearance of my dissertation as a book in the Harrassowitz series "Beiträge zur Indologie" is due to the help of the series editor, Professor Dr. Konrad MEISIG, of the Institut für Indologie at Johannes Gutenberg-

Universität, Mainz. I would like to express here my gratitude for his support of my academic work.

It is my hope that this book not only will serve as a source of detailed comparative material on SA/SN for scholars interested in early Buddhism, but also will contribute to happiness, peace, and understanding for individuals and in the world.

煒傑 Wei-keat (CHOONG Mun Keat)
"Veluvana", Brisbane, Australia
June, 1999

ABBREVIATIONS

AN	Aṅguttara-nikāya
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
CSA	雜阿含經論會編 [Combined Edition of Sūtra and Śāstra of the Saṃyuktāgama]
DA	Dīrghāgama 長阿含經
DN	Dīgha-nikāya
EA	Ekottarāgama 增一阿含經
FSA	SA in Foguang Tripiṭaka 佛光大藏經
MA	Madhyamāgama 中阿含經
MN	Majjhima-nikāya
NAWG	*Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse*
SA	Saṃyuktāgama 雜阿含經
SN	Saṃyutta-nikāya
Sn.	Sutta-nipāta
P.	Pāli
PED	*Pali-English Dictionary* (ed. by RHYS DAVIDS & STEDE)
PTS	The Pali Text Society, London.
"RESA"	"雜阿含經 部類之整編" ["Re-edition of the Grouped Structure of SA"], an article in CSA
Skt.	Sanskrit
T	Taishō Tripiṭaka 大正大藏經 or Taishōshinshū-Daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經 (ed. by J. TAKAKUSU and K. WATANABE, 1922-1934)
VCBT	Heinz BECHERT (ed.), *Von Ceylon bis Turfan* (1967).
=	"is/are the counterpart(s) of . . ."

INTRODUCTION

The principal textual source for any study of early Buddhist teachings is the four Nikāyas/Āgamas (collections), which form the core of the *Sūtra-piṭaka* or "Basket of Discourses". One of the four, the *Saṃyutta-nikāya/ Saṃyuktāgama* or "Connected Collection", can be shown to be of particular value as a source of information on fundamental Buddhist teachings. It is the subject of the present study, which is a comparative examination of the Sūtra-aṅga portion[1] of the Pāli *Saṃyutta-nikāya* and its Chinese counterpart, *Saṃyuktāgama* (雜阿含經 Za-ahan-jing).[2]

The Pāli *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (abbreviated SN) and the Chinese *Saṃyuktāgama* (abbreviated SA) are, roughly speaking, two different versions of the same collection of suttas/sūtras or discourses. SN is the version preserved in Pāli language within the Tāmraśāṭīya school (the self-styled Theravāda), which was formerly active in western India (the region of Ujjenī), and which still flourishes in Sri Lanka and southeast Asia. The Chinese SA is a translation from Sanskrit of the version preserved within the Sarvāstivāda, a school which was formerly active in northern India and Central Asia, but which has long been extinct. Although broadly similar in structure and content, these two texts also display differences, which presumably reflect, at least in part, doctrinal differences between the two schools. Comparison of these texts therefore promises to throw some light on those doctrinal differences. It may be expected to help reveal which teachings are common to the two traditions and which are unique to the one or the other. This should help make it possible to identify which teachings belong to the period before the two traditions diverged, and which are purely sectarian.

Within Buddhist studies, research into "early Buddhism" is usually based only on the Pāli texts. Naturally, the Pāli texts are important sources for such research; however, the Pāli canon, as the scripture of the southern Buddhist tradition, represents only one of the many early Buddhist schools. If one considers only Pāli sources and does not compare them with the Chinese versions, then one is studying Pāli Buddhism, not early Buddhism. Both the Pāli and the Chinese versions of the Nikāyas/Āgamas are sectarian texts. For the study of early Buddhism it is essential to pay attention to both

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1 Sūtra-aṅga is discussed in section 2 on pp. 7-11.

2 The pinyin transcription is used for Chinese, except where a name or title is already well established in some other form. For Japanese the Hepburn system is used, with the same proviso.

these versions. The present study of the fundamental teachings of early Buddhism is based on the Pāli SN and the Chinese SA, representing the two main branches within the Sthavira tradition. To clarify this point and thereby reveal the significance of this study, some historical and textual background is necessary.

1. Historical background

The historical period most relevant to this study is the first five centuries of Buddhism, i.e. the fifth to first centuries BC. That interval, which concludes with the full emergence of the opposition between Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) and Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle), can be recognised as comprising three periods:[3]

(1) Original Buddhism: The forty-five year period of the Buddha's teaching activity. The life of the Buddha (eighty years) is uncertainly and approximately dated to 508-428 BC.[4]

(2) Early Buddhism: The period from the death of the Buddha up to the first schism of the Saṅgha (the monastic community) into two main branches, the Mahāsaṅghika and the Sthavira, dated about 428-300 BC.[5] This period saw the convening of two Saṅgha councils (saṃgīti), the first at Rājagṛha (Pāli: Rājagaha, today's Rājgir) shortly after the death of the Buddha, and the second at Vaiśālī (P. Vesāli), 100 years later.[6] These two councils were convened by leading monks to determine the Buddha's teachings under the headings of Sūtra or Dharma (teaching) and Vinaya

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3 This periodisation and terminology follow 印順 Yin Shun, 原始佛教聖典之集成 Yuanshi Fojiao Shengdian zhi Jicheng [*The Formation of Early Buddhist Texts*] (Zhengwen Chubanshe, Taipei, 1971), pp. 1-2.

4 Other dates proposed by various researchers are 464-384 BC and 566-486 BC. The dating question lies outside the scope of this textual study, so will not be further discussed here. Cf. Yin Shun, 印度佛教思想史 Yindu Fojiao Sixiang Shi [*A History of the Thought of Indian Buddhism*] (1988; Zhengwen Chubanshe, Taipei, 1993), pp. 8-9; Hajime NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes* (Japan, 1980; reprinted Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989), pp. 13-14; Heinz BECHERT, "The Problem of the Determination of the Date of the Historical Buddha", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, vol. 33 (1989), pp. 93-120.

5 Yin Shun, *Formation*, p. 868.

6 Ibid., pp. 25-32. Cf. MAYEDA Egaku, 原始佛教聖典の成立史研究 Genshi Bukkyō Seiten no Seiritsushi Kenkyū *A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts* (Sankibō Busshorin, Tokyo, 1964), pp. 555-579. Problems relating to the historicity and functions of the councils again lie outside the scope of this study, and are passed over in the summary presented here.

(rules of the Saṅgha). Only these two councils are recognised in common by all schools of "Sectarian Buddhism" (the third period; see below). They belong to the period before the schism that began the period of Sectarian Buddhism. The present Sūtra and Vinaya piṭakas, i.e. the extant collections of teachings and Saṅgha rules, are *sectarian* texts; however, their essential form (structure) and content, recognised in common by all schools of Sectarian Buddhism, were certainly established in the period of Early Buddhism.[7]

(3) Sectarian Buddhism or the period of Early Buddhist Schools: This refers to the period from the first schism of the Saṅgha into two main branches (Mahāsaṅghika and Sthavira), through the development of various schools (traditionally numbering eighteen) by further schism within these two branches, up to but not including the emergence of the early Mahāyāna. It is dated about 300 BC to 100 BC.[8]

The first schism occurred not long after the second council; it arose mainly out of differences over certain Vinaya rules.[9] Following this first schism, a further division within the Sthavira branch yielded the Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda schools. A council, called the "Third Council" in the tradition of Pāli Buddhism, was held in 251 BC at Pāṭaliputra (modern Paṭnā) under the patronage of the emperor Aśoka (reigned c. 268-232 BC),[10] in order to establish the identity of the Vibhajyavāda.[11] Subsequent subdivision within each of these two sub-branches led to the numerous Sthavira schools. One of the Vibhajyavāda schools became the Tāmraśāṭīya,[12] which early established itself on Sri Lanka. Although it calls itself Theravāda (Skt. Sthaviravāda) "the Teaching of the Elders" or Vibhajjavāda (Skt. Vibhajyavāda) "the Distinctionist Teaching", the Tāmraśāṭīya is actually a sub-school of the Vibhajyavāda, which in its turn is a derivative of the Sthavira or "Elder" branch.[13] It is here called Pāli Buddhism. The Sarvāstivāda is also a derivative of the Sthavira. Thus, both

7 Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 2, 25-26.

8 Ibid., pp. 868-869; Yin Shun, *History*, p. 45.

9 Yin Shun, *History*, pp. 38-39. Cf. MAYEDA, p. 579; NAKAMURA, p. 100.

10 NAKAMURA, pp. 91, 93-94.

11 Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 38-39, 868. Cf. MAYEDA, pp. 583-588; Étienne LAMOTTE, *History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era* (tr. Sara WEBB-BOIN) (1958; Institut Orientaliste de l'Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1988), p. 272.

12 Also called Tāmraparṇīya or Taṃbapa[ṃ]ṇaka, referring to the Buddhist sect or monks of Tāmraparṇī (P. Tambapaṇṇi = Laṅka, Sīhaḷa; i.e. today's Sri Lanka). Cf. LAMOTTE, pp. 120, 301-302, 526, 536, 547, 786; Yin Shun, *History*, p. 45.

13 Yin Shun, *Formation*, p. 10, note 7.

Pāli Buddhism and Sarvāstivāda belong to the Sthavira branch of Sectarian Buddhism; the other main branch was the Mahāsaṅghika. The relationship of these various schools to one another, and to the main historical events of the first five centuries, may be depicted diagrammatically as in the following figure.[14]

14 Yin Shun, *History*, p. 45; Cf. LAMOTTE, pp. 517-548; Nalinaksha DUTT, *Buddhist Sects in India* (K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1970; reprinted Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978), pp. 48-56; André BAREAU, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris, 1955), p. 30; NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism*, pp. 99-103; and NAKAMURA Hajime, 仏教語大辞典 Bukkyōgo Daijiten [*Great Dictionary of Buddhist Terms*] (Tokyo Shoseki, Tokyo, 1989), p. 1184; HIRAKAWA Akira, *A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna* (tr. and ed. by Paul GRONER) (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993), pp. 112-116. There is some disagreement about the pattern and timing of the various divisions. Also, there is inconsistency in the names of some of the schools; e.g. Kaukkuṭika (also Kaukuṭika, Kukkuṭika, Gokulika); Caityaśaila (Caityavāda, Ceitiyavāda, Caitīya, Caitika); Pūrvaśaila (Pubbaseliya, Uttaraśaila); Sammatīya (Saṃmitīya); Ṣaṇḍagirīya (Ṣaṇṇagarika); Kāśyapīya (Suvarṣaka); Tāmraśāṭīya (Tāmraśātīya), etc.

The First Five Centuries of Buddhism

c. 508 BC — Birth of the Buddha

The Period of Original Buddhism

c. 473 BC — Enlightenment of the Buddha


c. 428 BC — Death of the Buddha

The Period of Early Buddhism (unified Saṅgha)

c. 428 BC — First Council

c. 328 BC — Second Council

The Period of Sectarian Buddhism



15 "Third Council", 251 BC (Pāli Buddhism).

Each school appears to have had its Tripiṭaka or "Three-baskets", comprising Sūtra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma. Most of these texts were early converted from various Prakrits (Middle Indo-Aryan dialects) into "Buddhist Sanskrit". However, the Tāmraśātīya school's version of the Tripiṭaka has been preserved in a Prakrit, the so-called Pāli (literally, "text"), which is based on a dialect from the region of Ujjenī (Ujjayanī), capital of Avanti, in western India.[16] Only this Pāli version has been preserved intact.[17] Most of the other Tripiṭakas were subsequently lost, but major portions are preserved in Chinese translations.

Pāli Buddhism has preserved all four Nikāyas of the Sūtra-piṭaka (P. Sutta-piṭaka), i.e. Dīgha-nikāya (abbreviated DN), Majjhima-nikāya (MN), Saṃyutta-nikāya (SN), and Aṅguttara-nikāya (AN), plus a fifth, the Khuddaka-nikāya or "Minor Collection". Other schools are represented by Chinese translations of just one or two of the four Nikāyas/Āgamas. For the Sarvāstivāda we have Chinese translations of the Saṃyuktāgama (SA)[18] and Madhyamāgama (MA), which are counterparts of the Pāli SN and MN. For

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16 MAYEDA, pp. 34-35, 47-51; 14-17 (in English Summary). Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 47-48. MIZUNO Kōgen, パーリ語文法 Pāri-go Bunpō *A Grammar of the Pali Language - with supplementary essays on the history of Pali studies* (1955; Sankibō, Tokyo, 1978), p. 26; MIZUNO Kōgen, *Buddhist Sutras: Origin, Development, Transmission* (1982; sixth printing, Kōsei Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1995), pp. 28-30.

17 According to *Dīpavaṃsa* (XX, 20-21) and *Mahāvaṃsa* (XXXIII, 100-101), the orally transmitted Pāli records (both "text of the three-baskets" piṭakattayapāli and its "commentary" aṭṭhakathā) were first systemically written down by monks during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇī (29-17 BC) of Sri Lanka. G. P. MALALASEKERA, *The Pāli Literature of Ceylon* (1928; Gunasena, Colombo, 1958), pp. 43-47; MAYEDA, pp. 615, 790-791; K. R. NORMAN, *Pāli Literature* (= *A History of Indian Literature*, vol. VII, Fasc. 2, ed. Jan GONDA) (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 10-11.

18 T 2, No. 99. Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 97-98. Some scholars consider that the Chinese SA is most closely related to the Mūla-sarvāstivāda tradition. ENOMOTO Fumio, "Udānavarga 諸本と雑阿含經, 別譯雑阿含經, 中阿含經の部派歸屬" Udānavarga Shohon to Zōagonkyō, Betsuyakuzōagonkyō Chūagonkyō no Buha Kizoku "On the Recensions of the Udānavarga and the Schools to which the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama, the smaller Chinese Saṃyuktāgama, and the Chinese Madhyamāgama are to be Ascribed", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 28/2 (1980. 3), pp. 55-57; Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, "Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien", in Heinz BECHERT ed., *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur* (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, 3), Teil 2 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1987), pp. 304-403. See also ENOMOTO Fumio, "On the Formation of the Original Texts of the Chinese Āgamas", *Buddhist Studies Review*, vol. 3, No. 1 (1986), pp. 19-30. Cf. also MAYEDA Egaku, "Japanese Studies on the Schools of the Chinese Āgamas", *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, Teil 1 (Göttingen, 1985), pp. 94-103.

the Dharmaguptaka school (another sub-school of the Vibhajyavāda) we have a Chinese translation of Dīrghāgama (DA), corresponding to the Pāli DN; and for the Mahāsaṃghika we have a Chinese translation of Ekottarāgama (EA), roughly corresponding to the Pāli AN. There are, therefore, four Chinese Āgamas (SA, MA, DA, EA) corresponding to the four principal Pāli Nikāyas (SN, MN, DN, AN), but representing three different schools. Besides these, there is in Chinese an "Additional Translation of the Saṃyuktāgama" (別譯雜阿含經 Bieyi Za-ahan-jing). This is a translation of part of SA (mainly the Geya-aṅga portion), and may belong to the Kāśyapīya school (another sub-school of the Vibhajyavāda; see above figure).[19] Finally, there are Chinese versions of many individual sutras from all four Āgamas.

The present study deals with SN and SA, one of the four extant Nikāyas/Āgamas. SN is preserved intact in Pāli, whereas SA was translated into Chinese from a now lost Sanskrit text by a monk named Guṇabhadra between 435-445 AD.[20] These two texts belong to two major schools, the Tāmraśāṭīya (SN) and the Sarvāstivāda (SA), that developed within the Sthavira branch in the period before the emergence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Structurally, they are characterised by a grouping of their contents according to topics, such as "The Five Aggregates", "Causal Condition", "The Noble Eightfold Path" – a feature that enhances their value as a source of information on matters of doctrine. This study does not examine the entire SN and SA, but rather focuses on their Sūtra-aṅga portion. That portion is of particular value as a source on early Buddhist teachings, for reasons that will now be briefly discussed.

2. Historical importance of SN/SA and of its Sūtra-aṅga portion

The historical importance of SN/SA has been demonstrated by the Chinese scholar-monk Yin Shun (印順) in two books, 原始佛教聖典之集成 [*The Formation of Early Buddhist Texts*] (1971),[21] and 雜阿含經論會編 [*Combined Edition of Sūtra and Śāstra of Saṃyuktāgama*] (1983).[22]

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19 Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 98, 668-672. MAYEDA, pp. 652, 662.

20 Yin Shun, "雜阿含經部類之整編" Za-ahan-jing Bulei zhi Zhengbian ["Re-edition of the Grouped Structure of SA"], in 雜阿含經論會編 Za-ahan Jing-Lun Huibian [*Combined Edition of Sūtra and Śāstra of Saṃyuktāgama*] (1983; Zhengwen Chubanshe, Taipei, 1991), vol. i, p. 1; *Formation*, p. 96. Cf. Bunyiu NANJIO, *A Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripitaka* (1883, Oxford; reprinted Lokesh Chandra, Delhi, 1980), p. 135; MAYEDA, pp. 648-649; NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 37.

21 For publication details, see note 3, above.

22 3 vols. See note 20, above.

In these two works (here abbreviated *Formation* and CSA), Yin Shun presents the results of his extensive research on the historical process of formation of the Vinaya-piṭaka and Sūtra-piṭaka during the period of Early Buddhism. He takes account of Japanese scholars' work on this topic, in particular HIRAKAWA Akira's 律蔵の研究 (English title: *A Study of the Vinaya-piṭaka*, 1960),[23] and MAYEDA Egaku's 原始佛教聖典の成立史研究 (English title: *A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts*, 1964).[24] However, he criticises some of their conclusions and presents his own findings. Both *Formation* and CSA have had considerable influence in Chinese scholarly circles. They are taken account of in the new edition of the Chinese SA in the *Foguang Tripiṭaka*, published in 1983 (abbreviated FSA).[25] Vol. 1 of FSA contains a statement that the editors were guided by Yin Shun's research; and vol. 4 reprints from CSA an article by Yin Shun entitled "雜阿含經部類之整編" ["Re-edition of the Grouped Structure of SA"] (abbreviated RESA).[26] Most importantly, the Foguang Tripiṭaka adopts the order of the fascicles (juan 卷) of SA as reconstructed by Yin Shun (discussed below). Both Yin Shun's CSA and the FSA were reviewed favourably by MIZUNO Kōgen (1988).[27] A brief introduction to the relevant research findings will now be provided as background on the structure of SA (also of SN), and in order to locate the present study within the context of previous work.

(1) The extant Chinese SA is in disorder with regard to the arrangement of its fifty fascicles (also, two of the original fifty fascicles have been lost). This obscures its under-lying structural organisation. As is pointed out by MIZUNO, the suggestion that the extant Chinese SA is in disorder, together with an attempt to rearrange the text, was first made by M. ANESAKI in an

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23 *Ritsuzō no Kenkyū* (Sankibō Busshorin, Tokyo).

24 See note 6, above. MAYEDA deals only with the Sūtra piṭaka.

25 佛光大藏經 Foguang Dazangjing [*Foguang Tripiṭaka*]: 阿含藏, 雜阿含經 Ahan Zang, Za-ahan-jing [*Āgama piṭaka, Saṃyuktāgama*], 4 vols., edited by Foguang Dazangjing Bianxiu Weiyuanhui [Editorial Commission of Foguang Tripiṭaka] and published by Foguang Publisher (Kao-hsiung, 1983).

26 CSA vol. i, pp. 1-74. FSA i, pp. 9-12, and p. 1 at the beginning of the text; iv, pp. 2373-2444. CSA was published in March 1983, and FSA was published in August 1983. The two appeared in Taipei and Kao-hsiung at almost the same time.

27 "雜阿含經の研究と出版" Zōagonkyō no Kenkyū to Shuppan ["Studies and Publications on Saṃyuktāgama"], *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, 17 (1988), pp. 1-45; Chinese Translation by WU Laoze in 雜阿含經之研究 Za-ahan-jing zhi Yanjiu [*Study of Saṃyuktāgama*] (Yuan Heng Si Miao Lin, Kao-hsiung, 1988), pp. 1-103. MIZUNO's review mentions previous relevant work by Japanese Buddhist scholars, but particularly praises Yin Shun's work on the formation of SA and his rearrangement of its fascicles.

article published in 1908.[28] Further investigation of SA was presented by LÜ Cheng (呂澂) in an article in 1924.[29] LÜ is the first to note that, according to *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* (瑜伽師地論), the SA was the foundation of the four Āgamas; and he suggests that the structure of the *Sūtra-mātṛkā* (契經 摩呾理 迦/本 母), essentially a commentary on portion of SA, contained in the Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī (攝 事 分) of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra*,[30] reflected the order of the divisions of SA. In his *Formation* and CSA, Yin Shun presents further extensive research on that topic. He demonstrates in detail that, according to the Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī, SA consists of three components representing the categories (aṅgas) termed Sūtra, Geya, and Vyākaraṇa.[31] These are the first three in a set of nine or twelve such categories or genres into which the contents of the Sūtra-piṭaka were traditionally classified. They are:

1. Sūtra (P. Sutta): short, simple prose
2. Geya (Geyya): verse mixed with prose
3. Vyākaraṇa (Veyyākaraṇa): exposition[32]

Yin Shun points out that only these three aṅgas out of the nine or twelve are mentioned in MA 191 and its Pāli counterpart, MN 122 (Mahāsuññatā-

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28 MIZUNO, pp. 3-4 (see note 27, above); M. ANESAKI, "The Four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese: A concordance of their parts and of the corresponding counterparts in the Pāli Nikāyas", *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XXXV (1908), pp. 68-138.

29 "雜阿含經刊定記" ["The Revision of SA"], originally published in 内學 *Nei Xue* 1 (Nanjing, 1924), pp. 104-125; reprinted in *Foguang Tripiṭaka: Āgama piṭaka*, "Appendix 2" (1988), pp. 659-679. Cf. also 雜阿含經論 [*Sūtra and śāstra of SA*], 40 fascicles, 1937-1938 (Xinwenfeng, Taipei, repr. 1992).

30 T 30, No. 1579, pp. 772c-868b. *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* was translated from Skt. by Xuan Zang (玄奘) (596-664 AD). The author is named as Maitreya or Maitreya-nātha, known as Maitreya Bodhisattva (c. 270-350 AD), but is also considered to be Asaṅga (c. 310-390 AD). NAKAMURA, *Indian Buddhism*, pp. 256, 264.

31 Cf. also Akira MUKAI, "The Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃyuktāgama", *Hokkaidō Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō*, 32/2 (1985), pp. 1-41. For comment on this article, see MIZUNO, p. 45.

32 The Pāli tradition recognises nine aṅgas or "classifications of teaching" (nava-aṅga [-buddha]-vacana or -satthu-sāsana). The remaining six are: 4. Gāthā ("Verse"), 5. Udāna ("Solemn Utterance"), 6. Ityuktaka/Itivṛttaka (Itivuttaka, "So Said"), 7. Jātaka ("Birth Stories"), 8. Vaipulya (Vedalla, "Analysis"), and 9. Adbhuta-dharma (Abbhuta-dhamma, "Extraordinary Things"). Other schools add three more: 10. Nidāna ("Causal Conditions"), 11. Avadāna ("Simile"), and 12. Upadeśa ("Instruction"), making "twelve classifications of the teaching" (Skt. dvādaśa-aṅga-dharma [or -buddha] -[pra]vacana). MAYEDA, pp. 188, 209-210, 216; Yin Shun, *Formation*, pp. 476, 494-497.

sutta),[33] and he suggests that they were historically the earliest ones to appear; the Sūtra-aṅga was the earliest of the three. Yin Shun sees the gradual formation of SA (and also its counterpart SN) as corresponding to these three aṅgas formed in sequence. Accepting the Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī's statement, he suggests that the SA/SN (i.e. the synthesis of the three aṅgas) came into existence first, and that subsequent expansion of it yielded the other Āgamas/Nikāyas in the sequence MA/MN, DA/DN, EA/AN; and he concludes that the gradual formation of the nine aṅgas happened in parallel with development of the four Āgamas/Nikāyas, of which SA/SN was the foundation.[34]

(2) The claim that SA consists of Sūtra, Geya, and Vyākaraṇa portions is mainly based on the Vastu-saṃgrahanī. The Pāli canon does not record such a tradition for SN. However, SA and SN are different versions (traditions) of the same collection, and comparison of the organisation of these two versions shows that they share a very similar structure. In both SN and SA the numerous discourses are grouped according to their subject matter into saṃyuktas (P. saṃyutta, Chinese xiangying 相應) (literally, "connected with"). The saṃyuktas are grouped in turn into vargas (P. vagga, Ch. song 誦 or pin 品) ("sections"). Superimposed on this structure is, in the case of SA, a categorisation according to the three aṅgas (details are given in Chapter 1). While no such categorisation is applied in the SN tradition, it is likely to have existed.[35]

(3) As mentioned above, the Sūtra-mātṛkā in the Vastu-saṃgrahanī of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* was shown by LÜ Cheng to be based on the SA. In fact it is based only on a portion of SA, namely the Sūtra-aṅga portion. The Sūtra-aṅga portion of SA comprises the greater part of four of its vargas, those titled "Aggregates", "Sense spheres", "Causal condition", and "Path". This portion is considered by Yin Shun to be the earliest in the historical

33 CSA i, "Preface", pp. 1-2. T 2, p. 739a; MN iii, p. 115.

34 *Formation*, pp. 630-631, 788-791 (cf. pp. 507, 622-625, 695-696); CSA i, "RESA", pp. 34, 39. According to Yin Shun, by expansion of the three aṅgas (compiled in SA/SN) new categories or classifications (aṅgas) then came to exist: aṅgas 6. Ityuktaka, 7. Jātaka, 8. Vaipulya, and 9. Adbhuta-dharma were compiled in MA, DA, and EA; aṅga 4. Gāthā corresponds to certain texts of *Sutta-nipāta*, and 5. Udāna is *Dhammapada*, both compiled in the Khuddaka-nikāya rather than being made part of the four basic Āgamas/Nikāyas (*Formation*, pp. 623-624, 808, 861). For the arguments by contemporary Buddhist scholars in regard to whether the nine (or twelve) aṅgas came to exist before the four Āgamas/Nikāyas or vice versa, see MAYEDA, pp. 486-488; *Formation*, pp. 5-6, 476-481; HIRAKAWA, pp. 74-75.

35 *Formation*, pp. 684-702; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 53-57.

formation of SA, and to contain the most fundamental teachings of the Buddha. In order to clarify the relationship between the Sūtra-mātṛkā of *Yogācāra-bhūmi* and the discourses of the extant Chinese SA, Yin Shun compiled his three-volume CSA. Vols. 1 and 2 cover the Sūtra-aṅga portion; vol. 3 covers the Geya and Vyākaraṇa portions.

(4) Yin Shun's textual research on the formation of early Buddhist texts suggests the following:

(a) SA/SN is an early compilation, whose structure had its origin in the first council; it therefore "represents" the situation with regard to the compilation of the Buddhist teachings shortly after the death of the Buddha.[36]

(b) Although the extant SA and SN are sectarian texts, one can seek an understanding of early Buddhist teachings by studying them comparatively.[37]

The above brief summary may suffice to give some idea of how Yin Shun's investigations into the early process of formation of the Buddhist Āgamas/Nikāyas point to the historical importance of SA/SN. Yin Shun's conclusions add to the significance of the present study of SA/SN. This study does not cover the entire SA/SN; it deals only with its Sūtra-aṅga portion focusing particularly on the main teachings contained in that portion. It makes use of Yin Shun's work, particularly that represented in vols. 1 and 2 of CSA. However, whereas Yin Shun is mainly concerned with structure, the present study focuses on content.

3. Aim and significance of the research

The doctrinal topics – the five aggregates, etc. – which define the saṃyuktas of SA/SN, are familiar subjects in Buddhist studies. However, a systematic comparison of how those doctrinal topics are dealt with in the Pāli SN and the Chinese SA has not been attempted hitherto. The present study is such a systematic comparison. Its purpose is to clarify the similarities and

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36 *Formation*, pp. 629-630, 690, 732; CSA i, "Preface", p. 1. Yin Shun maintains that MA/MN, DA/DN, and EA/AN originated at the second council, one hundred years after the death of the Buddha, and thus represent the Buddhism of the period just before that council (*Formation*, p. 732).

37 CSA i, "RESA", p. 60.

differences between SN and SA regarding the principal Buddhist teachings dealt with in the Sūtra-aṅga portion of these two texts. This will demonstrate the methodological importance of such comparative study. Research based only on the Pāli sutras or discourses yields a one-sided picture with little historical depth. Comparison of the Pāli SN with its Chinese counterpart, SA, may be expected to reveal which elements (regarding any particular teaching) are common to the two and which are unique to one or the other; and this should make it easier to distinguish which elements belong to the period before the Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajjavāda schools separated, and which developed later within one or the other of these two branches.

It may well be that some of the common or shared teachings thus identified go even further back to the period of Early Buddhism, or even to Original Buddhism. However, no such inferences will be drawn here. This study focuses only on the textual comparison itself, without entering into any discussion of whether any of the common teachings belong to the early periods. One of its main purposes is to demonstrate the efficacy of such comparison as a research method. This study focuses on the Sūtra-aṅga portion of the two texts (SA and SN) because that is where most of the discourses on important doctrines are located. This definition of scope also happens to fit in with the view expressed by Yin Shun that the Sūtra-aṅga portion developed earlier, historically, than the Geya and Vyākaraṇa portions.[38]

There exists a comparative study of the Chinese Madhyamāgama and the Pāli Majjhima-nikāya, namely the published doctoral dissertation of THICH Minh Chau (published 1964).[39] More narrowly focused works along similar lines include studies of the Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra (DN 2) by Konrad MEISIG (1987) and by Graeme MACQUEEN (1988), and MEISIG's study (1988) of the Aggañña-Sutta (DN 27).[40] The latter work includes a useful summary of such comparative research to date, and an overview of its place in the study

38 As discussed in section 2, above, pp. 7-11.

39 *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya: A Comparative Study* (The Saigon Institute of Higher Buddhist Studies, Publication Department, 1964; reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991).

40 Konrad MEISIG, *Das Śrāmaṇyaphala-Sūtra: Synoptische Übersetzung und Glossar der chinesischen Fassungen verglichen mit dem Sanskrit und Pāli* (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1987); Graeme MACQUEEN, *A Study of the Śrāmaṇyaphala-Sūtra* (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1988); Konrad MEISIG, *Das Sūtra von den vier Ständen: Das Aggañña-Sutta im Licht seiner chinesischen Parallelen* (= Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, vol. 20) (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1988).

of early Buddhism.[41] Yin Shun's research on SA/SN focuses on structure (form) rather than content. This study, focusing on content in order to identify shared and unshared teachings, therefore breaks new ground.

4. Sources and method

For the SN, the PTS edition in Roman script (5 vols. 1884-1904) is the standard primary source used in Buddhist studies, and it is adopted as such for this study. However, attention is also paid to the Nālandā edition in Devanāgarī script (4 vols, 1959), this being a more recent critical edition with cross-references to the PTS, Thai, Burmese, and Sinhalese editions. For checking particular words two CD-ROMs, *PaliText*[42] and *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana*,[43] were also utilised. English, Japanese, and Chinese translations of SN were consulted;[44] however, this study is based directly on the primary source texts.

For the SA, the Taishō Tripiṭaka, vol. 2 (1924), No. 99 (pp. 1-373) is the principal primary source. However, the Taishō edition has many faults and therefore is used here in conjunction with CSA and FSA, both of which provide corrections, modern Chinese punctuation, comments, and up-to-date information on Pāli and other textual counterparts.[45] CSA is the main source for textual readings and for information on Pāli counterparts of SA sutras. The Pāli counterparts shown in CSA[46] sometimes differ from those given in the Taishō Tripiṭaka, in Chizen AKANUMA's *The Comparative*

41 MEISIG (1988), pp. 2, 6-7. Other smaller studies in which Pāli/Chinese comparison is employed in order to clarify specific teachings include: Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, "Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit: Zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung einer spirituellen Praxis des Buddhismus" *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 60 (1976), pp. 241-266; Johannes BRONKHORST, "Dharma and Abhidharma" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 48, part 2 (1985), pp. 305-320; Tilmann VETTER, "Zwei schwierige Stellen im Mahānidānasutta: Zur Qualität der Überlieferung im Pāli-Kanon" *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie* 38 (1994), pp. 137-160; CHOONG Mun-keat (Wei-keat), *The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism* (1995; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999).

42 Version 1.0, published by The Dhammakaya Foundation, Thailand, 1996. This CD-ROM is based entirely on the PTS edition.

43 Version 1.1, published by Vipassana Research Institute, India, 1997. This CD-ROM is based on the canon agreed on at the Sixth Council (Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana) held in Myanmar during 1954-1956.

44 See Bibliography.

45 All SA source references are given (in footnotes) to both Taishō and CSA.

46 Cf. CSA i, "RESA", p. 71.

Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas (1929),[47] and in FSA; they are adopted here as the most up-to-date, and with the recognition that the identification of "counterparts" is a task beset by serious methodological problems. For the Chinese SA there is a Japanese translation,[48] but no translation into any European language. The translated portions given in this study therefore probably represent the first attempt to make the contents of the Chinese SA accessible to the English-reading public.

In some cases the Pāli counterpart of an SA sutra is located in a nikāya other than SN, e.g. in MN or AN; and the reverse is also true. For that reason the source corpus occasionally extends beyond SA/SN.[49]

Fragmentary Sanskrit counterparts of SA/SN sutras, unearthed at Turfan and elsewhere and published by Chadrabhāl TRIPĀṬHĪ, Ernst WALDSCHMIDT and others, are not covered in this study, but are mentioned in footnotes. A full list of Sanskrit (and Tibetan) counterparts is given as Appendix 3. The Sanskrit equivalents of Chinese terms are shown in footnotes in some cases.

As mentioned above, the contents of SN/SA are grouped into saṃyuktas according to doctrinal subject matter. This provides a natural basis for this comparative study according to doctrinal topic: the chapter-headings broadly correspond to the saṃyukta titles (see below). For each of the main teachings thus identified, relevant passages from the two texts are examined, analysed, and commented upon. Broadly speaking, this entails four equally important tasks: presentation or description, analytical comparison, explanation, and classification. These processes are based firmly on the data without giving preference to either tradition (SN or SA). The emphasis is on distinguishing shared and unshared components. In the case of unshared components, some attempt is made to account for the differences in terms of sectarian doctrinal positions.

5. Structure of the study

Following this Introduction, the main body of the study is presented in seven chapters:

Chapter 1, "The Sūtra-aṅga portion of SA and SN", presents an overall picture of the distribution of the first three aṅgas, particularly the Sūtra-aṅga, in SA and SN.

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47 Published by Hajinkaku-shobō, Nagoya.
48 See Bibliography.
49 Cf. CSA i, "RESA", pp. 34, 38-39.

Chapter 2, "The Five Aggregates", presents a comparison of the main teachings contained in the Khandha Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart, the Yin Xiangying (陰相應) of SA.

The next four chapters do the same with successive topics, as follows:

Chapter 3, "The Sense Spheres", Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta/Ruchu Xiangying (入處相應);
Chapter 4, "Feeling", Vedanā Saṃyutta/Shou Xiangying (受相應);
Chapter 5, "The Realms of Nature", Dhātu Saṃyutta/Jie Xiangying (界相應);
Chapter 6, "Causal condition", Nidāna Saṃyutta/Yinyuan Xiangying (因緣相應).

Chapter 7, "The Path", compares the main teachings contained in the Mahā Vagga of SN and its counterpart the Dao-pin Song (道品誦) of SA. The topics, each of which has its own saṃyutta/xiangying, are the Noble Eightfold Way, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, and so on.[50]

Finally, the Conclusion reviews the findings, assesses their significance, and draws conclusions regarding the efficacy of the comparative method employed here.

50 The sequence of the topics for chapters 2 to 7 follows neither tradition (SN or SA).

Background to the Sūtra-aṅga having been briefly given in the Introduction, this chapter will go into the specifics, identifying just what is recognised as Sūtra-aṅga in SA and SN.

Discussion of the research whereby Yin Shun and others have reconstructed the original form of the Chinese SA and identified the distribution of the three aṅgas within it lies beyond the scope of this study. For the present purpose it will suffice to summarise the results of that research, and to provide an overview of the inferred distribution of the aṅgas in SA and SN. Doing this will incidentally also give an overall picture of the structure of the two texts, and thus provide the rationale for the sequence of topics adopted in the comparative study that follows. Detailed information is provided in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1, which show the distribution of the three aṅgas in SA and SN respectively. This chapter briefly explains those tables and surveys comparatively the distribution of the saṃyuktas within each of the three aṅgas in SA and SN together.

1. Distribution of the three aṅgas in SA and in SN

The extant Chinese SA in the Taishō Tripiṭaka[1] comprises fifty fascicles with 1362 discourses. Since it is in disorder as regards the original arrangement of its parts, and lacks two of the original fascicles, there is a need to display its underlying structure as reconstructed by Yin Shun. This is done in Table 1, parts (1) to (5) (see Appendix 1, pp. 243-247). In the first column of Table 1 are listed the fifty-one xiangying 相應 (saṃyuktas), grouped in five song 誦 (vargas, sections), as recognised in the Taishō edition. The second column shows the location of each xiangying in the Taishō edition in terms of fascicle numbers and discourse or sutra numbers. This reveals how the Taishō fascicles have been rearranged by Yin Shun in order to restore the original order (1, 10, 3, 2, 5 ...). It also shows that fascicles 23 and 25 ("discourses" 604 and 640-641) of the extant SA are not part of the prototype SA (their present content is from the 阿育王/無憂王經 Aśokāvadāna, and has nothing to do with SA). Column 3 provides the corresponding information for the new edition of SA in the Foguang Tripiṭaka (vols. 1-4). It presents the remaining forty-eight fascicles and their 1359 discourses. The Taishō discourse numbers are the ones used for

1 Vol. 2, No. 99, pp. 1-373.

reference in this study.[2] The "fascicle" (卷 juan) is a purely Chinese device for organising Buddhist texts; only the saṃyuktas reflect the original Indian system.[3] The structure can be summarised as follows:

(1) **Five Aggregates** Section (五陰誦Wuyin Song) containing four saṃyuktas (xiangying), 189 discourses
(2) **Six Sense Spheres** Section (六入處誦 Liuruchu Song) containing one saṃyukta, 131 discourses
(3) **Causal Condition** Section (雜因誦Zayin Song) containing fourteen saṃyuktas, 298 discourses
(4) **Path** Section (道品誦Dao-pin Song) containing twenty-one saṃyuktas, 431 discourses
(5) **Eight Assemblies** Section (八衆誦Bazhong Song)[4] containing eleven saṃyuktas, 310 discourses

Table 1 shows how the Saṃyuktas are classified according to the three aṅgas, Sūtra, Geya, and Vyākaraṇa. Vyākaraṇa is subdivided into two types, Spoken by Śrāvakas or Disciples (弟子所說) and Spoken by the Tathāgata or Buddha (如來所說).[5] The Sūtra-aṅga is contained in Sections (1) to (4); Geya comprises Section (5); and the two Vyākaraṇa components are attached to Sections (1), (3), and (4).[6] In the Taishō Tripiṭaka the Vyākaraṇa portion, Spoken by Śrāvakas, is marked off with the heading 弟子所說誦 (Dizi Suoshuo Song "Spoken by Śrāvakas Section");[7] the Spoken by the Tathāgata section is not so marked, but its distribution is inferred from the information given in *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*. The distribution of the aṅgas in SA is shown in column 4 of Table 1.

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2 According to CSA, the number of SA discourses is 13412; and according to *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*, it is 13444. These figures are very different from the Taishō and Foguang total. Yin Shun's calculation is based on various indications regarding the content of the texts. CSA i, "RESA", pp. 66-70. Cf. SAIGUSA Mitsuyoshi, "雑阿含經の經の数について" Zō Agon-kyō no kyō no kazu ni tsuite ["On the number of sutras in the Za Ahan-jing"], in his 初期仏教の思想 Shoki Bukkyō no Shisō *Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism* (Tōyō Tetsugaku Kenkyū-jo, Tokyo, 1978), pp. 645-669.

3 Cf. FSA i, pp. 9-12; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 45-52, 64; *Formation*, pp. 677-683.

4 八衆 = Skt. aṣṭau pariṣadaḥ (P. aṭṭha parisā).

5 The Skt. terms may be Śrāvaka-bhāṣitaḥ and Tathāgata-bhāṣitaḥ. Cf. HOSODA Noriaki, "トルファン将来木版刷梵文雑阿含經断簡" Torufan shōrai mokuhansatsu Bonbun Zatsu-agonkyō danken [Fragmentary wood-block manuscripts of the Sanskrit SA from Turfan], *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 37/2 (1989), p. 542.

6 *Formation*, pp. 697-701; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 24-29; CSA iii, pp. 373-766.

7 T 2, p. 126a. *Formation*, p. 678, note 6 and p. 681. CSA i, "RESA", pp. 41-45, 65-66.

Table 2 (pp. 248-251) provides comparable information for SN. It shows that SN comprises fifty-six saṃyuttas (Skt. saṃyukta), with a total of 2862 discourses.[8] The whole can be summarised as follows:

(1) **Verse** Section (Sagātha Vagga) containing eleven saṃyuttas, 271 discourses
(2) **Causal Condition** Section (Nidāna Vagga) containing ten saṃyuttas, 286 discourses
(3) **Aggregates** Section (Khandha Vagga) containing thirteen saṃyuttas, 715 discourses
(4) **Six Sense Spheres** Section (Saḷāyatana Vagga) containing ten saṃyuttas, 395 discourses
(5) **Great** Section (Mahā Vagga) containing twelve saṃyuttas, 1195 discourses

Regarding the distribution of the three aṅgas, the third column of Table 2 shows that Sutta (Skt. Sūtra) is located in Sections (Vaggas) (2) to (5); Geyya (Skt. Geya) comprises the whole of Section (1), together with 21. Bhikkhu Saṃyutta, which is in Section (2) (Nidāna Vagga);[9] and the two types of Veyyākaraṇa (Skt. Vyākaraṇa) (Sāvaka and Tathāgata) are scattered in Sections (2) to (5).

2. Distribution of saṃyuktas within each aṅga

In order to reveal more clearly the distribution of the saṃyuktas among the aṅgas, the arrangement of the saṃyuktas of SA and SN, aṅga by aṅga, is shown comparatively, in the following table, parts (a) to (c).[10] The numbers of the sections (誦, vagga) are indicated in brackets. The arrangement of the table is mainly based on SA.

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
8 According to Buddhaghosa, SN has 7762 discourses (*Samantapāsādikā*, 18: 9-10; *Formation*, p. 66; K. R. Norman, *Pāli Literature*, p. 50), a figure perhaps arrived at in a manner similar to that employed for SA in *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* and CSA. Cf. Saigusa, "On the number of suttas in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*", in *Principal Thoughts*, pp. 613-644. I follow the discourse numbers of the PTS edition. Most discourses in SN have titles not found in SA.

9 Regarding Geyya in Section 1, see *Formation*, pp. 696-697; CSA i, "RESA", p. 57.

10 CSA is edited in this way: Sūtra-aṅga in vols. 1 and 2, Geya and Vyākaraṇa in vol. 3. (CSA i, "RESA", p. 65).


Table of the distribution of saṃyuktas within each aṅga in SA and SN

(a) **Sūtra-aṅga:**[11]



11 Cf. *Formation*, pp. 686-688; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 55-56.

(b) **Geya-aṅga:**[12]



12 *Formation*, pp. 701-702; CSA i, "RESA", p. 56. The Sagātha-vagga of SN in the Pāli tradition is regarded by Buddhaghosa as Geyya-aṅga: "Sabbam pi sagāthakaṃ suttaṃ geyyan ti veditabbaṃ, visesena Saṃyuttake sakalo pi Sagāthāvaggo" (All the suttas containing verses should be known as Geyya, particularly the entire Sagātha-vagga in the Saṃyutta). *Papañcasūdanī*, vol. II, p. 106; *Samantapāsādikā*, vol. I, p. 28.

(c) **Vyākaraṇa-aṅga:**[13]

SA	SN
(6) Dizi Suoshuo (弟子所說)[14]	[Sāvaka][15]
- Shelifu (舍利弗) X.	- 38. Jambukhādaka S.
	- 39. Sāmaṇḍaka S.
	- 28. Sāriputta S.
- Muqianlian (目揵連) X.	- 40. Moggalāna S.
	- 19. Lakkhaṇa S.
- Analü (阿那律) X.	- 52. Anuruddha S.
- Dajiazhanyan (大迦旃延) X.	
- Anan (阿難) X.	
- Zhiduoluo (質多羅) X.	- 41. Citta S.
(7) Rulai Suoshuo (如來所說)[16]	[Tathāgata][17]
- Luotuo (羅陀) X.	- 23. Rādha S.
- Jian (見) X.	- 24. Diṭṭhi S.
- Duanzhi (斷知) X.	
- Tian (天) X.	- 32. Valāha S.
- Xiuzheng (修證) X.	- 34. Jhāna S.
	- 43. Asaṃkhata S.
	- 3. Abhisamaya S.
- Ru-jie-yin (入界陰) X.	- 25. Okkantika S.
	- 26. Uppāda S
	- 27. Kilesa S.
- Buhuaijing (不壞淨) X.	
- Dajiaxie (大迦葉) X.	- 16. Kassapa S.
- Juluozhu (聚落主) X.	- 42. Gāmaṇi S.
- Ma (馬) X.	

13 Cf. *Formation,* pp. 673-676, 697-701; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 24-29, 43, 56-57, 65-66. There are some mistakes in this part in *Formation,* pp. 699-700, according to CSA iii.

14 "Spoken by Śrāvakas or Disciples".

15 This heading is not in the text.

16 "Spoken by the Tathāgata".

17 This heading is not in the text.

- Mohenan (摩訶南) or Shishi (釋氏) X.	
- Wushi (無始) X. ———	-15. Anamatagga S.
- Pocuozhong-chujia (婆蹉種出家) X.	- 33. Vacchagotta S. - 44. Avyākata S.
- Waidao-chujia (外道出家) X.	
- Za (雜) X.	
- Piyu (譬喻) X. ———	- 20. Opamma S.
- Bing (病) X.	
- Yebao (業報) X.	
	- 17. Lābhasakkāra S.
	- 18. Rāhula S.
	- 29. Nāga S.
	- 30. Suppaṇṇa S.
	- 31. Gandhabbakāya S.
	- 37. Mātugāma S.
	- 53. Jhāna S.

As this table shows, the Sūtra-aṅga portion is closely similar in SA and SN, as regards both its content and its distribution among the four sections. There are only the following three differences:

(i) In SA, Di (諦) Xiangying is located in (3) Zayin Song (雜因誦), while in SN the corresponding 56. Sacca Saṃyutta is located in (5) Mahā Vagga.[18] For convenience, in this study Di Xiangying/Sacca Saṃyutta will be dealt with according to its position in SN (i.e. in Chapter 7).

(ii) In SA, Shou (受) Xiangying is located in (3) Zayin Song (雜因誦), whereas in SN the corresponding 36. Vedanā Saṃyutta is located in (4) Saḷāyatana Vagga.[19]

(iii) The Xue (學) Xiangying of SA, located in Dao-pin Song (道品誦), has no counterpart in SN. The sutras it contains do have Pāli counterparts; they are located in Tika-nipāta of AN (to be examined in Chapter 7).[20]

For the Geya-aṅga, in both SA and SN the component Saṃyuktas are all grouped together, with just one exception: in SN, 21. Bhikkhu Saṃyutta is located apart, in (2) Nidāna Vagga. Ten of the twelve discourses in 21.

18 On this, see *Formation*, pp. 688-689; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 55-56.

19 On this, see *Formation*, pp. 687-688; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 50, 56.

20 For comment on this, see *Formation*, p. 688; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 38-39, 55; CSA ii, p. 430.

Bhikkhu Saṃyutta of SN actually contain verses, indicating that this saṃyutta properly belongs in the Sagātha Vagga.[21]

For the Vyākaraṇa-aṅga (Śrāvaka and Tathāgatha), there are major differences between SA and SN, making it necessary to rearrange the SN Saṃyuttas in part (c) of the Table. How this situation should be interpreted historically is not clear.[22]

The overall picture of the distribution of the three aṅgas in SA and SN may be summarised as follows:

(1) Sūtra-aṅga: 4 sections; 16 saṃyuktas in SA, 15 in SN.
(2) Geya-aṅga: 1 section; 11 saṃyuktas in SA, 12 in SN.
(3) Vyākaraṇa-aṅga: 2 sections in SA, not grouped in SN; 24 saṃyuktas in SA, 29 in SN.

This comparative study deals only with the Sūtra-aṅga portion, which represents the doctrinal core of SA and SN.

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21 *Formation*, p. 701; CSA i, "RESA", p. 56.

22 Yin Shun suggests that historically the discourses of the Vyākaraṇa-aṅga were at first attached to, or subordinated to, the relevant Sūtra-aṅga sections, and that the gathering of them into saṃyuktas (xiangyings/saṃyuttas) grouped in a single section (誦 song/vagga) was a later development. *Formation* (pp. 700-701) and CSA i, "RESA" (pp. 32, 43, 56-57).

Chapter 2. The five aggregates

This chapter presents a comparison of the Khandha Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart Yin Xiangying (陰相應)[1] of SA. The Pāli text comprises the 158 discourses of the 22nd Saṃyutta of SN; the Chinese comprises the 112 discourses of fascicles 1, 10, 3, 2, and 5 of SA.[2]

The term *khandha* (translated 陰 in SA, and 蘊 in some other texts) is commonly translated "aggregate", less often "group", "mass", "heap", "component". The Khandha Saṃyutta/Yin Xiangying (Aggregate-Connected or Connected with Aggregates) deals with the well-known set of pañcakkhandhā (五陰), the "five aggregates":[3]

1. The aggregate of material form (rūpa-khandha 色陰)
2. The aggregate of feeling (vedanā-khandha 受陰)
3. The aggregate of perception (saññā-khandha 想陰)
4. The aggregate of activities (saṃkhārā-khandha 行陰)
5. The aggregate of consciousness (viññāṇa-khandha 識陰)

The contents of this section of SN/SA lend themselves to investigation under nine headings:

1. definitions of the *five aggregates*;
2. the *five aggregates* and the *five aggregates with attachment*;
3. the notion of fully knowing *the five aggregates*, including the *arising*, the *cessation*, the *way* leading to the *cessation*, the *flavour*, the *danger*, and the *giving up* of *the five aggregates*;
4. the relationship between *the four abodes of consciousness* and *the five aggregates*;
5. the notion of fully seeing *the five aggregates*;
6 to 8. the teachings of *the middle way*, of *not-self* and *karmic effect*, and of the difference between the Buddha and *arhants* – all as they relate to the *five aggregates*; and
9. evidence of sectarian influence in teachings relating to the *five aggregates*.

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1 Skt. Skandha Saṃyukta.

2 SN iii, pp. 1-188. T 2, pp. 1-22, 29-37, 64-72; CSA i, pp. 1-212. On the discourses and their locations, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 243, 249.

3 The exact meanings of the terms *rūpa* etc. are uncertain. The English renderings adopted here are provisional.

1. Definitions of the five aggregates

For definitions of the *five aggregates* (or the *five aggregates with attachment*) two rather different accounts are available. The first account is exemplified in SN 22. 56-57 and their counterparts SA 41-42, the second in SN 22. 79 and its counterpart SA 46. How these two explain the five will now be examined, aggregate by aggregate.

1. The *aggregate of material form* (rūpa 色)

According to the first account (both SN and SA), "material form" (rūpa 色) refers to the *four great elements* (cattāro mahābhūtā 四大) and to *material form derived from the four great elements* (catunnaṃ mahābhūtānam upādāya rūpaṃ 四大[所]造色).[4] This statement is not accompanied by any explanation of what the *four great elements* are. (Elsewhere, however, the four are frequently listed as the elements (dhātu 界) of solidity/earth (paṭhavī 地), fluidity/water (āpo 水), heat/fire (tejo 火), and motion/air (vāyo 風).)[5]

The second account in its Pāli version offers a folk etymology of "rūpa" (*material form*):[6]

> Why, bhiksus, do you call it *material form* (rūpa). One is molested (ruppati); this is why it is called *material form*. By what is one molested? One is molested by cold and heat, by hunger and thirst, by touch of gnats, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and snakes. One is molested, bhiksus, that is why it is called *material form*.

The corresponding SA version differs only slightly in detail and is even less coherent than the above English rendering, through total loss of the pun (rūpa/ruppati):[7]

> If it can be molested, broken (可閡 可分), this is called the *aggregate of material form with attachment*. It refers to what is hindered (所礙), whether by touch of hand, stone, cane, or knife; of cold or warmth; of thirst or hunger; of mosquitoes, gnats or all poisonous insects; of wind or rain. This is called molested by touch (觸 閡).

4 SN 22. 56-57 = SA 41-42: SN iii, pp. 59, 62; T 2, pp. 9b, 10a (CSA i, pp. 149, 152).
5 E.g. SN 35. 197 = SA 1172: SN iv, p. 174; T 2, p. 313c (CSA i, p. 334).
6 SN iii, p. 86.
7 T 2, p. 11b (CSA i, p. 158).

> Thus, molestation (閡) is the *aggregate of material form with attachment.*

2. The *aggregate of feeling* (vedanā 受)

For feeling, the first account, identical in the two versions, lists *six feelings*, or *six "bodies" of feeling* (cha vedanā-kāyā 六受身), namely:[8]

feeling born of eye-contact (cakkhu-samphassajā vedanā 眼觸生受)
feeling born of ear-contact (sota-samphassajā vedanā 耳觸生受)
feeling born of nose-contact (ghāna-samphassajā vedanā 鼻觸生受)
feeling born of tongue-contact (jivhā-samphassajā vedanā 舌觸生受)
feeling born of body-contact (kāya-samphassajā vedanā 身觸生受)
feeling born of mind-contact (mano-samphassajā vedanā 意觸生受)

In the second account, the SN version explains *feeling* thus:[9]

> One experiences (vediyati or vedayati), bhiksus, that is why it is called feeling (vedanā). What does one experience? One experiences pleasant (sukhaṃ), one experiences unpleasant (dukkhaṃ), one experiences neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant (adukkha-asukhaṃ). One experiences, bhiksus, that is why it is called feeling.

Its SA counterpart states:[10]

> All characteristics of experience (諸覺相) are the *aggregate of feeling with attachment*. What does one experience? One experiences unpleasant, one experiences pleasant, one experiences neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant. That is why the characteristics of experience are called the *aggregate of feeling with attachment*.

Thus, the two traditions appear to agree in identifying *feeling* with pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral experience in each of the six sense modes.

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8 SN 22. 56-57 = SA 41-42: SN iii, pp. 60, 63; T 2, pp. 9b, 10a (CSA i, pp. 149-150, 152).
9 SN iii, pp. 86-87.
10 T 2, p. 11c (CSA i, p. 158).

3. The *aggregate of perception* (saññā 想)

The two versions of the first account agree in identifying this with *six perceptions* or *six bodies of perception* (cha saññā-kāyā 六想身), though they differ in their terminology, as follows.[11]

SN	SA
perception of [visible] forms (rūpa-saññā)	perception born of eye-contact (眼觸生想)
perception of sounds (sadda-saññā)	perception born of ear-contact (耳觸生想)
perception of odours (gandha-saññā)	perception born of nose-contact (鼻觸生想)
perception of tastes (rasa-saññā)	perception born of tongue-contact (舌觸生想)
perception of tangibles (phoṭṭhabba-saññā)	perception born of body-contact (身觸生想)
perception of [mental] objects (dhamma-saññā)	mind-contact perception (意觸生想)

In the second account, the SN version explains *perception* thus:[12]

> One perceives (sañjānāti), bhiksus, that is why it is called perception (saññā). What does one perceive? One perceives green, yellow, red, or white. One perceives, bhiksus, that is why it is called perception.

Its SA counterpart reads:[13]

> All perceptions are the *aggregate of perception with attachment*. What perceptions? Few perceptions, many perceptions, countless perceptions, perception of nothingness as "there is nothing". That is why it is called the *aggregate of perception with attachment*.

Here SN explains concretely that one perceives (or recognises) the colour green, yellow, red, or white. This appears incomplete as an explanation, since it covers only visual perception; however, it provides a clearer picture

11 SN 22. 56-57 = SA 41-42: SN iii, pp. 60, 63; T 2, pp. 9b-c, 10b (CSA i, pp. 150, 152).
12 SN iii, p. 87.
13 T 2, p. 11c (CSA i, p. 158).

than the SA version, which actually gives little clue to the nature of *perception*.

4. The *aggregate of activities* (saṅkhārā 行)

The two versions of the first account identify this aggregate with *six bodies of volition* (cha cetanā-kāyā 六思身); and as with the *aggregate of perception*, they differ in terminology:[14]

SN	SA
volition of [visible] forms (rūpa-sañcetanā)	volition born of eye-contact (眼觸生思)
volition of sounds (sadda-sañcetanā)	volition born of ear-contact (耳觸生思)
volition of odours (gandha-sañcetanā)	volition born of nose-contact (鼻觸生思)
volition of tastes (rasa-sañcetanā)	volition born of tongue-contact (舌觸生思)
volition of tangibles (phoṭṭhabba-sañcetanā)	volition born of body-contact (身觸生思)
volition of [mental] objects (dhamma-sañcetanā)	volition born of mind-contact (意觸生思)

In the second account, the SN version explains *saṅkhārā* thus:[15]

> And why, bhiksus, should one say *activities* (or "compounds", saṅkhārā)? They compose the compounded (saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti), bhiksus, that is why they are called *activities*. And what is the compounded that they compose? They compose the compounded material form of materiality (rūpaṃ rūpattāya); they compose the compounded feeling of feelingness (vedanaṃ vedanattāya); they compose the compounded perception of perceptivity (saññaṃ saññattāya); they compose the compounded activities of activity (saṅkhāre saṅkhārattāya); they compose the compounded consciousness of consciousness-hood (viññāṇaṃ viññāṇattāya). They compose the compounded, bhiksus, that is why they are called *activities*.

The SA version states:[16]

14 SN 22. 56-57 = SA 41-42: SN iii, pp. 60, 63; T 2, pp. 9c, 10b (CSA i, pp. 150, 153).
15 SN iii, p. 87.

> The characteristic of composing (爲作相) is the *aggregate of activities with attachment*. What do they compose? They compose material form; they compose feeling, perception, activities, consciousness. That is why the characteristics of composing are the *aggregate of activities with attachment*.

Thus, the two versions are closely similar – and equally cryptic – on the subject of the *activities*.

5. The *aggregate of consciousness* (viññāṇa 識)

Both versions of the first account equate this with *six bodies of consciousness* (cha viññāṇa-kāyā 六識身), as follows:[17]

eye-consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇa 眼識)
ear-consciousness (sota-viññāṇa 耳識)
nose-consciousness (ghāna-viññāṇa 鼻識)
tongue-consciousness (jivha-viññāṇa 舌識)
body-consciousness (kāya-viññāṇa 身識)
mind-consciousness (mano-viññāṇa 意識)

In the second account, the SN version explains *consciousness* thus:[18]

> One distinguishes (vijānāti), bhiksus, that is why it is called consciousness (viññāṇa). What does one distinguish? One distinguishes sour or bitter, acrid or sweet, alkaline or non-alkaline, saline or non-saline. One distinguishes, bhiksus, that is why it is called consciousness.

Its SA counterpart states:[19]

> The characteristic of distinguishing (別知相) is the *aggregate of consciousness with attachment*. What is one conscious of (識)? One is conscious of visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tangibles, mental objects. That is why it is called the *aggregate of consciousness with attachment*.

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16 T 2, p. 11c (CSA i, p. 158).
17 SN 22. 56-57 = SA 41-42: SN iii, pp. 61, 64; T 2, pp. 9c, 10b-c (CSA i, pp. 150, 153).
18 SN iii, p. 87.
19 T 2, p. 11c (CSA i, p. 158).

The word "distinguishes" (or "is conscious of", vijānāti) in SN is similar in meaning to "characteristic of distinguishing" and "is conscious of" in SA. Thus, although the SN version of the second account mentions only flavours as the objects, the two versions agree in teaching that *consciousness* is a sort of becoming aware of objects.

This section has shown the two versions largely in agreement in defining the *five aggregates* in two different ways: (1) by listing the components of each aggregate, and (2) by giving a mainly etymological derivation of each of the five terms.

2. The "five aggregates" and the "five aggregates with attachment"

Both traditions (SN and SA) use both the term *five aggregates* (pañcakkhandhā 五陰) and the term *five aggregates with* (or *of*) *attachment* (pañcupādānakkhandhā = pañca-upādāna-khandhā 五受陰=五取陰). This section will investigate how these two terms are distinguished.

The distinction between the *five aggregates* (pañcakkhandhā) and the *five aggregates with attachment* (pañcupādānakkhandhā) is clearly made in SN 22. 48 and its counterpart SA 55. The Pāli version quotes the Buddha as saying:[20]

> I will teach you, bhiksus, the *five aggregates* and the *five aggregates with attachment*. Do you listen to it!
>
> What, bhiksus, are the *five aggregates*? Every material form in the past, future, or present, inward or outward, gross or subtle, inferior or excellent, far or near, is called the *aggregate of material form*; every feeling ...; every perception ...; all activities ...; every consciousness in the past, future, or present, inward or outward, gross or subtle, inferior or excellent, far or near, is called the *aggregate of consciousness*. These, bhiksus, are called the *five aggregates*.
>
> And what, bhiksus, are the *five aggregates with attachment*? Every material form in the past, future, or present, ... far or near, that is accompanied by influxes (sāsava), associated with attachment (upādāniya), this is called the *aggregate of material form with attachment*; every feeling ...; every perception ...; all activities ...;

20 SN iii, pp. 47-48.

> every consciousness in the past, future, or present, ... far or near, that is accompanied by influxes, associated with attachment, this is called the *aggregate of consciousness with attachment*. These, bhiksus, are called the *five aggregates with attachment*.

The corresponding SA 55 has the Buddha say:[21]

> I will teach you what are the *aggregates* and what are the *aggregates with attachment*.
>
> What are the *aggregates*? All material form in the past, future, or present, inward or outward, gross or subtle, excellent or inferior, far or near, is all collectively called the *aggregate of material form*; and similarly, feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness: all are collectively called the *aggregate of feeling*, *of perception*, *of activities*, and *of consciousness*. These are called the *aggregates*.
>
> What are the *aggregates with attachment*? If material form is accompanied by influxes, is [associated with] attachment; if that form, in the past, future, or present, gives rise to sensual desire, anger, ignorance, and various other distressing mental phenomena; and similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness; these are called the *aggregates with attachment*.

Thus, SN 22. 48 and SA 55 are almost identical in explaining the (*five*) *aggregates*, but differ slightly in explaining the (*five*) *aggregates with attachment*. In its explanation of the *aggregates with attachment* the SA version adds the expression: "... gives rise to sensual desire, anger, ignorance, and various other distressing mental phenomena". This unshared expression does not, however, represent a significant difference, since the items named are identical with the "influxes". The two versions are, therefore, essentially in agreement about the distinction between the *five aggregates* and the *five aggregates with attachment*.

Regarding this distinction, further explanation is provided in SN 22. 82 and its counterpart SA 58. The Pāli version reads:[22]

21 T 2, p. 13b (CSA i, p. 169).

22 SN iii, pp. 100-101.

> ... [A certain bhiksu asked:] Venerable Sir, in what do these *five aggregates with attachment* have their root? (kiṃmūlakā)
>
> [The Buddha replied:] Bhiksu, these *five aggregates with attachment* have their root in *excitement/impulse* (chanda).
>
> Venerable Sir, is it that the *five aggregates with attachment* are attachment (upādāna), or is attachment something apart from the *five aggregates with attachment*?
>
> No indeed, bhiksu, those *five aggregates with attachment* are not attachment, nor yet is attachment something apart from those *five aggregates with attachment*. But where there is *exciting/impulsive desire* (chandarāga), there is attachment.
>
> ... The bhiksu put another question: Venerable Sir, may it be that in the *five aggregates with attachment* there is variety of exciting desire (chandarāga-vemattatā).
>
> The Blessed One replied: It may be so, bhiksu. Herein, bhiksu, one thinks thus: "May I have such a material form in future time; may I have such feeling, such perception, such activities, such consciousness in future time". In this way, bhiksu, in the *five aggregates with attachment* there may be variety of exciting desire.

The corresponding SA 58 records the conversation thus:[23]

> ... World Honoured One, in what do these *five aggregates with attachment* have their root, their arising, their birth, their occurrence?
>
> The Buddha replied: These *five aggregates with attachment* have their root in *excitement/impulse* (欲), their arising in excitement, their birth in excitement, their occurrence in excitement.
>
> ... World Honoured One, is it that the *aggregates* are attachment, or are the *five aggregates* distinct from attachment?

23 T 2, p. 14b (CSA i, pp. 175, 178 note 2).

> The Buddha replied: The *five aggregates* are not attachment, nor yet are the *five aggregates* different from attachment. But where there is *exciting/impulsive desire* (欲 貪), there are the *five aggregates with attachment.*
>
> ... World Honoured One, are two *aggregates* connected?
>
> The Buddha replied: Yes, Yes. Suppose a person thinks thus: May I in future time have such a material form, such feeling, such perception, such activities, such consciousness. This, bhiksu, is called *aggregate* and *aggregate* being connected.

The two versions have the following in common:

1. The root from which the *five aggregates with attachment* arise is *exciting/impulsive desire.*
2. *Attachment* is neither the *five aggregates* themselves, nor something apart from or different from the *five aggregates*; where there is *exciting desire*, there is *attachment.*

The two versions also differ significantly. In SN the monk asks, "may it be that in the *five aggregates with attachment* there is variety of *exciting desire*?", whereas in SA he asks, "are two *aggregates* connected?". The questions appear different; but in both versions the Buddha answers "yes", and gives the same reason: because one thinks to have the *five aggregates* be such or such in future time. The significance of the difference in the question is not apparent.

The above examination of the terms, *five aggregates* (or simply *aggregates*) and *five aggregates with attachment* has found the two versions agreeing that the distinction depends on whether or not each of the five is accompanied by the influxes and associated with attachment. The two versions also agree that *attachment* is present wherever there is *exciting* or *impulsive desire.*

3. Knowing things as they really are

This section will examine the notion of *fully knowing* the *five aggregates* (or the *five aggregates with attachment*) as presented in the two versions.

The two versions agree that the ending of suffering requires that one *knows* (jānāti) and *sees* (passati) *things as they really are* (yathābhūtaṃ). For example, SN 22. 101 reports the Buddha as saying:[24]

> By knowing, by seeing, bhiksus, I declare, is the destruction (or extinction, khayaṃ) of the influxes (āsavānaṃ), not by not knowing, not by not seeing.

Its counterpart SA 263 has almost the same:[25]

> Then the Buddha said to the bhiksus: By knowing and seeing I attained the extinction of the influxes (漏盡), not by not knowing and not seeing.

What are the things that one has to know and see as they really are? SN 22. 57 and its counterpart SA 42 provide the following answer:[26]

> ... Bhiksus, a bhiksu fully knows (pajānāti 如實知) material form (rūpa 色), the arising (samudaya 集) of material form, the cessation (nirodha 滅) of material form, the way (paṭipadā 道跡) leading to the cessation of material form, the flavour (assāda 味) of material form, the danger (ādīnava 患) of material form, and the giving up (nissaraṇa 離) of material form [and similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness].

This indicates that to achieve destruction of the influxes one must fully know and see seven things: (1) the five aggregates, (2) the arising of the five aggregates, (3) the cessation of the five aggregates, (4) the way leading to the cessation of the five aggregates, (5) the flavour of the five aggregates, (6) the danger of the five aggregates, and (7) the giving up of the five aggregates.

However, there also exist other accounts of what one has to know and see as they really are. The following are examples:

24 SN iii, p. 152.
25 T 2, p. 67a (CSA i, p. 58).
26 SN iii, p. 62; T 2, p. 10a (CSA i, pp. 151-152). Cf. Chapter 3, p. 78.

I. Know two things:
– (1) the arising of the five aggregates (or of the personality (the "being-group", sak-kāya = the five aggregates with attachment)), and (2) the cessation of the five aggregates.[27]

II. Know three things:
– (1) the five aggregates, (2) the arising of the five aggregates, and (3) the cessation of the five aggregates.[28]
– (1) the flavour of the five aggregates, (2) the danger of the five aggregates, and (3) the giving up of the five aggregates.[29]

III. Know four things:
– (1) the five aggregates (or the personality (sak-kāya), or suffering (dukkha = the five aggregates with attachment)), (2) the arising of the five aggregates, (3) the cessation of the five aggregates, and (4) the way leading to the cessation of the five aggregates.[30]

IV. Know five things:
– (1) the arising of the five aggregates, (2) the cessation of the five aggregates, (3) the flavour of the five aggregates, (4) the danger of the five aggregates, and (5) the giving up of the five aggregates.[31]
– (1) the five aggregates, (2) the arising of the five aggregates, (3) the flavour of the five aggregates, (4) the danger of the five aggregates, and (5) the giving up of the five aggregates.[32]

V. Know six things:
– (1) the five aggregates, (2) the arising of the five aggregates, (3) the cessation of the five aggregates, (4) the flavour of the five aggregates, (5)

27 SN 22. 5-6, 44, 126-128: SN iii, pp. 13-15, 44, 171-173; SA 69: T 2, p. 18a (CSA i, p. 112).
28 SN 22. 89, 101, 102: SN iii, pp. 130-131, 152-153, 157; SA 59, 65-68, 70, 103: T 2, pp. 15b, 17a-18a, 18b, 30c (CSA i, pp. 88-89, 107-110, 113, 181-182).
29 SN 22. 26-28, 73, 107, 129, 133: SN iii, pp. 27-31, 81, 160, 173, 175 (not in SA).
30 SN 22. 50, 56, 103-105, 113-114, 135: SN iii, pp. 50, 59, 157-159, 162-163, 176-177; SA 31, 71, 257, 263: T 2, pp. 6c, 18b-c, 64c-65a (CSA i, pp. 41, 114-116, 46).
31 SN 22. 74-75, 108-110, 131-132, 134: SN iii, pp. 82, 160-161, 174, 176; SA 53: T 2, pp. 12c-13a (CSA i, p. 166).
32 SA 41: T 2, p. 9b (CSA i, p. 149) (not in SN).

the danger of the five aggregates, and (6) the giving up of the five aggregates.[33]

VI. Know seven things:
– (1) the five aggregates, (2) the arising of the five aggregates, (3) the cessation of the five aggregates, (4) the way leading to the cessation of the five aggregates, (5) the flavour of the five aggregates, (6) the danger of the five aggregates, and (7) the giving up of the five aggregates.[34]

These six categories are shown in the following table:

Knowing the five aggregates in different formulations

1.	5 aggregates		•		•		•	•	•
2.	arising	•	•		•	•	•	•	•
3.	cessation	•	•		•	•		•	•
4.	way				•				•
5.	flavour			•		•	•	•	•
6.	danger			•		•	•	•	•
7.	giving up			•		•	•	•	•

In all these formulations both versions refer indiscriminately to the *five aggregates* or the *five aggregates with attachment*. The nature of the seven items listed above will now be examined, under two groupings: 3.1. The five aggregates, their arising, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation; 3.2. The flavour, the danger, and the giving up of the five aggregates.

3.1. The five aggregates, their arising, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation

The *five aggregates* themselves have already been examined (section 1). We now go on to investigate the *arising* of the *five aggregates*, their *cessation*, and the *way leading to* their *cessation* – the second to fourth of the seven things that one should "fully know". These three teachings are naturally closely linked. The two versions discuss them in terms of the causes and

33 SA 32, 74, 258, 266-268: T 2, pp. 7a, 19b, 65a, 69b-70a (CSA i, pp. 42, 121, 46, 68-73) (not in SN).

34 SN 22. 57: SN iii, p. 62; SA 42: T 2, p. 10a (CSA i, pp. 151-152).

conditions responsible for the coming into existence or not coming into existence of the *five aggregates* (or the *five aggregates with attachment*). The following will summarise the available accounts in eight sub-groupings.

(1) In SN 22. 82 and its counterpart SA 58, the Buddha states the cause (hetu 因) and condition (paccayo 緣) for the designation (paññāpanāya) or name (名) of the *five aggregates*, thus:[35]

> The four great elements are the cause and condition for the designation/name of the aggregate of material form. Contact (phassa 觸) is the cause and condition for the designation of the aggregates of feeling, perception, and activities. Name-and-material form (nāma-rūpa 名 色) is the cause and condition for the designation/name of the aggregate of consciousness.

Thus, the two versions agree in identifying three causes/conditions for the coming into existence of the *five aggregates*, as shown (the arrow sign denotes the causal or conditional relationship):

	The *five aggregates*:
the *four great elements* ----→	material form
contact ----------------------→	feeling, perception, activities
name-and-material form ---→	consciousness

In the previous section we saw material form equated with the four great elements themselves, and as derived from the four great elements. The latter statement appears to agree with the present identification of the four great elements as the cause and condition of material form. It is therefore only in respect of the remaining four aggregates that the quoted statement provides new information. That information is confirmed and elaborated on elsewhere in the two versions.

(2) Regarding the arising (samudaya 集) of the five aggregates, SN 22. 57 and its counterpart SA 42 similarly state in common that "from the arising of *contact* (phassa-samudayā) is the arising of *feeling* (vedanā-samudayo), *perception* (saññā-samudayo), and *activities* (saṅkhāra-samudayo)"; and "from the arising of name-and-material form (nāmarūpa-

35 SN iii, p. 101; T 2, p. 14c (CSA i, pp. 175-176).

samudayā) is the arising of consciousness (viññāṇa-samudayo)";[36] however, they differ regarding the arising of material form. The SN version says: "from the arising of *nutriment* (āhāra-samudayā) is the arising of material form (rūpa-samudayo)", while the SA says: "*delight and desire* (喜愛 or 愛喜)[37] in material form is the arising of material form":[38]

	The *five aggregates*:
nutriment (SN) or *delight and desire* (SA) --→	material form
contact ---------------------→	feeling, perception, activities
name-and-material form --→	consciousness

Regarding the cessation (nirodha 滅) of the five aggregates, the two versions describe it as just the opposite or negation of the *arising*.[39] Thus, the SN version states: "from the *cessation of nutriment* (āhāra-nirodhā) is the *cessation of material form* (rūpa-nirodho)"; "from the *cessation of contact* (phassa-nirodhā) is the *cessation of feeling, perception,* and *activities*"; "from the *cessation of name-and-material form* (nāmarūpa-nirodhā) is the *cessation of consciousness*". The corresponding SA version states the same, except that for material form it has: "from the *cessation of delight and desire* is the *cessation of material form*".

Both versions state that the way (paṭipadā 道跡)[40] leading to the cessation of each of the five aggregates is the noble eightfold way.[41]

Regarding *nutriment* (āhāra) in the SN version, no explanation is given. In other contexts, āhāra most commonly means simply food for maintaining the body (*material form*) of living beings. On this understanding, the

36 SN iii, pp. 63-64; T 2, p. 10a-c (CSA i, pp. 152-153). See also SN 22. 56 = SA 41: SN iii, pp. 60-61; T 2, p. 9b-c (CSA i, pp. 149-150).

37 Skt. nandi-rāga.

38 SN iii, p. 62; T 2, p. 10a (CSA i, p. 152). See also SN 22. 56 = SA 41: SN iii, p. 59; T 2, p. 9b (CSA i, p. 149), and SA 59: T 2, p. 15b (CSA i, p. 89), which has no SN counterpart.

39 SN iii, pp. 62-64; T 2, p. 10a (CSA i, p. 152). See also SN 22. 56: SN iii, pp. 59-61 (whose counterpart SA 41does not mention this teaching: T 2, p. 9b; CSA i, p. 149).

40 SN iii, pp. 62-65; T 2, p. 10a-c (CSA i, pp. 152-153). See also SN 22. 56: SN iii, p. 59 (whose counterpart SA 41 does not mention this teaching: T 2, p. 9b; CSA i, p. 149). Cf. SN 22. 84 = SA 271: SN iii, p. 109; T 2, p. 71c (CSA i, p. 81).

41 Regarding the contents of the noble eightfold way between SN and SA, see Chapter 7, The path.

statement that the arising of material form (the body) depends on food is compatible with the statement that it depends on the four great elements. Both statements appear, however, to conflict with the statement given in the SA counterpart that the arising of material form is due to delight and desire in material form. This matter will be discussed further in Chapter 6 under the heading "Nutriments".

The term *name-and-material form* (nāma-rūpa) is also not explained in either version. This too will be discussed in Chapter 6.

(3) The arising and the cessation of *craving* (taṇhā) is also identified as the cause for the arising and the cessation of the *five aggregates with attachment.*

For example, SN 22. 103 and 105, after equating the totality (anta) of the personality (sakkāya) with the *five aggregates with attachment*, go on to say:[42]

> And what, bhiksus, is the totality of the arising of the personality (sakkāya-samudaya)? It is just that *craving* (taṇhā), which leads to further becoming, accompanied by *delight and desire* (nandi-rāga), finding delight (abhinandinī) in this or that – that is to say, craving for sensual pleasure (kāma-taṇhā), craving for existence (or becoming, bhava-taṇhā), craving for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā). This, bhiksus, is called the totality of the arising of the personality.
>
> And what, bhiksus, is the totality of the cessation of the personality (sakkāya-nirodha)? It is complete fading away and cessation (asesa-virāga-nirodho) of that *craving,* abandonment (cāgo) of it, renunciation (paṭinissaggo) of it, liberation (mutti) from it, non-attachment (anālayo) to it. This, bhiksus, is called the totality of the cessation of the personality.

The corresponding SA 70 and 71 say almost the same, but without specifying the three kinds of craving (craving for sensual pleasure, existence, and non-existence):[43]

> What is the totality[44] of the arising of the personality (有身集邊)? It is *attachment* (受)[45] and *craving* (愛), which leads to further

42 SN iii, pp. 158-159. SN 22. 105 omits "totality" (anta) throughout.
43 T 2, p. 18b-c (CSA i, pp. 113-114 and FSA i, p. 116).
44 SA 71 (= SN 22. 105) omits "totality" (邊) throughout.
45 SA 71 omits "attachment" here and in the next paragraph.

> becoming, accompanied by *delight and desire* (貪喜), finding delight (樂著) in this or that. This is called the totality of the arising of the personality.
>
> What is the totality of the cessation of the personality (有身滅邊)? It is the complete extinction, ending, fading away, cessation, calming of that *attachment* and *craving,* which leads to further becoming, accompanied by delight and desire, finding delight in this or that. This is called the totality of the cessation of the personality.

Regarding the way leading to cessation, SN 22. 103, 105 and SA 71, but not SA 70, state it is the noble eightfold way.[46]

Thus, the two versions here state in common that the *five aggregates with attachment* are the [*totality*] of the *personality*; that this arises from "*craving*, which leads to further becoming, accompanied by *delight and desire*, finding delight in this or that"; and that it ceases with the cessation of that *craving*, by the practice of the noble eightfold way.

A similar teaching is found in SN 22. 104, which has no SA counterpart. This discourse equates the *five aggregates with attachment* with *suffering* (dukkha); then it goes on to say that the arising of suffering is *craving*, ... and so on as before. The formulation is as in the Four Noble Truths.[47]

(4) A teaching resembling that of *arising by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppāda) is found in SN 22. 5-6 and their counterpart, SA 65. The SN version states:[48]

> And what, bhiksus, is the *arising* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*?
>
> Herein, bhiksus, one rejoices (abhinandati), one welcomes (abhivadati), one remains attached (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati). In what does one rejoice, what does one welcome, to what does one remain attached?
>
> One rejoices in *material form* (*feeling*, *perception*, *activities*, *consciousness*), one welcomes *material form* (*feeling* ...), one remains attached to *material form* (*feeling* ...). In one who rejoices in,

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46 SN iii, pp. 158-159; T 2, p. 18c (CSA i, p. 114).
47 SN iii, pp. 158-159.
48 SN iii, p. 14.

> welcomes, and remains attached to *material form* (*feeling* ...) there arises ***delight*** (nandi). That *delight* in *material form* (*feeling* ...) is ***attachment*** (upādāna). Conditioned by that attachment is *becoming*. Conditioned by becoming is *birth*. Conditioned by birth, *ageing-and-death, grief, lamentation, pain, depression and despair* together come to exist. Thus is *the arising of this whole mass of suffering.* ...
>
> Such, bhiksus, is the *arising* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*.
>
> And what, bhiksus, is the *passing away* (attha-gama) of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*?
>
> Herein, bhiksus, one does not rejoice (nābhinandati), one does not welcome (nābhivadati); not having attached, one remains (nājjhosāya tiṭṭhati). In what does one not rejoice, what does one not welcome; not having attached to what does one remain?
>
> In material form (feeling ...) one does not rejoice; material form (feeling ...) one does not welcome; not having attached to material form (feeling ...), one remains. One who does not rejoice in, one who does not welcome, one who remains not having attached to that material form (feeling ...) does not give rise to ***delight*** (nandi). From the cessation (nirodhā) of that delight is the cessation of ***attachment*** (upādāna). From the cessation of attachment is the cessation of becoming, ... and so forth. Thus is *the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.*

The corresponding SA 65 differs significantly. It says:[49]

> What is the *arising* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*?
>
> The ignorant untaught ordinary person, with regard to unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral feelings, does not observe as they really are the *arising* of *feeling*, the *ceasing* of *feeling*, the *flavour* of *feeling*, the *danger* of *feeling*, the *giving up* of *feeling*. Because he does not observe things as they really are, he finds ***delight*** in feeling and

49 T 2, p. 17a-b (CSA i, p. 107).

generates ***attachment*** (於受樂著生取); conditioned by attachment is *becoming*; conditioned by becoming is *birth*; conditioned by birth are *ageing-sickness-and-death, grief, lamentation, affliction, pain*. Thus is *the arising and generation of the whole mass of suffering*. This is called the *arising* of *material form*; this is called the *arising* of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*.

What is the *cessation* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*?

The well-taught noble disciple, with regard to unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral feelings, observes as they really are the *arising* of *feeling*, the *ceasing* of *feeling*, the *flavour* of *feeling*, the *danger* of *feeling*, the *giving up* of *feeling*. Because he observes things as they really are, he ceases *finding **delight*** in feeling (於受樂著滅); from the cessation of *finding* [*delight*] is the cessation of ***attachment***; from the cessation of attachment is the cessation of becoming; from the cessation of becoming is the cessation of birth; from the cessation of birth is the cessation of ageing-sickness-and-death, grief, lamentation, affliction, pain. Thus is *the cessation of the whole mass of suffering*. This is called the *cessation* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*.

The wording of the two versions is not the same, as shown in the following comparison (based on the arising mode):

SN	SA
1. Rejoicing, welcoming, remaining attached to material form, feeling, perception, activities, consciousness.	1. Not seeing the *arising, ceasing, flavour, danger*, and *giving up of feeling* (unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral).
2. → delight, attachment.	2. → delight, attachment.
3. → becoming.	3. → becoming.
4. → birth.	4. → birth.
5. → ageing-and-death, grief, lamentation, pain, depression and despair.	5. → ageing-sickness-and-death, grief, lamentation, affliction and pain.

The two differ in the first item, explaining the arising of *delight* and *attachment*. The SN version attributes the arising of delight to one's rejoicing in material form, feeling, etc. – i.e. in all five aggregates. The SA version attributes it to one's failure to recognise certain characteristics of feeling – i.e. of just one aggregate. The resulting *delight* (nandi 樂) is clearly connected with *craving* (taṇhā 愛) and *desire* (rāga 喜), because, as seen in the same segments quoted earlier,[50] *craving*, which leads to further becoming, is described as "accompanied by *delight and desire* (nandi-rāga)", and as "*finding delight* (abhinandinī) in this or that". Consequently, we infer that the *delight* of the present segment is identical with *craving*. There is, therefore, agreement that the arising of *delight* or *craving* is the main root for *the arising of suffering*.

The discourses being examined here show a connection between the *five aggregates* and *arising by causal condition* (paṭiccasamuppāda).[51] Both versions begin by asking what is the arising and the cessation of the five aggregates, but in answer they give an abbreviated version of the teaching on *arising by causal condition*, which explains the arising and the cessation of suffering. Thus, suffering is identified with the five aggregates, and the arising and cessation of suffering, explained with an abbreviated account of paṭiccasamuppāda, is the arising and cessation of the five aggregates.

While it is true that *suffering* is elsewhere frequently identified with the *five aggregates with attachment*, one may suggest that the content of this discourse (both versions) hardly constitutes an explanation of the arising and cessation of the five aggregates. Both versions appear, in the end, not to provide an answer to the question they ask at the outset. The implications of this problem cannot be pursued here.

(5) The two different wordings seen in the two versions just examined are found combined in SA 69. Explaining *the way leading to the arising* (趣道) and *the cessation* (滅道) *of the personality* (有身集),[52] SA 69 states a series of causes and effects; in the arising mode, they are the following:

1. Not fully knowing the arising, ceasing, flavour, danger, and giving up of material form ... consciousness.
2. → *rejoicing in* (樂), *welcoming* (歎), *attaching to* (著), and *dwelling on* (住) them.

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50 Such as SN 22. 103, 105 = SA 70-71.

51 On this teaching, see Chapter 6.

52 T 2, p. 18a-b (CSA i, pp. 112-113). See also SA 60, 66-67: T 2, pp. 15b-c, 17b-c (CSA i, pp. 90, 108-109) (no SN counterparts).

3. → craving and delight (愛樂), and attachment (取).
4. → becoming.
5. → birth.
6. → ageing-sickness-and-death, grief, lamentation, affliction and pain.

In the ceasing mode the items are the opposite or negation of these: fully knowing the arising, etc. of material form ... consciousness, and so on. Here items 1 and 2 are equivalent to the SN and SA versions respectively of the first item identified under (4), above.

The Pāli counterpart of the present discourse, SN 22. 44, also explains *the way leading to the arising* and *the cessation of the personality* (sakkāya), but it does so very differently: [53]

> ... Herein, bhiksus, the untaught ordinary person, having no regard for the noble ones, unskilled in the noble teaching, untrained in the noble teaching ... views (samanupassati) *material form as the self* (rūpam attato), or *the self as possessed of material form* (rūpavantaṃ attānam), or *material form as being in the self* (attani rūpam), or *the self as being in material form* (rūpasmiṃ attānaṃ). He views *feeling ..., perception ..., activities ..., consciousness ...*
>
> This, bhiksus, is called *the way leading to the arising of the personality* (sakkāya-samudaya-gāmini-paṭipadā). So the meaning here is just this: it is called, bhiksus, *the view* (samanupassanā) *leading to the arising of suffering* (dukkha-samudaya-gāmini).
>
> ... Herein, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple, having regard for the noble ones, skilled in the noble teaching, trained in the noble teaching ... does not view *material form as the self*, nor *the self as possessed of material form*, nor *material form as being in the self* , nor *the self as being in material form.* He does not view *feeling ..., perception ..., activities ..., consciousness ...*
>
> This, bhiksus, is called *the way leading to the cessation* (nirodha) *of the personality.* So the meaning here is just this: it is called, bhiksus, *the view leading to the cessation of suffering* (dukkha-nirodha-gāminī samanupassanā).

53 SN iii, p. 44.

In place of the series of six items of the SA version, the SN version has the following much simpler series (in arising mode):

1. Being unskilled in the noble teaching.
2. → seeing *the five aggregates* as self.
3. → the personality = suffering.

As regards their doctrinal content, the two versions may well be equivalent at some deeper level: both attribute suffering ultimately to ignorance. However, as regards their surface expression, they appear totally different. This may raise the question whether the two really are "counterparts", i.e. derived from a common "original" discourse.

(6) SA 68, which has no SN counterpart, purports to explain the arising and the cessation of the *five aggregates* in terms of a variant of the conditioned arising and ceasing formula, beginning with the sense organs:[54]

> What is the *arising* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*? Conditioned by eye (and the rest) and visual form (and the rest) arises eye *consciousness* (and the rest); the coming together of these three things (sense organ, sense object, and consciousness) is the arising of *contact*. Conditioned by contact arises *feeling*. Conditioned by feeling arises *craving*, and so on ... and thus arises the whole mass of *suffering*. This is called the *arising* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*.
>
> What is the *cessation* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*? Conditioned by eye and visual form arises eye *consciousness*; the coming together of these three things is the arising of *contact*. Conditioned by the cessation of contact *feeling* ceases, and so on ... and thus ceases the whole mass of *suffering*. ... This is called the *cessation* of *material form*, of *feeling*, of *perception*, of *activities*, of *consciousness*.

This is another case where a discourse purports to explain the arising and cessation of the five aggregates, but actually presents a version of the paṭiccasamuppāda (*arising by causal condition*) formula. The teaching contained in this discourse (SA 68) is closely connected to teachings on the six sense spheres, so will be re-examined in Chapter 3.

54 T 2, p. 18a (CSA i, p. 110).

(7) SN 22. 101 and its counterpart SA 263 state that the way leading to fully knowing-and-seeing the arising and the passing away of the five aggregates (equated with destruction of the influxes) is the thirty-sevenfold way (in seven categories).

SN 22. 101 states:[55]

> By *knowing* (jānato), by *seeing* (passato), bhiksus, I declare, is the *destruction* (khaya) of the *influxes* (āsavā), not by not knowing, not by not seeing.
>
> And by knowing what, by seeing what, bhiksus, is the destruction of the influxes? [It is by knowing and seeing]: thus is material form (feeling, perception, activities, consciousness), thus is the arising of material form (feeling, perception, activities, consciousness), thus is the passing away (atthagama) of material form (feeling, perception, activities, consciousness). By so knowing, by so seeing, bhiksus, is the destruction of the influxes.
>
> Suppose, bhiksus, that there arises this wish in a bhiksu who abides not intent on, not practising *cultivation* (bhāvanā): [May] my *mind* (cittaṃ) be *without attachment* (anupādāya), liberated from the influxes. Despite that, his *mind* is not *without attachment*, not *liberated from the influxes*. What is the reason for that?
>
> It must be said that it is his *neglect of cultivation* (abhāvitattā). Neglect of cultivation of what? Neglect of cultivation of the four *stations of mindfulness* (satipaṭṭhānānaṃ), of the four *right efforts* (sammappadhānānam), of the four *factors of supernormal power* (iddhipādānam), of the five *faculties* (indriyānam), of the five *powers* (balānam), of the seven *factors of enlightenment* (bojjhaṅgānam), of the *noble eightfold way* (ariyassa aṭṭhaṅgikassa maggassa).

The discourse indicates that fully knowing-and-seeing the arising and passing away of the five aggregates brings destruction of the influxes ("the mind without attachment, liberated from the influxes"); and that the way to achieve that is *cultivation* (bhāvanā), in seven categories:

55 SN iii, pp. 152-153.

(1) the four stations of mindfulness (cattāro sati-paṭṭhānā)
(2) the four right efforts (cattāro sammappadhānā)
(3) the four factors of supernormal power (cattāro iddhi-pādā)
(4) the five faculties (pañca indriyāni)
(5) the five powers (pañca balāni)
(6) the seven factors of enlightenment (satta bojjhaṅgā)
(7) the noble eightfold way (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga)

These seven together comprise thirty-seven items, well known in early Buddhist schools as the "thirty-seven things leading to enlightenment" (sattatiṃsa bodhipakkhiya-dhammā).[56] This thirty-sevenfold way is here identified as the way leading to fully knowing-and-seeing the arising and passing away of the five aggregates, or the destruction of the influxes.

The corresponding SA 263 records the same teaching, along with the same seven bodhipakkhiya categories, but without mentioning the number of items in each category.[57]

Neither version explains the seven categories. Each of the categories is the subject of its own saṃyukta (saṃyutta) in SN and SA, and the seven will be examined in Chapter 7.

(8) *Concentration* (samādhi) is particularly mentioned in both versions as conducive to fully knowing-and-seeing the arising and passing away (cessation) of the five aggregates.

For example, SN 22. 5 reports the Buddha as saying:[58]

> Practise concentration (samādhim bhāvetha), bhikṣus! A bhikṣu who is concentrated (samāhito), bhikṣus, knows things as they really are. And what things does he know as they really are? [He knows:] the arising of material form, and the passing away of material form; the arising of feeling, of perception, of activities, of consciousness, and the passing away of feeling, of perception, of activities, of consciousness.

Similarly, SN 22. 6 states instead:[59]

56 Also listed at SN 22. 81 = SA 57: SN iii, p. 96; T 2, p. 14a (CSA i, p. 171); SA 75: T 2, p. 19c (CSA i, p. 123) (= SN 22. 58: SN iii, pp. 65-66).
57 T 2, p. 67a-b (CSA i, p. 58).
58 SN iii, pp. 13-14.
59 SN iii, p. 15.

> Develop application to solitude (paṭisallāṇe), bhiksus! A bhiksu who is secluded (paṭisallīno), bhiksus, knows things as they really are. And what things does he know as they really are? ... (Answer as above, SN 22. 5).

"Develop application to solitude" means much the same as "practise concentration". Hence, SN 22. 5-6 affirm a close relationship between *concentration* (in *solitude*) and *fully knowing* the *arising* and *passing away* of the five aggregates.

The SA counterpart of both the above SN discourses, SA 65, has the Buddha saying:[60]

> You should always practise diligently *concentrative meditation*, inwardly calming your mind (方便禅思,内寂其心). Why? A bhiksu, who always practises diligently *concentrative meditation*, inwardly calming his mind, sees things as they really are. What things does he see as they really are? [He sees:] this is material form, the arising of material form, and the cessation of material form; this is feeling ...; perception ...; activities ...; this is consciousness, the arising of consciousness, and the cessation of consciousness ...

This agrees with the SN version in closely linking the practice of *concentrative meditation* with *fully seeing* the *arising* and *passing away* of the five aggregates. Thus, the two versions identify concentration as a means to insight.[61]

This section (3.1) has revealed considerable variety between SN and SA in their teachings on the *arising*, the *cessation*, and the *way leading* to the *cessation* of the *five aggregates*.

Teachings that are shared between the two traditions (SN and SA) include:

- The aggregate of material form arises conditioned by the four great elements; the aggregates of feeling, perception, and activities arise conditioned by contact; and the aggregate of consciousness arises conditioned by name-and-material form.

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60 T 2, p. 17a (CSA i, p. 107). SA 66-68 state a similar teaching, but they lack SN counterparts (T 2, pp. 17b-18a; CSA i, pp. 108-110).

61 Regarding *concentration* (samādhi), SN 22. 80 = SA 272 mention a *concentration* called *signless concentration* (animitta-samādhi 無相三昧), referring to the practice of the *four stations of mindfulness* (SN iii, p. 93. T 2, p. 72a-b; CSA i, p. 84).

- All five aggregates arise conditioned by craving.
- The cessation of the five aggregates is the opposite or negation of their arising – except in the case of the aggregate of material form, for which the two versions fail to explain its ceasing.
- The way leading to the cessation of the aggregates entails fully knowing-and-seeing, achieved through the thirty-sevenfold way, the noble eightfold way, or concentration.

The principal unshared teachings are the following two:

- Regarding the arising of the aggregate of material form, SN 22. 56-57 say it is conditioned by *nutriment*, whereas SA 41-42 say it is conditioned by *delight* in *and desire* for material form – see No. (2).
- Explanations of the arising and ceasing of the *five aggregates* in terms of an abbreviated paṭiccasamuppāda formula show partial disagreement. The account given in SN 22. 5-6 differs in its beginning section from that given in the counterpart, SA 65 – see No. (4) (cf. also No. (5)). And both of these differ from the account given in SA 68, which has no SN counterpart – see No. (6).

3.2. The flavour, the danger, and the giving up of the five aggregates

This section will investigate the remaining three things that one should fully know for the ending of affliction: the flavour (assāda 味), the danger (ādīnava 患), and the giving up (nissaraṇa 離) of the five aggregates. These three things to be known regarding the five aggregates are defined in SN 22. 82 as follows:[62]

> Venerable sir, what is the flavour, the danger, the giving up of material form? What is the flavour, the danger, the giving up of feeling, of perception, of activities, of consciousness?
>
> Bhiksu, the ease-and-joy (sukhaṃ somanassaṃ) that arises conditioned by material form – this is the flavour of material form. The impermanence (aniccaṃ), the suffering (dukkhaṃ), the unstable nature (vipariṇāma-dhammam) of material form – this is the danger of material form. The restraining of exciting/impulsive desire (chandarāga-vinayo), the abandoning of exciting desire

62 SN iii, pp. 102-103.

> (chandarāga-pahānaṃ) for material form – this is the giving up of (or escape from) material form. (Similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness).

The corresponding SA 58 presents the very same teaching.[63] Similar statements are found in other discourses, such as SN 22. 57 and its counterpart SA 42.[64] Thus, the two versions display no differences in the teaching on the *flavour*, *danger*, and *giving up* of the *five aggregates*.

This section on "Knowing things as they really are" with respect to the five aggregates has shown that, in the two versions, there are altogether seven things to be known, namely: 1. the five aggregates (or the five aggregates with attachment), 2. the arising of the five, 3. their cessation, 4. the way leading to their cessation, 5. their flavour, 6. their danger, and 7. the giving up of the five aggregates.

In different contexts differing numbers of these seven things are specified as needing to be known (see table on p. 36). The number ranges from two to seven. Some of the resulting sets correspond to standard formulae; for example, the set of four (the five aggregates, their arising, their cessation, and the way to their cessation) is the familiar set of *four noble truths* (cattāri ariyasaccāni).[65]

4. The four abodes of consciousness and the five aggregates

Both versions speak of *four abodes* (or *bases*) *of consciousness* (catasso viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo, 四識住) in connection with the *five aggregates*.[66]

In the Pāli this teaching is represented in SN 22. 53 and 55:[67]

> Bhiksus, by attachment (or approach) to material form (rūpupāyam), consciousness (viññāṇaṃ), having an abode (tiṭṭhamānaṃ), may persist (tiṭṭheyya). With material form for its object (rūpāramma-

63 T 2, p. 14c (CSA i, p. 176).

64 SN iii, pp. 62-64; T 2, p. 10a-c (CSA i, pp. 152-153); others are: SN 22. 26 (no SA counterpart), and SA 41 (whose counterpart SN 22. 56 does not mention this teaching) (SN iii, pp. 28, 58-61; T 2, p. 9b-c; CSA i, pp. 149-151).

65 Just one of the seven items appears in some textual contexts; such cases are not considered here.

66 SN 22. 54 and its counterpart SA 39: SN iii, pp. 54-55; T 2, p. 9a. See also SN 22. 53, 55 and their counterparts SA 40, 64: SN iii, pp. 53-54, 58; T 2, pp. 9a-b, 17a (CSA i, pp. 147, 102).

67 SN iii, pp. 53-54, 58. SN 22. 53 omits the first of the two references to vedanā and saññā.

> ṇaṃ), with material form for its platform (rūpapatiṭṭhaṃ), seeking delight (nandupasevanaṃ), it may come to growth, increase, abundance. By attachment to feeling (vedanupāyam) ... to perception (saññupāyaṃ) ... to the activities (saṅkhārupāyaṃ), consciousness, having an abode, may persist. With the activities for its object, with the activities for its platform, seeking delight, it may come to growth, increase, abundance.
>
> Bhiksus, if anyone were to declare thus: Apart from material form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from the activities, I will make known the coming or the going of consciousness, the ceasing or the arising of consciousness, the growth or the increase or the abundance of consciousness – to do that would be impossible.
>
> If, bhiksus, a bhiksu abandons desire (rāgo) for the element of material form (rūpadhātuyā), then by that abandonment of desire, its object (ārammaṇam) is cut off. Thereby there is no platform (patiṭṭhā) for consciousness. If, bhiksus, a bhiksu abandons desire for the element of feeling ... of perception ... of activities ... of consciousness, then by that abandonment of desire, its object is cut off. Thereby there is no platform for consciousness.
>
> Without that platform, consciousness has no growth, no generating activity, and is liberated (vimuttam). Through being liberated it is steady; through steadiness it is contented; through contentment it does not worry; being unworried, it individually becomes utterly at peace (parinibbāyati). It knows thus: Birth is ended, noble conduct is established, done is what was to be done, there is no more further becoming.

The corresponding SA 40 and 64 have similar contents but different expressions.[68] For example, SA 64 (= SN 22. 55) describes the liberated *consciousness* in this sequence: without abode (無所住), not growing (不增長), not generating activity (無所爲作), steady (住), contented (知足), liberated (解脫), not clinging (無所取), not attaching (無所著), individually knowing nirvāṇa (自覺涅槃), with birth ended, ... with no

68 T 2, pp. 9a-b, 17a (CSA i, pp. 147-148, 102-103).

further becoming,[69] which is slightly different from the Pāli. The two versions share the following:

1. The *four abodes of consciousness* are:

(1) material form with attachment
(2) feeling with attachment
(3) perception with attachment
(4) activities with attachment

2. The *four abodes, objects,* or *platforms* of *consciousness* (which are associated with *attachment* or approach, upāya), together with that *consciousness* itself, constitute the *five aggregates with attachment.*

3. *Growth, increase,* and *abundance* of *consciousness* is caused by seeking delight (nandi-upasevanā 愛樂), or desire (rāga 貪) for material form, feeling, perception, and activities. If desire for those four is abandoned, then *consciousness* is deprived of its *object* or *platform.* Without that *platform, consciousness* will not grow and generate activity, and thus is liberated. Here, *consciousness* is portrayed as having a leading function (generating activity or not) in regard to liberation from suffering; it is treated as being in a different category from the other four aggregates.

5. Seeing things as they really are

In section 3, above, note was taken of the notion of knowing (seeing) things *as they really are* (yathābhūtaṃ) with regard to the five aggregates. Seeing or observing things as they really are leads to liberation from "this whole mass of suffering". This section will investigate further occurrences of this teaching.

The *five aggregates,* seen *as they really are,* are sometimes stated to be conditioned or compounded (saṅkhata).[70] However, when both versions of the saṃyukta are examined, it is found that the essential characteristics of the five aggregates are most often presented in either of the following formulations:

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69 T 2, p. 17a (CSA i, p. 103).

70 SN 22. 21 and its counterpart SA 260: SN iii, pp. 24-25; T 2, pp. 65c-66a (CSA i, p. 51); SN 22. 81: iii, pp. 96-99, and its counterpart SA 57: T 2, p. 14a-b (CSA i, p. 172); SA 80: T 2, p. 20b (no SN counterpart; CSA i, p. 128); SN 22. 55 and its corresponding SA 64: SN iii, pp. 56-57; T 2, p. 16c (CSA i, p. 102).

(1) impermanent, suffering, not-self (anicca, dukkha, anatta, 無常，苦，無我/非我)
(2) impermanent, suffering, empty (suñña, 空), not-self

The more common of the two is formulation (1): one sees the five aggregates as *impermanent, suffering,* and *not-self.* The two versions contain frequent references to the attainment of liberation through this insight.[71] Commonly the progression from seeing impermanence etc. to attaining liberation is described in terms of the following series of five stages:[72]

1. seeing (the five aggregates as impermanent etc.) – passati, sammā-passaṃ, sammādiṭṭhi, 觀，正見[73]
2. disgust (with the five aggregates) – nibbidā, 厭
3. destruction of delight and desire, fading away or absence of desire – nandirāgakkhaya, virāga, 喜貪盡，離欲
4. liberation, cessation – vimutti (vimuccati, suvimutta), nirodha, ceto-vimutti, paññā-vimutti, 解脫，滅盡，心解脫，慧解脫
5. knowledge of liberation – vimutti-ñāṇa, 解脫知見

The practising monk sees the five aggregates as **impermanent**; seeing them as impermanent, he sees them as **suffering**; seeing them as suffering, he sees them as **not-self**; seeing them as not-self, he attains, in the words of one discourse, "the calming of all activities, renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, the fading away of desire, cessation, **nirvana** (sabbasaṅkhārasamathe, sabbūpadhipaṭinissagge, taṇhakkhaye, virāge, nirodhe, nibbāne)".[74] Other discourses in SN and SA, while using different wording, describe essentially the same series. This teaching on *seeing* the five aggregates as *impermanent, suffering,* and *not-self,* thus leading to nirvana, is therefore common to the two versions.

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71 E.g. SN 22. 15, 45-46, 49, 59, 76-77, 79-80, 158: SN iii, pp. 22, 44-46, 48-50, 67-68, 82-84, 88-89, 94, 187, etc. SA 9-12, 33-34, 82-87, 104, 110, 264, 269: T 2, pp. 2a-2b, 7b-8a, 21b-22b, 31a, 36a, 68b, 70b, etc. CSA i, pp. 13-15, 63-64, 75, 133-139, 184, 206.

72 E.g. SN 22. 51-52, 12: SN iii, pp. 51-52, 21 = SA 1-2: T 2, p. 1a (CSA i, pp. 2-3); SN 22. 9: SN iii, p. 19 = SA 8: T 2, p. 1c (CSA i, pp. 10-11); SN 22. 49: SN iii, p. 50 = SA 30: T 2, p. 6b (CSA i, p. 39); cf. SN 22. 58: SN iii, p. 65 = SA 75: T 2, p. 19b (CSA i, p. 123), etc.

73 According to CSA: i, pp. 2, 6, the word 正觀 (rightly seeing or right insight) in SA 1: T 2, p. 1a (counterpart of SN 22. 12, 51: SN iii, pp. 21, 51) should read 正見 (right view). See also SA 58: T 2, p. 15a (CSA i, p. 177).

74 SN 22. 90 = SA 262: SN iii, pp. 132-135; T 2, pp. 66b-67a (CSA, pp. 54-56).

The second formulation – seeing the five aggregates as impermanent, suffering, **empty**, and not-self – is frequent in SA but rare in SN.[75] For example, SA 1 has: "As one sees impermanence, so also with suffering, emptiness, and non-selfhood. ..."[76] Its Pāli counterparts SN 22. 12-14, 51 have only impermanence, suffering, and non-selfhood.[77]

However, the formulation with four terms (impermanent, suffering, **empty**, not-self) is not entirely absent from SN. In SN 22. 122-123, Sāriputta tells Mahā-koṭṭhita that the *five aggregates with attachment* should be thoroughly reflected upon by a virtuous (or well-taught) monk thus:[78]

> ... as *impermanence* (aniccato); as *suffering* (dukkhato), as sickness, as swelling, as arrow, as pain, as illness, as alien, as decay; as *emptiness* (suññato); as *not-self* (anattato).

In the corresponding SA 259 Śāriputra states that the five aggregates with attachment should be thoroughly reflected upon thus:[79]

> ... as sickness, as swelling, as arrow, as pain; as *impermanence* (無常); as *suffering* (苦); as *emptiness* (空); as *not-self* (非 我).

Here the four terms – impermanence, suffering, emptiness, not-self – are accompanied by extra words which graphically express the concreteness of suffering. The extra words are seven in SN (sickness, swelling, arrow, pain, illness, alien, decay), and four in SA (sickness, swelling, arrow, pain); and they are placed differently in the two versions.

The set of eight terms used in SA 259 (sickness, swelling, arrow, pain, *impermanence*, *suffering*, *emptiness*, *not-self*) is also found in other discourses of the SA, but nowhere else in the SN. For example, SA 265 uses the same eight terms in describing the five aggregates;[80] but its counterpart, SN 22. 95, says instead that the five aggregates are seen as *void* (without reality, rittaka), *insubstantial* (tucchaka), and *lacking essence* (asāraka).[81]

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75 E.g. SA 1, 8, 104, 109, 110, 259, 265: T 2, pp. 1a, 1c, 31a-c, 35a-c, 65b-c, 68c-69a (CSA i, pp. 2, 10, 48, 65, 184, 200, 203-205).
76 T 2, p. 1 (CSA i, p. 3).
77 SN iii, pp. 21, 51.
78 SN iii, p. 167.
79 T 2, p. 65b; see also EA 34. 1: T 2, p. 689a (CSA i, p. 48).
80 T 2, pp. 68c-69a (CSA i, pp. 65-66).
81 SN iii, pp. 140-143.

Again, SA 104 uses the same eight terms, together with a ninth, "not belonging to self (非我所)";[82] but its counterpart SN 22. 85 describes the five aggregates more briefly as impermanent, suffering, not-self, compounded (saṅkhata), and deadly (vadhaka).[83]

Finally, SA 110 also uses the eight terms, but it has no SN counterpart.[84]

Thus, the second formulation (impermanent, suffering, empty, not-self) is not emphasised in SN. This indicates that the first formulation (impermanent, suffering, and not-self), being common to the two versions, is the more basic.

The two formulations of the insight that leads on to liberation draw attention to the following noteworthy details:

(1) the reason why "impermanence is suffering"
(2) the various terms for the notion of "not-self"

Regarding (1), the reason why "impermanence is suffering", SN 22. 43 reports the Buddha as saying:[85]

> Herein, bhiksus, the untaught ordinary person ... views (samanupassati) *material form* as *self* (rūpam attato), *self* as *possessed of material form* (rūpavantaṃ attānam), *material form* as being *in self* (attani rūpam), *self* as being *in material form* (rūpasmiṃ attānaṃ). Such a person's material form (body) *changes and becomes different.* Owing to *the changing and becoming different* (vipariṇāmaññathā-bhāvā) of material form, *grief, lamentation, pain, depression, and despair* come to exist in him. He views *feeling* ... *perception* ... *activities* ... *consciousness* as *self* ...

This text indicates that the origin of suffering lies in self-view, in self-attachment to the five aggregates, which are impermanent phenomena. When the five aggregates change or become different, this produces grief,

82 T 2, p. 31c (CSA i, p. 186).

83 SN iii, pp. 114-115.

84 T 2, p. 35b-c (CSA i, pp. 203-205). The Pāli counterpart of SA 110 is MN 35 (MN i, pp. 227-237); it mentions only "impermanence" and "not-self". SA 110 has a Chinese counterpart, EA 37. 10 (T 2, p. 715b-c); it states that the five aggregates are "impermanent; impermanence is suffering; suffering is not-self; not-self is emptiness; emptiness is neither this is self nor self is this", i.e. it treats emptiness and not-self as the same notion.

85 SN iii, pp. 42-43.

lamentation, pain, depression and despair in the one who holds the self-view. This is why impermanence is suffering for an unenlightened being.

The SA counterpart of the quoted section, SA 36, agrees in stating that suffering is caused by attachment to the impermanent five aggregates, but it does not mention how or why impermanence implies suffering.[86] However, clear explanations of why impermanence is suffering are found elsewhere in both versions. The following are examples.

In SN 22. 84 and its counterpart SA 271[87] the Buddha teaches that if one is not rid (avigata) of desire (rāga), excitement/impulse (chanda), love (pema), thirst (pipāsa), fever (pariḷāha), and craving (taṇhā)[88] for the five aggregates, then when those aggregates change and become different, there comes to exist the affliction of grief, lamentation, pain, depression, and despair.[89] Hence, impermanence is suffering.

Similarly, SN 22. 7 describes the effect of holding self-view with regard to the five aggregates:[90]

> ... The material form of such a person changes and becomes different. His material form having become changed and different, his consciousness (viññaṇa) is occupied (anuparivatti) with the changing material form. From this being occupied with the changing material form, worried thoughts arise (paritassanā dhammasamuppādā), and remain gripping his mind (cittam pariyādāya tiṭṭhanti). From this gripping of his mind, he becomes fearful (uttāsavā), perplexed (vighātavā), full of longing (apekhavā), attached (upādāya), and worried (paritassati). (And similarly for the other aggregates.)

The corresponding SA 43 has similar content.[91]

Other texts with similar content are also found in both versions.[92] Thus, with regard to the explanation of why impermanence is suffering, the two versions are in agreement.

86 T 2, p. 8a-b (CSA i, p. 141).
87 SN iii, pp. 107-108; T 2, p. 71a-b (CSA i, p. 80).
88 SA 271 has: desire, excitement/impulse, love, longing, and craving (T 2, p. 71a-b; CSA i, p. 80).
89 SA 271 has: depression, lamentation, despair and pain (T 2, p. 71b; CSA i, p. 80).
90 SN iii, p. 16.
91 T 2, pp. 10c-11a (CSA i, pp. 154-155).
92 SN 22. 8 = SA 44: SN iii, p. 18; T 2, p. 11a (CSA i, p. 155). SN 22. 1-2 = SA 107-108: SN iii, pp. 3-4, 7; T 2, pp. 33b-34a (CSA i, pp. 194, 196). Cf. EA 13. 4: T 2, p. 573a-b (counterpart of SN 22. 1 and SA 107).

(2) Various terms for the notion of "not-self". Investigation into the various expressions used in the two versions for "not-self", suggests a classification into five groups, as follows.

1. "Not belonging to self" (anattaniya 非我所); and "neither self nor belonging to self" (anatta-anattaniya 非我非我所 or 非我非我所應).

These two expressions are common to the two versions.[93] A similar meaning is contained in the following Pāli verse, which appears in several locations:[94]

> no c' assaṃ no ca me siyā,
> na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati.
> (If I were not, and it was not mine,
> I shall not be [and] it will not be mine.)

Its only SA counterpart (at SA 64) reads: [95]

> 法無有吾我，亦復無我所，我既非當有，我所何由生?
> (Dharmas (phenomena) are not-self, and not belonging to self.
> Since self will not be, whence will there be belonging to self?)

The meaning is again "neither self nor belonging to self".

2. "Not belonging to you" (na tumhākaṃ 非汝所應法).

In SN 22. 33-34 and their counterpart SA 269 the Buddha tells the monks that each of the five aggregates is "not belonging to you" (na tumhākaṃ), so they should "put it away" (pajahatha) for their profit and happiness.[96]

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93 E.g. SN 22. 69: SN iii, p. 78 = SA 17-18: T 2, pp. 3c-4a (CSA i, pp. 25-26); SN 22. 89: SN iii, pp. 127-129 = SA 103: T 2, pp. 29c-30b (CSA i, pp. 179-181); SN 22. 33: SN iii, p. 34 and SA 269: T 2, p. 70a (counterpart of SN 22. 33 and 34: SN iii, pp. 33-34; CSA i, p. 75).

94 SN 22. 81: SN iii, p. 99 (lacking in counterpart SA 57: T 2, pp. 13c-14b; CSA i, pp. 170-172); SN 22. 152: SN iii, p. 183 (no SA counterpart); SN 22. 55: SN iii, p. 55 = SA 64: T 2, p. 16c (CSA i, p. 102). SN 22. 55 has assa for assaṃ, and bhavissati for bhavissāmi. The Nālandā edition has *nābhavissaṃ* (I would not be) for *na bhavissāmi* in all cases (Nālandā Saṃyutta Nikāya vol. 2-3, pp. 322, 396-7, 285-7). It is possible that the earlier unsanskritised form, with eight syllables per line, was: no c'assaṃ no ca me siyā, nāhessaṃ na me hessati.

95 T 2, p. 16c (CSA i, p. 102) = SN 22. 55: SN iii, p. 55.

96 SN iii, pp. 33-34; T 2, p. 70b (CSA i, p. 75).

3. "Self-conceit/pride" (asmi-māna 我 慢), "self-excitement/impulse" (asmi-chanda 我欲), and "self-bias" (asmi-anusaya 我使=我隨眠).

In SN 22. 91-92 and their counterparts SA 23-24 Rāhula asks the Buddha how one should know (jānato 知) and see (passato 見) so that with regard to this body with its consciousness (saviññāṇake kāye 此 識 身) and all external objects (bahiddhā sabbanimittesu 外 境 界 一 切 相), one will be without "the view of I and mine, the conceit, the bias" (ahaṃkāra-mamaṃkāra-mānānusayā 我、我所見、我慢、使); the Buddha tells him it is achieved by seeing (disvā 觀) with right insight (sammappaññāya 平等慧) the five aggregates as not-self.[97] Hence, in this teaching conceit and bias (mānānusayā 慢、使) based on the view of I and mine (ahaṃkāra-mamaṃkāra 我、我所見) are overcome by the insight of not-self.

A similar teaching with these three terms, self-conceit (asmi-māna 我慢), self-excitement/impulse (asmi-chanda 我欲), and self-bias (asmi-anusaya 我使), together in the same sequence is found in SN 22. 89 and its counterpart SA 103.[98] Each of the terms is combined with the word asmi 我 ("I am" or "self"); the conceit, excitement, and bias are based on the view of I or mine, and liberation from them entails the insight of not-self. Thus, expression of the notion of not-self as freedom from self-conceit, self-excitement, and self-bias is a feature shared in common by the two versions.

4. SN has these two forms of expression:

I. "This[99] is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self" (n'etam mama, n'eso 'ham asmi, na m'eso attā ti).[100]
II. One does not regard (na samanupassati) material form as self (rūpaṃ attato), or self as possessing material form (rūpavantaṃ attānaṃ), or material form as being in self (attani rūpaṃ), or self as being in material form (rūpasmiṃ attānaṃ). (and similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness)[101]

Corresponding to these two forms of wording found in SN, SA has just one form of wording: "This is not self, this is not other than self, neither is

97 SN iii, pp. 136-137; T 2, p. 5a-b (CSA i, pp. 31-32). See also SN 22. 72: SN iii, pp. 80-81 (no SA counterpart), and SN 22. 124-125: SN iii, pp. 169-170, but their counterpart SA 22: T 2, pp. 4c-5a (CSA i, p. 30) has different expression.
98 SN iii, pp. 130-131; T 2, p. 30a-c (CSA i, pp. 180-182).
99 Referring to each of the five aggregates.
100 E.g. SN. 22. 45, 49, 59, 118-119: SN iii, pp. 45, 49-50, 67-68, 165-166.
101 E.g. SN 22. 55, 85; cf. 47: SN iii, pp. 56-57, 113-114, 46.

self in this nor this in self" (非我/不是我，不異我，不相在).[102] The difficult phrase 不相在 (neither is self in this nor this in self) is clarified at SA 45 and SA 109, and specific explanation of each wording, such as "this is not other than self" etc., is found in SA 109.[103]

The two forms of expression in SN and the corresponding one form in SA are frequent in the two versions.[104] They are semantically close, meaning simply that there is nothing in compounded phenomena (whether within or beyond the five aggregates) that is self or belongs to self. Thus, despite the different wording, the two versions share this fundamental teaching of the notion of not-self.

5. Freedom from the view "superior am I" (seyyo 'ham asmi, 我勝), "equal am I" (sadiso 'ham asmi, 我等), or "inferior am I" (hīno 'ham asmi, 我劣).

In SN 22. 49 the Buddha says to Soṇa:[105]

> Whatsoever recluses or brahmins, Soṇa, in regard to the impermanent material form, the suffering unstable phenomenon, have the view (samanupassanti) "superior am I", "equal am I", or "inferior am I", what else are they but non-seers of things as they really are? (and similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness)

He then says that those who do not have this view are seeing things as they really are; and he goes on to use the more familiar formulation: "This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self".

The corresponding SA 30 instead has Śroṇa asking Śāriputra:[106]

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102 Corresponding to the first form of SN: SA 84 (= SN 22. 45), SA 30 (= SN. 22. 49), SA 34 (= SN 22. 59), and SA 76 (= SN 22. 118-119): T 2, pp. 21c, 6b, 7c, 19c (CSA i, pp. 135, 38-39, 139, 124). Corresponding to the second form of SN: SA 64 (= SN. 22. 55), SA 104 (= SN 22. 85); cf. SA 45 and 63 (= SN 22. 47): T 2, pp. 16c, 31a, 11b, 16b (CSA i, pp. 102, 185, 157, 100).

103 T 2, pp. 11b, 34b-35a. SA 45 is counterpart of SN 22. 47: SN iii, pp. 46-47; SA 109 has no SN counterpart (CSA i, pp. 157, 198-200).

104 E.g. SN 22. 15-17, 44-47, 49, 55, 59, 71-72, 76-77, 79-80, 82, 85, 91-93, 99, 118-119, 124-125, 150, 158: SN iii, pp. 22-23, 44-46, 49-50, 56-57, 67-68, 80-81, 82-84, 88-89, 94, 102-104, 113-114, 136-138, 150, 165-166, 169-170, 181-182, 187. SA 23-24, 30, 33-34, 45, 62-64, 76, 82-87, 104, 109, 264: T 2, pp. 5a-b, 6b, 7c, 11b, 16a-c, 19c, 21b-22b, 31a, 34b-35a, 68b (CSA i, pp. 31-32, 38, 63-64, 98-102, 124, 134-139, 157, 185, 198-200).

105 SN 22. 49: SN iii, pp. 48-49.

106 T 2, p. 6a-b (CSA i, p. 38). Cf. also SA 45 and 63: T 2, pp. 11b, 16b-c (CSA i, pp. 157, 100), counterparts of SN 22. 47: SN iii, pp. 46-47.

> Whatsoever recluses or brahmins, in regard to the impermanent material form, the changing unstable material form, declare "superior am I" (我勝), "equal am I" (我等), or "inferior am I" (我劣) – why have they such a perception, not seeing the truth? (and similarly for feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness)

Śāriputra replies that well-taught disciples do not have this view, but instead see, with regard to material form etc., "This is not self, this is not other than self, neither is self in this nor this is self".

Thus, both versions express not-self in terms of not having the view "I am superior", "I am equal", or "I am inferior".

To conclude, in regard to the notion of seeing the five aggregates *as they really are*, this section has identified two formulations of the insight, namely: (1) "impermanent, suffering, not-self", and (2) "impermanent, suffering, empty, not-self". Formulation (1) is common to the two versions, whereas formulation (2) is emphasised in SA. This suggests that the first formulation of the insight is the more basic teaching, since it is widely shared by the two versions. Regarding the connection between impermanence and suffering, and the various expressions for the teaching of not-self, there is no significant difference between the two versions, despite some unshared wording.

6. The middle way

As mentioned above, seeing the five aggregates as *impermanent*, *suffering*, and *not-self* is identified, in both versions, as *right view* (sammādiṭṭhi 正見). The two versions also identify *right view* with *the middle way*. That teaching will be investigated in this section.

In SN 22. 90 Ānanda tells Channa (Skt. Chanda) that he heard the Buddha teach Kaccāna[107] as follows:[108]

> Indeed, Kaccāna, this world usually depends on two [extremes]: *existence* (or eternalism: atthitā) and *non-existence* (or nihilism: natthitā).
>
> Now, Kaccāna, one who with *right wisdom* (sammappaññāya) sees the arising of the world as it really is, does not hold to the non-

107 = Kaccāyana in SN 12. 15: SN ii, p. 17.
108 SN iii, pp. 134-135. See also Chapter 6, pp. 192-195.

> existence of the world (loke natthitā). Kaccāna, one who with *right wisdom* sees the cessation of the world as it really is, does not hold to the existence of the world (loke atthitā).
>
> Surely, Kaccāna, this world mostly is attached to methods, bound to biases (upāyupādānābhinivesavinibandho). But one who does not approach attachment to means, mental obstinacy, and tendency towards bias, who does not cling to it, he does not insist on: "*It is my self*" (Attā me ti). Then, [one knows]: when suffering arises, it arises; when suffering ceases, it ceases. One is not in doubt, is not perplexed. Here, one comes to have knowledge/insight (ñāṇam) independently of others. Thus this, Kaccāna, is *right view* (sammādiṭṭhi).
>
> "Everything exists" (sabbam atthīti), Kaccāna, this is one extreme. "Everything does not exist" (sabbam natthīti), this is the other extreme. Kaccāna, not approaching either extreme, the Tathāgata teaches the Dharma by *the middle* (majjhena): Conditioned by ignorance are activities, conditioned by activities is consciousness, and so forth. Thus arises this whole mass of suffering. By the total fading away and cessation of ignorance, activities cease, and so forth. Thus ceases this whole mass of suffering.

The counterpart, SA 262, has very similar content,[109] though instead of *the middle* (majjhena) it has *the middle way* (中道).[110] The two versions state in common that the Buddha taught *right view* (sammādiṭṭhi 正見) in terms of *the middle* (*way*).

Both versions of this discourse give background on why Channa asks Ānanda about the teaching.[111] According to the SN version, Channa says he already knows the teaching that "material form and so on are impermanent; material form and so on are not-self; all activities (saṅkhārā) are impermanent; all phenomena (dhammā) are not-self". The SA version has the same, but adds "*nirvana is cessation* (涅槃寂滅)". SN states that Channa does not find this knowledge leads him to: "the *calming* (samathe) of all activities, renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, the

109 T 2, pp. 66c-67a (CSA i, pp. 55-56). See also Chapter 6, pp. 192-195.
110 Skt. madhyama-pratipad (P. majjhima-paṭipadā).
111 SN iii, pp. 132-134; T 2, p. 66b-c (CSA i, pp. 54-55).

fading away of desire, cessation, nirvana"; SA has instead "the *emptiness* (空寂) of all activities, ...".[112] In SN, Channa then says:[113]

> "My mind does not spring forward (cittaṃ na pakkhandati), does not become calm (nappasīdati), does not settle (na santiṭṭhati), is not liberated (na vimuccati), but fear and attachment arise (paritassanā upādānam uppajjati), and my mind returns again [to think] (paccudāvattati mānasam): '*Who then is the self* (atha ko carahi me attāti)?' Then, it certainly does not see the dharma (na kho panetaṃ dhammam passato hoti)."

According to SA, he simply says:[114]

> "Herein, *what is the self* which says that it knows thus and sees thus, that is, which *sees the Dharma* (此中云何有我,而言如是知,如是見,是名見法)?"

These various differences do not amount to significant doctrinal disagreement, though they do show again the SA emphasis on *emptiness*.

Teachings about *right view* and *the middle way* in relation to the non-selfhood of the *five aggregates* are expressed in the two traditions in a variety of ways, as shown in the following four examples:

(I) SN 22. 47 states:[115]

> ... with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge, he does not have the view "I am", "this is I"; "I will exist",[116] "I will not exist"; "I will have material form" (rūpī), "I will not have material form" (arūpī); "I will have perception" (saññī), "I will not have perception" (asaññī); "I will have neither-perception-nor-non-perception" (nevasaññī nāsaññī).

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112 SN iii, pp. 133-134; T 2, p. 66b-c (CSA i, pp. 54-55)

113 SN iii, pp. 133-134. According to both the readable meaning and Nālandā Devanāgarī edition: vol. 2-3, p. 352, the wording (in SN 22. 90: SN iii, p. 133) "na vimuccati paritassanā // upādānam uppajjati ..." should read as follows: "na vimuccati, paritassanā upādānam uppajjati ...".

114 T 2, p. 66b-c (CSA i, pp. 54-55).

115 SN iii, p. 47.

116 Following the CD-ROM Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana (bhavissan ti) and Nālandā (vol. 2-3, p. 278) (bhavissaṃ ti) rather than PTS (bhavissanti), which Woodward implausibly translates as "things will be" (p. 41).

Of the two corresponding SA discourses, SA 45 reads:[117]

> ... with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge, he does not give rise to perception of existence, perception of non-existence, perception of both existence and non-existence; perception of superiority, perception of equality, perception of inferiority; the perception that "I know, I see".

The other counterpart, SA 63, reads:[118]

> ... with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of knowledge, he does not [give rise to these views]: existence, non-existence; both existence and non-existence; neither existence nor non-existence; "I am superior", "I am inferior", "I am equal"; "I know, I see."

The expressions "I am superior" and so on are lacking in the SN version, but have been seen earlier in this connection in other SN discourses.[119] The different versions indicate some confusion about whether the reference is to "neither-perception nor non-perception" or to "non-perception of both existence and non-existence".

(II) Both traditions contain discussion about extreme views on what happens after death to one whose mind has been totally emptied of self-view or influxes (āsavā).

In SN 22. 85 Sāriputta tells Yamaka that it is "an evil view" (pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ) to believe that when the body breaks up after death, a bhiksu who has "destroyed the influxes" (khīṇa-āsava) "is broken up, perishes, and does not exist" (ucchijjati vinassati no hoti). He points out that since the five aggregates are impermanent etc., and since one cannot regard the Tathāgata as *material form* (rūpaṃ), or as in *material form* (rūpasmiṃ), or as distinct from *material form* (aññatra rūpā); or as without *material form* (arūpī) (and similarly for feeling, perception, activities and consciousness); therefore, it is not right to consider that when the body breaks up after death, a bhiksu who has destroyed the influxes is broken up, perishes, and does not exist.[120] The corresponding SA 104 has almost the same content.[121]

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117 T 2, p. 11b (CSA i, p. 157).
118 T 2, p. 16b-c (CSA i, p. 100).
119 E.g. SN 22. 49: SN iii, pp. 48-49 (its counterpart SA 30: T 2, p. 6a-b; CSA i, p. 38).
120 SN iii, pp. 111-112.
121 T 2, p. 31a-b (CSA i, p. 185).

Another discourse, SN 22. 86 along with its counterpart SA 106, goes further, stating that one cannot proclaim in regard to these views: After death the Tathāgata exists; does not exist; both exists and does not exist; neither exists nor does not exist.[122]

SA 105 (no SN counterpart) shows that, regarding the Tathāgata and the five aggregates, there are two extreme views about what happens after death: the annihilationist view (斷見) and the eternalist view (常見);[123] and it states that after death there is no condition (因緣) to declare in those who have fully understood and cut off all conceits.[124]

Similarly, SA 72 states:[125]

> The Arhant does not have existence after death in another world; does not have non-existence after death in another world; does not have both existence and non-existence after death in another world; does not have neither existence nor non-existence after death in another world; [of these extreme views] detailed explanations are innumerable, but the enumeration [of extreme views] has all ceased completely [in the Arhant].

This discussion about the two extreme views of existence and non-existence after death is not found in the corresponding SN 22. 106.[126]

(III) SA 272 identifies these three extreme views:[127]

1. life/soul (命) is body (身);
2. life/soul is one thing and body is another;
3. material form is self, they are one and are eternal and unchanging.

The corresponding SN 22. 80 identifies just two:[128]

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122 SN iii, pp. 116-119; T 2, pp. 32c-33a (CSA i, pp. 192-193).

123 SN 22. 81 and its counterpart SA 57 also mention these two views: the eternalist view (sassata-diṭṭhi 壞有見), and the annihilationist view (uccheda-diṭṭhi 斷見). SN 22. 81 and SA 57 state that these two views are connected with self-view and are *the activities* (saṅkhāra 行). SN iii, pp. 98-99; T 2, p. 14b (CSA i, p. 172).

124 T 2, p. 32a-b (CSA i, pp. 189-190).

125 T 2, p. 19a (CSA i, p. 119).

126 SN iii, pp. 159-160. Both versions have the Buddha teaching bhiksus about: 1. dharmas to be known (pariññeyyā dhammā 所知法), 2. knowledge (pariññā 智), and 3. the one who has knowledge (pariññātāvī puggalo 智者).

127 T 2, p. 72b (CSA i, p. 84).

128 SN iii, pp. 93-94.

1. the view of existence (bhava-diṭṭhi), and
2. the view of non-existence (vibhava-diṭṭhi).

Despite the different wording, the two versions can be seen to present similar teachings. The view that "life/soul is body" corresponds to "the view of non-existence", because it implies that when the body breaks up (after death), life (or soul or self) also breaks up, perishes, and ceases to exist. The view that "life/soul is one thing and body another" corresponds to "the view of existence", because it implies that when the body breaks up, life (or soul or self) does not break up or perish but continues to exist. The view that "material form is self and they are eternal and unchanging" amounts to another form of "the view of existence". Thus, the two versions give different accounts of the same extreme views.

(IV) SN 22. 79 says, of one who sees the five aggregates as not-self:[129]

> He, bhiksus, is to be called a noble disciple who reduces [the five aggregates], and does not increase them (apacināti no ācināti); who abandons, and does not attach to them (pajahati na upādiyati); who discards, and does not bind to them (viseneti no usseṅeti); who is dispassionate, and not impassioned by them (vidhūpeti na sandhūpeti).

Such a well-taught noble disciple develops, with respect to the five aggregates, "disgust" (nibbidā), "fading of desire" (virāga), "liberation" (vimutti), and "knowledge of liberation" (vimutti-ñaṇa). The text then goes on to say:[130]

> He, bhiksus, is to be called a bhiksu who neither reduces nor increases [the five aggregates] ... neither abandons nor attaches to them ... neither discards nor binds them ... is neither dispassionate nor impassioned regarding them.

This negates both of the opposed actions in each case. Such double-negative expressions appear to be saying that in liberation there is neither existence nor non-existence of the five aggregates.

However, the corresponding SA 46 does not confirm this. It has only the first set with slightly different wording: "reduces, and does not increase" (減

129 SN iii, p. 89.
130 SN iii, p. 90.

而不增); "retreats, and does not move ahead" (退而不進); "extinguishes, and does not give rise" (滅而不起); "detaches, and does not attach" (捨而不取)".[131]

However, another SA discourse, SA 60, which has no SN counterpart, does contain this kind of double negation. It states:[132]

> If a bhiksu does not delight in the five aggregates, his mind is liberated; he abides equanimous and detached (平等捨住), *neither extinguishing nor generating* (不滅不生), with right mindfulness (正念) and right knowledge (正智).

Thus, the two traditions indicate, in different discourses, that liberation is devoid of the two extremes with regard to the five aggregates: existence (arising) and non-existence (ceasing).

To summarise this section, the two traditions agree in speaking of *right view* as *the middle way*, devoid of the two extremes of existence and non-existence. The reference is to existence or non-existence after death of one who has ended the influxes, existence or non-existence of life (physical and mental), and existence or non-existence of the five aggregates in the state of *liberation* (vimutti).

7. Not-self and karmic effect

SN 22. 82 and its counterpart SA 58 record the Buddha's answer to a question regarding not-self and the effects (or results) of karma. According to the SN version, a certain bhiksu had this thought:[133]

> ... So then you (the Buddha) say that material form is not-self (anattā); feeling ...; perception ...; activities ...; consciousness is not-self. How can *karmas* that are performed by the *not-self*, affect the *self*? (anattakatāni kammāni katham attānaṃ phusissantī ti).

The SA version reads:[134]

131 T 2, p. 11c (CSA i, p. 158).
132 T 2, p. 15c (CSA i, p. 90).
133 SN: iii, p. 103, reading "katham" (Nālandā edition, vol. 2-3, p. 326, and Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana) instead of "katam" (PTS).
134 T 2, p. 15c (CSA i, p. 177).

> ... So if there is *no self*, who will in future time receive the results (受報) of *karmas* performed by the *not-self* (作無我業)?

The two versions then state that the Buddha, reading the bhiksu's mind, responded by teaching that the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, and not-self, and that one who sees this attains liberation.[135] Thus, the Buddha appears not to answer the question. On the other hand, his teaching implies that since the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, and not-self, there is no unchanging entity as doer of actions or recipient of their effects. In any case, this teaching shared by the two versions suggests that there was in early Buddhism a perceived need to show that there was no contradiction between the teaching of not-self and the notion of karma operating in saṃsāra.[136]

8. The Fully Enlightened One and the Wisdom-liberated One

In SN 22. 58 the Buddha says:[137]

> Bhiksus! The Tathāgata, arahant, fully enlightened (sammāsambuddho), is without attachment (anupādā), liberated (vimutto), through disgust (nibbidā), fading of desire (virāgā), and cessation (nirodhā) with regard to material form [likewise to feeling, perception, activities, and consciousness], and he is called *fully enlightened*. Bhiksus! A bhiksu liberated by wisdom/insight (paññāvimutto) is also without attachment, liberated, through disgust, fading of desire, and cessation with regard to material form [and the rest], and he is called *liberated by wisdom* (paññāvimutto) ...
>
> Now herein, bhiksus, what is the distinction, the specific feature, the difference between the Tathāgata, arahant, fully enlightened, and a bhiksu liberated by wisdom?

His answer is:[138]

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135 SN iii, pp. 103-104; T 2, p. 15c.

136 SN 22. 99-100 and their counterparts SA 266-267: SN iii, pp. 149-152; T 2, pp. 69b-70a (CSA i, pp. 68-71).

137 SN iii, pp. 65-66.

138 SN iii, p. 66.

> The Tathāgata, arahant, fully enlightened, is one who causes the path to arise which had not arisen before, who produces the path which had not been produced before, who proclaims the path which had not been proclaimed before, who knows the path, who understands the path, who fully comprehends the path; and now, bhiksus, hearer-disciples (sāvakā) abide following the path after him. That, bhiksus, is the distinction, the specific feature, the difference between the Tathāgata, arahant, fully enlightened, and a bhiksu liberated by wisdom.

The corresponding SA 75 asks the question in identical terms, except that it refers to the Buddha as "the Tathāgata, worthy/realised one, fully enlightened" (如來、應、等正覺); and instead of "a bhiksu liberated by wisdom" it has "an arhant liberated by wisdom (阿羅漢慧解脫)".[139] It answers the question rather differently:[140]

> ... The Tathāgata, worthy one, fully enlightened, is one who had never before heard the Dharma, but who is able, on his own, to know the Dharma, perfectly understanding the highest enlightenment; and who thereafter, to enlighten hearer-disciples, teaches the Dharma, namely: the *four stations of mindfulness*, the *four right efforts*, the *four factors of supernormal power*, the *five faculties*, the *five powers*, the *seven factors of enlightenment*, the *noble eightfold way*. Bhiksus! This is called the Tathāgata, worthy one, fully enlightened: one who attains what had not been attained before, who gains benefit that had not been gained before, who knows the path, who distinguishes the path, who proclaims the path, who fully comprehends the path, who also by teaching can lead hearer-disciples to achievement, and thus teaches rightly according to the delightful good Dharma. This is the difference between the Tathāgata and an arhant.

The SA version has much more information than the SN, listing the 37-fold path: the *four stations of mindfulness*, etc. Also, as mentioned above, when referring to the *fully enlightened one* (Tathāgata) and the *wisdom-liberated one*, the two versions use different expressions, as follows:

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139 T 2, p. 19b (CSA i, p. 123).
140 T 2, p. 19c (CSA i, p. 123).

SN 22. 58	SA 75
the Tathāgata, *arahant*, fully enlightened	the Tathāgata, worthy one, fully enlightened
a bhiksu liberated by wisdom.	an *arhant* liberated by wisdom

The SN version applies the term "arahaṃ" (Skt. arhant) to the Tathāgata but not to the person who is "liberated by wisdom".[141] The SA version does the reverse. The expression "worthy one", used in SA, is equivalent in meaning to "arhant";[142] but normally in the Chinese āgamas the term "arhant" is not *translated*, as here; the usual practice is to *transcribe* the Sanskrit thus: 阿羅漢, a-luo-han = arhant. It is therefore clear that here the SA version is distinguishing not only between the *fully enlightened one* (the Tathāgata) and the *wisdom-liberated one*, but also, and particularly, between the Buddha and the arhant (who is liberated by wisdom).

It is possible that this feature of the SA version to some extent reflects later Mahāyāna developments, whereby arhants, apart from the historical Buddha, came to be rated less highly than practitioners of the Bodhisattva path. That would explain why the term *arhant* appears to have been transferred from the *fully enlightened one* (SN) to the *wisdom-liberated one* (SA). It is perhaps significant that the translator of SA, Guṇabhadra, is believed to have belonged to a Mahāyāna school (Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra).[143]

The description of *one who is liberated by wisdom* (paññāvimutta 慧解脫), in terms of liberation from attachment to the five aggregates, through disgust, fading of desire, and cessation, is found repeated, with some variation in terminology, in several other discourses. For example, SN 22. 51 = SA 1[144] and SN 22. 115-116 = SA 28[145] give much the same account of one whose *mind is liberated* (cittaṃ vimuttaṃ 心解脫) and one who

141 In this SN discourse (SN 22. 58) one who is "liberated by wisdom" has attained liberation from attachment to the five aggregates. In other discourses one who has achieved this is also called *arahant*; e.g. SN 22. 76-77, 110: SN iii, pp. 82-84, 161 (no SA counterpart); SN 22. 63-65: SN iii, pp. 73-76 (= SA 21: T 2, p. 4b-c; CSA i, pp. 28-29).

142 PED, p. 77.

143 CSA i, "RESA", pp. 58-59.

144 SN iii, p. 51 (cf. SN 22. 12: SN iii, p. 21 = SA 1); T 2, p. 1a (CSA i, pp. 2-3).

145 SN iii, pp. 163-164 (= SA 26-29: T 2, pp. 5c-6a; CSA i, pp. 35-37); T 2, p. 6a (CSA i, p. 36).

experiences *nirvana in this very life* (diṭṭhadhamma-nibbāna 見法涅槃) respectively.[146]

9. Sectarian components or teachings

The possibility of Mahāyāna influence in SA has already been mentioned in connection with the SA emphasis on emptiness and its seeming downgrading of the arhant. Note will now be taken of a few further pieces of evidence indicating the possible influence of sectarian teachings.

(1) SN 22. 21 states:[147]

> ... material form [and the rest] is impermanent (aniccaṃ), compounded (saṅkhatam), *arisen by condition* (paticcasamuppannaṃ). It is subject to destruction (khayadhammaṃ), to decay (vayadhammaṃ), to fading away (virāgadhammaṃ), to cessation (nirodhadhammam). Because of its cessation, one says 'cessation'.

The corresponding SA 260 reads:[148]

> ... the five aggregates with attachment are grounded on the compounded (本行所作)[149] and are *grounded on the thought out* (本所思願).[150] They (the five aggregates with attachment) are impermanent, subject to cessation. Because those phenomena are subject to cessation, one says 'cessation'.

Thus, the SA version has "grounded on the thought out", where the SN has simply "arisen by condition".

A similar situation is found in another discourse. In SN 22. 81 an activity (saṅkhāro) is described as:[151]

146 See also SA 2: T 2, p. 1a (CSA i, p. 3) = SN 22. 52: SN iii, p. 52. Cf. also Chapter 3, p. 100, and SN 35. 124: SN iv, p. 109 = SA 237: T 2, p. 57c (CSA i, p. 286); SN 12. 16: SN ii, p. 18 = SA 363-365: T 2, p. 101a (CSA ii, p. 81).

147 SN iii, p. 24.

148 T 2, p. 65c (CSA i, p. 51).

149 P. abhisaṃkhata; Skt. abhisaṃskṛta.

150 P. Skt. abhisañcetayita. Cf. Choong Mun-keat (Wei-keat), *The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism* (1995; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999), p. 74.

151 SN, iii, pp. 96-99.

> ... impermanent (anicco), compounded (saṅkhato), arisen by condition (paṭiccasamuppanno).

In its SA counterpart, SA 57, it is described as:[152]

> ... impermanent, compounded, *subject to arising conditioned by mind* (心緣起法).

The phrases, *grounded on the thought out* (本所思願) and *subject to arising conditioned by mind* (心緣起法), which are present in SA but not in SN, may reflect influence from the theory of conditioned arising by "mind-only" (vijñapti-mātratā or citta-mātra), a teaching of the Mahāyāna Vijñānavāda school, to which Guṇabhadra is believed to have belonged.[153]

(2) SA 80[154] mentions three kinds of concentration (三昧):[155] emptiness (空), signless (無相), and nothingness (無所有),[156] and describes the teaching as "the purifying view (知見清淨) of the noble dharma-mark (聖法印[157])". This SA discourse has no SN counterpart, and furthermore the notion of the *noble dharma-mark* is not found in the Pāli tradition.

(3) Yin Shun maintains that the passages quoted below contain evidence of sectarian teachings. SA 79 (no SN counterpart) contains the following wording:[158]

> ... because material form (also feeling, perception, activities, consciousness) *exists* in the past (以有過去色故), ... because material form *exists* in the future (以有未來色故), ... because material form *exists* in the present (以有現在色故) ...

Also, in three other SA discourses, but not in their SN counterparts, the word "exist (有)" is found at the end in a statement that it should be substituted in the text, as follows:[159]

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152 T 2, p. 14a (CSA i, p. 172).
153 CSA i, "RESA" pp. 58-59.
154 T 2, p. 20a-b (CSA i, pp. 127-128).
155 Skt. samādhi.
156 On the three kinds of concentration, cf. CHOONG Mun-keat, *The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism*, pp. 58-59.
157 Skt. ārya-dharma-mudrā.
158 T 2, p. 20a (CSA i, pp. 126-127, and note 1 on p. 127).
159 SA 69-71: T 2, p. 18b-c (CSA i, pp. 113-116). See also CSA i, p. 133, note 5.

> ... As for 'should be taught' (當說), so also for '*exist*' (有) and 'should be known' (當知).

Yin Shun suggests that the above expressions found in the SA are connected with the Sarvāstivāda emphasis on "existence" in past, future, and present time.[160] By contrast, in SN 22. 62, the discourse called Niruttipatha "Mode of expression", the Buddha explains in detail the need to distinguish the three times: any material form (feeling, perception, activities, consciousness) in the past is to be spoken of as "existed" (ahosi); in the future as "will exist" (bhavissati); in the present as "exists" (atthi).[161] Yin Shun points out that this discourse, which has no SA counterpart, is affirming the theory of "the existence of present time", a teaching of the Tāmraśāṭīya tradition (Pāli Buddhism).[162] This matter is worthy of further research.

The following indications of sectarian influence have been identified:

1. An emphasis on emptiness in SA.
2. Implied acceptance of the Bodhisattva ideal (down-grading of the arhant) in SA.
3. Evidence of the "Mind-only" doctrine in SA.
4. Reference to "the purifying view of the noble dharma-mark" (聖法印知見清淨) found only in SA.
5. Evidence of the theory of the existence of past, future, and present time (Sarvāstivāda) in SA, as against the Pāli tradition's acceptance of only the existence of present time in SN.

Taken together, these strongly suggest that the existing SN and SA contain an admixture of later sectarian teachings.

10. Conclusion

This comparison of the Khandha Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart, the Yin Xiangying of SA, has revealed that most of the teachings covered are shared between the two versions. However, it has also revealed a significant number of unshared elements, some of which are identifiable as sectarian. Such cases of agreement and disagreement would clearly need to be taken into account in any attempt to identify and discuss the teachings of early Buddhism.

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160 CSA i, "RESA", p. 57.

161 SN iii, pp. 71-72.

162 CSA i, "RESA" pp. 57-58.

CHAPTER 3: THE SENSE SPHERES

This chapter will comparatively examine the main teachings contained in the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta (Connected with the Six Sense Spheres) of SN, and its counterpart, the Ruchu Xiangying (入處相應,[1] Connected with the Sense Spheres) of SA. The SN version has 207 discourses, and the SA version has 131;[2] some seventy-four discourses are common to the two versions.

1. The term "Sense spheres"

The English "sense spheres" is adopted here for the Pāli/Sanskrit term *āyatana* (Chinese ruchu 入處 or chu 處). In many cases "sense faculties" or "sense organs" would be satisfactory, the reference being to eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind (the saḷāyatana, 六入處 liu ruchu); however, *āyatana* (*ruchu*) often covers also the corresponding sense objects – visible forms, sounds, etc. – thus necessitating the broader term "sense spheres".[3]

The scope of the term *āyatana* (入處) in both versions is illustrated in the following quotations:[4]

> SN 35. 13 (no SA counterpart): What is the flavour, the danger, and the giving up of eye (cakkhussa), ear (sotassa), nose (ghānassa), tongue (jivhāya), body (kāyassa), and mind (manassa)? ... As long as I did not thoroughly understand, as they really are, the flavour, the danger, and the giving up of these *six internal sense spheres* (channam ajjhattikānam āyatanānam) ...

> SN 35. 14 (no SA counterpart): What is the flavour, the danger, and the giving up of visible forms (rūpānaṃ), sounds (saddānaṃ), odours (gandhānaṃ), tastes (rasānaṃ), tactile objects (phoṭṭhabbānaṃ), and mental objects (dhammānam)? ... As long as I did not thoroughly understand, as they really are, the flavour, the

1 The title is given in CSA as Ruchu Xiangying (Skt. Āyatana Saṃyukta) and in FSA as Liu-ruchu Xiangying (六入處相應 Skt. Ṣaḍ-āyatana Saṃyukta) (CSA i, p. 213; FSA i, pp. 10, 16).

2 On the discourses and their locations in the two versions, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 244, 250.

3 PED, p. 105.

4 SN iv, pp. 7-8. Cf. SN 35. 15-18: SN iv, pp. 7-12. T 2, p. 90c (CSA i, p. 408). Cf. SA 198, 208: T 2, pp. 50c, 52c (CSA i, pp. 222, 253).

> danger, and the giving up of these *six external sense spheres* (channam bāhirānam āyatanānam) ...
>
> SA 323 (no SN counterpart): ... There are *six internal sense spheres* (六内入處). What are the six? Namely, the internal sense spheres of eye (眼), ear (耳), nose (鼻), tongue (舌), body (身), and mind (意).
>
> SA 324 (no SN counterpart): ... There are the *six external sense spheres* (六外入處).[5] What are the six? Namely, visible forms (色) are an external sense sphere; sounds (聲), odours (香), tastes (味), tactile objects (觸), and mental objects (法) are external sense spheres. These are called the *six external sense spheres*.

In the two versions the *six internal sense spheres* are also called the *six faculties* or *organs* (cha indriyāni 六根).[6] This shows the term *āyatana* or 入處 being used, in the two versions, both for the six sense faculties – the "internal sense spheres", and for the corresponding six sense objects – the "external sense spheres", thus:

Six internal sense spheres (sense faculties/organs):		**Six external sense spheres** (sense objects):
eye	------------------------------------	visible forms[7]
ear	------------------------------------	sounds
nose	------------------------------------	odours
tongue	------------------------------------	tastes
body	------------------------------------	tactile objects
mind	------------------------------------	mental objects

There are, therefore, twelve sense spheres, though the term "twelve sense spheres" (十二入處) is found only in one discourse of SA.[8]

The term "six sense spheres" (saḷāyatana[9] 六入處) is also used in SN and SA in reference to the six sense faculties; however, it appears only once in

5 = 六境.

6 SN 35. 198: SN iv, p. 176; SA 279, 1167, 1171: T 2, pp. 76a, 311c, 313a-b (CSA i, pp. 369, 323, 331). According to PED (p. 121) "Indriya" means "faculty, function".

7 Here *rūpa* (色) is visible form, a meaning different from that of *rūpa* as the first of the *five aggregates*, which is material form.

8 That is, in only one discourse of Ruchu Xiangying: SA 319: T 2, p. 91a (CSA i, p. 405). The Pāli counterpart, SN 35. 23: SN iv, p. 15, lacks the term.

9 = chaḷāyatana, cha-āyatana.

Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta and twice in Ruchu Xiangying, namely at SN 35. 117 = SA 211, and SA 230.[10] The discourse SN 35. 117 begins with the Buddha teaching about the cessation of each sense faculty and of its corresponding sense perception (cakkhu and rūpasaññā, etc.):[11]

> So, bhiksus, there are *the sense spheres to be known* (āyatane veditabbe), namely: Wherein *eye* (cakkhuṃ) ceases (nirujjhati) and *perception of visible forms* (rūpasaññā) fades away (virajjati) is a sense sphere to be known; ... wherein *tongue* (jivhā) ceases and *perception of tastes* (rasasaññā) fades away is a sense sphere to be known; ... wherein *mind* (mano) ceases and *perception of mental objects* (dhammasaññā) fades away is a sense sphere to be known.

The bhiksus subsequently ask Ānanda to explain this teaching, and he concludes his explanation by saying:[12]

> ... This, friends, is the teaching of the Exalted One concerning the cessation of *the six sense spheres* (saḷāyatana-nirodhaṃ).

The counterpart SA 211 is similar, but has the Buddha himself also using the term "six sense spheres" (六入處 liu ruchu) for the six sense faculties.[13] Thus, there exists in the Pāli Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta just this one occurrence of the term *saḷāyatana* after which the saṃyutta is named.

Another term closely similar in meaning is cha phassāyatanāni (六觸入處) "six contact-spheres". This term occurs frequently in the two versions.[14] The six are enumerated at SN 35. 94:[15]

> Bhiksus, there are these *six contact-spheres* (cha phassāyatanā)[16] ... What six? The *eye contact-sphere* (cakkhuṃ phassāyatanam) ... the

10 SN 35. 117: SN iv, p. 100 = SA 211: T 2, p. 53b-c (CSA i, pp. 257-258). SA 230: T 2, p. 56b (CSA i, p. 275), but its counterparts, SN 35. 65-66, 68: SN iv, pp. 38-40, lack the term.

11 SN iv, p. 98.

12 SN iv, p. 100.

13 T 2, p. 53a-c (CSA i, pp. 257-259).

14 SN 35. 71-73, 94, 103, 134-135, 193, 204-205: SN iv, pp. 43-45, 70, 83, 124-126, 168, 191-192,196. SA 209-210, 249, 279, 1169-1170, 1175: T 2, pp. 52c-53a, 60a, 76b, 312b-313a, 315b (CSA i, pp. 254-256, 299, 370, 327, 330, 342); cf. SA 246: T 2, p. 59a (CSA i, p. 294).

15 SN iv, p. 70 (= SA 279: T 2, p. 76b; CSA i, p. 370).

> *tongue contact-sphere* (jivhā phassāyatanam) ... the *mind contact-sphere* (mano phassāyatanam) ...

SA 209 has a similar statement:[17]

> There are the *six contact-spheres* (六觸入處). What six? The *eye contact-sphere* (眼觸入處), the *ear* (耳), *nose* (鼻), *tongue* (舌), *body* (身), and the *mind contact-sphere* (意觸入處).

An explanation of the six is provided at SN 35. 106 and its counterpart SA 218:[18]

> Conditioned by eye [and the rest] and visible forms [and the rest] arises eye-consciousness (cakkhuviññāṇaṃ眼識) [and the rest]. The coming together of the three is *contact* (phasso 觸).

Each of the six internal sense spheres (sense faculties) together with its corresponding external sense sphere (sense object) gives rise to a corresponding kind of consciousness; and the "coming together" of these three (sense faculty, object, and consciousness) is *contact* (phassa). There are, therefore, six contacts with the sense spheres.

The nature of the *six internal* and *six external sense spheres* is explained in two SA discourses, SA 322 and SA 306, neither of which has an SN counterpart.[19] The following summarises the content of this explanation.

According to SA 322:

(a) Of the internal sense spheres (sense faculties), eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body are "pure materiality (淨色), based on the four great elements (四大所造)"; they are invisible (不可見) and objective (有對).

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16 Elsewhere the plural consistently ends in -āni.

17 T 2, p. 52c (CSA i, p. 254) (= SN 35. 71-73: SN iv, pp. 43-45).

18 SN iv, pp. 86-87; T 2, p. 54c (CSA i, pp. 267-268). See also SN 35. 93 = SA 214: SN iv, p. 68; T 2, p. 54a (CSA i, p. 263), SN 35. 107: SN iv, p. 87 (no SA counterpart), SA 213 (counterpart of SN 35. 92: SN iv, p. 67), SA 221 (no SN counterpart), and SA 228 (no SN counterpart): T 2, pp. 54a, 55a, 55c-56a (CSA i, pp. 261-262, 269-270, 272-273).

19 T 2, pp. 91c, 87c-88a (CSA i, pp. 407, 389-390). Yin Shun states that SA 322 is a sectarian Sarvāstivādin text called "別法處經" (the Discourse on Distinguishing the Sense Spheres of Dharma) (CSA i, p. 408, note 1).

(b) Of the internal sense spheres, the mind (意, P. mano/manas), whether as "mental state (心 citta), mind (意 mano) or consciousness (識 viññāṇa)", is non-material (非色); it is invisible, and non-objective (無對).

(c) Of the external sense spheres (sense objects), visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, and touches are "materiality, based on the four great elements", and are objective. Visible forms are visible; sounds, odours, tastes, and touches are invisible.

(d) Of the external sense spheres, mental objects (法, P. dhammā) belong to a category outside both the six internal sense spheres (sense faculties) and the five external sense spheres (sense objects). Mental objects (法) are invisible, and non-objective.

According to SA 306:

The six internal and six external sense spheres give rise to the corresponding kinds of consciousness (識); the coming together of these three (sense faculties, sense objects, and consciousness) is contact (觸); conditioned by contact arise feeling (受), perception (想) and volition (思). These four – consciousness, feeling, perception and volition – are "the non-material aggregates" (無色陰),[20] whereas the body-faculty (身根) is "the material aggregate" (色陰).[21]

Thus, according to these two SA discourses, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body, together with their corresponding visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, and touches are "the material aggregate" (色陰); the mind (意), also given as "mental state (心), mind (意), or consciousness (識)", is "the non-material aggregate" (無色陰); and mental objects (法) are neither material nor non-material.

To summarise, the two versions agree in recognising two kinds of *sense spheres* (āyatanāni 入處): *six internal sense faculties* and their corresponding *six external sense objects*. They also agree in almost totally avoiding the terms, *six sense spheres* (saḷāyatana 六入處) and *twelve sense spheres*, and in frequently referring to the *sense spheres* in terms of the *six contact-spheres* (cha phassāyatanā(ni) 六觸入處).

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20 Skt. arūpa-skandha.

21 Skt. rūpa-skandha.

2. Knowing things as they really are

As with the five aggregates (Chapter 2), so here also the two versions agree in frequently stating that for the ending of suffering, one must know (or see) things "as they really are" (yathābhūtaṃ) with respect to the sense spheres.

For example, SN 35. 71 has the Buddha saying:[22]

> Bhiksus! Whichever bhiksu does not know (nappajānāti), as they really are, the arising (samudaya), the cessation (atthagama), the flavour (assāda), the danger (ādīnava), and the giving up (nissaraṇa) of the *six contact-spheres*, has not established noble conduct (brahmacariya); he is far from this dharma-discipline (dhamma-vinaya).

The corresponding SA 209 has virtually the same.[23]

In connection with the items "the arising", "the cessation", and so on, similar statements occur elsewhere in other discourses, but with the *six contact-spheres* often replaced by approximate equivalents, such as the *six internal sense spheres*, or the *six internal* and *six external sense spheres*. Also, some of those discourses do not refer to "knowing things as they really are", and do not always have the same number of items. The following are examples.

– (1) the arising, (2) the cessation, (3) the flavour, (4) the danger, and (5) the giving up of the six internal sense spheres.[24] – (1) the arising, (2) the cessation, (3) the flavour, (4) the danger, and (5) the giving up of the six external sense spheres.[25] – (1) the arising, (2) the cessation, (3) the flavour, (4) the danger, and (5) the giving up of the six contact-spheres.[26]
– (1) karma (action) that is old (purāṇakamma, referring to action of the six internal sense spheres), (2) karma that is new (navakamma), (3) the

22 SN iv, p. 43. See also SN 35. 72-73: SN iv, pp. 44-45.

23 T 2, p. 52 (CSA i, p. 254), counterpart of SN 35. 71-73: SN iv, pp. 43-44.

24 SA 234: T 2, p. 57a (CSA i, p. 278), but not in the corresponding SN 35. 116: SN iv, pp. 93-97.

25 SN 35. 136: SN iv, p. 127, and its counterpart, SA 308: T 2, p. 88b-c (CSA i, pp. 392-393).

26 SN 35. 71-73: SN iv, pp. 43-45, and their counterpart, SA 209: T 2, p. 52 (CSA i, p. 254); SN 35. 103: SN iv, p. 83 (no SA counterpart; cf. MA 114: T 1, p. 603a).

cessation of karma (kammanirodha), and (4) the way leading to the cessation of karma (kammanirodhagāminī paṭipadā).[27]
– (1) the world (世間, explained as referring to the six internal sense spheres), (2) the arising, (3) the cessation of the world, and (4) the way leading to the cessation of the world.[28]

– (1) the flavour, (2) the danger, and (3) the giving up of the six internal and six external sense spheres.[29]

– (1) the arising, and (2) the cessation of the six internal and six external sense spheres (equated with dukkha, "suffering").[30]
– (1) the arising of suffering (referring to the suffering nature of the six contacts), and (2) the cessation of suffering.[31]
– (1) the way leading to the arising of suffering (equated with the suffering nature of the six contacts), and (2) the way leading to the cessation of suffering.[32]
– (1) the arising of the world (loka, explained as referring to the suffering nature of the six contacts), and (2) the cessation of the world.[33]
– (1) the arising of the mass of suffering (equated with the suffering nature of the six contacts), and (2) the cessation of the mass of suffering.[34]

– the all (sabba 一切, referring to both the six internal and six external sense spheres).[35]
– all dharmas (一切法, referring to the six contacts that give rise to feeling).[36]
– the twofold (dvaya 二法, referring to both the six internal and six external sense spheres).[37]
– the twofold (dvaya) or two causal conditions (二因緣) which give rise

27 SN 35. 145: SN iv, pp. 132-133 (no SA counterpart).
28 SA 233: T 2, p. 56 (CSA i, p. 277; no SN counterpart).
29 SN 35. 13-18: SN iv, pp. 7-13 (no SA counterpart).
30 SN 35. 21-22: SN iv, p. 14 (no SA counterparts).
31 SN 35. 106: SN iv, p. 86 (counterpart of SA 218; CSA i, pp. 267-268).
32 SA 218: T 2, p. 54c (counterpart of SN 35. 106; CSA i, pp. 267-268).
33 SN 35. 107: SN iv, p. 87 (no SA counterpart).
34 SN 35. 113: SN iv, p. 90 (no SA counterpart).
35 SN 35. 23: SN iv, p. 15, and its counterpart SA 319: T 2, p. 91a-b (CSA i, p. 405).
36 SA 321: T 2, p. 91b (CSA i, p. 406; no SN counterpart).
37 SN 35. 92: SN iv, p. 67, and its counterpart SA 213: T 2, p. 54a (CSA i, pp. 261-262).

to consciousness (or to the six contacts).[38]
– Māra (the Evil One), the sentient being (satta), suffering (dukkha), or the world (loka) (each referring to the nature of the six contacts).[39]
– the way conducive to nirvana (nibbāna-sappāya-paṭipadā 涅槃道跡, referring to seeing (knowing) the nature of the six contacts as impermanent and not-self).[40]

These teachings on the *sense spheres* will now be examined in two divisions: 2.1. The arising, the cessation, and the way leading to the cessation; 2.2. The flavour, the danger, and the giving up.

2.1. The arising, the cessation, and the way leading to the cessation

As with the five aggregates (Chapter 2), the teachings here on "the arising", "the cessation", and "the way leading to the cessation" naturally constitute a closely linked triad. This section will first present various accounts of these teachings (in ten groups), and then identify what is common and what unshared between the two versions.

(1) SN 35.21 reads:[41]

> Bhiksus, that which is the arising (uppādo), the persistence (ṭhiti), the birth (abhinibbatti), the appearance (pātubhāvo) of *eye* [ear, and the rest of the six internal sense spheres] is the arising of suffering, the persistence of sicknesses, the appearance of ageing-and-death.
>
> But that, bhiksus, which is the cessation (nirodho), the calming (vūpasamo), the disappearance (atthagamo) of *eye* [ear ...] is the cessation of suffering, the calming of sicknesses, the disappearance of ageing-and-death.

38 SN 35. 93: SN iv, p. 67, counterpart SA 214: T 2, p. 54a (CSA i, p. 263).

39 SN. 35. 65-68: SN iv, pp. 38-40, and their counterpart SA 230: T 2, p. 56a-b (CSA i, p. 275; counterpart of SN 35. 65-66, 68). On "Māra pāpimant" (the Evil One), cf. also SN 35. 114-115: SN iv, pp. 91-93 = SA 243: T 2, p. 58c (CSA i, p. 292); SN 35. 199: SN iv, p. 178 = SA 1167: T 2, p. 311c (CSA i, p. 323); SN 35. 202: SN iv, pp. 185-187 = SA 1176: 316b-c (CSA i, p. 346). On "the world", cf. also SN 35. 82 and 84: SN iv, pp. 52-53 = SA 231: T 2, p. 56b (CSA i, p. 276).

40 SN 35. 146 and 148: SN iv, pp. 133-135, and their counterparts SA 219-220: T 2, p. 55a (CSA i, p. 268). On "the way", cf. SN 35. 30-32: SN iv, pp. 21-26 (no SA counterparts) and SA 221: T 2, p. 55a (no SN counterpart; CSA i, pp. 269-270).

41 SN iv, p. 14.

The teaching continues in the next discourse, SN 35. 22:[42]

> Bhiksus, that which is the arising, the persistence, the birth, the appearance of *visible forms* [sounds, and the rest of the six external sense spheres] is the arising of suffering, the persistence of sicknesses, the appearance of ageing-and-death.
>
> But that, bhiksus, which is the cessation, the calming, the disappearance of *visible forms* [sounds ...] is the cessation of suffering, the calming of sicknesses, the disappearance of ageing-and-death.

Thus, SN 35. 21-22 state that the arising and the cessation of the six internal and six external sense spheres are the arising and the cessation of suffering. These two SN discourses lack SA counterparts.

(2) In SA 221, the Buddha says:[43]

> What is the way leading to all attachment[44] (趣一切取道跡)? Conditioned by eye and visible forms arises eye consciousness; the coming together of these three things is contact; conditioned by contact is feeling; conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is attachment ... [so also for the rest of the sense spheres] This is called the way leading to all attachment.
>
> And what is the way leading to the cutting off of all attachment (斷一切取道跡)? One knows thus: Conditioned by eye and visible forms arises eye consciousness; the coming together of these three things is contact; by *the cessation of contact*, feeling ceases; by the cessation of feeling, craving ceases; by the cessation of craving, attachment ceases ... [similarly for the rest of the sense spheres]

This depicts the way leading to the arising of all attachment as beginning with the six internal and six external sense spheres, and the cessation of that attachment as being achieved by the cessation of *contact*, derived from the sense spheres. This SA discourse lacks an SN counterpart.

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42 SN iv, p. 14.
43 T 2, p. 55a (CSA i, pp. 269-270).
44 Skt. upādāna.

(3) SN 35. 106 and its counterpart SA 218 provide further detail on how the six internal and six external sense spheres relate to the arising and cessation of suffering. The SN version reads:[45]

> And what, bhikṣus, is the arising of suffering?
>
> Conditioned by eye and visible forms arises eye consciousness (cakkhuviññāṇaṃ). The coming together of the three is contact (phasso). Conditioned by contact is feeling (vedanā). Conditioned by feeling is *craving* (taṇhā). This is the arising of suffering (dukkhassa samudayo). Conditioned by ear and sounds [and the rest of the six internal and six external sense spheres] ... This, bhikṣus, is the arising of suffering.
>
> And what, bhikṣus, is the cessation (atthagamo) of suffering?
>
> Conditioned by eye [and the rest] and visible forms [and the rest] arises eye consciousness [and the rest]. The coming together of the three is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling. Conditioned by feeling is craving. *But by the complete fading away and cessation of that craving* (tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodhā), *attachment* (upādāna) *ceases*. By the cessation of attachment, becoming (bhava) ceases. By the cessation of becoming, birth (jāti) ceases. By the cessation of birth cease ageing-and-death, grief, distress, pain, depression and despair. This, bhikṣus, is the cessation of suffering.

The corresponding SA 218 has slightly different wording:[46]

> What is the way leading to the arising of suffering?
>
> Conditioned by eye [and the rest] and visible form [and the rest] arises eye consciousness [and the rest]. The coming together of the three is contact. Conditioned by contact is feeling; conditioned by feeling is *craving*; conditioned by craving is *attachment*; conditioned by attachment is *becoming*; conditioned by becoming is *birth*; conditioned by birth arise ageing-sickness-and-death,[47] grief, despair,

45 SN iv, pp. 86-87.
46 T 2, p. 54c (CSA i, pp. 267-268).
47 SA usually includes 病 (sickness), where SN does not.

distress, and pain ... This is the way leading to the arising of suffering.

What is the way leading to the cessation of suffering?

Conditioned by eye [and the rest] and visible form [and the rest] arises eye consciousness [and the rest]; the coming together of these three things is contact. By the cessation of contact, feeling ceases. *By the cessation of feeling, craving ceases. By the cessation of craving, attachment ceases.* By the cessation of attachment, becoming ceases. By the cessation of becoming, birth ceases. By the cessation of birth, ageing-sickness-and-death, grief, despair, distress, and pain cease. Thus ceases the whole mass of suffering ... This is called the way leading to the cessation of suffering.

These two versions differ on the mechanism of the cessation. According to the SN version, the first step is the cessation of *craving*, from which follows the cessation of attachment, and the rest; but according to its SA counterpart, the first step is the cessation of *contact*, which is followed by the cessation of feeling, and the rest. However, the two versions agree on the sequence that leads to the whole mass of suffering (though the SN version states it in full only in its account of cessation):

Conditioned by (1) eye (and the rest) and (2) visible forms (and the rest) arises (3) eye consciousness (and the rest); the coming together of these three is (4) contact; conditioned by contact is (5) feeling; conditioned by feeling is (6) craving; conditioned by craving is (7) attachment; conditioned by attachment is (8) becoming; conditioned by becoming is (9) birth; conditioned by birth arise (10) ageing-(sickness)-and-death, grief, distress, pain, depression and despair.

Thus, both versions depict the sequence that culminates in the arising of suffering as beginning with the *six internal* and *six external sense spheres*. Also, this sequence shows a connection between the *sense spheres* and an abbreviated version of *arising by causal condition* (paṭiccasamuppāda),[48] which explains the causal conditions of suffering.

48 On this teaching, see Chapter 6.

(4) SN 35. 107 (no SA counterpart) is identical with the above SN 35. 106 except that it replaces "suffering" with "the world" (loka).[49]

On the other hand, SA 233 (no SN counterpart) explains "the world", "the arising of the world", and "the way leading to the cessation of the world" rather differently:[50]

> What is the world? It is the six internal sense spheres. ...
>
> What is the arising of the world? It is *craving* that leads to further becoming, accompanied by delight and desire, and finding delight in this or that.
>
> What is the cessation of the world? It is the complete cutting off, abandonment, withdrawal, extinction, fading way, cessation, calming, ending of *craving* that leads to further becoming, accompanied by delight and desire, and finding delight in this or that.
>
> What is the way leading to the cessation of the world? It is the noble eightfold path: right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.

Hence, SN 35. 107 (no SA counterpart) and SA 233 (no SN counterpart), while differing in both wording and content, agree that the arising of the world is due to *craving*, and that the cessation of *craving* is the cessation of the world.

(5) SN 35. 65-68 identify the arising of contact through the six internal and six external sense spheres as the source not only of the world (loka) and suffering (dukkha), or the notions thereof, but also of Māra (the Evil One) and the sentient being (satta), or the corresponding notions (paññatti). In these discourses the Buddha says:[51]

> Samiddhi, where there is eye [ear ...], visible forms [sounds ...], eye consciousness [ear consciousness ...], phenomena (dhammā) to be perceived (viññātabbā) by the eye [ear ...], there is the world [Māra, the sentient being, suffering] or the notion (paññatti) thereof.

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49 SN iv, p. 87.
50 T 2, p. 56c (CSA i, p. 277).
51 SN iv. pp. 38-40.

Absence of the internal and external sense spheres is then similarly equated with absence of the world etc.

The corresponding SA 230 is broadly similar, but it omits suffering, and it continues the series as far as feeling:[52]

> What is the world [the sentient being, Māra]? It is eye [ear ...], visible forms [sounds ...], eye consciousness [ear consciousness ...], eye contact [ear contact ...], feeling conditioned by eye contact and experienced inwardly – unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral feelings – this is called the world [the sentient being, Māra]. Why is this? [Because of] the arising of the *six sense spheres* is the arising of contact, and so on ... and thus arises the whole mass of suffering.

The corresponding negative formulation follows. Thus, the two versions agree in attributing the arising of the world, the sentient being, Māra, (and suffering) ultimately to the sense spheres.

(6) SN 35. 93 and its counterpart SA 214 state that the six contacts give rise to feeling, volition, and perception.

SN 35. 93 states:[53]

> Conditioned by eye [ear ...] and visible form [sound ...] arises eye consciousness [ear consciousness ...]. ... Now, bhiksus, the coming together, the grouping together, the meeting together of these three things is called eye contact [ear contact ...].
>
> Bhiksus! Contacted, *one feels*; contacted, *one wills*; contacted, *one perceives* (phuṭṭho bhikkhave vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti).

The corresponding SA 214 differs slightly.[54] In place of the last sentence quoted above it has: "Contacted, one feels; feeling, one wills; willing, one perceives." (觸已受, 受已思, 思已想.) That is, it makes each of the last three terms conditional on its predecessor, rather than making the three conditional on contact. The three verbs vedeti (one feels), ceteti (one wills), and sañjānāti (one perceives) correspond to the nouns vedanā (feeling), cetanā (volition), and saññā (perception) respectively, represented in SA

52 T 2, p. 56a-b (CSA i, p. 275).
53 SN iv, pp. 67-69.
54 T 2, p. 54a (CSA i, p. 263).

214 by 受, 思, 想. Thus, the two versions agree in stating that the six contacts give rise to feeling, volition, and perception, while differing on just what are the immediate conditions for the arising of volition and perception.

The items listed in this teaching also differ significantly from those seen earlier in group (3) (p. 82). Here (SN 35. 93 = SA 214) we have the six contacts giving rise to feeling, volition, and perception, all of which are members of the set of five aggregates (pañcakkhandhā);[55] but in group (3) (SN 35. 106 = SA 218) the six contacts give rise to feeling, craving, attachment, becoming, birth, and the whole mass of suffering. This difference between the two formulations is a point worthy of further investigation in some future study.

(7) SN 35. 145 (no SA counterpart) discusses four aspects of *karma* (action), namely old karma (purāṇakamma), new karma (navakamma), the cessation of karma (kammanirodha), and the way leading to the cessation of karma (kammanirodhagāminī paṭipadā):[56]

> What, bhiksus, is *old karma*? Eye, bhiksus, which is brought about (abhisaṅkhatam), intended (abhisañcetayitaṃ), and to be felt (vedaniyaṃ), is to be regarded as *old karma*. ... Tongue ... Mind, which is brought about, intended, and to be felt, is to be regarded as old karma. This, bhiksus, is called *old karma*.
>
> And what, bhiksus, is *new karma*? Karma that one performs now, bhiksus, by body (kāyena), by speech (vācāya), by mind (manasā). This, bhiksus, is called *new karma*.
>
> And what, bhiksus, is *the cessation of karma*? The cessation, bhiksus, of body-karma (kāyakamma), speech-karma (vacīkamma), mind-karma (manokamma), by which one contacts release (vimuttiṃ phusati). This, bhiksus, is called *the cessation of karma*.
>
> And what, bhiksus, is *the way leading to the cessation of karma*? It is this noble eightfold path, namely right view ... right concentration. This bhiksus, is called *the way leading to the cessation of karma*.

According to this discourse, *old karma* (old action) is the six internal sense spheres, which have been brought about, intentionally done (in the past)

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55 Cetanā = saṅkhārā, see Chapter 2, p. 28.
56 SN iv, pp. 132-133.

and will be felt; whereas *new karma* is action that one now performs by body-speech-mind. This teaching on karma is not found in SA.

(8) SN 35. 64 and its counterpart SA 310 both teach that the arising of delight (nandi) is the arising of suffering, and the cessation of delight is the cessation of suffering.

SN 35. 64 states:[57]

> There are, Migajāla, visible forms to be perceived by the eye (cakkhuviññeyyā), pleasant, enjoyable, pleasing, desirable in appearance, lust-evoking, causing excitement. If a bhiksu takes delight in them (abhinandati), welcomes them (abhivadati), remains attached to them (ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati), then in him, thus delighted, welcoming, remaining, and attached, there arises delight (nandi). I declare, Migajāla, from *the arising of delight is the arising of suffering* (nandisamudayā dukkhasamudayo). ... [So also for the rest of the sense spheres]
>
> There are, Migajāla, visible forms to be perceived by eye, pleasant, ... If a bhiksu does not take delight in them, ... then in him, ... delight ceases. I declare, Migajāla, from *the cessation of delight is the cessation of suffering* (nandinirodhā dukkhanirodho). ... [Similarly for the rest of the sense spheres]

The corresponding SA 310 has almost identical content.[58] Thus, the two versions agree that the arising (and ceasing) of delight associated with the sense spheres is responsible for the arising (and the cessation) of suffering.

(9) SN 35. 146 has the Buddha say:[59]

> I will teach you, bhiksus, a way conducive to nirvana (nibbānasappāyā paṭipadā). Listen, consider well, I will speak! And what, bhiksus, is a way conducive to nirvana?
>
> Herein, a bhiksu sees (passati) eye [ear ...] as *impermanent* (anicca); sees visible forms [sounds ...] as impermanent; sees eye consciousness [ear consciousness ...] as impermanent; sees eye contact [ear contact ...] as impermanent; sees also feelings – pleasant,

57 SN iv, pp. 37-38. Cf. SN 35. 124 and SN 35. 118: SN iv, pp. 109, 102.
58 T 2, p. 89a (CSA i, pp. 395-396).
59 SN iv, pp. 133-134.

> unpleasant, and neutral – that arise conditioned by eye contact [ear contact ...] as impermanent.
>
> This, bhiksus, is a way conducive to nirvana.

The succeeding discourses, SN 35. 147-149, state in identical wording that seeing the same phenomena as suffering (dukkha), as not-self (anattan), and as impermanent-suffering-not-self are similarly ways conducive to nirvana.[60]

SN 35. 147 and 149 lack SA counterparts. The counterparts of SN 35. 146 and 148, namely SA 219-220, state in similar wording that seeing the phenomena in question as impermanent and as not-self is a way conducive to nirvana.[61] Thus, in both versions seeing the six internal and six external sense spheres and derived phenomena as impermanent, (suffering), and not-self is identified as leading to the attainment of nirvana.

(10) SN 35. 99 has the Buddha say:[62]

> Bhiksus, practise *concentration* (samādhim bhāvetha)! A bhiksu who is concentrated, bhiksus, knows things as they really are (yathābhūtam pajānāti).
>
> And what things does he know as they really are?
>
> He knows eye [ear ...] as impermanent as it is really is. He knows visible forms [sounds ...] ... eye consciousness [ear consciousness ...] ... eye contact [ear contact ...] as impermanent as it really is. These pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings that arise conditioned by eye contact [ear contact ...] he also knows, as impermanent as they really are.

The next discourse, SN 35. 100, has him say:[63]

> Bhiksus, apply yourselves to *solitude* (paṭisallāṇam yogam āpajjatha)! A bhiksu who is secluded (paṭisallīno), bhiksus, knows things as they really are.

60 SN iv, pp. 134-136.
61 T 2, p. 55 (CSA i, p. 268).
62 SN iv, p. 80.
63 SN iv, pp. 80-81.

> And what things does he know as they really are? He knows: ... [as above]

Virtually the same content is found in SN 35. 159-160,[64] and again in SA 207 and 206, which are identified as the counterparts of both pairs of SN discourses.[65] Application to *solitude* (paṭisallāṇa) is a natural preparation for the practice of concentrative meditation (samādhi). The two versions advocate cultivation of concentration as a means conducive to knowing things as they really are – in particular knowing the impermanence of the sixfold series of phenomena that begins with the sense spheres.

Here the two versions mention only two forms of mental cultivation: concentration (samādhi) and knowing impermanence.

To conclude, this section (groups 1-10) has identified various accounts of "the arising", "the cessation", and "the way leading to the cessation" relating to the sense spheres, as recorded in the two versions. The findings can be summarised as follows.

As regards arising, the two versions agree on the following. The arising phenomena – the six contacts derived from the six internal and six external sense spheres – are the arising of suffering, of the world, of the sentient being, or of Māra. The arising of the world and the arising of suffering are also said to be connected with *craving* and *delight* respectively (see groups 4 and 8, above). In this connection, there are two sequences following the arising of the six contacts derived from the sense spheres: (a) the six contacts give rise to feeling, craving, attachment, becoming, birth, and the whole mass of suffering (SN 35. 106 = SA 218, see group 3); and (b) the six contacts give rise to feeling, volition, and perception (SN 35. 93 = SA 214, group 6). The former resembles an abbreviated version of *arising by causal condition* (paṭiccasamuppāda), explaining the causal sequence leading to suffering; the latter shows a connection between the *sense spheres* and three of the *five aggregates*. Regarding the arising of suffering, the two versions generally identify its beginning either in the arising of *contact* derived from the *sense spheres*, or in the arising of *craving* or *delight*, which again is connected with *contact* derived from the *sense spheres*.

Statements about cessation are naturally negative reflections of those on arising. However, the actually occurring statements on cessation that are shared by the two versions are only these: (a) SN 35. 64 and its counterpart SA 310 agree that the cessation of *delight* is the cessation of suffering (see

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64 SN iv, pp. 143-145.

65 T 2, p. 52b-c (CSA i, pp. 251-252).

group 8); (b) although SN 35. 107 and SA 233 (each of which lacks an SA/SN counterpart) differ in wording and content in regard to the world, they agree that the cessation of *craving* is the cessation of the world (group 4). In certain cases the two versions disagree. SN 35. 106 states that by the cessation of *craving*, the rest cease in sequence, whereas its counterpart SA 218 states that by the cessation of *contact*, the rest cease in sequence (group 3). Again, SA 211 states that by the cessation of *contact*, the rest cease in sequence; but it goes only as far as *attachment*, and it has no SN counterpart (group 2). Also, SN 35. 21-22 state that the cessation of the six internal and six external sense spheres is the cessation of suffering (group 1); and they lack SA counterparts. Thus, on the subject of cessation, the two versions agree only in two cases, namely the statements that the ceasing of suffering and of the world begins with the cessation of *delight* and of *craving* respectively, associated with the *sense spheres*.

Regarding the way leading to the cessation, no disagreements are found. The way is variously identified in the two versions as: (a) the noble eightfold path, (b) seeing the phenomena derived from the sense spheres as impermanent, and (c) cultivating concentration and knowing impermanence.

The comparison has further revealed one unshared teaching and one case of disagreement. The teaching on karma – old karma, new karma, the cessation of karma, and the way leading to that cessation – is found only in SN (see group 7). And, whereas SN says "contacted, one feels; contacted, one wills; contacted, one perceives", SA says "contacted, one feels; feeling, one wills; willing, one perceives" (group 6).

2.2. The flavour, the danger, the giving up

SN 35. 13 (no SA counterpart) states:[66]

> The pleasure-and-joy (sukha somanassa) that arises conditioned by eye – this is the *flavour* (assāda) of eye. The impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha), unstable nature (vipariṇāmadhamma) of eye is the *danger* (ādīnava) of eye. The restraining of exciting desire (chandarāgavinaya), abandoning of exciting desire (chandarāga-pahāna) for eye is the *giving up* (nissaraṇa) of eye. [Similarly for ear etc.]

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66 SN iv, p. 7.

SN 35. 14 (also no SA counterpart) states the same, in terms of the corresponding external sense spheres.[67]

As regards occurrences in the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta of SN and the corresponding Ruchu Xiangying of SA, this explanation of flavour, danger, and giving up is found only in the former. However, as seen in Chapter 2, a similar explanation of flavour, danger, and giving up is found in the Yin Xiangying (Skandha Saṃyukta) of SA (see pp. 49-50). Thus, the teaching on flavour, danger, and giving up is common to SN and SA, though not in the present saṃyukta.

3. Seeing things as they really are

In keeping with the pattern seen in Chapter 2 based on the five aggregates, the two versions here agree that one must fully see the nature of the *sense spheres* as impermanent, suffering, (empty), and not-self. This section will investigate this teaching on seeing things as they really are, particularly with regard to the notion of emptiness.

Insight into impermanence, suffering, and not-self is frequently mentioned in both versions. The two contain frequent references to the attainment of a mind that is well liberated (cittaṃ suvimuttaṃ), or totally free from suffering and affliction, through insight into the *sense spheres* as impermanent, suffering, and not-self.[68] The mind becomes well liberated by rightly seeing or knowing, often in this sequence: right view (sammādiṭṭhi), disgust (nibbidā), and destruction of delight and desire (nandirāga-kkhaya).[69]

As in Chapter 2, not-selfhood is variously expressed in the two versions; for example:

- not belonging to you (na tumhākaṃ).[70]
- neither self nor belonging to self (nevattānaṃ na attaniyaṃ).[71]

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67 SN iv, p. 8.

68 E.g. SN 35. 1, 4, 32, 86, 89, 121, 149, 179, 182: SN iv, pp. 1-3, 24-26, 54-55, 63-64, 106-107, 135, 152-154. SA 188, 195-196, 208, 333: T 2, pp. 49b, 50a-b, 52c, 92b (CSA i, pp. 215, 218-219, 253, 411).

69 E.g. SN 35. 155-158: SN iv, pp. 142-143, and their counterparts SA 188-189: T 2, p. 49b (CSA i, pp. 214-215).

70 SN 35. 101-102: SN iv, pp. 81-82. SA 274: T 2, p. 73a (CSA i, p. 355).

71 E.g. SN 35. 193: SN iv, p. 168. Cf. SN 35. 101-102, 137: SN iv, pp. 82, 129. SA 199, 252, 274: T 2, pp. 50c, 61a, 73a (CSA i, pp. 222, 303, 355-356).

- this is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self (netam mama, neso ham asmi, na meso attā).[72] I (ahaṃ), mine (mama), and I am (asmi) do not exist.[73]
- this is not self, this is not other than self, neither is self in this nor this in self (非是我，非異我，不相在).[74]

Insight into the four characteristics of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and not-self finds frequent mention only in SA.[75] However, "empty" or "emptiness" does occur in SN, though it is particularly characteristic of SA. The following five occurrences are attested in Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta:

(1) SN 35. 197:[76]

> Now, bhiksus, I have made this simile to illustrate my meaning, and the interpretation of it is this. ... The empty village (suñño gāmo), bhiksus, is a term (adhivacana) for the six internal sense spheres. If a wise, experienced, intelligent person investigates it with the eye, he finds it just *void* (rittaka), just *vain* (tucchaka), just *empty* (suññaka). ... with the tongue, ... with the mind, ...

Thus, the six internal sense spheres are said to be simply "empty".

The corresponding SA 1172 states:[77]

> I have spoken this simile, and you should understand the meaning. Bhiksus! ... The empty village is a simile for the six internal sense spheres. Good clansman, one observes thus: The eye-sphere is *impermanent-and-decaying* (無常變壞); the one who attaches to eye

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72 SN 35. 1-6, 32, 86-87, 89, 121, 149, 179-184: SN iv, pp. 1-3, 25, 54-55, 58-59, 63-64, 106-107, 135, 153-155.

73 SN 35. 205: SN iv, p. 198.

74 SA 198-199, 209, 248, 273-274, 276: T 2, pp. 50c-51a, 52c-53a, 59c, 72c-73a, 74a-c (CSA i, pp. 222-223, 254, 297, 354, 356, 361-363. Cf. SA 226-227: T 2, p. 55a (CSA i, pp. 271-272).

75 E.g. where SA 1175 has: "One observes the five aggregates as ill, as swelling, as arrow, as painful; as *impermanent*, as *suffering*, as *empty*, as *not-self*", the corresponding SN 35. 204 has only: "One fully knows the arising and the cessation of the five aggregates" (T 2, p. 315b; CSA i, p. 342. SN iv, p. 192). Other SA occurrences at SA 188, 195, 196, 208, 333: T 2, pp. 49b, 50a-b, 52c, 92b (CSA i, pp. 215, 218-219, 253, 411).

76 SN iv, pp. 174-175.

77 T 2, p. 313c (CSA i, p. 334).

> is also an *impermanent and vain phenomenon* (無常虛僞之法). The ear, nose, tongue, body and mind-spheres are also thus.

This teaches that the six internal sense spheres are impermanent, decaying and vain phenomena.

Thus, despite different wording, the two versions state in common that the six internal sense spheres are empty of any permanent entity.

(2) SN 35. 85 records the following conversation between Ānanda and the Buddha:[78]

> Venerable Sir, it is said "The world is empty! The world is empty!" (suñño loko) But in what regard, venerable Sir, is it said that the world is empty?
>
> Ānanda, because of being *empty of self or of anything belonging to self* (suññam attena vā attaniyena vā), the world is said to be empty. And what, Ānanda, is empty of self or of anything belonging to self?
>
> Ānanda, eye is empty of self or of anything belonging to self. Visible forms are empty of self or of anything belonging to self. Eye consciousness ... Eye contact is empty of self or of anything belonging to self. Ear ... nose ... tongue ... body ... mind ... Whatever feeling (vedayitaṃ) pleasant or unpleasant or neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant arises conditioned by mental contact is also empty of self or of anything belonging to self.

The corresponding SA 232 has rather different wording. Here the questioner is Samṛddhi (三彌離提, P. Samiddhi), and the Buddha's answer to the question is:[79]

> Eye is empty, empty of eternal and unchanging nature (常恆不變易法空),[80] empty of anything belonging to self. Why is this? This is

78 SN iv, p. 54.

79 T 2, p. 56b (CSA i, pp. 276-277). The Sanskrit of this discourse has been reconstructed from the Chinese by Étienne LAMOTTE, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra) avec une étude sur la Vacuité*, tome IV (Louvain, 1976), pp. 2112-2113. See also the same author's "Trois Sūtra du Saṃyukta sur la Vacuité", *BSOAS*, 36 (1973), pp. 313-323.

80 LAMOTTE: śāśvatenāvipariṇāmadharmeṇa śūnyam.

> nature as it is (此性自爾).[81] Visible forms, eye consciousness, eye contact, the feeling unpleasant or pleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant that arises conditioned by eye contact is empty, empty of eternal and unchanging nature, empty of anything belonging to self. Why is this? This is nature as it is. Ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are also thus. This is why it is said the world is empty (空世間).[82]

The expressions "empty of eternal and unchanging nature" and "this is nature as it is" found in SA 232 are lacking in SN 35. 85. However, the two versions explain in common that the world is empty because each of the sense spheres with derived phenomena is *empty of self or of anything belonging to self.* In the Pāli, the word "suñña" (empty) is an adjective used with the instrumental case forms "attena" and "attaniyena", hence "empty of self" and "empty of anything belonging to self". Thus, "empty" in both versions means the same as "not-self". It is not being said that any of the items named, such as the six contacts with sense spheres, is absent or does not exist; it is only being said that "self" does not exist in those phenomena.

(3) SA 236 reads:[83]

> The Buddha asked Śāriputra: Into which meditative abode (meditative state) (禪住) do you enter at this time?
>
> Śāriputra answered the Buddha: World-Honoured One, at this time in the forest I enter the meditative abode of *emptiness-concentration* (空三昧).[84]
>
> The Buddha said to Śāriputra: Good, good, Śāriputra. At this time in your seated meditation you are entering *the meditative abode of the elders* (上座禪住).[85]

The Pāli counterpart of this discourse is not in SN, but in the Majjhima Nikāya: MN 151.[86] When compared with SA 236, it confirms that 空三昧

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81 Lamotte: prakṛtir asyaiṣā.
82 Lamotte: śūnyo loka.
83 T 2, p. 57b (CSA i, pp. 280-281).
84 Skt. śūnyatā-samādhi.
85 Skt. sthavira-vihāra?
86 MN iii, pp. 293-297. Another Chinese counterpart is EA 45. 6: T 2, p. 773b-c.

(emptiness-concentration) corresponds to suññatā-vihāra (emptiness-abode),[87] and 上座禪住 (the meditative abode of the elders) corresponds to mahāpurisa-vihāra (abode of great men).[88] Thus, "emptiness-concentration" (SA 236) or "emptiness-abode" (MN 151) is portrayed in the two versions as a highly valued meditation state.

Regarding how one practises this meditation, the two versions share the following teachings (in summary):

A bhiksu who wishes to abide in emptiness-concentration or the emptiness-abode should, when on the alms round, reflect thus: In regard to visible forms perceived by the eye [MN: also sounds perceived by the ear, etc.], do I have desire, longing, craving, or attachment [MN: excitement, desire, hatred, delusion, sensory reaction]? If he knows that he has these mental states, he should make an effort to get rid of them; if he knows that he does not have them, he should mindfully practise skilful states throughout the day.

Thus, the two versions indicate that emptiness-concentration or emptiness-abode is a state of mind that is empty of unskilful states such as desire and longing in connection with the sense spheres.

(4) SA 335 (no SN counterpart):[89]

> I will teach you Dharma ... namely the Discourse on *Emptiness in its Ultimate Meaning* (第一義空經)[90] ... Bhiksus, when the eye arises, *there is no place from which it comes; when it ceases, there is no place to which it goes*. Thus, the eye, being not real, arises; having arisen it ceases completely. It is a result of [previous] action (業報),[91] but there is *no doer* (無作者);[92] when these aggregates cease, other aggregates continue, except in *conventional Dharma* (俗數法 sushu-fa).[93] The same teachings apply also to the ear, nose, tongue, body,

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87 EA 45. 6 (T 2, p. 773b-c) uses the same term 空三昧 as SA 236.

88 EA 45. 6 (T 2, p. 773b-c) indicates that 空三昧 is "the supreme samādhi" (第一三昧) and "the royal samādhi" (王三昧).

89 T 2, p. 92c (CSA i, p. 414; another counterpart is EA 37. 7: T 2, p. 713c). The Sanskrit of SA 335 has been reconstructed from the Chinese by Étienne LAMOTTE; see *Traité*, pp. 2135-2137, and "Trois Sūtra", pp. 313-323.

90 LAMOTTE: *paramārtha-śūnyatā*-sūtra.

91 LAMOTTE: karma-vipāka.

92 LAMOTTE: akartṛka (= not-self).

93 LAMOTTE: dharmasaṃketa.

> and mind, except in conventional Dharma. The conventional Dharma is: Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises,[94] thus: Conditioned by ignorance are activities; conditioned by activities is consciousness, and so on ... and thus arises this whole mass of suffering. And again, *when this does not exist, that does not exist; when this ceases, that ceases*:[95] When ignorance ceases, activities cease; when activities cease, consciousness ceases, and so on ... and thus ceases this whole mass of suffering. Bhiksus, this is called the Discourse on the Nature of Emptiness in its Ultimate Meaning (第一義空法經 diyiyi-kong-fajing).

Thus, to see "emptiness in its ultimate meaning" is to see fully both (a) the nature of conditioned arising and ceasing (the so-called conventional Dharma), and (b) the six internal sense spheres neither coming from anywhere when arising nor going anywhere when ceasing; being not real in arising and ceasing; as results of action (fruits of previous karma), but without a doer (i.e. empty of self).

(5) A similar message is contained in SA 273 (no SN counterpart):[96]

> ... Bhiksus, just as two hands coming together produce sound, so, conditioned by eye and visible forms arises eye consciousness, and these three things together are contact. From contact arise feeling, perception, and volition. *All these phenomena are not-self, impermanent; they are without a permanent self, not eternal, not stable, changing*. Why is this so? Bhiksus, these have the nature of birth, ageing, death, ceasing, and rebirth. Bhiksus, *all compounded things* (行)[97] *are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come* (*arise*) *and go* (*cease*). Therefore, bhiksus, with regard to *all empty compounded things* (空諸行) you should know, rejoice in, and be mindful of this: *All empty compounded things are empty of* [*any*] *permanent, eternal, lasting, unchanging nature;* [*they are*] *not self and not belonging to self* ... [So also for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, with their corresponding objects, consciousness, contact, etc.]

94 LAMOTTE: asmin satīdaṃ bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate.
95 LAMOTTE: asminn asati idaṃ na bhavati, asya nirodhād idaṃ nirudhyate.
96 T 2, p. 72c (CSA i, pp. 353-354).
97 Skt. saṃskārāḥ.

The discourse goes on to say that as each of the six internal sense spheres is impermanent, so it is suffering; and being suffering, it is not-self. And seeing this, one becomes disgusted with each of the six internal sense spheres; being disgusted, one does not delight in it; not delighting, one attains *liberation* (解脫) and *liberation-knowledge and vision* (解脫知見).

Thus, "empty" as used here (SA 273) refers mainly to absence of self, to self being not real, as seen in the coming (arising) and going (ceasing) of the sense spheres and derived phenomena. This teaching is similar to that of the Discourse on Emptiness in its Ultimate Meaning (SA 335) discussed above. The present discourse (SA 273) is identified by Yin Shun as a "text chanted in the Sarvāstivādin tradition".[98]

The findings of this section may be summarised as follows:

Seeing the *sense spheres* and related phenomena as "impermanent, suffering, and not-self" is a common teaching in the two versions, whereas seeing them as "impermanent, suffering, *empty*, and not-self" is frequent only in SA. However, the item "empty" or "emptiness", though it particularly characterises SA, does appear also in a few Pāli counterparts. Here, the notion of emptiness usually means that the sense spheres and related phenomena are empty of permanence, or empty *of self*. A seemingly different meaning is that the mind is empty of unskilful states in connection with the sense spheres.

4. Practices involving the sense spheres

Closely connected with the notion of the *sense spheres* are teachings concerning body-and-mind in everyday practice. These teachings will now be examined in seven groups:

(1) Three practices

SN 35. 198 and SN 35. 120 (no SA counterparts) describe in very similar manner a set of three practices. SN 35. 198 will be quoted here. It has the Buddha saying thus:[99]

> Bhiksus, possessed of three things a bhiksu dwells full of pleasure and happiness (sukhasomanassabahulo) in this very life, and has a basis for the destruction of the influxes (āsavānaṃ khayāya). What three? He is *one who guards the sense-doors* (indriyesu guttadvāro), is

98 CSA i, p. 355, note 1: 撫掌喻經 (Hand-clapping Simile Sūtra).
99 SN iv, pp. 175-177 (see also SN iv, pp. 103-105: SN 35. 120).

moderate in eating (bhojane mattaññu), and is *devoted to wakefulness* (jāgariyam anuyutto).

And how, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *one who guards the sense-doors*?

Herein a bhiksu, *seeing a visible object with the eye does not grasp at its outward appearance* (na nimittagāhī) *nor at its secondary features* (nānuvyañjanaggāhī). Since covetousness (abhijjhā), distress (domanassā), those evil unskilful states (pāpakā-akusalā-dhammā), might attack one who remains with *the eye faculty* unrestrained, he applies himself to restraint (saṃvarāya) protects (rakkhati) *the eye faculty*, applies restraint (saṃvaram) of *the eye faculty*. Hearing a sound with the ear ... smelling a scent with the nose ... tasting a savour with the tongue ... touching tangibles with the body ... cognising (viññāya) a mental object with the mind ... Bhiksus, just so, a bhiksu practises for guarding (ārakkhāya), restraint (saṃyamāya), taming (damāya), and calming (upasamāya) of *the six faculties* (channam indriyānam). Thus, bhiksus, is a bhiksu one who guards the sense-doors.

And how, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *moderate in eating*?

Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu takes food with proper care, not for fun, indulgence, not for personal charm and adornment, but for maintenance and sustenance of the body, to overcome its pangs, to aid the practice of the noble conduct. ... That, bhiksus, is how a bhiksu is moderate in eating.

And how, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *devoted to wakefulness*?

Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu during the day, by walking up and down and sitting, purifies his mind (cittam) of hindering mental states (āvaraṇiyehi dhammehi). In the first watch of the night by walking up and down and sitting he purifies his mind of hindering mental states. In the middle watch of the night he lies down on his right side like a lion, placing one foot on the other, mindful and aware, fixing his mind intently on the thought of rising. In the last watch of the night, having risen, by walking up and down and sitting, he purifies his mind of hindering mental states. Thus, bhiksus, is a bhiksu devoted to wakefulness.

Of the three practices described here (SN 35. 198, similar to SN 35. 120) the first, *guarding the sense-doors*, is specifically based on the six internal sense spheres and derived phenomena. The others are more general.

(2) Four practices

The same three practices, plus a fourth are described in SA 275. This discourse has its Pāli counterpart not in SN but in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, namely AN 8. 9.[100] In both versions the Buddha says that the bhiksu Nanda is able to practise the noble life with fullness and purity because:

i. he is one who has guarded or closed sense-doors (防護/關閉根門)
ii. he is moderate in drinking and eating (飲食知量)
iii. he is devoted to practice in the first and last watches of the night (初夜後夜精勤修習)
iv. he is possessed of right mindfulness and right comprehension (正念正智成就)[101]

The fourth practice is described thus:[102]

> Looking to the eastern quarter, the good clansman Nanda, who is possessed of one-pointed mind and right mindfulness, remains stable and observing. The same applies for looking to the southern, western, and northern quarters. So observing, worldly covetousness (貪), distress (憂), those evil unskilful states (惡不善法) do not flow into his mind. He retains right mindfulness, does not let scattered mind occur, and knows (覺): the arising (起), enduring (住), and ceasing (滅) of all feelings (受); the arising, enduring, and ceasing of all perceptions (想); and the arising, enduring, and ceasing of all reflections (覺).[103]

The addition of this fourth item is the only significant difference between the content of this discourse (SA 275 = AN 8. 9) and the ones considered above (SN 35. 198, SN 35. 120).

100 T 2, p. 73a-c (CSA i, pp. 356-358). AN iv, pp. 166-168.
101 In the counterpart AN iv, p. 166: satisampajaññena samannāgato.
102 T 2, p. 73b (CSA i, p. 357). A similar teaching is also found in the counterpart: AN iv, pp. 166, 168.
103 Skt. vitarka.

(3) Mind-liberation, wisdom-liberation

The two versions contain frequent accounts of the practice of guarding the sense-doors.[104] They also often state that guarding the sense-doors is conducive to *mind-liberation* and *wisdom-liberation* (ceto-vimutti paññā-vimutti 心解脱慧解脱).[105] For example, SN 35. 132:[106]

> In what regard, Kaccāna, does one have *guarded sense-doors* (guttadvāro)?
>
> Herein, brahmin, a bhiksu, seeing an object with the eye, is not attached to pleasant objects, or is not repelled by unpleasant objects. He remains with mindfulness established (upaṭṭhitāya satiyā), with immeasurable mind (appamāṇacetaso). Thus he knows, as it really is, that *mind-liberation*, that *wisdom-liberation*, so that those evil unskilful states that have arisen cease without remainder.
>
> Hearing a sound with the ear ... cognising a mental object with the mind, he is not attached ... Thus, brahmin, does one have guarded sense-doors.

The corresponding SA 255 has similar content.[107] Hence, the two versions link *mind-liberation, wisdom-liberation* with the practice of guarding the sense-doors.

(4) Overcoming sensuality

SN 35. 127 and its counterpart SA 1165 describe in very similar terms two meditative practices that may precede the practice of guarding the sense-doors. The venerable Piṇḍola of Bhāradvāja is asked how it is that young bhiksus can live happily in noble conduct (brahmacariya) without

104 SN 35. 132 and its counterpart SA 255: SN iv, pp. 119-120; T 2, p. 64a-b (CSA i, pp. 315-316); SN 35. 202 = SA 1176: SN iv, pp. 184-186; T 2, p. 316b-c (CSA i, p. 346); SN 35. 203 = SA 1173: SN iv, pp. 189-190; T 2, p. 314a-b (CSA i, p. 336); SN 35. 206 = SA 1170-1171: SN iv, pp. 198-200; T 2, p. 313a-b (CSA i, pp. 330-331. Cf. EA 38. 8: T 2, pp. 723c-724a). SN 35. 153: SN iv, p. 140 (no SA counterpart). SN 35. 94, 96, 97-98, 127, 134, 199, 205: SN iv, pp. 70, 76-77, 78-80, 112, 125, 178, 195-196 = SA 279, 278, 277, 1165, 212, 1167, 1169: T 2, pp. 76a-b, 75c, 311b, 53c, 311c, 312b (CSA i, pp. 369-370, 368, 367, 320, 260, 323, 327).

105 E.g. SN 35. 132, 202-203, 206: SN iv, pp. 119-120, 184-186, 189-190, 198-200; SA 255, 1176, 212: T 2, pp. 64a-b, 316b-c, 53c (CSA i, pp. 346, 315-316, 260).

106 SN iv, p. 120.

107 T 2, p. 64a-b (CSA i, p. 316).

sensual pleasures (kāmā). He replies that it is because they apply the practice of mother-mind (mātu-cittam), sister-mind (bhaginī-cittam), and daughter-mind (dhītu-cittam), taught by the Buddha. When a young bhiksu sees women or girls he generates the thought that they are just like his own mother, sister, or daughter. If, however, his mind is still unsteady and burning with desire-hatred-delusion, then he should turn to the practice of reflecting on the body as impure (asubha 不淨), as full of impurities, both internally and externally. If that reflection also proves ineffective, then finally one should take up the practice of remaining with guarded sense-doors.[108]

(5) Guarding the sense-doors versus Brahmanical practices

SN 35. 132 and its counterpart SA 255 combine the teaching of guarding the sense-doors with a criticism of certain practices and attitudes of the brahmins (brāhmaṇā). The venerable Mahā-Kaccāna[109] hears some young pupils of the brahmin Lohicca noisily vilifying certain recluses (samaṇā) as "menials, black fellows, offspring of Brahmā's feet".[110] Mahā-Kaccāna responds to this expression of traditional brahmanical superiority and racism by criticising such brahmanical practices as fasting, ritual bathing and chanting ritual texts, and advocating mindful practices, such as guarding the sense-doors. His versified lecture (largely identical in the two versions)[111] prompts a visit by Lohicca himself. The brahmin asks to be told more about guarding the sense-doors, and Mahā-Kaccāna obliges with the usual account of the practice. Lohicca is delighted. According to SN 35. 132 he asks to take the Three Refuges and becomes a disciple (upāsaka) of Mahā-Kaccāna;[112] according to SA 255 Lohicca simply returns home.[113]

(6) Development of the sense faculties

SA 282 and its counterpart MN 152[114] have the Buddha ask Uttara, a young pupil of the brahmin Pārāsariya, whether his master teaches his disciples "the development of the faculties" (修諸根 indriyabhāvanā). Uttara says yes, and explains: My teacher teaches that "one should not see forms with the eye, one should not hear sounds with the ear."[115] The Buddha

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108 SN iv, pp. 110-112; T 2, p. 311a-b (CSA i, p. 320).
109 = Mahā-Kaccāyana (Skt. Mahā-Kātyāyāna).
110 SN iv, p. 117. Cf. T 2, p. 63b (CSA i, p. 314).
111 SN iv, pp. 117-118. T 2, p. 63c (CSA i, p. 314).
112 SN iv, p. 121.
113 T 2, p. 64c (CSA i, p. 316).
114 T 2, pp. 78a-79a (CSA i, pp. 378-381). MN iii, pp. 298-301.
115 T 2, p. 78a (CSA i, p. 378). MN iii, p. 298: "cakkhunā rūpaṃ na passati, sotena saddaṃ na suṇāti".

replies: "So a blind person has developed sense faculties! Why? Simply because a blind person does not see forms with the eye." And Ānanda adds: "So a deaf person has developed sense faculties! Why? Simply because a deaf person does not hear sounds with the ear." (So SA; MN attributes both comments to the Buddha.)[116] The Buddha tells Ānanda that the development of the sense faculties taught by himself is very different from that taught by Uttara's brahmin teacher. Then he explains the "incomparable development of the sense faculties" (無上修根 anuttarā indriyabhāvanā) as taught in his Noble Discipline. It has to do with fully knowing and seeing the arising and cessation of pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral feelings, in connection with the six sense faculties and the six external sense objects (in SA: also the six kinds of consciousness), and with the corresponding ability to remain aloof from those feelings.[117] This is clearly a similar practice to guarding the sense-doors.

(7) Seeing unskilful states

In SN 35. 152 the Buddha says:[118]

> Is there, bhiksus, any method (pariyāya), by following which a bhiksu is apart from belief (aññatreva saddhāya), apart from preference (aññatra ruciyā), apart from hearsay (aññatrānussavā), apart from methodological argument (aññatrākāraparivitakkā), apart from reflection on theory (aññatra diṭṭhi-nijjhānakhantiyā), apart from speculation (aññam vyākareyya), and fully knows thus: "Birth is ended, noble conduct is established, done is what was to be done, there is no more of further becoming"?
>
> ... There is indeed a method ... And what is that method?
>
> Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu, seeing a visible object with the eye, either knows the existence of desire (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha) within him, thus: 'I inwardly have desire, hatred, and delusion', or knows the non-existence of desire, hatred, and delusion within him, thus: 'I inwardly do not have desire, hatred, and delusion'. Now, bhiksus, I ask: As to that knowing the existence or non-existence of desire, hatred, and delusion within him, are these

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116 T 2, p. 78b (CSA i, p. 379). MN iii, p. 298.
117 T 2, pp. 78b-79a (CSA i, pp. 379-381). MN iii, pp. 298-300.
118 SN iv, pp. 138-139.

states (dhammā) to be known (veditabbā) by belief, or preference, or hearsay, or methodological argument, or reflection on theory?

Surely not, venerable sir.

Are not these states to be known by seeing (disvā) with wisdom (paññāya).

Surely, venerable sir.

Again, as to hearing a sound with the ear ...

The corresponding SA 313 differs in detail of wording but has similar content.[119] This practice of fully knowing, with regard to the sense faculties, the presence or absence of unskilful mental states such as desire, hatred, and delusion is again very similar to the practice of guarding the sense-doors. The two versions state in common that this practice yields knowing and seeing through direct experience, without dependence on belief, hearsay, argumentation, and so on.

This section, having presented examples of teachings on various practices, particularly guarding the sense-doors, has revealed no significant differences between the two versions; and it has demonstrated the importance attached to such practices in both traditions.

5. Sectarian and later components

Some unshared, possibly sectarian, components have been identified in previous sections, in particular the emphasis on emptiness in SA discourses. This section will present further evidence of possible sectarian and other developments.

(1) In SA 320, which has no SN counterpart, a brahmin named Jānukṣīṇī (生聞) comes to ask a question of the Buddha:[120]

Gautama! It is said "All exists" (一切有). But in what regard is it said that all exists?

119 T 2, p. 90b-c (CSA i, p. 402).
120 T 2, p. 91b (CSA i, pp. 405, 406 note 2).

> The Buddha says: I will now question you. Answer as you see fit. Brahmin! What do you think, does eye exist?
>
> Yes, it exists, śramaṇa Gautama.
>
> Do visible forms exist?
>
> Yes, they exist, śramaṇa Gautama.
>
> Brahmin! Do there exist visible forms, eye consciousness, eye contact, feelings unpleasant or pleasant or neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant that arise conditioned by eye contact?
>
> Yes, they exist, śramaṇa Gautama.
>
> The same saying applies to ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.
>
> After hearing this discourse from the Buddha, the brahmin Jānukṣīṇī was delighted, rose from his seat and departed.

Yin Shun maintains that this discourse is presenting the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of "all exists" (sarvam asti), which asserts "the existence of the three times" (past, present, and future).[121]

Teachings about "existence" do occur in discourses shared by both versions. For example, in SN 35. 195-196 (counterpart SA 1166) the Buddha says:[122]

> Just so, bhiksus, where eye *exists* (sati), there, conditioned (paccayā) by eye contact, arises internally the pleasant or the unpleasant. ... [And similarly for the remaining sense spheres]

The text is saying that the eye and the rest exist. The corresponding SA 1166 has similar content.[123] Other discourses concerning "existence" are SN 35. 133, 193 and their respective counterparts SA 253, 248.[124] However, these are not saying "All exists"; they are merely asserting the existence of

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121 CSA i, p. 406 note 2, and "RESA", p. 57.
122 SN iv, pp. 171-172.
123 T 2, p. 311b-c (CSA i, p. 322).
124 SN iv, pp. 123-124, 166-167. T 2, pp. 62a-b, 59b-c, (CSA i, pp. 307, 297).

something in present time. Teachings that could be construed as affirming the existence of all three times are not found in SN.

(2) SA 306 (no SN counterpart) states that the sense spheres and derived phenomena are:[125] "impermanent 無常, compounded 有爲,[126] arising *conditioned by thought* 思願緣生".[127] In SA 214, 241, and 1169 the wording is not significantly different. There the phenomena in question are:[128] "impermanent 無常, compounded 有爲, arising *conditioned by mind* 心緣生"[129] (SA 214); or "phenomena arising *conditioned by mind* 心緣生法" (SA 241); or "arising *caused and conditioned by mind* 心因緣生" (SA 1169).

However, the SN counterparts of these three have quite different wording. SN 35. 93 (counterpart of SA 214) has "impermanent (anicca), changing (vipariṇāmi), becoming otherwise (aññathā-bhāvi)";[130] SN 194 (counterpart of SA 241) has only "impermanent" (anicca);[131] and SN 205 (counterpart of SA 1169) has: "whatever there is of "I", or "I am", or "mine", none of that exists for him" (Ahan ti vā Maman ti vā Asmīti vā tam pi tassa na hotīti).[132]

Thus, the expressions "arising conditioned by thought", "arising conditioned by mind" and so on of the SA versions are lacking in SN; and, as noted in Chapter 2, these expressions suggest a connection with the teaching of conditioned arising by "mind-only" (vijñapti-mātratā or citta-mātra), associated with the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) school.[133] The difference in wording may, therefore, reflect sectarian influence.

(3) A suspicious example of unshared content is the protective verse and mantra present in SA 252[134] but not in its counterpart SN 35. 69.[135]

Both versions give an account of a bhiksu being bitten by a poisonous snake while meditating in a cave. The bhiksu is able to maintain his composure because he has seen the non-selfhood of the six internal sense

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125 T 2, p. 88 (CSA i, p. 390).
126 Skt. saṃskṛta?
127 Skt. sañcetayita-pratītya-samutpanna?
128 T 2, pp. 54a, 58b, 312c (CSA i, pp. 263, 290, 328).
129 Skt. citta-pratītya-samutpanna?
130 SN iv, pp. 67-68.
131 SN iv, pp. 170-171.
132 SN iv, p. 198.
133 See Chapter 2, pp. 70-71.
134 T 2, pp. 60c-61b (CSA i, pp. 302-304). The fragmentary Sanskrit text of SA 252 has been reconstructed by Ernst WALDSCHMIDT in "Das Upasenasūtra, ein Zauber gegen Schlangenbiß aus dem Saṃyuktāgama" *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1957), pp. 37-42.
135 SN iv, pp. 40-41.

spheres (in SA: also of phenomena derived therefrom). He dies nevertheless. In SA, but not in SN, the Buddha then teaches a verse (gāthā) and mantra that bhiksus may chant to protect themselves from snakebite in the future. The verse is mainly about loving-kindness, compassion, and doing no harm to all living beings; the mantra is given in Chinese transcription of the Sanskrit.[136] This protective verse and mantra are likely to have been added at some time after the separation of the schools which SA and SN represent.

(4) Display of psychic powers.

In the well-known "Fire Sermon" (SN 35. 28 = SA 197) the Buddha teaches that the sense spheres and derived phenomena are on fire with the flame of desire-hatred-delusion. In the SA version, but not in the SN, the Buddha, before delivering this teaching, gives a display of "psychic power" (神足示現)[137] and then of "knowing others' minds" (他心示現).[138] This display is likely to be a hagiographic embellishment added within the Sarvāstivādin tradition.[139]

(5) SA teaching with no counterpart.

In SA 334, which has no SN counterpart, the Buddha is reported as giving the following teaching:[140]

> What is 'the Discourse on Having Cause, Condition, and Bondage' (有因有緣有縛經)? It is this: Eye [ear, and the rest] has its cause, condition and bondage. What is the cause, condition and bondage of eye [and the rest]? The cause, condition and bondage of eye is *karma*. ... The cause, condition and bondage of karma is *craving*. ... The cause, condition and bondage of craving is *ignorance* (無明). ... The cause, condition and bondage of ignorance is *incorrect reflection* (不正思惟). ... What is the cause, condition and bondage of incorrect reflection? It is this: Conditioned by eye [and the rest] and visible forms [and the rest] arises incorrect reflection, it gives rise to delusion (癡) ... and that delusion is ignorance. Delusively seeking desire (癡求欲) is called craving; what is done by craving (愛所作) is called karma. Thus, bhiksus, caused by incorrect reflection is

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136 The verse and mantra are also present in the Sanskrit text of SA 252; see WALDSCHMIDT, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

137 Skt. ṛddhi-prātihārya (P. iddhi-pāṭihāriya).

138 Skt. ādeśanā-prātihārya (P. ādesanā-pāṭihāriya).

139 T 2, p. 50b-c (CSA i, pp. 220-221). SN iv, pp. 19-20.

140 T 2, p. 92b-c (CSA i, p. 412).

> ignorance; caused by ignorance is craving; caused by craving is karma; caused by karma are eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.

This teaching, found in SA but not in SN, resembles the twelve-membered formula of *conditioned arising* (paṭicca-samuppāda) more closely than does the usual series beginning with the sense spheres. Its significance would be a worthy subject of further research.

The findings of this and previous sections indicate that the cited instances of unshared material may be due to various causes: sectarian development, folk-religious addition, hagiographic embellishment, scholastic elaboration of doctrine, or perhaps accidental loss in the tradition that lacks the unshared material.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the main teachings relating to the *sense spheres* contained in Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta of SN and Ruchu Xiangying (入處相應) of SA. As in Chapter 2, the overall finding is that most of the teachings are shared by the two versions, but that some unshared elements also exist. Certain substantial differences between the two versions can be interpreted as probably representing sectarian developments. Others are of doubtful significance, and interpretation of them must await further research.

CHAPTER 4. FEELING

The Vedanā Saṃyutta or Shou Xiangying (受相應),[1] the "Feeling-Connected" or "Connected with Feeling", is a relatively small collection. The SN version has twenty-nine discourses, the SA version twenty-four;[2] some fifteen discourses are common to the two versions. This chapter examines comparatively the main teachings contained in this collection. The presentation is according to the following topics: 1. the components of feeling, 2. knowing things as they really are (in regard to feeling), 3. the arising and the cessation of feeling, and 4. stages in the cessation of feeling.

1. The components of feeling

SN 36. 26 reports the Buddha as saying:[3]

> Bhiksus, there are these three feelings (vedanā). What three? Pleasant feeling (sukhā vedanā), unpleasant feeling (dukkhā vedanā), neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant/neutral feeling (adukkhamasukhā vedanā).

That feeling is of these three kinds,[4] is the teaching on feeling most consistently shared by the two versions.[5] The only difference found has to do with the sequence: SN always makes "pleasant feeling" the first of the three, whereas SA usually puts "unpleasant feeling" first.[6]

While dukkhā vedanā, unpleasant feeling, is one of the three feelings, the two traditions also have the Buddha repeatedly saying that all feelings are dukkha, suffering. In SN 36. 11 and its counterpart SA 474, a certain bhiksu (named as Ānanda in SA 474), while seated in solitary meditation, reflects that the Buddha has said that there are three kinds of feeling, but has also said (SN) "whatsoever is felt is within suffering" (yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin) or (SA) "all feelings are suffering" (諸所有受悉皆是苦/一切

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1 Skt. Vedanā Saṃyukta.
2 On the discourses and their locations, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 244, 250.
3 SN iv, p. 234.
4 Each of them is, in its turn, of six types, depending on the type of "contact" that gives rise to it: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental.
5 E.g. SN 36. 1-3: SN iv, pp. 204-205; SA 473-475: T 2, p. 121a, c (CSA ii, pp. 198-201).
6 E.g. SA 466-468: T 2, p. 119a-b (CSA i, pp. 189-191).

諸受悉皆是苦).[7] He goes to ask the Buddha for clarification. According to SN 36. 11, the Buddha replies:[8]

> Bhiksu! Concerning the impermanence of compounded things (saṅkhārānaṃ yeva aniccataṃ), I have said that whatsoever is felt is within suffering. Bhiksu! Concerning the perishable nature (khayadhammataṃ) of compounded things, their nature of decaying (vayadhammataṃ), fading away (virāgadhammataṃ), ceasing (nirodhadhammataṃ), and changing for the worse (vipariṇāma-dhammataṃ), I have said that whatsoever is felt is within suffering.

In the corresponding SA 474 the Buddha replies:[9]

> Because all compounded things (行) are impermanent, and all compounded things are changing by nature (變易法), I have said all feelings are suffering.[10] Also, Ānanda, because of the gradual cessation (漸次寂滅) of compounded things, the gradual calming (漸次止息) of compounded things, I have said all feelings are suffering.

While the two versions differ in wording, they share the main teaching that the reason all feelings are suffering is the impermanent nature of compounded things.

Also shared in common by the two traditions is a distinction of feeling into two kinds (dve vedanā 二受): bodily feeling (kāyikā vedanā 身受) and mental feeling (cetasikā vedanā 心受). This distinction is made in SN 36. 6 and its counterpart SA 470.[11] The Buddha is explaining the difference between "the untaught ordinary person" (assutavā puthujjana 愚癡無聞凡夫) who feels the three feelings, and "the well-taught noble disciple" (sutavā ariyasāvaka 多聞聖弟子) who also feels the three feelings. He explains that the untaught ordinary person feels a twofold feeling, bodily and mental, while the well-taught noble disciple feels only one feeling, the bodily, not the mental. The two versions state it thus:[12]

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7 SN iv, p. 216; T 2, p. 121a (CSA ii, p. 199).
8 SN iv, pp. 216-217.
9 T 2, p. 121a-b (CSA ii, p. 199).
10 Regarding this statement, see also SA 473: T 2, p. 121a (CSA ii, p. 198), counterpart of SN 36. 1-2: SN iv, pp. 204-205.
11 SN iv, pp. 207-210; T 2, pp. 119c-120b (CSA ii, pp. 193-195).
12 SN iv, pp. 208-209; T 2, p. 120a (CSA ii, p. 194).

SN 36. 6	SA 470
The untaught ordinary person, bhiksus, being touched by unpleasant feeling (dukkhāya vedanāya), grieves, is distressed, laments, beats the breast, falls into bewilderment. He feels two feelings: bodily and mental. ...	The untaught ordinary person in whom bodily contact gives rise to all feelings, increasing all pain, and even threatening life, grieves, laments, complains, cries aloud, producing utter confusion in the mind. At that time he increases two feelings: bodily feeling and mental feeling. ...
But, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple, being touched by unpleasant feeling, does not grieve, is not distressed, does not lament, does not beat the breast, does not fall into bewilderment. He feels one feeling: bodily, not mental (so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati, kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ).	The well-taught noble disciple in whom bodily contact gives rise to painful feeling, a great pain that compels, and even threatens life, does not give rise to grief, lamentation, complaint, crying aloud, utter confusion in the mind. At that time there arises only one feeling, namely bodily feeling, not mental feeling (唯生一受,所謂身受,不生心受).

The untaught ordinary person who has the two feelings will develop the following (in summary):

• He has repulsion for unpleasant feeling: Contacted/touched (puṭṭha/ phuṭṭha 觸) by unpleasant feeling, he feels repulsion (paṭighavā 瞋恚) for it, and thus the tendency to repulsion (paṭighānusaya) obsesses/fastens (anuseti) him (恚使所使).

• He has desire for pleasant feeling: Contacted by unpleasant feeling (SA 470: by pleasant feeling), he delights in sensual pleasure (kāmasukham abhinandati). Delighting in sensual pleasure for pleasant feeling, the tendency to desire (rāgānusaya) thus obsesses him. SA 470 says that, contacted by pleasant feeling in the five sensual pleasures (五欲樂),[13] he feels the five sensual pleasures, and thus the tendency to desire obsesses

13 Skt. pañca kāmāḥ.

him (貪使所使); also, SA 470 puts desire for pleasant feeling before repulsion at unpleasant feeling.

• He has ignorance regarding neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling: He does not fully understand the arising, the cessation, the flavour, the danger, the giving up of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, and thus the tendency to ignorance (avijjānusaya) regarding neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling (adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya), obsesses him (癡使所使).

Both texts say that, having felt each of the three feelings, the untaught ordinary person who has the two feelings is bound (saññutta 所繫) by repulsion, desire, ignorance; he is in bondage to the whole mass of birth-and-death, distress, sorrow, grief, affliction, and suffering. In contrast, the well-taught noble disciple, who has only one feeling (bodily), is without these three kinds of bondage. He feels the three feelings but is free from the bondage of repulsion, desire, and ignorance, and thus is not in bondage to birth-and-death, distress, and so on.

Thus, the two versions agree on the teachings regarding the classification of feeling into two kinds, bodily and mental, and regarding the development from pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feeling to desire, repulsion, and ignorance respectively.[14]

Another discourse, SN 36. 19 with its counterpart SA 485, records a disagreement about whether the Buddha teaches only two feelings (pleasant and unpleasant) or three feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, and neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant). The Buddha explains that he teaches feeling as being of two, three, or many different kinds. In the SN version the disagreement is between the builder Pañcakaṅga and the venerable Udāyi, and it is Ānanda who reports the disagreement to the Buddha; in the SA counterpart, the disagreement is between King Bimbisāra and the venerable Udāyi, and it is these two themselves who go to ask the Buddha which of them is right. The disagreement arises when Pañcakaṅga/Bimbisāra asks Udāyi how many feelings are spoken of by the Buddha. Udāyi says three feelings are spoken of by the Buddha; but Pañcakaṅga/Bimbisāra says that only two feelings are spoken of by the Buddha: pleasant feeling and unpleasant feeling; neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling belongs to "the pleasure that is tranquil and subtle" (santa-paṇīta-sukha) or to "cessation"

14 See also SN 36. 3: SN iv, pp. 205-206, and its counterpart, SA 468: T 2, p. 119b-c (CSA ii. pp. 191-192); cf. SN 36. 4: SN iv, pp. 206-207 = SA 469: T 2, p. 119c (CSA ii, pp. 192-193).

(寂滅).[15] The Buddha's response to this disagreement, according to SN, is that he teaches both two feelings and three feelings, and even five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, and 108 feelings – without saying what they are; and according to the SA counterpart it is that he sometimes speaks of one feeling, or two, or three, four, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, 108, or even innumerable feelings (無量受) – and he specifies what are they.[16] In both versions the Buddha then suggests that one should, without quarrelling, dwelling in harmony and respect, understand the method explained (pariyāya-desite) in the teaching (dhamme), or the true meaning of the teaching (眞實之義).[17]

On how many kinds of feelings are spoken of by the Buddha, the two versions of the discourse differ slightly, and only the SA version (SA 485) explains them.[18] The explanations lacking in SN 36. 19 (also SN 36. 20)[19] are to be found in SN 36. 22.[20] They can be summarised as follows:

15 SN iv, p. 223; T 2, p. 123c (CSA ii, p. 212).
16 SN iv, p. 224; T 2, p. 124a (CSA ii, p. 212).
17 SN iv, pp. 224-225; T 2, p. 124a (CSA ii, pp. 212-213).
18 SN iv, p. 224; T 2, p. 124a (CSA ii, p. 212).
19 SN iv, pp. 228-229 (no SA counterpart).
20 SN iv, pp. 231-232 (no SA counterpart).

One feeling:	The suffering of all feelings (all feelings are dukkha, 苦).
Two feelings:	Bodily and mental feelings.
Three feelings:	Pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings.
Four feelings (SA only):	Feeling with attachment (繫受) to the dhātu (realm)[21] of sensual desire (kāma-dhātu), to the dhātu of material form (rūpa-dhātu), and to the dhātu of non-material form (arūpa-dhātu); and feeling without attachment (不繫受).
Five feelings:	Feelings that are the faculties (indriyāni) of pleasure (sukha), pain (dukkha), joy (somanassa), grief (domanassa), and neutrality (upekkhā).
Six feelings:	Feeling born of eye-contact, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-contact.
Eighteen feelings:	Six ways of giving attention (upavicāra) to joy, grief, and neutrality.
Thirty-six feelings:	Six forms of joy concerned with the worldly life (geha-sita), and six concerned with renunciation (nekkhamma-sita); six forms of grief concerned with the worldly life, and six concerned with renunciation; six forms of neutrality concerned with the worldly life, and six concerned with renunciation.
108 feelings:	Thirty-six feelings of the past, of the future, and of present time.
Innumerable feelings (SA only):	Indefinite numbers of feelings with regard to this or that.

21 On this term, see Chapter 5.

To conclude, despite a few minor differences, no remarkable divergence is found between the two versions as regards the classification of feeling. The two share the following:

(1) The principal classification is into three kinds of feeling: pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings.

(2) Another major distinction is between two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and mental feeling.

(3) In the untaught ordinary person pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings evoke the reactions of desire, repulsion and ignorance respectively; these three reactions, implicitly equated with mental feeling, constitute bondage. In the well-taught noble disciple the three mental feelings do not arise in response to bodily feeling. Thus, the untaught ordinary person experiences both bodily feeling and mental feeling, while the well-taught noble disciple experiences only bodily feeling.

(4) The Buddha also classifies feeling according to three dhātus, six types of sense-contact, six ways of giving attention, two life-styles (worldly and renunciation), and three times.

(5) All feelings are suffering, because of the impermanent nature of compounded things.

2. Knowing things as they really are

As with the five aggregates (Chapter 2) and the six sense spheres (Chapter 3), the teachings on feeling emphasise "knowing things as they really are". Both versions state that knowing feelings as they really are is an important practice in the noble life. For example, SN 36. 26 reports the Buddha as saying:[22]

> Bhiksus, there are these three feelings. ... Bhiksus, whatsoever recluses or brahmins do not know (nappajānanti) as they really are (yathābhūtam), the arising (samudayaṃ), the ceasing (atthagamaṃ), the flavour (assādaṃ), the danger (ādīnavaṃ), the giving up (nissaraṇaṃ) of these three feelings, [those recluses or brahmins are approved neither as recluses among recluses, nor as brahmins among brahmins, and those venerable ones in this present life do not abide

22 SN iv, p. 234.

understanding for themselves, realising, attaining the well-being that is the aim (attham) of recluseship or of brahminhood.][23]

The same teaching is found in SN 36. 27-28, except that in SN 36. 28 the things to be known are: 1. feeling, 2. the arising of feeling, 3. the cessation (nirodhaṃ) of feeling, and 4. the way leading to the cessation of feeling.[24] The three sutras SN 36. 26-28 have a single SA counterpart, SA 480.[25] It is similar in content, but lists altogether eight things that should be "known as they really are": 1. feeling, 2. the arising of feeling, 3. the cessation of feeling, 4. **the way leading to the arising of feeling** (受集道跡), 5. the way leading to the cessation of feeling (受滅道跡), 6. the flavour of feeling, 7. the danger of feeling, and 8. the giving up of feeling. This includes one item more than SN 36. 26-28, namely the way leading to the arising of feeling.

The same eight aspects of feeling to be fully known are also found in SN 36. 23, 24, 25.[26] SA counterparts of these are SA 476, 475, and 478 respectively, of which SA 478 differs from the other two in listing only five of the eight things to be fully known: 1. feeling, 2. the arising of feeling, 3. the cessation of feeling, 4. **the way leading to the arising of feeling**,[27] and 5. the way leading to the cessation of feeling.[28]

Regarding things that are to be fully known about feeling, SN lists variously four, six, seven, or eight things,[29] and SA lists five, six, or eight.[30] Among these things relating to feeling, the flavour, danger, and giving up are as in Chapters 2 and 3, relating to the Khandhas and the Sense Spheres

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23 The words in brackets are elided in the text, but can be supplied from SN 12. 13: SN ii, p. 15; see F. L. Woodward (tr.), *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* (1927; PTS, reprinted 1980) iv, p. 159, note 1.

24 SN iv, p. 235. The PTS text (but not the Nālandā) repeats "vedanāsamudayaṃ nappajānanti".

25 T 2, p. 122a-b (CSA ii, p. 203).

26 SN iv, pp. 232-234.

27 The eight, including the way leading to the arising of feeling, are also found in SA 479 (no SN counterpart) (T 2, p. 122a; CSA ii, p. 202). Cf. also SA 481 (no SN counterpart) (T 2, p. 122c; CSA ii, p. 205).

28 T 2, pp. 121b-122a (CSA ii, pp. 200-202).

29 Four things to be fully known about feeling – SN 36. 1, 28: SN iv, pp. 204, 235. Six things – SN 36. 16, 26-27: SN iv, pp. 221, 234-235. Seven things – SN 36. 15, 17-18: SN iv, pp. 219-220, 221, 223. Eight things – SN 36. 23-25: SN iv, pp. 232-234.

30 Five things to be fully known about feeling – SA 478, 481: T 2, p. 122a, c (CSA ii, pp. 202, 205). Six things – SA 470: T 2, p. 120a-b (CSA ii, p. 194). Eight things – SA 475-476, 479-480: T 2, pp. 121b-122b (CSA ii, pp. 200-203).

respectively; the remainder have not previously been encountered in their present form.

3. The arising and the cessation of feeling

Regarding the arising and cessation of feeling four points deserve to be noted.

3.1. The body is a condition for the arising of feeling. The two versions say in common, "in this body (kāyasmiṃ) arise diverse feelings (vividhā vedanā uppajjanti)";[31] and they speak of people being "contacted/touched (phuṭṭho) by painful bodily feeling (sārīrikāya dukkhāya vedanāya)".[32] But although the body is a condition for the arising of feeling (i.e. bodily feeling), it is not said that the death of the body brings cessation of feeling. The two versions say that the condition for the cessation of feeling in this present life is fully understanding feeling; this brings about the cessation of the "influxes" (āsavā). In SN 36. 12 this is expressed in verse thus:[33]

> A bhiksu who is ardent, aware, and free from attachment (nirūpadhi) is wise (paṇḍito), and comprehends well all feelings.
>
> Understanding feelings fully, he in this present life is without influxes (anāsavo), and when the body dies, he, established in the Dharma, is a saint (vedagū) beyond reckoning.

The corresponding SA 471 says:[34]

> A bhiksu who is ardent, aware, and not unstable is wise and fully comprehends all feelings.
>
> Through understanding fully all feelings, he in this present life ends every kind of influx, and when the body dies, he is beyond measure, having attained permanently full nirvana (般涅槃).[35]

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31 SN 36. 12-14: SN iv, pp. 218-219 and their counterparts, SA 471-472: T 2, p. 120b-c (CSA ii, pp. 195-196).

32 SN 36. 4: SN iv, p. 206 (= SA 469: T 2, p. 119c; CSA ii, p. 192). SA 470: T 2, p. 120a (CSA ii, p. 194) (= SN 36. 6: SN iv, p. 208).

33 SN iv, p. 218. Cf. also SN 36. 3, 5: SN iv, pp. 206-207.

34 T 2, p. 120c (CSA ii, pp. 195-196). See also SA 470, 472-473: T 2, pp. 120b-121a (CSA ii, pp.195-196,198). Cf. SA 467-468: T 2, p. 119b-c (CSA ii, pp. 190, 192).

35 Skt. parinirvāṇa (P. parinibbāna).

Thus, the two versions agree that fully understanding all feelings in this present life, and thereby causing the influxes to cease is the means to liberation, peace, and purity.[36]

3.2. Contact (phassa 觸) is also a condition for the arising of feeling. SN 36. 23-25 report the Buddha as saying:[37]

> Bhiksu(s), there are these three feelings ... From the arising of contact comes the arising of feeling (phassasamudayā vedanāsamudayo). Craving (taṇhā) is the way leading to the arising of feeling (vedanāsamudayagāminī paṭipadā). From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling (phassanirodhā vedanānirodho). The way leading to the cessation of feeling (vedanānirodhagāminī paṭipadā) is this noble eightfold path (ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo) ...

The corresponding SA 476, 475, 478 have:[38]

> Bhiksu(s), there are these three feelings ... From the arising of contact (觸) comes the arising of feeling; from the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. If, with regard to feeling, one has craving and delight (愛樂), welcoming, sensual attachment, firm abiding, this is said to be the way leading to the arising of feeling. If, with regard to feeling, one is without delight and craving, welcoming, sensual attachment, firm abiding, this is said to be the way leading to the cessation of feeling ...

Thus, the two versions agree that contact causes the arising of feeling, and the cessation of contact brings the cessation of feeling.[39] It should be noted that the noun "phassa" (contact) is closely related to the verbs "phassati/phusati" (to contact, to touch), and the past participle "phuṭṭha" (contacted, touched). But whereas "phuṭṭha" is used in connection with the body, as in 3.1 above, "phassa" refers to all six kinds of contact (as in 3.2): Phassa is the "coming together" (saṅgati) of the six sense-faculties, the six external objects, and the corresponding consciousnesses.

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36 Cf. SN 36. 4 and 6: SN iv, pp. 206-210 = SA 469-470: T 2, pp. 119c-120b (CSA ii, pp. 192-195).

37 SN iv, pp. 233-234.

38 T 2, pp. 121c-122a (CSA ii, pp. 201-202).

39 Bodily feeling. On contact, see also SN 36. 15-18: SN iv, pp. 220-223 (= SA 474: T 2, p. 121a-b; CSA ii, pp. 199-200), SN 36. 10: SN iv, p. 215 = SA 466: T 2, p. 119a (CSA ii, p. 190).

The two versions also agree that craving (or delight and craving) is the way leading to the arising of feeling.[40] They differ regarding the way leading to the cessation of feeling: in SN the way is the noble eightfold path; in SA it is being without delight and craving.

However, this difference does not represent a doctrinal divergence, since other discourses show that cultivation of the noble eightfold path and the elimination of craving are identified in both collections as means to the cessation of feeling or suffering (all feelings are suffering). One SA discourse, SA 481, goes on to list the stages of the noble eightfold path, together with two more items, namely *right liberation* (正解脱)[41] and *right knowledge* (正智).[42] This amounts to a noble tenfold path; but this discourse (SA 481) has no SN counterpart,[43] which raises questions about the status of this teaching.[44]

3.3. Full understanding of feelings, or of conceit (self-pride), is the means to cessation of the tendency to desire, repulsion, and ignorance regarding the three types of feeling (i.e. bodily feeling). Such full understanding in a person leads to fading away of craving, and release of the mind from suffering. SN 36. 3 and its counterpart, SA 468, state it thus:[45]

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40 Mental feeling.

41 Skt. samyag-vimukti (P. sammā-vimutti).

42 Skt. samyag-jñāna (P. sammā-ñāṇa).

43 T 2, p. 122c (CSA ii, p. 204).

44 But the tenfold path is found elsewhere in the Pāli and Chinese canons; e.g.: DN ii: p. 217; iii: pp. 271, 290-2. MN i: pp. 42, 44, 446-7; ii: p. 29; iii: pp. 75-6. SN ii: p. 168; v: pp. 17, 382-4. AN ii: pp. 89, 221-2; v: pp. 212-49, 310. DA: T 1, pp. 52c, 59a, 60a; MA: T 1, pp. 735c-736b.

45 SN iv, pp. 205-206; T 2, p. 119b-c (CSA ii, pp. 191-192).

SN 36. 3	SA 468
There are these three feelings ... When in a bhiksu the tendency to desire (rāgānusayo) for pleasant feeling is abandoned (pahīno), the tendency to repulsion (paṭighānusayo) from unpleasant feeling is abandoned, the tendency to ignorance (avijjānusayo) regarding neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling is abandoned, this abandoning of the tendency to desire [to repulsion, to ignorance] in a bhiksu is called *right seeing* (sammaddaso). He has cut off craving (taṇhaṃ), broken the bond (saṃyojanaṃ); *by perfect comprehension of conceit/self-pride* (sammā-māna-abhisamayā) he has made an end of suffering.	There are these three feelings ... If a bhiksu has cut off (已斷), has known (已知) the tendency to desire (貪使) for pleasant feeling; has cut off, has known the tendency to repulsion (恚使) from unpleasant feeling; has cut off, has known the tendency to ignorance (癡使) regarding neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, that bhiksu is said to have cut off craving, broken all bonds, and, *by perfect comprehension of conceit* (慢無間等), made an end of suffering. At that time the World Honoured One uttered this verse:
One who has pleasant feeling but does not know what feeling is, seeing no giving up (a-nissaraṇa-dassino) of it, has the tendency to desire.	When one has pleasant feeling but does not know pleasant feeling, [he has] the tendency to desire, seeing no way of giving it up.
One who has unpleasant feeling but does not know what feeling is, seeing no giving up of it, has the tendency to repulsion.	When one has unpleasant feeling but does not know unpleasant feeling, [he has] the tendency to repulsion, seeing no way of giving it up.
What is neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant [feeling], as taught by the great wise one (bhūri-pañña), if one delights (abhinandati) in that, even he is not released from suffering.	What is neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling, as taught by the enlightened one, if one does not observe well, he everlastingly does not cross to the other shore.

*A bhiksu who is ardent, not abandoning awareness is wise and comprehends well all feelings.	*A bhiksu who is ardent, aware and not unstable is wise and fully comprehends all feelings.
*Understanding feelings fully, he in this present life is without influxes, and when the body dies, he, established in the Dharma, is a saint beyond reckoning.	*Through understanding fully all feelings, he in this present life ends every kind of influx, and when the body dies, he is beyond measure, attained permanently full nirvana.

*Wording is similar to that at 3.1, above.

Despite small differences in expression, the two traditions agree that the bondage of feeling lies in the tendency to desire, repulsion, and ignorance regarding pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feelings respectively; and that this breaking of the bonds of mental feeling is achieved by fully understanding *conceit* or *self-pride* (māna) in connection with fully knowing *feeling*.

3.4. Practising a certain insight as the way to the cessation of (mental) feeling.

SN 36. 5 says:[46]

> Bhiksus, pleasant feeling should be seen as suffering; unpleasant feeling should be seen as an arrow; neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling should be seen as impermanence. Bhiksus, when a bhiksu is one who has seen (diṭṭhā) pleasant feeling as suffering, unpleasant feeling as an arrow, neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling as impermanence, such a bhiksu is called *rightly seeing* (sammaddasa). He has cut off craving, broken the bond, [and] by fully understanding conceit/self-pride (māna), has made an end of suffering.
>
> The bhiksu who sees the pleasant as suffering, the unpleasant as an arrow, and the state that is neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant as impermanent, is rightly seeing, [and] understands feelings well.
>
> Understanding feelings fully, he in this present life is without influxes, and when the body dies, he, established in the Dharma, is a saint beyond reckoning.

46 SN iv, p. 207.

The corresponding SA 467 has almost the same.[47]

According to both versions, liberation from the bondage of feeling is achieved by seeing (or observing) the three feelings as suffering, an arrow, and impermanent; this is reckoned as *rightly seeing* (sammaddasa 正見).

Regarding *rightly seeing*, SN 36. 7-8 contain a teaching about mindfulness-and-awareness (sati-sampajañña) of the three feelings, in respect only of impermanence. The following is a summary:

The monk is mindful (sato) with regard to the body (kāye), the feelings (vedanāsu), the mind (citte), and phenomena (dhammesu). He is aware (sampajāno) with regard to his bodily movements. Thus practising, he knows (pajānāti) and contemplates (anupassī) that the three feelings are conditioned by the body (kāyam paṭicca) or conditioned by contact (phassam paṭicca),[48] and that body or contact is "impermanent, compounded, and arisen by conditions" (anicco saṅkhato paṭicca samuppanno); so the three feelings *cannot be permanent*. By this way of mindful insight into the three feelings, his *tendency to desire, to repulsion, and to ignorance*, regarding body or contact, and regarding feeling pleasant, unpleasant, and neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant, is abandoned (pahīyati). He is aware of the three (bodily) feelings as he is released from bondage (vi-saññutta) to them (i.e. released from the tendency to desire, repulsion, and ignorance).[49]

The two SN discourses summarised above lack SA counterparts, but their main content, regarding mindfulness and awareness of the three feelings, leading to cessation of the three corresponding tendencies, is clearly not alien to the SA tradition.

To summarise, the two versions agree in identifying three conditions or causes for the arising of feeling: the body, contact, and craving. Regarding the cessation of feeling (and thereby of suffering) the two versions are not entirely the same, but the differences do not represent any significant doctrinal divergence. They share mainly the teaching that the condition for the cessation of the bondage of feeling (i.e. mental feeling) in this present life is fully understanding feeling, or fully understanding *self-pride*, or seeing feeling (i.e. bodily feeling) as suffering, an arrow, and impermanent (reckoned as *rightly seeing* sammaddasa 正見); this way of knowing-and-

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47 T 2, p. 119a-b (CSA ii, p. 190).

48 kāyam in SN 36. 7: SN iv, p. 211; phassam in SN 36. 8: SN iv, p. 214.

49 SN iv, p. 213.

seeing will bring about the cessation of the influxes or craving in regard to the bonds of feeling.

4. Stages in the cessation of feeling

Various stages in the cessation of feeling are recorded in the two versions.

In SN 36. 11 and its counterpart SA 474[50] the Buddha, after teaching that there are three feelings and that all of them are suffering (because of the impermanence of sankhāras, compounded things or activities), then goes on to describe how various mental states progressively cease, each yielding a superior state and finally the perfectly peaceful state. This progressive or gradual ceasing of states is variously called:[51]

- gradual cessation of activities (anupubbaṃ saṅkhārānaṃ nirodho 諸行漸次寂滅 or 諸受漸次寂滅 the gradual cessation of feelings)
- gradual calming of activities (anupubbaṃ saṅkhārānaṃ vūpasamo 諸行漸次止息)
- gradual tranquillity of activities (anupubbaṃ saṅkhārānaṃ passaddhi; not in SA)

Here the terms "cessation (nirodha 寂滅)", "calming (vūpasama 止息)" and "tranquillity (passaddhi)" are applied to the activities (saṅkhārā 行) in reference to stages in meditative concentration:[52]

- dhyāna (four stages of concentrative meditation, jhāna 禪)
- four (non-physical) "realms" (āyatana 入處)
- cessation of perception-and-feeling (saññā-vedayita-nirodha 想受滅)
- cessation (calming or tranquillity) of desire-hatred-delusion (rāga-dosa-moha 貪恚癡).

Each of the states in this series is described as "a pleasure more excellent and exquisite than" (sukham abhikkantatarañca paṇītatarañca) or "a

50 SN 36. 11, 15-18: SN iv, pp. 216-218, 220-223 = SA 474: T 2, p. 121a-b (CSA ii, pp. 199-200).

51 SN iv, p. 217; T 2, p. 121a-b (CSA i, p. 199).

52 SN iv, pp. 217-218; T 2, p. 121b (CSA i, pp. 199-200). Cf. also SN 36. 19: SN iv, pp. 225-228 = SA 485: T 2, p. 124a-b (CSA ii, p. 213); SN 36. 29: SN iv, pp. 235-237 = SA 483: T 2, p. 123a-b (CSA ii, pp. 209-210).

pleasure superior to" (勝樂) the previous state.[53] This series, which is clearly connected with the cessation of feeling, will now be surveyed.

4.1. The four dhyānas

SN and SA each present two parallel accounts of the four dhyānas (jhānas 禪). Those of the SN version are shown in the following table.

SN 36. 11, 15-18[54]	SN 36. 19-20; SN 36. 29[55]
In the first dhyāna speech (vācā) has ceased (niruddhā), been calmed (vūpasantā), been tranquillised (paṭippassaddhā).	... a bhiksu, separating (vivicca) himself from sensual pleasures (kāmehi),[56] separating himself from evil states (akusalehi dhammehi), abides having attained the first dhyāna, in which there is thought (sa-vitakkaṃ) and investigation (sa-vicāraṃ), and detachment-born joy and pleasure (viveka-jaṃ pīti-sukhaṃ).
In the second dhyāna thought and investigation (vitakka-vicāra) have ceased, been calmed, been tranquillised.	... a bhiksu, by the calming down (vūpasamā) of thought and investigation, abides having attained the second dhyāna, in which there is inner tranquillity (ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ), one-pointedness of mind (cetaso ekodibhāvam), which is without thought and without investigation, and with concentration-born joy and pleasure (samādhijaṃ pīti-sukhaṃ).

53 SN 36. 19: SN iv, pp. 225-228 = SA 485: T 2, p. 124a-b (CSA ii, p. 213). Before the first state of dhyāna in the two versions is the state of sensual pleasure (kāmasukha) or sensual feeling (欲受): the five sensual strands (pañca kāmaguṇā 五欲功德).

54 SN iv, pp. 217, 220-223.

55 SN iv, pp. 225-226 (229); 236-237.

56 The first dhyāna is stated in SN 36. 19-20 to be a more excellent pleasant feeling than the five sensual pleasures (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile).

In the third dhyāna joy (pīti) has ceased, been calmed, been tranquillised.	... a bhiksu, by the fading away of joy (pītiyā ca virāgā), abides disinterested (upekhako), mindful and aware (sato ca sampajāno), and experiences pleasure (sukhaṃ) with the body, and abides having attained the third dhyāna, of which the Noble Ones say "equanimous, mindful, abiding in pleasure" (upekhako satimā sukhavihārīti).
In the fourth dhyāna the in-breathing and out-breathing (assāsapassāsā) have ceased, been calmed, been tranquillised.	... a bhiksu, through the giving up of pleasure and pain (sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā), through the ceasing of previous happiness and sorrow (pubbeva somanassa-domanassānam atthagamā), abides attaining the fourth dhyāna, which is without pain and pleasure (adukkham-asukham), and with disinterestedness-mindfulness-and-purity (upekhā-sati-pārisuddhiṃ).

The corresponding SA 474 (= SN 36. 11, 15-18), SA 485 (= SN 36. 19-20), and SA 483 (= SN 36. 29) have similar contents.[57]

4.2. The four (non-physical) realms (āyatana) and the cessation of perception-and-feeling

The four realms (āyatana) are elsewhere called the *four non-physicals* (cattāro arūpā/āruppā) or the *four non-physical attainments* (catasso āruppa-samāpattiyo),[58] though the latter term is not found in these two versions (Vedanā Saṃyutta and Shou Xiangying). These are states of concentrative meditation that may follow the four dhyānas. Attainment of the fourth realm may be followed by a further concentrative attainment: *cessation of*

57 T 2, pp. 121b, 124a-b, 123a-b (CSA ii, pp. 199, 213, 209).
58 DN 33: DN iii, p. 224; DA 9: T 1, p. 50c.

perception-and-feeling. The four realms and *cessation of perception-and-feeling* are described in SN 36. 19-20[59] and SA 474,[60] as follows:

1. *The realm of endless space* (ākāsānañcāyatana 空入處)

SN: Through the complete transcending of material form-perception (rūpa-saññā), through the disappearance of reaction-perception (paṭigha-saññā), through non-attention (amanasikāra) to variety-perception (nānatta-saññā), [knowing] that space is endless (ananto ākāso ti), he abides having attained *the realm of endless space*.
SA: When he attains *the realm of space*, perception of material form ceases.

2. *The realm of endless consciousness* (viññāṇañcāyatana 識入處)

SN: Through the complete transcending of *the realm of endless space*, [knowing] that consciousness is endless (anantaṃ viññāṇanti), he abides having attained *the realm of endless consciousness*.
SA: When he attains *the realm of consciousness*, perception of *the realm of space* ceases.

3. *The realm of nothingness* (ākiñcaññāyatana無所有入處)

SN: Through the complete transcending of *the realm of endless consciousness*, [knowing] that there is nothing (natthi kiñcīti), he abides having attained *the realm of nothingness*.
SA: When he attains *the realm of nothingness*, perception of *the realm of consciousness* ceases.

4. *The realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception* (n'eva saññā-nāsaññāyatana 非想非非想入處)

SN: Through the complete transcending of *the realm of nothingness*, he abides having attained *the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception*.
SA: When he attains *the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception*, perception of *the realm of nothingness* ceases.

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59 SN iv, pp. 227-228; its counterpart SA 485: T 2, p. 124b (CSA ii, p. 213) abbreviates.
60 T 2, p. 121b (CSA ii, p. 199); its counterparts SN 36. 11, 15-18 give only the names.

5. *The cessation of perception-and-feeling* (saññā-vedayita-nirodha 想受滅)

SN: Through the complete transcending of *the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception,* he abides having attained *the cessation of perception-and-feeling.*
SA: When he attains *the cessation of perception-and-feeling, perception-and-feeling* ceases.

Thus, the entire account of the states of concentrative meditation is largely identical in the two versions.

4.3. Cessation of desire-hatred-delusion (rāga-dosa-moha)

In SN 36. 11, 15-18, the Buddha, after teaching the nine stages of concentrative meditation, says:[61]

> For the bhikkhu who has destroyed the influxes (khīṇāsavassa), desire has ceased, hatred has ceased, delusion has ceased.

The corresponding SA 474 says:[62]

> For a person who does not delight in and is liberated from desire, hatred, and ignorance/delusion there is excellent calmness, subtle calmness, superior calmness, the highest calmness, the calmness not surpassed by any other kind of calmness.

Thus, the two versions, though differing in expression, agree in locating the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion after the nine stages of concentrative meditation, and in making it the highest state of all, by virtue of its peacefulness and purity (cessation of the influxes).

On the other hand, SN 36. 29 mentions the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion in four situations, as shown below.

1. After teaching about the five strands of sensual pleasure (pañca-kāmaguṇā) and the first and second dhyānas, the Buddha says that there is a *joy* (pīti) superior to that of the first and the second dhyānas. The five strands of sensual pleasure are "the joy that is carnal" (sāmisā pīti); the first and second dhyānas are "the joy that is non-carnal" (nirāmisā pīti); and the

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61 SN iv, pp. 217-218, 220-222.
62 T 2, p. 121b (CSA ii, p. 200).

joy superior to that of the first and second dhyānas is “the joy that is even more non-carnal than the non-carnal” (nirāmisā nirāmisatarā pīti). This higher joy is the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion:[63]

> Bhiksus! Joy (pīti) arises in a bhiksu who, having extinguished the influxes reflects (paccavekkhato) on the mind liberated from desire (rāgā cittaṃ vimuttam), reflects on the mind liberated from hatred (dosā cittaṃ vimuttam), reflects on the mind liberated from delusion (mohā cittaṃ vimuttam).

2. After teaching the five strands of sensual pleasure and the first, second, and third dhyānas, the Buddha says that there is a *pleasure* (sukha) superior to those of the first second and third dhyānas. The five strands of sensual pleasure are “the pleasure that is carnal” (sāmisā sukhaṃ); the pleasure of the first to third dhyānas is “the pleasure that is non-carnal” (nirāmisā sukhaṃ); and the pleasure that surpasses that of the first to third dhyānas is called “the pleasure that is even more non-carnal than the non-carnal” (nirāmisā nirāmisataraṃ sukhaṃ). This highest pleasure is cessation of desire-hatred-delusion, and is described just as in 1, above, but with “pleasure” (sukha) instead of “joy”.[64]

3. After teaching the five strands of sensual pleasure and the fourth dhyāna, the Buddha then says that there is an *equanimity* (upekkhā) that surpasses that of the fourth dhyāna. The five strands of sensual pleasure are “the equanimity that is carnal” (sāmisā upekkhā); the fourth dhyāna is “the equanimity that is non-carnal” (nirāmisā upekkhā); and the equanimity that surpasses that is “the equanimity that is even more non-carnal than the non-carnal” (nirāmisā nirāmisatarā upekkhā). This highest equanimity is the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion, and is described just as in 1, but with “equanimity” (upekkhā) instead of “joy”.[65]

4. After teaching “the liberation that is carnal” (sāmiso vimokkho), which is “the liberation that is carnal connected with material form” (rūpapaṭisaṃyutto vimokkho sāmiso), and “the liberation that is non-carnal” (nirāmiso vimokkho), which is “the liberation that is non-carnal connected with non-material form” (arūpapaṭisaṃyutto vimokkho nirāmiso), the Buddha says that there is a *liberation* (vimokkha) that surpasses this *liberation that is non-carnal.* Referred to as “the liberation that is even more

63 SN iv, p. 236.
64 SN iv, pp. 236-237.
65 SN iv, p. 237.

non-carnal than the non-carnal" (nirāmisā nirāmisatro vimokkho), it is the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion, and is described as in 1, above, but with "liberation" (vimokkha) instead of "joy".[66]

As noted above, the four āyatanas are also called the four āruppas (non-material attainments), so it is possible that here "the liberation that is non-carnal connected with the *non-material*" refers to the four āyatanas, while "the liberation that is carnal connected with *material form*" refers to the four dhyānas. However, the text, SN 36. 29, does not say so explicitly.

The above four sets, leading to the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion, are based, therefore, on joy, pleasure, equanimity, liberation. The counterpart, SA 483, employs almost the same four (念,[67] 樂, 捨, 解脫); however it mentions the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion only in connection with the fourth type, liberation (解脫). It calls the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion "the liberation that is [even more] non-carnal [than] the non-carnal" (無食無食解脫).[68]

To conclude, in SN 36. 11, 15-18 = SA 474, the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion (rāga-dosa-moha) follows after the nine progressive or gradual stages of concentrative meditation (i.e. the four dhyānas, the four non-physical realms, and the cessation of perception-and-feeling). But, in SN 36. 29 it is mentioned after the second to fourth dhyānas and after the non-material liberation (i.e. the four non-physical realms), whereas in the counterpart SA 483 it is put at the end of the series, i.e. after the material and non-material liberation (rūpa and arūpa). The versions share in common here that the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion is the highest attainment.[69]

Comparison of the two versions leaves it unclear which dhyāna stage is the minimum required in order to attain the cessation of desire-hatred-delusion.

5. Conclusion

This comparison of Vedanā Saṃyutta and its counterpart Shou Xiangying (受相應) has revealed only minor disagreements in the major teachings on

66 SN iv, p. 237.

67 I suggest that 念 (mindfulness) should read 喜 (joy).

68 T 2, p. 123a-b (CSA ii, pp. 209-210).

69 Cf. SA 484: T 2, p. 123b-c (CSA ii, pp. 210-211) = AN 5. 170: AN iii, p. 202. They both show Ānanda as teaching Bhadrajit (Bhaddaji) that the destruction of influxes (āsavānaṃ khayo) is the best of sights (dassanā), of sounds (savanā), of pleasures (sukhā), of perceptions (saññā), and of becomings (bhavā).

feeling between the two versions. A common feature revealed in the comparison is that in both versions *feeling* is closely related to the development of the nine progressive stages of meditation.

CHAPTER 5. THE REALMS OF NATURE

This chapter compares the main teachings contained in Dhātu-saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart, Jie Xiangying (界相應)[1] of SA. The SN version comprises thirty-nine discourses, and the SA version twenty-two discourses;[2] some sixteen discourses are common to the two versions.

In *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* the Pāli term *dhātu* of the SN version is translated as "element"; but the translators, C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS and F. L. WOODWARD, acknowledge that "'element' is by no means a good fit for *dhātu* . . . ".[3] Comparison with the SA version confirms this. In the Chinese version the Sanskrit *dhātu* appears as *jie* (界), which elsewhere means "realm", "locus" or "field". This Chinese term fits much better to the teachings on *dhātu* because, as will be seen, the term *dhātu* is used variously to mean "set of conditions", "natural scope or extent", "natural individual characteristics or ethical qualities", and "intrinsic nature". "The realms of nature" is therefore used for *dhātu* in the title of this chapter; and the text title *Dhātu Saṃyutta* or *Jie Xiangying* may be translated as "Connected with the Realms of Nature". However, given the semantic difficulties, the untranslated *dhātu* will be used in the rest of this chapter as a common term for both versions.

The presentation in this chapter is according to the various usages of the term *dhātu*, namely: (1) a set of eighteen items that figure in some versions of conditioned arising, (2) other bases for conditioned existence, (3) ethical or moral factors, (4) meditative attainments, (5) the "dhātu of self-acting", and (6) the material elements. Consideration of these various usages may be expected to clarify the notion of *dhātu* as presented in the two versions.

1. The eighteen dhātus

The term "eighteen dhātus" (十八界)[4] is found only in the SA version, not in the SN version,[5] but the teaching of eighteen dhātus is common to the two versions.[6] The eighteen dhātus comprise the six sense faculties, the six

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1 Skt. Dhātu-saṃyukta.

2 Regarding the discourses and their locations, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 244, 248.

3 Vol. 2 (1922; PTS, reprinted 1982), p. 101, note 1.

4 Skt. aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ, P. aṭṭhārasa dhātuyo.

5 SA 452-453: T 2, p. 116a (CSA ii, p. 165) (= SN 14. 2-5: SN ii, pp. 140-143).

6 SN 14. 1, 2-5, 7-10: SN ii, pp. 140-148 = SA 451, 452-453, 454-455: T 2, pp. 115c-116c, 125a (CSA ii, pp. 164-167). See also SA 460: T 2, pp. 117c-118a (CSA ii, p. 179) in Jie Xiangying = SN 35 129: SN iv, pp. 113-114 in Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta.

external sense objects, and the corresponding six kinds of consciousness. For example, SN 14. 1 and its counterpart SA 451 both state:[7]

> I will teach you, bhiksus, the diversity of dhātus (dhātu-nānatta 種種諸界 or 種種界) . . . What is the diversity of dhātus? The dhātu of eye, the dhātu of visual forms, the dhātu of eye consciousness, [and so on through the senses to] the dhātu of mind, the dhātu of mental objects, the dhātu of mental consciousness. This, bhiksus, is called the diversity of dhātus.

There are, in both versions, two accounts of the sequence of conditioned arising in terms of these dhātus, as the following shows.

(1) According to SN 14. 2-5, conditioned (paṭicca) by the diversity of dhātus arises (uppajjati) the diversity of contact (phassa-nānatta), and conditioned by the diversity of contact arises the diversity of feeling (vedanā-nānatta). In explaining this, these four sutras speak of the diversity of dhātus only in terms of the six sense faculties (eye, ear, . . . mind).[8] It is this sixfold diversity that accounts for the diversity of contact, which is also sixfold: eye contact, ear contact, etc., and similarly for the diversity of feeling.[9]

The corresponding SA 452-453 say much the same, but speak of the diversity of dhātus in terms of the eighteen dhātus (i.e. the six sense faculties, six external sense objects, and six kinds of consciousness); and they add craving, the next link in the chain of conditioned arising: Conditioned by the diversity of the eighteen dhātus arises the diversity of contact; conditioned by the diversity of contact arises the diversity of feeling; and conditioned by the diversity of feeling arises the diversity of craving.[10]

Both versions (SN 14. 2-5; SA 452-453) affirm that the direction of this conditioning is such that the diversity of dhātus conditions the diversity of contact rather than the other way round; and similarly for the remaining links.

(2) In the next group of SN sutras, SN 14. 7-10 (also in SN 14. 6) the diversity of dhātus is specified in terms of the six external objects (visible

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7 SN ii, p. 140; T 2, pp. 115c-116c (CSA ii, p. 164).
8 SN ii, pp. 140-143.
9 Cf. the six contact-sense spheres "cha phassāyatanāni" (= 18 dhātus), Chapter 3, pp. 73, 75-76.
10 T 2, p. 116a-b (CSA ii, pp. 165-166).

forms, sounds, . . . mental objects).[11] It appears that this mode of specifying the sixfold nature of the dhātus is not essentially different from that observed above (in terms of the six sense faculties). These sutras give two different accounts of conditioned arising beginning with the dhātus. According to SN 14. 7-8, conditioned by the diversity of dhātus there arise, in causal sequence, the diversity of perception (saññā), the diversity of thought (saṅkappa), of excitement (chanda), of burning (pariḷāha), and of quest (pariyesanā); whereas according to SN 14. 9-10, conditioned by the diversity of dhātus there arise in sequence the diversity of perception, of thought, of contact, of feeling, of excitement, of burning, of quest, and of gain (lābha).

The SA discourses that correspond to SN 14. 7-10, namely SA 454-455, say that conditioned by the diversity of the eighteen dhātus (the six sense faculties, six external sense objects, and six kinds of consciousness) there arise, in sequence, the diversity of contact (觸), of feeling (受) (SA 454 only), of perception (想), of excitement (欲), of thought (覺), of burning (熱) (i.e. fever of passion), and of quest (求).[12]

Here again both versions (SN 14. 7-10; SA 454-455) emphasise that the direction of the conditioning is as stated (e.g. the diversity of dhātus conditions the diversity of contact), and not the other way round.

The different sequences arising from the diversity of dhātus in these SN and SA versions are as shown in the following table:

11 SN ii, pp. 143-149.

12 T 2, pp. 116b-c, 125a (CSA ii, pp. 166-167).

Different sequences arising from the diversity of dhātus

SN 14. 7-8	SN 14. 9-10	SA 454	SA 455
dhātus	dhātus	dhātus	dhātus
↓	↓	↓	↓
perception	perception	contact	contact
thought	thought	feeling	
	contact	perception	perception
	feeling	excitement	excitement
excitement	excitement	thought	thought
burning	burning	burning	burning
quest	quest	quest	quest
	gain		

There are marked differences here, both between SN and SA, and within each of those traditions. Furthermore, the items listed include some that are not in the usual version of *conditioned arising* (paṭiccasamuppāda).

To summarise, SN 14. 1-10 and their counterparts SA 451-455 agree regarding the identity of the eighteen dhātus. They then identify two major types of causal sequence arising from those eighteen dhātus. In the first type, the sequence is: dhātu, contact, feeling, (craving), as in the familiar conditioned arising series. In the second type, summarised in the above table, there are differences both within and between the two versions, thus raising questions about their historical status. Here the term *dhātu* is used to mean "set of conditions" in connection with the sense spheres.

2. Other bases of conditioned arising

SN 14. 12, 13 and their counterparts SA 458, 457 record other sets of dhātus that initiate conditioned existence. We consider first SN 14. 12 and SA 458, which state thus:[13]

13 SN ii, pp. 151-152; T 2, p. 117a-b (CSA ii, p. 175).

SN 14. 12	SA 458
With causal condition (sa-nidānam), bhiksus, arises *thinking of sensuality* (kāma-vitakko), not without causal condition; with causal condition arises *thinking of ill-will/malevolence* (vyāpāda-vitakko), not without causal condition; with causal condition arises *thinking of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-vitakko), not without causal condition. How do they arise?	With causal condition (因) arises *perception* (or *thinking*?) *of sensuality* (欲想), not without causal condition; with causal condition arise *perception of ill-will* (恚想) and *perception of cruelty* (害想), not without causal condition.
Conditioned (paṭicca) by ***the dhātu of sensuality*** (kāma-dhātum) arises *perception of sensuality* (kāma-saññā); conditioned by perception of sensuality arises *thought of sensuality* (kāma-saṅkappo); conditioned by thought of sensuality arises *excitement of sensuality* (kāma-chando); conditioned by excitement of sensuality arises *burning of sensuality* (kāma-pariḷāho); conditioned by burning of sensuality arises *quest of sensuality* (kāma-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of sensuality, the untaught worldly person practises wrong conduct (micchāpaṭipajjati) in three ways: in body, speech, and mind (kāyena vācāya manasā).	How does *perception of sensuality* arise with causal condition? Conditioned by ***the dhātu of sensuality*** (欲界) arises *perception of sensuality* (欲想); conditioned by perception of sensuality arises *excitement of sensuality* (欲欲); conditioned by excitement of sensuality arises *thought of sensuality* (欲覺); conditioned by thought of sensuality arises *burning of sensuality* (欲熱); conditioned by burning of sensuality arises *quest of sensuality* (欲求). Quest of sensuality having arisen, the untaught worldly person practises wrong conduct (邪) in three ways: in body, speech, and mind ...
Conditioned by ***the dhātu of ill-will*** (vyāpāda-dhātum) arises *perception of ill-will* (vyāpāda-saññā); conditioned by perception of ill-will arises *thought of ill-will* (vyāpāda-saṅkappo); ... *excitement of ill-will* (vyāpāda-chando); ... *burning of ill-*	How does *perception of ill-will* arise with causal condition? ...

will (vyāpāda-pariḷāho); ... *quest of ill-will* (vyāpāda-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of ill-will, ... practises wrong conduct in three ways: in body, speech, and mind.	
Conditioned by ***the dhātu of cruelty*** (vihiṃsā-dhātum) arises *perception of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-saññā); ... *thought of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-saṅkappo); ... *excitement of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-chando); ... *burning of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-pariḷāho); ... *quest of cruelty* (vihiṃsā-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of cruelty, ... practises wrong conduct in three ways: in body, speech, and mind.	How does *perception of cruelty* arise with causal condition? Conditioned by ***the dhātu of cruelty*** (害界) arises *perception of cruelty, excitement of cruelty, thought of cruelty, burning of cruelty, quest of cruelty*. Quest of cruelty having arisen, the untaught worldly person practises wrong conduct in three ways: in body, speech, and mind.

The two versions display a few minor disagreements. Both name three dhātus: the dhātu of sensuality, the dhātu of ill-will, and the dhātu of cruelty. However, in SN each of these dhātus is the causal condition for **thinking** (vitakka) of sensuality, of ill-will, and of cruelty, while in SA each of them is the causal condition for **perception** (想) of sensuality, of ill-will, and of cruelty. Where SN has "thinking", SA has "perception". Regarding this disagreement, three possibilities are considered here:

(1) The term *thinking* (P. vitakka, Skt. vitarka) possibly has here the same meaning as *perception* (P. saññā, Skt. saṃjñā), the term *perception* being found in both texts as the second item (i.e. the perception of sensuality, of ill-will, and of cruelty) in the causal sequence.

(2) 想 (*perception*) in SA 458 possibly was wrongly used to translate vitarka (vitakka, *thinking*) (cf. also table, p. 138, below).

(3) Also possible is that each of the three thinkings in SN 14. 12 (i.e. thinking of sensuality, of ill-will, and of cruelty) refers to the whole causal sequence.

Another difference is that, in the sequence of the causal conditions involving these three dhātus, SN has "thought" (saṅkappa) before

"excitement" (chanda), whereas SA has them the other way round, as shown in the following table:

Causal sequence based on the three dhātus (of sensuality, ill-will, and cruelty)

SN 14.12	SA 458
dhātu	dhātu
↓	↓
perception	perception
thought	**excitement**
excitement	**thought**
burning	burning
quest	quest

This table reveals a close connection with the table on p. 133. As these two tables show, the sequence and components derived from the three dhātus in SN 14. 12 are the same as in SN 14. 7-8.

Both SN 14. 12 and SA 458, referring to these three bases for causal arising or conditioned existence, say that if any recluse or brahmin, in whom has arisen wrong/dangerous perception (visamagatam saññam 危險想), does not give it up and bring it to nothing, then he will in this present time (diṭṭhe dhamme 現法) abide in suffering (dukkhaṃ viharati 苦住), with destruction (sa-vighātam 有礙), distress (sa-upāyāsam 有惱), burning (sa-pariḷāham 有熱), and at the separation of the body, after death, he can expect a **bad destiny** (duggati 惡趣).[14]

Both texts then give teachings based on the opposites of these three dhātus: the dhātu of renunciation (nekkhamma-dhātu 出要界), the dhātu of benevolence (avyāpāda-dhātu 不恚界), and the dhātu of kindness (avihiṃsā-dhātu 不害界). SN. 14. 12 then has the Buddha say:[15]

> With causal condition (sa-nidānam), bhiksus, arises *thinking of renunciation* (nekkhamma-vitakko), not without causal condition; with causal condition arises *thinking of benevolence* (avyāpāda-vitakko), not without causal condition; with causal condition arises *thinking of kindness* (avihiṃsā-vitakko), not without causal condition. How do they arise?

14 SN ii, p. 152. T 2, p. 117b (CSA ii, pp. 175-176).
15 SN ii, pp. 152-153.

> Conditioned by ***the dhātu of renunciation*** arises *perception of renunciation* (nekkhamma-saññā); conditioned by perception of renunciation arises *thought of renunciation* (nekkhamma-saṅkappo); conditioned by thought of renunciation arises *excitement of renunciation* (nekkhamma-chando); conditioned by excitement of renunciation arises *burning of renunciation* (nekkhamma-pariḷāho); conditioned by burning of renunciation arises *quest of renunciation* (nekkhamma-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of renunciation, the noble well-taught disciple (sutavā ariyasāvako) practises right conduct (sammāpaṭipajjati) in three ways: in body, speech, and mind.

> Conditioned by ***the dhātu of benevolence*** arises *perception of benevolence* (avyāpāda-saññā); ... *thought of benevolence* (avyāpāda-saṅkappo); ... *benevolence-excitement* (avyāpāda-chando); ... *burning of benevolence* (avyāpāda-pariḷāho); ... *quest of benevolence* (avyāpāda-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of benevolence, ...

> Conditioned by ***the dhātu of kindness*** arises *perception of kindness* (avihiṃsā-saññā); ... *thought of kindness* (avihiṃsā-saṅkappo); ... *excitement of kindness* (avihiṃsā-chando); ... *burning of kindness* (avihiṃsā-pariḷāho); ... *quest of kindness* (avihiṃsā-pariyesanā). Pursuing a quest of kindness, ... right conduct ... in body, speech, and mind.

The corresponding SA 458 is similar, but again with **perception** of renunciation, of benevolence, and of kindness (出要想, 不恚想, 不害想), instead of **thinking** of these. The causal condition for the three perceptions in SA 458 is also the dhātus of renunciation, of benevolence, and of kindness. And the causal sequence of these three dhātus in SA 458 again has "excitement" coming before "thought".[16]

Referring to these three dhātus, both texts then say that if any recluse or brahmin, in whom has arisen wrong/dangerous perception, gives it up, brings it to nothing, then he will in this present time abide in happiness (sukham viharati 樂住), without destruction (avighātam 不礙), distress (anupāyāsam 不惱), or burning (apariḷāham 不熱), and at the separation of the body, after death, he can expect a **happy destiny** (sugati 善趣).[17]

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16 T 2, p. 117b (CSA ii, p. 176).

17 SN ii, p. 153. T 2, p. 117b (CSA ii, p. 176).

Thus, with regard to the dhātus that give rise to conditioned existence, SN 14. 12 and its counterpart SA 458 report altogether six kinds of dhātu: the dhātus of sensuality, of ill-will, and of cruelty; and their opposites, the dhātus of renunciation, of benevolence, and of kindness.

The next discourse, SN 14. 13, and its counterpart SA 457 name further dhātus that initiate conditioned existence. Both versions state that conditioned by the dhātu of ignorance (avijjā-dhātu 無明界), whether low (hīna-dhātu 下界), average (majjhima-dhātu 中界), or excellent (paṇīta-dhātu 勝界), there arise in sequence various conditions and actions, as the following table shows:[18]

Conditions and actions derived from the dhātu of ignorance (low, average, or excellent)

SN 14. 13	SA 457
dhātu ↓	dhātu ↓
1. saññā (perception)	1. 說 (speech)
2. diṭṭhi (view)	2. 見 (view)
3. vitakka (thinking)	3. 想 (perception or thinking?)
4. cetanā (volition)	4. 思 (volition)
5. patthanā (wishes)	5. 欲 (wishes)
6. paṇidhi (aspiration)	6. 願 (aspiration)
7. puggala (person)	7. 士夫 (person)
8. vācā (speech)	8. 所作 (what is done)
9. ācikkhati (to declare)	9. 施設 (to reveal)
10. deseti (to teach)	10. 建立 (to establish)
11. paññāpeti (to reveal)	11. 部分 (part)
12. paṭṭhapeti (to establish)	12. 顯示 (to disclose)
13. vivarati (to disclose)	13. 受生 (rebirth)
14. vibhajati (to analyse)	
15. uttānikaroti (to explain)	
16. uppatti (rebirth)	

The SN version names sixteen items derived from the dhātu of ignorance, where the SA names thirteen; five items in SN and two in SA have no exactly corresponding terms. The sequence in the two versions is identical except in the case of speech.

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18 SN ii, pp. 153-154. T 2, p. 117a (CSA ii, p. 171).

To summarise, SN and SA present two sets of dhātu that initiate conditioned existence: (1) the dhātus of sensuality, ill-will, and cruelty; and their opposites; and (2) the dhātu of ignorance (low, average, excellent). These dhātus are shared by the two versions. However, regarding the factors derived from the two sets of dhātu, the two versions show minor disagreements in both composition and sequence. In addition, the items listed include many that are not in the usual *conditioned arising* sequence.

3. Ethical or moral dhātu

In both the SN and SA versions of this saṃyukta, the term *dhātu* is applied also to teachings concerned with how beings of various ethical or moral characteristics "flow together and meet together". For example, SN 14. 14 reports the Buddha as saying:[19]

> It is by *dhātu* (dhātuso), bhiksus, that beings (sattā) *flow together, meet together* (saṃsandanti samenti). Beings of low inclinations (hīnādhimuttikā) flow together, meet together with those of low inclinations. [Those of] virtuous inclinations (kalyānādhimuttikā) flow together, meet together with those of virtuous inclinations. In past time ... In future time ... Now in the present time, it is by *dhātu* ...

The corresponding SA 445 is a little different:[20]

> *Beings always meet together, gather together with dhātu* (衆生常與界俱, 與界和合). What is meant by saying that beings always meet together with dhātu? This is to say, when beings act with unvirtuous mind, they meet together with unvirtuous dhātu (不善界); when [they act with] virtuous mind, they meet together with virtuous dhātu (善界); when [they act with] noble mind, they meet together with noble dhātu (勝界); when [they act with] base mind, they meet together with base dhātu (鄙界). Therefore, bhiksus, you should practise this, being virtuous in the various dhātus.

19 SN ii, pp. 154-155. Cf. also SN 14. 16: SN ii, pp. 157-158 and its counterparts SA 446, 448: T 2, p. 115a-c (CSA ii, pp. 160, 162).
20 T 2, p. 115a (CSA ii, p. 160).

Thus, SN 14.14 implies that the dhātu by which beings meet together is their low inclination or virtuous inclination in past, future, or present time, while SA 445 speaks of the dhātus of an unvirtuous mind, a virtuous mind, a noble mind, and a base mind, without mentioning the three times. Here the term *dhātu* clearly means natural characteristic in the sense of ethical or moral quality; these are ethical or moral dhātus.

Other discourses in the two versions discuss specific ethical or moral dhātus in the same context of beings who possess them always flowing together and meeting together. For example, SN 14. 17 refers to the notion of dhātu in connection with two linked sets (negative and positive) of seven ethical qualities. There are people or beings who are 1. lacking faith/confidence (asaddhā) or possessing faith/confidence (saddhā), 2. unconscientious (ahirikā) or conscientious (hirimanā), 3. shameless (anottāpino = not ashamed of evil or wrong conduct) or ashamed of wrong conduct (ottāpino), 4. possessing little knowledge (appassutā) or possessing great knowledge (bahussutā), 5. lazy (kusītā) or diligent (āraddhaviriyā), and 6. forgetful in mindfulness (muṭṭha-satino) or established in mindfulness (upaṭṭhita-satino), and 7. of bad insight (duppaññā) or possessed of insight (paññavanto).[21] Similar teachings with some of these items are also found in SN 14. 18-22, with nothing new added.[22] These discourses are all saying that "by *dhātu* beings flow together, meet together"; for instance, by dhātu unbelievers (asaddhā) flow together, meet together with unbelievers. Altogether fourteen ethical dhātus are named.

Like the above, SN 14. 23 names the four items 1, 2, 3, and 7, and adds one more item in both the negative and the positive listings: unconcentrated (asamāhitā) and concentrated (samāhitā).[23] SN 14. 24 also lists items 1, 2, 3, and 7, but adds the pair of bad morality (dussīlā) and observant of moral precepts (sīlavanto).[24]

Of the above eight sutras (SN 14. 17, 18-22, 23, 24), only SN 14. 23 has no SA counterpart; the rest have their counterpart in SA 450. It presents the same teachings, but with a much longer list of ethical dhātus, which need not be reported here.[25]

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21 SN ii, p. 159.
22 SN ii, pp. 160-165.
23 SN ii, p. 166.
24 SN ii, pp. 166-167.
25 T 2, p. 115c (CSA ii, p. 163).

Another discourse, SN 14. 25 with counterpart SA 449, gives the ethical dhātus of beings in terms of not following or following *the five precepts of training* (pañca-sikkhā-padāni).[26]

Then there is a set of four discourses, SN 14. 26-29, which, again on the theme that "by *dhātu* beings flow together, meet together", list pairs of ethical dhātus regarding individuals who practise or do not practise *seven ways of action* (sattakammapathā), *ten ways of action* (dasakammapathā), the *eightfold* [path] (aṭṭhaṅgiko), and the *tenfold* [path] (dasaṅga).[27] These four SN discourses all lack SA counterparts.

The *seven ways of action* (SN 14. 26) are the first four of the five precepts (above), followed by three more items relating to speech: slander (pisuṇavācā), abusive speech (pharusavācā), and idle talk (samphappalāpa). In each case those who practise the wrong type of speech are paired with those who abstain from it. These make a total of seven pairs of ethical or moral dhātu.[28]

Individuals practising the *ten ways of action* (SN 14. 27) are defined in terms of the above seven pairs together with three more pairs: covetous (abhijjhāluno) and not covetous (anabhijjhāluno); malevolent minded (vyāpannacittā) and non-malevolent minded (avyāpannacittā); and having wrong view (micchādiṭṭhikā) and having right view (sammādiṭṭhikā). These together make ten pairs based on the notion of ethical dhātu.[29]

The *eightfold* (SN 14. 28) is the noble eightfold path: individuals are paired as those who have wrong view and those who have right view, and so on, making eight pairs.[30]

The *tenfold* (SN 14. 29) comprises the paired items of the noble eightfold path, together with two further pairs: those who have wrong or right knowledge (micchāñāṇino and sammāñāṇino), and those who have wrong or right liberation (micchāvimuttino and sammāvimuttino). These make ten pairs of ethical dhātu.[31]

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26 SN ii, p. 167; T 2, p. 115c (CSA ii, p. 162). The pañca-sikkhā-padāni are abstention from destruction of life (pāṇātipātā), from taking what is not given (adinnādānā), from wrong behaviour in sensual pleasure (kāmesu micchācārā), from false speech (musāvādā), and from carelessness-inducing intoxicants and liquors (surāmeraya-majjapamāda-ṭṭhānā).

27 SN ii, pp. 167-169.

28 SN ii, p. 167.

29 SN ii, p. 168.

30 SN ii, p. 168.

31 SN ii, p. 169.

Finally in this section on ethical or moral dhātus, we consider SN 14. 15 and its counterpart SA 447.[32] Here, the Buddha, to illustrate the notion that "by dhātu beings flow together and meet together", points out eight bhiksus (in SN) or thirteen (in SA); each of them shares with many other bhiksus "walking to and fro" (caṅkamantanti 經行) the same personal characteristic or nature (dhātu). In SN the eight bhiksus and the characteristics they share with their followers are:

1. Sāriputta and his followers possess great wisdom (mahāpaññā).
2. Moggallāna etc. possess great psychic powers (mahiddhikā).
3. Kassapa etc. are ascetic indoctrinators (dhutavādā).
4. Anuruddha etc. possess deva-vision (dibbacakkhukā).
5. Puṇṇa Mantāniputta etc. are Dharma-preachers (dhammakathikā).
6. Upāli etc. are vinaya-bearers (vinayadharā).
7. Ānanda etc. have heard/learned much (bahussutā).
8. Devadatta etc. are willers of evil (pāpicchā).

The corresponding SA 447 names thirteen bhiksus, the above 1 to 4 and 6 to 8, together with the following six:

1. Kaundinya (or Ajña-Kaundinya, P. Añña-Kondañña) and his followers are most senior.
2. Śroṇa-Koṭiviṃśa (P. Soṇa-Kolivīsa) etc. are most diligent in practice.
3. Darva (or Darva-Mallaputra, P. Dabba-Mallaputta) etc. are able and skilled in repairing utensils for the Saṅgha.
4. Pūrṇajit (P. Puṇṇaji) etc. are skilled in argument and good at teaching Dharma.
5. Kātyāyāna (or Mahākātyāyāna, P. Mahā-Kaccāyana/Kaccāna) etc. are skilled in analysing the teaching and explaining the Dharma.
6. Rāhula and his followers are good at keeping the discipline.

Both discourses indicate that those bhiksus keep company because they possess the same dhātu (personal characteristic or nature).

Regarding these various ethical, moral, or personal characteristic dhātus, the two versions share the notion that there are such dhātus possessed by beings. However, while the SN discourses always mention the ethical dhātus

32 SN ii, pp. 155-157; T 2, p. 115a-b (CSA ii, pp. 161-162). Another counterpart at EA 49. 3: T 2, pp. 795b-796a.

in connection with past, future and present time, their SA counterparts do not do so.[33]

4. Meditative attainments

SN 14. 11 and its counterpart SA 456 speak of the following seven dhātus:[34]

1. the dhātu of light (ābhā-dhātu 光界)
2. the dhātu of purity (subha-dhātu 淨界)
3. the dhātu of the realm of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana-dhātu 無量空入處界)
4. the dhātu of the realm of infinite consciousness (viññāṇañcāyatana-dhātu 無量識入處界)
5. the dhātu of the realm of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana-dhātu 無所有入處界)
6. the dhātu of the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-dhātu 非想非非想入處界)
7. the dhātu of the cessation of perception-and-feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha-dhātu) or the dhātu of cessation (有滅界)

The two versions differ regarding the *causal condition* (paṭicca 緣) by which these seven dhātus can be known, and the *attainment* (samāpatti 正受 = stage of meditation) by which each of them can be reached. These are as follows.

SN 14. 11 states that: dhātu 1 (light) is known through darkness (andhakara); dhātu 2 (purity) is known through impurity (asubha); dhātu 3 (infinity of space) is known through material form (rūpa); each of the dhātus 4 to 6 is known through the dhātu named previously (dhātu 4 is known through dhātu 3, etc.); and finally dhātu 7 (cessation of perception-and-feeling) is known through cessation. SA 456 states that dhātus 1 to 3 are known as above; dhātu 4 (infinity of consciousness) is known through space;[35] dhātu 5 (nothingness 無所有) is known through *everything-ness* (所有); dhātu 6 (neither-perception-nor-non-perception) is known through *the*

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33 The term for time is addhāna, referring to a long period of time, i.e. a lifetime (PED, p. 26). SN 14. 14-22, 29: SN ii, pp. 154-165, 169. SA 445-448, 450 (counterparts of SN 14. 14-16, 24): T 2, p. 115a-c (CSA ii, pp. 160-163).

34 SN ii, pp. 150-151; T 2, pp. 116c-117a (CSA ii, p. 169).

35 See CSA ii, p. 171, note 3.

supreme existence (有第一);[36] and finally dhātu 7 (cessation) is known through *the body of existence* or *individuality* (有身).[37]

Regarding the attainment by which each of these dhātus is to be reached, SN 14. 11 says that dhātus 1 to 5 are to be reached by *attainment of perception* (saññāsamāpatti); dhātu 6 by *attainment of remaining activities* (saṅkhārāvasesasamāpatti); and dhātu 7 by *attainment of cessation* (nirodhasamāpatti). By contrast, SA 456 states that dhātus 1 to 5 are to be attained by *attainment of self-activity* (自行正受); dhātu 6 by *attainment of the supreme existence* (第一有正受); and dhātu 7 by *attainment of the cessation of the body of existence* (or *individuality*) (有身滅正受). Neither version offers any explanation of these attainments.

This set of seven dhātus is common to the two versions as are also the causal conditions by which the first four of the seven are to be known. The two source texts differ, however, regarding the causal conditions by which dhātus 5-7 are to be known, and regarding the attainment by which each of the seven dhātus is to be reached. It is therefore possible that the details regarding attainment of the higher dhātus represent a relatively late addition in the two traditions. Here, the term *dhātu* is being used to mean meditative state.

A few discourses in SA, all of which lack SN counterparts, report other sets of dhātus, apparently pertaining to meditation, as follows.

SA 461 names three dhātus:[38] the dhātu of sensuality (欲界), the dhātu of materiality (色界), and the dhātu of non-materiality (無色界).[39]

SA 462 names a different three:[40] the dhātu of materiality, the dhātu of non-materiality, and the dhātu of cessation (滅界).[41]

SA 463 has this statement:[42]

> That is to say, emergence from the dhātu of sensuality into the dhātu of materiality, emergence from the dhātu of materiality into the dhātu of non-materiality, and the dhātu of the cessation (滅) of all activities (一切諸行) and all thoughts (一切思想). These are called the *three emergence-dhātus* (三出界).

36 P. bhavagga? (= neither-perception-nor-non-perception).
37 Skt. satkāya, P. sakkāya.
38 T 2, p. 118a (CSA ii, p. 180).
39 Skt. P. kāma-dhātu, rūpa-dhātu, arūpa-dhātu.
40 T 2, p. 118a (CSA ii, p. 180).
41 Skt. P. nirodha-dhātu.
42 T 2, p. 118b (CSA ii, p. 181).

Finally, SA 464 speaks of "all liberation dhātus" (諸解脫界),[43] explaining them as the dhātu of elimination (斷界),[44] the dhātu of fading away (of sensual desire) (無欲界),[45] and the dhātu of cessation (滅界), attained by practising both calm and insight (止觀).[46] The sutra explains that the dhātu of elimination is the elimination of all activities (一切行); the dhātu of fading away (of sensual desire) is the elimination of craving and sensuality (愛欲); and the dhātu of cessation is the cessation of all activities.[47]

Of the above four sutras (SA 461-464), only SA 463 has a Pāli counterpart, and it is located not in SN but in Itivuttaka 51 of Khuddaka-nikāya.[48] This Pāli version mentions just three dhātus – the dhātu of materiality, the dhātu of non-materiality, and the dhātu of cessation; unlike its SA counterpart, it mentions neither the dhātu of sensuality, nor the step-by-step progression from each dhātu to the next.

This section has shown that the term *dhātu* is used in the two versions to refer to various meditative sates; however, the details regarding attainment of these states are not entirely shared by both versions, and some of the sets of dhātus are found only in SA sutras that lack SN counterparts.

5. The "dhātu of self-acting"

SA 459 has its Pāli counterpart not in SN but in Aṅguttara Nikāya, namely AN 6. 38. This discourse reports the Buddha as saying that there is a dhātu of self-acting (atta-kāra 自作), and there is a dhātu of other-acting (para-kāra 他作). The following first presents the content of AN 6. 38, and then compares with SA 459.

AN 6. 38 has a certain brahmin say to the Buddha:[49]

> This, Master Gotama, is my doctrine; this is my view: There is no self-acting (attakāro); there is no other-acting (parakāro).

The Buddha replies:

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43 Skt. sarva-vimukti-dhātu.
44 Skt. prahāṇa-dhātu.
45 Skt. virāga-dhātu.
46 Skt. śamatha-vipaśyanā.
47 T 2, p. 118b-c (CSA ii, pp. 182-183).
48 Iti. pp. 45-46.
49 AN iii, pp. 337-338.

> Brahmin, I have never seen or heard of such a doctrine, such a view. How indeed can one, stepping forward by oneself (sayaṃ abhikkamanto), stepping backward by oneself (sayaṃ paṭikkamanto), say thus: "There is no self-acting; there is no other-acting"? What do you think, brahmin, is there a *dhātu of initiating* (ārabbha-dhātu)? Yes, sir.
>
> That being so, are beings that initiate (ārabbhavanto sattā) to be known? Yes, sir.
>
> Well, brahmin, since there is a dhātu of initiating and beings that initiate to be known, this among beings is self-acting; this is other-acting. What do you think, brahmin, is there a *dhātu of stepping away* (nikkama-dhātu) ... a *dhātu of stepping forward* (parakkama-dhātu) ... a *dhātu of firmness* (thāma-dhātu) ...a *dhātu of standing still* (ṭhiti-dhātu) ... a *dhātu of stepping toward* (upakkama-dhātu)? Yes, sir.
>
> That being so, are beings that step toward [anything] (upakkamavanto sattā) to be known? Yes, sir.
>
> Well, brahmin, since there is a dhātu of stepping toward and beings that step toward to be known, this among beings is self-acting; this is other-acting. Never, Brahmin, I have seen or heard of such a doctrine, such a view. How indeed can one, stepping forward by oneself, stepping backward by oneself, say such: There is no self-acting; there is no other-acting?
>
> This, indeed, is wonderful, Master Gotama! ... And from this day onward, till life ends, I will go (to Master Gotama ...) for refuge.

The corresponding SA 459 has different wording, but the same overall meaning. It begins with the brahmin saying to the Buddha:[50]

> In beings there is no self-acting (非自作), there is no other-acting (非他作).

It then reports the Buddha's reply and the subsequent conversation thus:

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50 T 2, p. 117c (CSA ii, pp. 177-178).

Brahmin, I have never seen such a doctrine. You are now coming here yourself and telling me there is no self-acting, there is no other-acting.

The brahmin said: For what reason, Gautama, is there in beings self-acting, is there other-acting?

The Buddha said to the brahmin: I shall now ask you a question; answer as you wish. What do you think, brahmin, is there in beings a *dhātu of effort* (方便界), so that beings know they make effort?

Yes, Gautama ...

The Buddha said to the brahmin: If there is a dhātu of effort so that beings know there is effort, this in beings is self-acting; this is other-acting.

What do you think, brahmin, is there in beings a *dhātu of staying still* (安住界), a *dhātu of firmness* (堅固界), a *dhātu of emerging* (出界), a *dhātu of acting* (造作界), so that beings know there is ... acting?

Yes, Gautama ...

The Buddha said to the brahmin: If there is a dhātu of staying still, a dhātu of firmness, a dhātu of emerging, a dhātu of acting, so that beings know there is ... acting, this in beings is self-acting; this is other-acting.

The brahmin said: Yes, in beings there is self-acting, there is other-acting. Gautama, I have much business to attend to, so I should leave you now.

The Buddha said to the brahmin: You have much business to attend to, so do as you see fit. ...

Thus, as the reason why "among beings there is self-acting, other-acting", AN 6. 38 lists six dhātus, while SA 459 lists five, as follows:

Dhātus of actions and postures

AN 6. 38	SA 459
1. dhātu of initiating	1. dhātu of effort
2. dhātu of stepping away	2. dhātu of staying still
3. dhātu of stepping forward	3. dhātu of firmness
4. dhātu of firmness	4. dhātu of emerging
5. dhātu of standing still	5. dhātu of acting
6. dhātu of stepping toward	

Only items 2, 3, and 4 of SA are shared with AN, and in a different order. Nevertheless, the two versions share in common that among beings there is self-acting and other-acting, by virtue of various dhātus. Here, the term *dhātu* is used to refer to certain actions and postures.

6. The material elements

SN 14. 30-39 all speak of four dhātus (catasso dhātuyo), identified as the four material elements: earth-dhātu (pathavīdhātu), water-dhātu (āpodhātu), heat-dhātu (tejodhātu), and air-dhātu (vāyodhātu).[51] For example, SN 14. 31 reports the Buddha as saying that before his enlightenment, while still a bodhisatta, he was thinking what are the flavour, the danger, and the giving up of these four dhātus; SN 14. 36 refers to the arising and the ceasing of the four dhātus (i.e. the arising and cessation of suffering); and SN 14. 37-39 state that bhiksus should know and see these four dhātus as they really are.[52] All of these ten Pāli discourses lack counterparts in SA.

These four dhātus do receive a mention in SA 465, as the first four in a set of six dhātus: the above-named four plus space-dhātu (空界) and consciousness-dhātu (識界).[53] However, the supposed Pāli counterparts of this text, SN 22. 91 and SN 18. 21, are not located in the Dhātu Saṃyutta and do not even mention the material elements.[54]

Thus, only four of the material dhātus (earth, water, heat, air) are common to the two versions. It is therefore possible that the space-dhātu

51 SN ii, pp. 169-177.
52 SN ii, pp. 170, 175-177.
53 Skt. ākāśa-dhātu, vijñāna-dhātu, P. ākāsa-dhātu, viññāṇa-dhātu. T 2, pp. 118c-119a (CSA ii, p. 184).
54 SN iii, pp. 135-136; SN ii, p. 252.

and consciousness-dhātu developed later, yielding the set of six dhātus. Also, it appears that the discourses which discuss the material dhātus were incorporated into this saṃyukta at a relatively late stage.

7. Conclusion

This comparison of the Dhātu Saṃyutta of SN and the Jie Xiangying of SA has revealed that *dhātu* is used to mean various different things in different contexts, including: "set of conditions responsible for initiating the chain of conditioned arising", "natural individual characteristic or ethical quality", "meditative attainment", and "material element". In general, the common shared meaning component of the term *dhātu* can be identified as "natural condition". Unshared teachings regarding *dhātu* are widespread and some of them are substantial. They are likely to represent later sectarian developments (e.g. in sections 1, 2, 4-6).

CHAPTER 6. CAUSAL CONDITION

The Nidāna Saṃyutta (Connected with Causal Condition) of SN and its Chinese counterpart, Yinyuan Xiangying (因緣相應)[1] of SA, deal mainly with *arising by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppāda 緣起), one of the fundamental teachings of early Buddhism. The SN version has ninety-three discourses, and the SA version fifty-seven;[2] some forty-four discourses are common to the two versions. For twenty-five of the SA discourses (and their SN counterparts) the Sanskrit source text (largely complete) is available and will be referred to in footnotes.[3] This chapter compares the content of the Pāli and Chinese, regarding both the main topic, *arising by causal condition*, and also some subsidiary related topics.

1. Arising by causal condition and dharmas arisen by causal condition

Regarding *causal condition*, SN 12. 20[4] and its counterpart SA 296[5] record the Buddha as teaching two closely related concepts. The SN version states: [6]

> I will teach you, bhiksus, *arising by causal condition* (paṭiccasamuppāda) and *dharmas* (phenomena) *arisen by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppanne ca dhamme[7]).

In the SA version (SA 296) the corresponding terms are: 因緣法 (yinyuan fa = 緣起法 yuanqi fa) *the dharma of arising by causal condition*, and 緣生法 (yuansheng fa) *dharmas arisen by causal condition*.[8] The first of these differs from the Pāli in having a suffixed "dharma" – evidently in the sense of "law" or "nature". This is likely to have been added by the translator, because the Sanskrit agrees with the Pāli, giving the two terms as "pratītyasamutpādaṃ

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1 Skt. Nidāna Saṃyukta.

2 On the discourses and their locations, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 244, 248.

3 Chandrabhāl TRIPĀṬHĪ, *Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasaṃyukta* (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1962). The twenty-five sūtras edited by Tripāṭhī correspond to SA 283-303 and SA 343-346.

4 SN ii, pp. 25-27.

5 T 2, p. 84b-c (CSA ii, pp. 34-35). For the Sanskrit version, see Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 14, pp. 147-152.

6 SN ii, p. 25.

7 SN ii, p. 26: paṭicca-samuppannā dhammā.

8 T 2, p. 84b (CSA ii, pp. 34-35). Cf. SA 299: T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 40); no Pāli counterpart, but see Skt. version, Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 17, pp. 164-165.

... pratītyasamutpannāṃś ca dharmān" (i.e. "pratītyasamutpādaḥ" and "pratītyasamutpannā dharmāḥ").[9]

In both versions (SN 12. 20 and SA 296), the Buddha then explains what these are.

SN 12. 20:[10]

> What, bhiksus, is *arising by causal condition*?
>
> Conditioned by (paccayā) birth (jāti) is ageing-and-death (jarāmaraṇaṃ). Whether, bhiksus, there be an arising or no arising of Tathāgatas (Buddhas) [in this world], **there remains this** [fact of] **nature** (ṭhitā va sā dhātu), **this constancy/status of phenomena** (dhammaṭṭhitatā), **this certainty of phenomena** (dhammaniyāmatā), **this causal relatedness** (idappaccayatā). Concerning this the Tathāgata is fully enlightened, he fully understands it. Being fully enlightened, fully understanding it, he declares it, teaches it, reveals it, establishes it, makes it clear, explains it in detail, shows it plain, saying: Look!
>
> Conditioned by **birth**, bhiksus, is **ageing-and-death**;
> conditioned by **becoming** (bhava), bhiksus, is birth;
> conditioned by **attachment** (upādāna), bhiksus, is becoming;
> conditioned by **craving** (taṇhā), bhiksus, is attachment;
> conditioned by **feeling** (vedanā), bhiksus, is craving;
> conditioned by **contact** (phassa), bhiksus, is feeling;
> conditioned by **the six sense spheres** (saḷāyatana), bhiksus, is contact;
> conditioned by **name-and-material form** (nāmarūpa), bhiksus, are the six sense spheres;
> conditioned by **consciousness** (viññāṇa), bhiksus, is name-and-material form;
> conditioned by **activities** (saṅkhārā), bhiksus, is consciousness;
> conditioned by **ignorance** (avijjā), bhiksus, are activities. ...
>
> Thus, bhiksus, that which is **suchness** (tathatā), **not unsuchness** (avitathatā), **not otherwise** (anaññathatā), **causal relatedness** (idappaccayatā) – This is called *arising by causal condition.*

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9 Tripāṭhī, pp. 147, 149, 164.
10 SN ii, pp. 25-26.

The corresponding SA 296 is different in expression; for example, it reverses the sequence, beginning with "conditioned by ignorance are activities". However, the message is the same in both versions.[11]

The Buddha explains *arising by causal condition* in terms of the two notions of (1) causal factors and (2) a natural law of phenomena, as follows:

(1) In both versions the causal factors of *arising by causal condition* are twelve: Conditioned by 1. ignorance are 2. activities, and so on in sequence to 3. consciousness, 4. name-and-material form, 5. the six sense spheres, 6. contact, 7. feeling, 8. craving, 9. attachment, 10. becoming, 11. birth, and 12. ageing-and-death. This indicates that *arising by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppāda, 因緣法,緣起法) is about the causal connections whereby each of the twelve factors is linked to the next.

(2) A natural law of phenomena in regard to *arising by causal condition* is expressed, in each version, in two sections:

11 T 2, p. 84b (CSA ii, p. 35).

(i) Whether Tathāgatas (Buddhas) arise in the world or not,

SN 12. 20	SA 296
there remains this [fact of] nature (ṭhitā va sā dhātu), this constancy of phenomena (dhammaṭṭhitatā), this certainty of phenomena (dhamma-niyāmatā), this causal relatedness (idappaccayatā).	these phenomena (此法)[12] are persistence (常住), the constancy/status of phenomena (法住), the nature of phenomena (法界).[13]
that which is suchness (tathatā), not unsuchness (avitathatā), not otherwise (anaññathatā), causal relatedness (idappaccayatā).	these dharmas are the constancy of phenomena (法住), the certainty of phenomena (法定), suchness of phenomena (法如法爾), no departure from the true (法不離如), no difference from the true (法不異如), actuality (審諦), truth (眞), reality (實), non-confusion (不顚倒).[14]

(ii) Concerning this *arising by causal condition* the Tathāgata is fully enlightened, and fully understands it; being fully enlightened, fully understanding it, he declares it, teaches it, reveals it.

Here, the SA version lacks the term "idappaccayatā", and uses words that have no exact counterparts in the SN. However, the two versions agree that *arising by causal condition* is not something made either by the Buddha or by others. Whether or not a Buddha arises in the world, *arising by causal condition* is a natural law of phenomena as they really are; the Buddha only discovers it and, having seen it fully, reveals it to others.

12 Referring to the causal factors of *arising by causal condition*.

13 Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 148: "eveyaṃ dharmatā dharmasthitaye dhātu(ḥ)". SA 299 (no SN counterpart) has: 法界常住 "[these phenomena are] the constancy/status of the nature of phenomena" (T 2, p. 85b; CSA ii, p. 40).

14 Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 149: "iti yātra dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā dharma-yathātathā avitathatā ananyathā bhūtaṃ satyatā tattvatā yāthātathā aviparītatā aviparyastatā".

Having explained *arising by causal condition*, the Buddha, goes on to explain *dharmas arisen by causal condition*. According to SN 12. 20 he says:[15]

> And what, bhiksus, are *dharmas arisen by causal condition*?
>
> Ageing-and-death is impermanent (aniccaṃ), compounded (saṅkhataṃ), arisen by causal condition (paṭicca-samuppannaṃ), having the nature of destruction (khayadhammaṃ), having the nature of decay (vayadhammaṃ), having the nature of fading away (virāgadhammaṃ), having the nature of cessation (nirodhadhammaṃ).
>
> Bhiksus, birth, becoming, attachment, craving, feeling, contact, the six sense spheres, name-and-material form, consciousness, activities, ignorance – each of these too is impermanent, compounded, arisen by causal condition, having the nature of destruction, of decay, of fading away, of cessation. These, bhiksus, are called *dharmas arisen by causal condition*.

The corresponding SA 296 is rather different:[16]

> What are *dharmas arisen by causal condition*? They are: ignorance, activities, ... Arising thus according to causal condition (隨順緣起),[17] these are called *dharmas arisen by causal condition*, that is to say: ignorance, activities, consciousness, name-and-material form, the six sense spheres, contact, feeling, craving, attachment, becoming, birth, ageing-sickness-death, [along with] grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. These are called *dharmas arisen by causal condition*.

Thus, the SA version merely says that *dharmas arisen by causal condition* are the twelve factors, while SN 12. 20 adds that each of the twelve is "impermanent, compounded, arisen by causal condition, having the nature of destruction, of decay, of fading away, of cessation". The shared teaching is, then, that *dharmas arisen by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppannā dhammā) are the twelve factors themselves.

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15 SN ii, p. 26.
16 T 2, p. 84b (CSA ii, p. 35).
17 Skt. pratītyasamutpādānulomatā, Tripāṭhī, p.149.

Finally, both versions have the Buddha state the effect of fully knowing *arising by causal condition* and *dharmas arisen by causal condition*:

SN 12. 20[18]	SA 296[19]
Now, bhiksus, because the noble disciple has, by right insight (sammāpaññāya), well seen (sudiṭṭhā) as they really are (yathā-bhūtaṃ) both *arising by causal condition* and *dharmas arisen by causal conditions*, it surely never happens that he will run back to the past, thinking: Did I indeed exist in time past? Did I indeed not exist in time past? What did I indeed exist as in time past? How did I indeed exist in time past? From being what did I indeed become what in time past?	Now, bhiksus, because the much learned noble disciple has, by right insight (正智), well seen (善見)[20] both the *dharma of arising by causal condition* and *dharmas arisen by causal condition*, he will not look backwards into time past, saying: Did I exist in time past, or did I not? What was I in time past? How was I in time past?
Or that he will run toward the future, thinking: Shall I indeed exist in future time? Shall I indeed not exist in future time? As what shall I indeed exist in future time? How shall I indeed exist in future time? From being what, shall I indeed become what in future time?	Nor he will look toward to future time: Shall I exist in future time, or shall I not? What shall I be? How shall I be?
Or that he will now become uncertain within himself as to the present time, thinking: Do I indeed exist? Do I indeed not exist? As what do I indeed exist? How do I indeed exist? From where did this being (i.e. I) come? Where will it go?	Nor does he inwardly hesitate (be uncertain within himself), thinking: What is this (i.e. I)? Why does it exist? Who was this in the past? What will it become in the end? Where do all these beings come from? What will they become when they die?

18 SN ii, pp. 26-27.
19 T 2, p. 84b-c (CSA ii, p. 35). Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 150-151.
20 The Skt. terms are: samyakprajñayā, sudṛṣṭā (Tripāṭhī, p. 150).

	If in a recluse or a brahmin there arise worldly views (凡俗見), namely view connected with self (我見所繫), view connected with a being (衆生見所繫), view connected with a soul/life (壽命見所繫), view connected with auspicious rituals and ceremonies (忌諱吉慶見所繫),[21] then these are completely cut off, completely known; they are cut off at the root, like the cut-off stump of a palm-tree, never to arise again in the future.

Thus, the SA version in the first three sections states almost the same as the SN version, but then continues into a fourth section. It is possible that this extra section in SA 296 represents a later addition. What the two versions say in common is that one who has fully known both *arising by causal condition* and *dharmas arisen by causal condition* is no longer assailed by doubts about his existence in the three times (past, future, and present).

In summary, the versions agree regarding the identity of *arising by causal condition* and of *dharmas* (or *phenomena*) *arisen by causal condition*. Although there are some unshared components, the two versions show no evidence of significant sectarian divergence.

2. The summary formula

The teaching of *arising by causal condition* is frequently presented in the following short formula:

> This existing, that comes to exist
> (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti);
> From the arising of this, that arises
> (imassuppādā idam uppajjati);

21 The Skt. terms are: pṛthalloke dṛṣṭigatāni, ātmavāda-pratisaṃyuktāni, sattvavāda-pratisaṃyuktāni; jīvavāda-pratisaṃyuktāni, kotūhalamaṅgalavāda-pratisaṃyuktāni (Tripāṭhī, p. 151).

This not existing, that does not come to exist
(imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti);
From the ceasing of this, that ceases
(imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati).

This four-sentence formula appears in SN 12. 21, 37, 41, 49-50, 61-62.[22] The SA contains a similar statement; it is found in SA 293, 296-302, 349-350, 358, 369.[23] Most of these discourses state the summary formula alongside the account with twelve factors. However, the appearance of the summary formula is inconsistent in the two versions, as represented in the above-mentioned discourses. Whereas all of the SN discourses named give all four sentences, only one of the SA discourses, SA 358 (no SN counterpart), gives all four: "此有故彼有, 此起故彼起... 此無故彼無, 此滅故彼滅";[24] the others give only the first two sentences: "有是故是事有, 是事有故是事起"[25] or "此有故彼有, 此起故彼起".[26]

3. The manner of knowing the teaching of arising by causal condition

The manner in which the teaching of *arising by causal condition* is to be known is the subject of SN 12. 68 and its counterpart SA 351.[27] These two versions tell of certain bhiksus who say[28] that "apart from belief, apart from inclination, apart from hearsay, apart from manner of argument, and apart from favour in speculation",[29] they know and see the arising and the ceasing of each of the (twelve) factors of *arising by causal condition*. Thus, the two versions of this discourse affirm that *arising by causal condition* is to be accepted and abided by only after observation and analysis, and not on the basis of mere tradition, faith, appearance, rumour, supposition, or inference.

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22 SN ii, pp. 28, 65, 70, 78-79, 95-96.

23 T 2, pp. 83c, 84b-86b, 98b, 100a, 101b-c (CSA ii, pp. 25, 35-43, 68-69, 77, 84). The only counterparts here are SA 350 = SN 12. 49-50.

24 T 2, p. 100a (CSA ii, p. 77).

25 SA 293 (no SN counterpart): T 2, p. 83c (CSA ii, p. 25).

26 SA 296-302 (counterparts of SN 12. 20, 35-36, 1-2, 46, 15, 17), SA 349 (no SN counterpart), SA 350 (counterpart of SN 12. 49-50), SA 369 (no SN counterpart): T 2, pp. 84b-86b, 98b, 101b-c (CSA ii, pp. 35-43, 68-69, 84).

27 SN ii, pp. 115-117; T 2, p. 98c (CSA ii, pp. 70-71).

28 In SN Musīla and Nārada speak to Saviṭṭha, whereas in SA Musīla (茂師羅) and Saviṣṭha (殊勝 P. Saviṭṭha) speak to Nārada (那羅[陀]).

29 aññatra saddhāya 異信, aññatra ruciyā 異欲, aññatra anussavā 異聞, aññatra ākāra-parivitakkā 異行覺想, and aññatra diṭṭhi-nijjhāna-khantiyā 異見審諦忍.

On the other hand, in SN 12. 22 and its counterpart SA 348 the Buddha encourages bhiksus to have confidence in his teaching of *arising by causal condition* thus:

SN 12. 22[30]	SA 348[31]
The Tathāgata, bhiksus, endowed with the ten *powers* (bala) and four *confidences* (vesārajja), knows the Place of the Bull; in assemblies he roars the Lion's Roar; he turns the Noble Wheel, [saying]:	The Tathāgata endowed with the ten *powers* (力) and four *confidences* (無畏), knows the place of former Buddhas; he turns the Noble Wheel; in assemblies he roars the Lion's Roar, saying:
Such is *material form*, its arising, its ceasing; such is *feeling*, its arising, its ceasing; such is *perception*, its arising, its ceasing; such are *activities*, their arising, their ceasing; such is *consciousness*, its arising, its ceasing.	
Thus: This existing, that comes to exist; ... From the ceasing of this, that ceases.	This existing, that comes to exist; from the arising of this, that arises.
That is to say, conditioned by ignorance are activities; conditioned by activities is consciousness, and so on. Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering. But from the utter fading away and cessation of ignorance activities cease; from the ceasing of activities consciousness ceases, and so on. Such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering.[32] ...	That is to say, conditioned by ignorance are activities, and so on. Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering; such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering. ...

30 Cf. also SN 12. 21. SN ii, pp. 27-29.
31 Cf. also SA 349. T 2, p. 98a-b (CSA ii, pp. 65-68).
32 SN ii, pp. 27-28.

Thus, bhiksus, you must train yourselves. Discerning your own good (attatthaṃ), discerning another's good (paratthaṃ), or discerning both your own good and another's good (ubhayatthaṃ), you should strive with vigilance.[33]	Thus, bhiksus, you must discern your own good (自利), another's good (他利), both your own good and another's good (自他俱利), and train yourselves vigilantly.

The two versions indicate that *arising by causal condition* is experienced and taught by the Buddha, who is endowed with the ten *powers* and the four *confidences*,[34] knows the best, and turns the Noble Wheel. They also indicate that the teaching is "good" for people by urging that bhiksus, discerning the good of themselves, of others, or of both themselves and others, train themselves vigilantly. Thus, both versions encourage bhiksus to have confidence in the teacher (the Buddha) as a model, and to follow his teaching for the good of all.

There exists a significant difference between the two versions (SN 12. 22 = SA 348). With respect to *arising by causal condition*, the SN version has *material form, feeling, perception, activities,* and *consciousness* (i.e. the five aggregates), together with the twelve factors of the series in both arising and ceasing modes. This indicates a connection between the five aggregates and the twelve factors, though the nature of the relationship is not explained in the text. The SA version, however, speaks only of the twelve factors. The presence of the extra passage in SN raises questions regarding its antiquity.

This section has shown that SN and SA agree in stating that *arising by causal condition* is to be accepted not merely on the basis of faith, tradition, etc, and that it should be put into practice vigilantly for the good of all people, following the example of the Buddha himself.

4. Teaching of arising by causal condition and analysis of the twelve factors

SN 12. 1-2 record the Buddha's *teaching* (desanā) on *arising by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppāda), and SN 12. 2 includes also an *analysis* (vibhaṅga) of it.[35] These two discourses together have a single SA

33 SN ii, p. 29.
34 Neither version explains them.
35 SN ii, pp. 1-4.

counterpart, SA 298,[36] which likewise records both *teaching* and *analysis* (法說義說).[37]

4.1. The teaching (desanā)

In SN 12. 1 the Buddha's *teaching* on *arising by causal condition* is presented as follows:

> Conditioned by ignorance, bhiksus, are activities; conditioned by activities is consciousness [and so on down to] conditioned by birth arise ageing-and-death, along with grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair (jarāmaraṇaṃ soka-parideva-dukkha-domanass-upāyāsā). Such is the arising (samudayo) of this whole mass of suffering.
>
> But by the complete fading away and ceasing (asesavirāganirodhā) of ignorance, comes the ceasing of activities; by the ceasing of activities, comes the ceasing of consciousness ... of ageing-and-death, along with grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. Such is the ceasing (nirodho) of this entire mass of suffering.

Thus, in SN 12. 1 the *teaching* on *paṭicca-samuppāda* or *arising by causal condition* entails presenting the formula not only in its *arising* (samudaya) mode but also in its *ceasing* (nirodha) mode.

SA 298 (the counterpart of SN 12. 1-2) gives the formula only in the *arising* mode.[38] Linguistically, the term paṭicca-samuppāda, *arising by causal condition*, signifies only *arising* (we do not find a corresponding term "paṭicca-nirodha" *ceasing by causal condition*). However, it is found that in both SN and SA a teaching on *arising by causal condition* often discusses the *ceasing* mode also (e.g. SA 299 includes both the *arising* and *ceasing* modes).[39] Implied is that since *arising* is according to *causal condition*, so *ceasing* is in principle also according to *causal condition*.

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36 T 2, p. 85a-b (CSA ii, pp. 38-39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 16, pp. 157-164. Another counterpart is EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797b-c.

37 The Pāli terms *desanā* and *vibhaṅgaṃ* appear in the uddāna (SN ii, p. 11) and as the verbs *desissāmi* and *vibhajissāmi* (p. 2). The Skt. has: "ādiñ ca deśayiṣye vibhaṅgañ ca" (Tripāṭhī, p. 157).

38 T 2, p. 85a (CSA ii, p. 38): 緣起法法說 (Skt. pratīyasamutpādasyādiḥ); cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 157-158.

39 T 2, p. 85b-c (CSA ii, p. 40), no SN counterpart. Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 17, pp. 164-165.

4.2. The analysis (vibhaṅga)

In SN 12. 2 and in SA 298 (counterpart of SN 12. 1-2), the Buddha explains each of the twelve factors in turn.

In SN 12. 2 the explanations begin with *ageing-and-death* and go back to *ignorance*; in SA 298 they proceed in the forward sequence, from *ignorance* to *ageing-and-death*. For convenience, in the following factor-by-factor comparison of the two versions the forward sequence is adopted.

Ignorance (avijjā 無明)[40]

The SN version (SN 12. 2) explains the first factor, ignorance, as follows:[41]

> What, bhiksus, is ignorance? It is, bhiksus, no knowledge (or no insight, aññāṇaṃ) regarding suffering (dukkhe), regarding the arising of suffering (dukkhasamudaye), the ceasing of suffering (dukkhanirodhe), the path leading to the ceasing of suffering (dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya).

The SA version (SA 298) is more extensive:[42]

> What is ignorance? It is no knowledge (不知)[43] regarding past time, no knowledge regarding future time, no knowledge regarding both past and future time; no knowledge regarding the internal, ... the external, ... both the internal and the external; no knowledge regarding karma (action), ... result, ... both karma and result; no knowledge regarding the Buddha, ... the Dharma, ... the Saṃgha; **no knowledge regarding suffering** (苦), ... **arising** (集), ... **ceasing** (滅), ... **the path** (道);[44] no knowledge regarding causes, ... dharmas (phenomena) arisen from causes; no knowledge regarding morally good and bad, ... guilty and not guilty, ... learning and not learning, ... inferior and superior, ... impurity and purity; analysis of arising by causal conditions[45] – no knowledge of all these; no awareness of the

40 Skt. avidyā.
41 SN ii, p. 4.
42 T 2, p. 85a (CSA ii, pp. 38-39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 158-159.
43 Skt. ajñānam (Tripāṭhī, p. 158).
44 Skt. duḥkhe ajñānaṃ samudaye nirodhe mārge ajñānaṃ (p. 158).
45 The Skt. has: "pratibhāga-pratītyasamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv ajñānam", no knowledge regarding analysing dharmas (phenomena) arisen by conditions (p. 158).

six contact-spheres as they really are; with regard to this and that no knowledge (不知), no vision (不見),[46] no full understanding (無無間等),[47] darkness, delusion, nescience: this is called ignorance.

Here the only item common to the two versions is no knowledge regarding suffering, its arising, its ceasing, and the path. This suggests that the extra material contained in the SA version may be later elaboration.[48]

Activities (saṅkhārā 行)[49]

Both versions[50] state in common that *activities* are these three: activity of body, speech, and mind (kāyasaṅkhāra, vacīsaṅkhāra, cittasaṅkhāra 身行, 口行, 意行).[51]

Consciousness (viññāṇaṃ 識)[52]

The two versions[53] agree here in explaining viññāṇa as the following *six classes* or *groups of consciousness* (cha viññāṇakāyā 六識身):[54]

eye-consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ 眼識)
ear-consciousness (sota-viññāṇaṃ 耳識)
nose-consciousness (ghāna-viññāṇaṃ 鼻識)
tongue-consciousness (jivhā-viññāṇaṃ 舌識)
body-consciousness (kāya-viññāṇaṃ 身識)
mind-consciousness (mano-viññāṇaṃ 意識)

Name-and-material form (nāmarūpaṃ 名色)

Here the two traditions exhibit some differences.[55] They agree in equating *material form* (rūpa 色) with *the four great elements* (cattāro mahābhūtā)

46 Skt. adarśanam (p. 159).
47 Skt. anabhisamayas (p. 159).
48 The corresponding EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797b has the same account of *ignorance* as SN 12. 2.
49 Skt. saṃskārāḥ.
50 SN ii, p. 4; T 2, p. 85a (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 159.
51 Skt. kāyasaṃskāro vāksaṃskāro manaḥsaṃskāraḥ.
52 Skt. vijñānam.
53 SN ii, p. 4; T 2, p. 85a (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 159.
54 Skt. ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ.
55 SN ii, pp. 3-4. T 2, p. 85b-c (CSA ii, p. 39); cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 159-160.

and *material form derived from the four great elements* (catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ).[56] However, they differ regarding the composition of *name* (nāma 名).

SN 12. 2 states that *name* is feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), volition (cetanā), contact (phassa), and attention (manasikāra); SA 298 states that *name* is *the four non-material aggregates* (四無色陰),[57] namely the aggregates of feeling (受陰), perception (想陰), activities (行陰), and consciousness (識陰).[58] The two explanations of nāma are therefore as shown:

SN	SA
feeling (vedanā) ————	feeling (受)
perception (saññā) ————	perception (想)
volition (cetanā) ————	activities (行)
contact (phassa)	consciousness (識)
attention (manasikāra)	

In these two sets the first and second items are identical. The third items, *volition* (cetanā – SN) and *activities* (saṅkhārā – SA), are demonstrably equivalent (see Chapter 2, p. 28). The item *contact* (phassa) in the SN set is arguably redundant, because, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, "contact" is a term for the "coming together" of three other items: the *sense-faculties, external objects,* and *consciousness* (viññāṇa 識), and conditioned by this *contact* arise *feeling, perception,* and *activities* (*volition*). Deleting *contact* from the list leaves *attention* (SN) and *consciousness* (SA). It is possible that *consciousness* the fifth of the five aggregates, is actually identical with *attention* (manasikāra). However, on the evidence available this must remain only a suggestion.

Thus, although the two versions appear to disagree regarding the components of nāma in the item nāma-rūpa, it is possible that the difference is only one of terminology.[59]

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56 四大，四大所造色 (Skt. catvāri mahābhūtāni, catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya rūpaṃ). In the Skt. the question is asked thus: rūpaskandhaḥ katarat? (p. 160) In SN 12. 2 and SA 298 it refers only to rūpa, 色.

57 Skt. catvāro 'rūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ.

58 Skt. vedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāraskandho vijñānaskandhaḥ.

59 The other counterpart, EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797b-c, gives the contents of nāma as: 痛, 想, 念, 更樂, 思惟 (= 受, 想, 行, 觸, 作意), which agrees with SN 12. 2.

The six sense spheres (saḷāyatanaṃ 六入處)[60]

The two versions agree that the six sense spheres are the following:[61]

sense sphere of eye (cakkhāyatanaṃ 眼入處)
sense sphere of ear (sotāyatanaṃ 耳入處)
sense sphere of nose (ghānāyatanaṃ 鼻入處)
sense sphere of tongue (jivhāyatanaṃ 舌入處)
sense sphere of body (kāyāyatanaṃ 身入處)
sense sphere of mind (manāyatanaṃ 意入處)

For "six sense spheres" (六入處) SA 298 also uses the term, "six internal sense spheres" (六内入處).[62]

Contact (phasso 觸)[63]

Here also there is full agreement. In both versions the *six classes of contact* (cha phassakāyā 六觸身)[64] are: eye-contact, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-contact (cakkhu-samphasso, sota-, ghāna-, jivhā-, kāya-, mano-samphasso; 眼觸, 耳, 鼻, 舌, 身, 意觸).[65]

Feeling (vedanā 受)

SN 12. 2 explains vedanā as the *six classes of feeling* (cha vedanākāyā):[66]

feeling that is born of eye-contact (cakkhu-samphassajā vedanā)
feeling that is born of ear-contact (sota-samphassajā vedanā)
feeling that is born of nose-contact (ghāna-samphassajā vedanā)
feeling that is born of tongue-contact (jivhā-samphassajā vedanā)
feeling that is born of body-contact (kāya-samphassajā vedanā)
feeling that is born of mind-contact (mano-samphassajā vedanā)

However, SA 298 explains it as the *three feelings* (三受):[67]

60 Skt. ṣaḍāyatanaṃ.
61 SN ii, p. 3; T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 160.
62 Skt. ṣaḍ ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni.
63 Skt. sparśaḥ.
64 Skt. ṣaṭ sparśakāyāḥ.
65 SN ii, p. 3; T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 160.
66 SN ii, p. 3.

unpleasant feeling (苦受)
pleasant feeling (樂受)
neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant feeling (不苦不樂受)[68]

The two versions appear to differ here. However, as shown in Chapter 4, both traditions say elsewhere that the three feelings exist in each of the six classes of feeling.[69] That is, the three and the six represent two different ways of analysing the same phenomenon. The two different explanations signify a difference in emphasis rather than in substance.

Craving (taṇhā 愛)[70]

SN 12. 2 lists *six classes of craving* (cha taṇhākāyā):[71]

craving for visible things (rūpa-taṇhā)
craving for sounds (sadda-taṇhā)
craving for odours (gandha-taṇhā)
craving for tastes (rasa-taṇhā)
craving for tangible things (phoṭṭhabba-taṇhā)
craving for mental objects (ideas) (dhamma-taṇhā)

The corresponding SA 298 specifies craving as being of the following three types (三愛):[72]

craving for sensuality (欲愛)
craving for material form (色愛)
craving for non-materiality (無色愛)

The *six classes of craving* specified in SN 12. 2 (above) do appear elsewhere in SA;[73] we find the term liu ai-shen (六 愛 身) "the six classes/groups of craving", explained as:

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67 Similarly the Skt.: tisro vedanāḥ.
68 T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 161, which puts sukhā vedanā (pleasant feeling) before duḥkhā (unpleasant).
69 The other counterpart, EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797c, gives the same account of feeling as SA 298.
70 Skt. tṛṣṇā.
71 SN ii, p. 3.
72 T 2, p. 85c (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 161: tisras tṛṣṇāḥ, kāmatṛṣṇā, rūpatṛṣṇā, ārūpyatṛṣṇā.

craving that is born of eye-contact (眼觸生愛)
craving that is born of ear-contact (耳觸生愛)
craving that is born of nose-contact (鼻觸生愛)
craving that is born of tongue-contact (舌觸生愛)
craving that is born of body-contact (身觸生愛)
craving that is born of mind-contact (意觸生愛)

This appears identical in signification with the explanation given in SN 12. 2 (above).[74]

On the other hand, the *three cravings* (三 愛) specified in SA 298 (above)[75] are not found anywhere in SN.[76] Thus, only the teaching of the *six classes of craving* is shared between SN and SA. The *three cravings* named in SA 298 possibly represent a relatively late development.

Again, as noted in Chapter 2, *craving* is also explained elsewhere in SN as the following three:

craving for sensuality (kāma-taṇhā),
craving for existence (bhava-taṇhā),
craving for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā).[77]

However, these three are not found in SA.[78] So this three-fold classification of *craving* in SN is also possibly a later development.

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73 E.g. in Liu-ruchu Xiangying (六入處相應), SA 276, 304, 330: T 2, pp. 74c, 86-7a, 92a-b (CSA i, pp. 363, 383-384, 410), and in Ru-jie-yin Xiangying (入界陰相應), SA 892: T 2, p. 224c (CSA iii, p. 553). Cf. also MA: T 1, p. 562c and DA: T 1, p. 51c.

74 Cf. SN 18. 8 and 18: SN ii, pp. 248, 251; DN 33-34: DN iii, pp. 244, 280; DN 15, 22: DN ii, pp. 58, 308, 310.

75 The three cravings in SA 298 are also found in SA 373, 895: T 2, pp. 102c, 225a (CSA ii, p. 93; iii, p. 555). Outside SA they are found in MA 29, 114: T 1, pp. 463a, 603a, and T No. 12: T 1, p. 227c.

76 They do make a unique appearance in DN 33: DN iii, p. 216, as tisso taṇhā: kāma-taṇhā, rūpa-taṇhā, arūpa-taṇhā". According to G. C. PANDE's historical stratification, DN 33 is "undoubtedly very late" (*Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, 1957; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1995, p. 113).

77 See p. 39. See also SN 22. 22, 31: SN iii, pp. 26, 32; SN 38. 10: SN iv, p. 257; SN 56. 11, 13, 14: SN v, pp. 421, 425-426. Cf. DA 9-11, 13: T 1, pp. 50a, 53a, 57c, 60c.

78 They are found in EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797c, the other Chinese counterpart of SN 12. 2 and SA 298 (see note 36, p. 160, above). Another variant appears in T No. 14, MA 97, and T No. 52: T 1, pp. 243a, 579b, 845a, which states that craving is of two kinds: craving for sensuality and craving for existence.

To reiterate, altogether three definitions of *craving* are found in SN and SA:

1. Six classes of craving: craving for the six senses
2. Craving for sensuality, for material form, and for non-materiality
3. Craving for sensuality, for existence, and for non-existence

Only the first definition (six classes) is common to SN and SA. This suggests that the second and third are sectarian doctrines, developed later than the first. It implies that in early Buddhism *craving* possibly meant simply "craving for the six sense objects", which is compatible with the teaching that a bhiksu should avoid craving by mindfully "guarding" the six sense doors (see Chapter 3, pp. 97-103).

Attachment (upādānaṃ 取)

The SN version states:[79]

> There are four attachments (cattāri upādānāni): attachment to sensuality (kāmupādānaṃ), attachment to view (diṭṭhupādānaṃ), attachment to rule-and-vow (sīlabbatupādānaṃ), attachment to self-theory (attavādupādānaṃ). This is called attachment.

The SA version agrees, except that in place of "attachment to self-theory" it has simply "attachment to self" (我取).[80] Self-theory (P. attavāda)[81] and self (我)[82] are not the same thing, but when they are united with the term "attachment", the difference becomes less significant.[83]

Becoming (bhavo 有)

The explanation of *becoming* is the same in the two versions. There are *three becomings* (tayo bhavā 三有):[84]

79 SN ii, p. 3.
80 T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39); cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 161: ātmopādānaṃ. The others are given as: 欲取, 見取, 戒取 (kāmopādānaṃ, dṛṣṭyupādānaṃ, śīlavratopādānam).
81 Skt. ātmavāda.
82 Skt. ātman, P. attan.
83 The other counterpart EA 49. 5: T 2, p. 797c agrees with SA 298.
84 SN ii, p. 3; T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 162: trayo bhavāḥ.

becoming in sensuality (kāma-bhavo 欲有)
becoming in materiality (rūpa-bhavo 色有)
becoming in non-materiality (arūpa-bhavo 無色有)[85]

Birth (jāti 生)

In SN 12. 2 birth is explained thus:[86]

> That which, of these and those beings (sattānaṃ) in this and that group of beings (sattanikāye), is birth (jāti), origin (sañjāti), coming to be (okkanti), becoming (abhinibbatti), appearance of aggregates (khandhānaṃ pātubhāvo), acquiring of sense spheres/faculties (āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho): this is called birth.

The counterpart, SA 298 adds two more items: acquiring dhātus (界), and acquiring life-faculty (命根).[87]

Ageing-and-death (jarāmaraṇaṃ 老死)

SN 12. 2 states:[88]

> That which, of these and those sentient beings in this and that group, is decay, decrepitude, breaking up, greying of hair, wrinkling of skin, shrinking of life-span, over-ripening of faculties. This is called ageing.
>
> That which, of these and those sentient beings from this and that group, is passing away, breaking up, disappearance, dying, death, the end of life-time, breaking up of aggregates, discarding of the carcass. This is called death.

The corresponding SA 298 has almost the same, though with a few more descriptive terms.[89]

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85 Skt. kāmabhavo rūpabhava ārūpyabhavaḥ (p. 162).
86 SN ii, p. 3.
87 T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 162: dhātupratilābha ... jīvitendriyasya
88 SN ii, pp. 2-3.
89 T 2, p. 85b (CSA ii, p. 39). Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 162-163.

This completes the *analysis* (vibhaṅga) section of the discourses in question. Whereas the *teaching* (desanā) section deals with the causal connections, the *analysis* deals with the individual items that are so connected. Thus, one can regard the *teaching* as dealing with *arising by causal condition* (paṭicca-samuppāda), and the *analysis* as dealing with *causally arisen phenomena* (paṭicca-samuppannā dhammā).

5. Different numbers of factors of arising by causal condition

In the discourses cited above, *arising by causal condition* is presented as having twelve factors. This is the number of factors most commonly mentioned. However, the doctrine is also presented with other numbers of factors, ranging from eleven down to just two. This section will investigate these different accounts.

5.1. Usual or full sequence

In both versions, discourses that list twelve factors are far more frequent than ones listing other numbers of factors, and they are widely distributed.[90] Clearly, for the teaching of *arising by causal condition*, the form with twelve factors is the representative formulation. It can therefore justifiably be called the "usual" or "full" sequence.

5.2. Beginning from *activities*

The series has eleven factors when it runs from *activities* (saṅkhārā) to the end. For this account of the teaching two sets of examples will be presented here.

(1) The Nidāna Saṃyutta of SN contains a group of three consecutive discourses, SN 12. 38-40, which have nearly identical structure, and whose SA counterparts, SA 359-361, are also consecutive and match closely.

SN 12. 39 and its counterpart, SA 360, report the Buddha as saying:[91]

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90 The following are just a few examples: SN 12. 1-2: SN ii, pp. 1-4, and their counterpart SA 298: T 2, p. 85a-b (CSA ii, pp. 38-39); SN 12. 20: SN ii, pp. 25-26, and its counterpart SA 296 (cf. SA 299): T 2, pp. 84b, 85b (CSA ii, pp. 35, 40); SN 12. 15: SN ii, p. 17, and its counterpart SA 301: T 2, pp. 85c-86a (CSA ii, p. 41); SN 12. 16: SN ii, p. 18, and its counterparts SA 363-365: T 2, pp. 100c-101a (CSA ii, pp. 80-81).

91 SN ii, p. 66. T 2, p. 100b (CSA ii, p. 78).

SN	SA
That which one *wills* (ceteti), bhiksus, and that which one *intends to do* (pakappeti), and that which one *carries out* (anuseti) – this becomes an *object* (ārammaṇam) for the persistence of *consciousness* (viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā). The object being there, there comes to be a *ground* of *consciousness*.	If one *wills* (思量), if one *intends to do* (妄想), then there is *carrying out* (使), a *basis* for the persistence of *consciousness* (攀緣識住).
Consciousness being grounded and growing, there comes to be the appearance (avakkhanti) of *name-and-material form*. Conditioned by *name-and-material form* are *the six sense spheres*; conditioned by *the six sense spheres* is *contact*; ... Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.	Because there is a basis for the persistence of *consciousness*, there is entry (入) of *name-and-material form*; because of the entry of *name-and-material form*, there are, in the future, *birth*, *ageing-sickness-and-death*, along with *grief*, *lamentation*, *pain*, *distress* and *despair*. Such is the arising of the whole mass of suffering.

Both versions of the discourse then go into the ceasing mode: "If one does not will ... there is no object (or no basis) for the persistence of *consciousness* ... such is the ceasing ...". Here the SA version says almost the same as the SN, except that it goes directly from *name-and-material form* to *birth*, *ageing-sickness-and-death*.

The verb ceteti (he wills) corresponds to the noun cetanā (volition), which is another term for saṃkhārā (activities).[92] The two verbs following ceteti, i.e. pakappeti (he intends to do) and anuseti (he carries out), are similar to it in meaning. Thus, these three verbs all have to do with *volition* (cetanā) or *activities* (saṃkhārā). Accordingly, this sutra is stating, in effect, that conditioned by *activities* (*volition*), there comes to be a ground or an object for the function of *consciousness*; then, conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*; and so on through the rest of the series.

92 See Chapter 2, p. 28.

Like SN 12. 39, above, SN 12. 38 and 40 also state that what one wills etc. becomes *an object* for the persistence of *consciousness*, and a *ground* of *consciousness*.[93] Then, SN 12. 38 continues:[94]

> *Consciousness* being grounded and growing, there is in the future the *becoming of rebirth* (punabbhavābhinibbatti). The *becoming of rebirth* in the future being there, there arise in the future *ageing-and-death*, *grief*, *lamentation*, *pain*, *distress*, and *despair*. Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

The corresponding SA 359 has the same content.[95]

In the corresponding position SN 12. 40 says:[96]

> *Consciousness* being grounded and growing, there comes to be *a bending* (nati). From there being *a bending*, there is *coming-and-going* (āgatigati). From there being *coming-and-going*, there is *decease-and-rebirth* (cutūpapāto). There being *decease-and-rebirth*, there arise in the future *birth*, *ageing-and-death*, *grief*, *lamentation*, *pain*, *distress*, and *despair*. Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

In this case the SA version (SA 361) has "*name-and-material form*" in place of "*a bending*".[97]

These texts, in both SN and SA versions, present a sequence from *activities* (as *volition*) to *consciousness*; from *consciousness* to the *becoming* of *rebirth* or a *bending*, *coming-and-going* (rebirth-and-redeath?), and *decease-and-rebirth*; and thus to *birth*, *ageing-and-death* and the whole mass of suffering. Despite the variant terminology, they present the factors from *activities* to *ageing-and-death* in the usual sequence.

Having presented the sequence in arising mode, both versions of the three discourses also give it in ceasing mode with the same factors. For example, SN 12. 39 and SA 360 state in common: "If then, bhiksus, one neither wills, nor intends to do, nor carries out (yato ca kho bhikkhave no

93 SN ii, pp. 65, 67.
94 SN ii, p. 65.
95 T 2, p. 100a (CSA ii, p. 78).
96 SN ii, p. 67.
97 T 2, p. 100b (CSA ii, p. 79).

ceteti no ca pakappeti no ca anuseti)", then the rest of the factors cease.[98] However, there is a minor disagreement here. For instance, SN 12. 39 says: "if bhiksus, one does not will, or intend to do, **but yet one carries out** (no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ca pakappeti atha ce anuseti)", then this too results in the arising of the rest of the factors.[99] This statement is not in the counterpart SA 360. A similar discrepancy exists between SN 12. 38, 40 and their counterparts SA 359, 361.[100] It is therefore possible that the unshared statements were added in the Pāli tradition.

(2) SN 12. 84 and its counterpart SA 367 (cf. SA 368) state the connection between *concentrative practice* (yoga) and *knowing-seeing* the eleven factors (from *activities* to the end) as they really are. SN 12. 84 says:[101]

> By him who does not know (ajānatā), who does not see (apassatā) *ageing-and-death* as they really are (yathābhūtaṃ), bhiksus, *concentrative practice* (yogo) must be done (karaṇīyo) for knowledge (ñāṇāya) about *ageing-and-death* as they really are; by him also who does not know, who does not see as it really is the arising of ageing-and-death, the ceasing of ageing-and-death, the way leading to the ceasing of ageing-and-death. *Birth, becoming, attachment, craving, feeling, contact, the six sense spheres, name-and-material form, consciousness, activities* are also thus.

The corresponding SA 367 says almost the same. The expression, "*concentrative practice* should be done (yogo karaṇīyo)" of SN 12. 84, is represented in SA 367 by "he should energetically practise *concentrative meditation*, for internally calming his mind" (當勤方便,修習禅思,内寂其心). This is in order to *manifest as they really are* (如實顯現) the eleven factors, the arising, the ceasing, and the way leading to the ceasing of the eleven factors. But this text adds that "manifesting as they really are, these

98 SN ii, p. 66; T 2, p. 100b (CSA ii, p. 78). Similarly, SN 12. 38, 40 (SN ii, pp. 65, 67) and SA 359, 361 (T 2, p. 100a-b; CSA ii, pp. 78-79).

99 SN ii, p. 66. Similarly, SN 12. 38 and 40 (SN ii, pp. 65, 67).

100 T 2, p. 100a-b (CSA ii, pp. 78-79).

101 SN ii, pp. 130-131. The topic and content of this text are the connection between yoga and knowing-seeing. Different topics, such as the teacher (satthā), training (sikkhā), with otherwise the same content as SN 12. 84 are found in SN 12. 82-83, 85-93: SN ii. pp. 130-132, which however lack SA counterparts.

dharmas (the eleven factors) are impermanent, compounded, and accompanied by influxes" (諸法無常，有爲，有漏，如實顯現).[102]

Similarly, SA 368 says "he should practise immeasurable samādhi (當修無量三摩提), mindfully concentrated", in order to reveal the eleven factors as they really are. But this discourse has no SN counterpart.[103]

Thus, for the aim of *knowing*-and-*seeing* (or *manifesting*) the eleven factors *as they really are*, the practice of concentration is necessary. This teaching is common to SN and SA.

To conclude, despite some minor differences between the two versions, two main common teachings are: (1) *volition* (*activities*) produces an object as ground for *consciousness*, which then leads on to the other factors in sequence; (2) the teaching of the eleven factors is connected with the notion of "fully knowing-and-seeing", which can be considered as the ceasing of the twelve factors (fully knowing-and-seeing means the cessation of *ignorance*).

There are also other discourses on fully knowing the eleven factors beginning with *activities*.[104] This indicates that fully knowing these eleven factors is a common teaching in SN and SA.

5.3. Beginning from *consciousness*

Statements that the series runs from *consciousness* (viññāṇa) to the end are found in SN 12. 59 and its counterpart SA 284:[105]

SN	SA
Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the flavour* (assādānupassino) in enfettering dharmas/phenomena (saññojaniyesu dhammesu), there comes the appearance (avakkanti) of *consciousness*. Conditioned by	In one who abides *grasping at the flavour* (味著) in attaching dharmas (於所取法), whose mind longs for and attaches to them, his ***mind*** (心) chases after (驅馳追逐) *name-and-material form*.[106] Conditioned by

102 T 2, p. 101b (CSA ii, p. 83).
103 T 2, p. 101b (CSA ii, p. 83).
104 SN 12. 29-30: SN ii, pp. 45-46 (no SA counterpart). SN 12. 33-34: SN ii, pp. 56-60 and their counterparts SA 356-357: T 2, pp. 99c-100a (CSA ii, pp. 75-76). SA 362: T 2, p. 100b (CSA ii, p. 80) (no SN counterpart). SA 355: T 2, p. 99c (CSA ii, p. 75), whose counterpart SN 12. 28: SN ii, pp. 43-45 is about knowing the twelve factors.
105 SN ii, p. 91. T 2, p. 79b-c (CSA ii, p. 6); cf. fragmentary Skt. version, Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 2, pp. 86-89.
106 Cf. Skt.: hārakaṃ vijñānaṃ bhavati nāmarūpe (there is a bringing, by *consciousness*, of name-and-material form) (pp. 87, 88).

consciousness is *name-and-material form*; ... Thus is the arising of this entire mass of suffering. ...	*name-and-material form* are *the six sense spheres*; ... Thus is the arising of this entire mass of suffering. ...
Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the danger* (ādīnavānupassino) in enfettering dharmas, there comes not the appearance of *consciousness*. From the ceasing of *consciousness*, *name-and-material form* ceases; ... Thus is the ceasing of this entire mass of suffering.	In one who abides *seeing impermanence* in attaching dharmas, *seeing arising-and-ceasing*, *seeing fading away of desire*, *seeing cessation*, *seeing relinquishment* (無常觀, 生滅觀, 無欲觀, 滅觀, 厭觀), the mind is without longing, without attachment, ***consciousness*** (識) does not chase after *name-and-material form*; *name-and-material form* then ceases. From the ceasing of *name-and-material form*, *the six sense spheres* cease; ... Thus is the ceasing of this entire mass of suffering.

Here, *mind* (心) and *consciousness* (識) in the SA version are clearly synonymous.[107] Both versions agree in attributing the arising sequence to *seeing/grasping at* the *flavour* in phenomena. The term *flavour* (assāda 味) is elsewhere explained in both traditions as "ease-and-joy" (sukhaṃ somanassaṃ).[108] The SN version (SN 12. 59) says that this seeing results in the appearance (or descent, avakkanti) of *consciousness*, which then conditions *name-and-material form*, and so on. The SA version (SA 284), however, says that in one so seeing the *mind* or *consciousness* chases after *name-and-material form*, which in turn conditions *the six sense spheres*, and so on.

In the ceasing mode, the SN version says that the appearance of *consciousness* (along with the rest of the sequence) is prevented in one who sees the *danger* in phenomena. By contrast, the SA version states that *consciousness* does not chase after *name-and-material form* (and thus the rest of the sequence ceases) in one who sees in phenomena the following: *impermanence*, *arising-and-ceasing*, *fading away of desire*, *cessation*, and *relinquishment*. Here the SN mentions only seeing the danger, while the SA

107 Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 88, which shows that both characters represent Skt. vijñāna.
108 See Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 49-50, 90-91.

names a series of five things to be seen. This series of five things in SA is to a certain extent in keeping with the explanation, seen elsewhere in both traditions, of the term *danger* (ādīnavā) as signifying "impermanence, suffering, unstable nature" (aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāma-dhammaṃ).[109]

Accordingly, although different wording exists, the two versions do not disagree significantly here.

5.4. Beginning from name-and-material form

In just one discourse, namely SN 12. 58 (no SA counterpart), the series runs from *name-and-material form* (nāma-rūpa) to the end:[110]

> Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the flavour* (assādānupassino) in enfettering phenomena (saññojaniyesu dhammesu), there comes the appearance (avakkanti) of *name-and-material form.* Conditioned by *name-and-material form* are *the six sense spheres;* ... Thus is the arising of this entire mass of suffering. ...
>
> Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the danger* (ādīnavānupassino) in enfettering phenomena, there comes not the appearance of *name-and-material form.* From the ceasing of *name-and-material form, the six sense spheres* cease; ... Thus is the ceasing of this entire mass of suffering.

This discourse agrees with the one considered above (SN 12. 59) in identifying "seeing" (the *flavour* or the *danger*) as the key to bringing about the arising or the ceasing of the whole mass of suffering. It differs only in beginning from *name-and-material form,* and thus having only nine factors. No example of this teaching with nine factors is found in SA.

5.5. Beginning from both consciousness and name-and-material form

An example of the series beginning with both *consciousness* and *name-and-material form* is found in SN 12. 65 and 67 and their counterparts SA 287 and 288.

In the arising mode, SN 12. 65 has the Buddha say:[111]

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109 See Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 49-50, 90-91.
110 SN ii, pp. 90-91.
111 SN ii, p. 104.

> What being, does *ageing-and-death* come to exist? By what condition is *ageing-and-death*? To me, bhiksus, through rightly thinking (yoniso manasikārā), came realisation by insight (paññāya abhisamayo): Where there is *birth*, *ageing-and-death* comes to exist; conditioned by *birth* is *ageing-and-death* [and so on back through *becoming*, *attachment*, *craving*, *feeling*, *contact*, *the six sense spheres*, *name-and-material form*; then:] What being, does *name-and-material form* come to exist? By what condition is *name-and-material form*? ... Where there is *consciousness*, *name-and-material form* comes to exist; conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*. ... What being, does *consciousness* come to exist? By what condition is *consciousness*? ... **Where there is *name-and-material form*, *consciousness* comes to exist; conditioned by *name-and-material form* is *consciousness*.** To me, bhiksus, came this: **This *consciousness* turns back, it goes no further than *name-and-material form*** (paccudāvattati kho idaṃ viññāṇaṃ nāmarūpamhā nāparaṃ gacchati). Thus, to that extent, you are born, or grow old, or die, or fall, or arise. That is to say, **conditioned by *name-and-material form* is *consciousness*; conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*** (nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ). Conditioned by *name-and-material form* are *the six sense spheres*; ... *contact* ... Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

The corresponding SA 287 is the same except in the final section quoted above.[112] After stating that the *six sense spheres* are conditioned by *name-and-material form*, it continues:

> What being, does *name-and-material form* come to exist? By what condition is there *name-and-material from*? ... Where there is *consciousness*, *name-and-material form* comes to exist; conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*. This reflection, then, came to me: **As far as *consciousness*, then it turns back; it goes no**

112 T 2, p. 80b-c (CSA ii, p. 11). Cf. the reconstructed fragmentary Skt. versions, Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 5, pp. 94-106, and FUKITA Takamichi, "梵文「大卒經」緣起説の復元について" *Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū* 24/2 (1982), pp. 26-43. These reconstructed Skt. versions have not entirely the same structure as SA 287; also in this section of SA 287, Tripāṭhī (pp. 97-98) unjustifiably reconstructs with the twelve factors, whereas Fukita (p. 35) appropriately has ten, as in SA 287.

further than this (齊識而還,不能過彼).[113] That is to say, conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*; conditioned by *name-and-material form* are the *six sense spheres*; ... *contact* ... Such is the arising of the whole mass of suffering.

Thus, the two versions differ slightly about the beginning of the series. SN has the series begin thus: "Conditioned by *name-and-material form* is *consciousness*; conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*; conditioned by *name-and-material form* are *the six sense spheres*; ...". SA, however, has it begin: "Conditioned by *consciousness* is *name-and-material form*; conditioned by *name-and-material form* are the *six sense spheres*; ...". That is, the statement "conditioned by *name-and-material form* is *consciousness*" in the SN version is not matched in the SA version. In SN these two factors are in a relationship of mutual dependence; in SA they are not.[114]

In the ceasing mode the two versions again differ slightly. In SN the Buddha traces the ceasing mechanism back to the mutual relationship between *name-and-material form* and *consciousness*. Then he states the forward sequence thus: "From the ceasing of *name-and-material form* ceases *consciousness*; from the ceasing of *consciousness* cease *name-and-material form*; from the ceasing of *name-and-material form* cease *the six sense spheres*"; and so on.[115] That is, SN 12. 65 names only ten factors in the ceasing mode as well as in the arising mode. However, the counterpart, SA 287, names altogether twelve factors in the ceasing mode. Having traced the ceasing series back to *consciousness*, it continues one step further: "From the ceasing of *activities* ceases *consciousness*". It then proceeds in the forward direction thus: "From the ceasing of *ignorance*, *activities* cease; from the ceasing of *activities*, *consciousness* ceases; from the ceasing of *consciousness*, *name-and-material form* ceases; from the ceasing of *name-and-material form*

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113 Cf. Skt.: tasya mama, vijñānāt pratyudāvṛtate mānasaṃ nātaḥ pareṇa vyativartate (This [idea] came to me: From consciousness the mind turns back; it goes no further than this) (Fukita, p. 35).

114 However, Fukita's reconstructed Skt. version (p. 35) has: tasya mamaitad abhavat / kasmin nu sati vijñānaṃ bhavati / kiṃpratyayañ ca punar vijñānam / (tasya mama yoniśo mana)si kurvata evaṃ yathā-(bhūtasyābhisamaya udapādi / nāmarūpe sati vijñānaṃ bhavati / nāmarūpapratyayañ ca punar vijñānam /) (To me came this: What being, does *consciousness* come to exist? By what condition is *consciousness*? To me, through rightly thinking, came full realisation: Where there is *name-and-material form*, *consciousness* comes to exist; conditioned by *name-and-material from* is *consciousness*.)

115 SN ii, p. 105.

cease *the six sense spheres*", and so on to the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering.[116]

In short, the SN version traces the arising series back to a reciprocal relationship between *name-and-material form* and *consciousness*, and maintains this pattern in the ceasing mode. The SA version traces the arising series back simply to *consciousness*, but then inconsistently begins the ceasing series with *ignorance*, thus incorporating all twelve factors.

To complicate matters further, the Buddha, having said that he reflected on and fully realised the causal cessation (ten factors in SN 12. 65, twelve factors in SA 287), then goes on to say, in both versions, that he has come to know fully *eleven* factors, listed in simple linear sequence, from *ageing-and-death* back to *activities* (i.e. omitting only *ignorance*). How these discrepancies are to be explained is not immediately apparent. Incidentally, the two versions agree in presenting in almost identical wording, the well-known simile of the noble eightfold path as an ancient road (purāṇañjasaṃ) that the Buddha has rediscovered.[117]

Another discourse that begins the series with a reciprocal relationship between *name-and-material form* and *consciousness* is SN 12. 67. There Sāriputta tells Mahākoṭṭhita that the situation is just like that of two sheaves of reeds (dve naḷakalāpiyo) leaning one against the other.[118] The counterpart, SA 288,[119] has much the same, though with some non-significant variations: The roles of Sāriputta and Mahākoṭṭhita are reversed, and the simile speaks of three sheaves rather that two.[120] In this case SA indicates clearly that *consciousness* and *name-and-material form* are in an interdependent relationship.

The ceasing mode in the forward direction corresponds, according to the SN version (SN 12. 67): "From the ceasing of *name-and-material form* ceases *consciousness*; from the ceasing of *consciousness* ceases *name-and-material form*; from the ceasing of *name-and-material form* cease the *six sense spheres* ...".[121] In this case the SA counterpart (SA 288) does not

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116 T 2, p. 80c (CSA ii, pp. 11-12). The intact Skt. text, Tripāṭhī: pp. 98-102 (and Fukita: pp. 36-39), also has the twelve factors here.

117 SN ii, pp. 106-107. T 2, pp. 80c-81a (CSA ii, p. 12); cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 104-106.

118 SN ii, p. 114.

119 T 2, p. 81a-b (CSA ii, p. 14). Cf. fragmentary Skt. version, Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 6, pp. 108-110.

120 The Skt. (Tripāṭhī: p. 110) has two (dvau naḍa-kalāpyau). The three of the Chinese SA perhaps came about through reckoning *name* (名) and *material form* (色) as two separate items (Tripāṭhī: p. 110, note 5).

121 SN ii, p. 114.

reiterate the reciprocal relationship between *consciousness* and *name-and-material form*, but unlike SA 287, it mentions only the ten factors.[122]

This section has shown that the teaching of conditioned arising as beginning with *consciousness* and *name-and-material form* in reciprocal relationship is common to SN and SA, but inconsistently so. Interpretation of the significance of this inconsistency suggests itself as a worthwhile topic for future research.

Another difference between the two versions that deserves attention is seen in the introduction to SN 12. 65 and its counterpart SA 287. In SN 12. 65 the Buddha says:[123]

> Before I was enlightened, bhikṣus, while I was not yet perfectly enlightened, a **bodhisatta**, this thought came to me, thus: ...

In the corresponding SA 287, he says:[124]

> Bhikṣus, before I was enlightened, being in a lonely place, concentrated energetically in meditation, this reflection came to me, thus: ...

Here, SA lacks the term "bodhisattva" (P. bodhisatta, "enlightenment-being"). It is possible that the word bodhisatta in SN was added later.[125]

5.6. Beginning from the *six sense spheres*

A few discourses discuss the sequence beginning from the six *sense spheres* (āyatanā) or *contact-sense spheres* (phassāyatanā). However, in such cases there is inconsistency between the two versions. For example, SN 12. 24, begins the ceasing mode thus: "By the complete fading away and ceasing of the *six contact-sense spheres*" (channam tveva phassāyatanānaṃ asesavirāganirodhā), *contact* ceases, and similarly the rest of the factors in

122 T 2, p. 81b (CSA ii, p. 15).
123 SN ii, p. 104. See also SN 12. 10: SN ii, p. 10.
124 T 2, p. 80b (CSA ii, p. 11). See also SA 285: T 2, p. 79c (CSA ii, p. 8), counterpart of SN 12. 10.
125 Cf. HIRAKAWA Akira, 初期大乗仏教の研究 Shoki Daijō Bukkyō no Kenkyū [*Studies on early Mahāyāna Buddhism*] (Shunjūsha, Tokyo, 1968), pp. 140-145; CSA i, "RESA", p. 60.

sequence.[126] However, its counterpart SA 343 has all twelve factors in both the arising and ceasing modes.[127]

On the other hand, SA 352-354 trace the sequence back to the *six sense spheres*, while their counterparts SN 12. 13-14 and SN 12. 71-81 trace it further back to *activities* (i.e. omitting only *ignorance*). The teachings conveyed are as follows.

In SA 352-354 the Buddha says that, to derive the benefit of being recluses and brahmins in this present life and attain enlightenment, one should fully know four things with regard to each of the eight factors, namely: the factor itself, its arising, its ceasing, and the path leading to its ceasing (法, 法集, 法滅, 法滅道跡).[128]

The SN counterparts say that recluses and brahmins should know the same four things, with regard to each of the eleven factors (other than *ignorance*).[129] Although these discourses omit the term *ignorance*, they indirectly acknowledge it, by affirming the importance of knowing the other eleven factors, since knowing implies the ceasing of *ignorance*.

Finally, there are three other Pāli discourses in which the series starts from the six sense spheres, namely SN 12. 43-45 (no SA counterparts):[130]

> Conditioned by *eye* and [visible] *forms* arises *eye-consciousness*. The coming together of the three is *contact*. Conditioned by *contact* is *feeling*; conditioned by *feeling* is *craving*. This, bhiksus, is the arising of suffering (dukkha, or of the world, loka). [Similarly for the other sense spheres].
>
> Conditioned by *eye* and [visible] *forms* arises *eye-consciousness*. The coming together of the three is *contact*. Conditioned by *contact* is *feeling*; conditioned by *feeling* is *craving*. By the complete fading away and ceasing of that *craving* (tassā yeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodhā), *attachment* ceases (upādānanirodho). By the ceasing of *attachment*, *becoming* ceases. By the ceasing of *becoming*, *birth* ceases. By the ceasing of *birth*, *ageing-and-death*, *grief*, *lamentation*, *pain*, *depression* and *despair* cease. Such is the ceasing

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126 SN ii, p. 37.

127 T 2, p. 94a (CSA ii, p. 47).

128 T 2, p. 99a-b (CSA ii, pp. 72-74).

129 dhamme, dhammānaṃ samudayaṃ, dhammānaṃ nirodhaṃ, dhammānaṃ nirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadaṃ. SN ii, pp. 14-16, 129-130.

130 SN ii, pp. 72-75.

of suffering (or of the world). [The same in the case of the other five sense spheres].

In these three discourses (SN 12. 43-45) the arising mode begins from the six sense spheres, but the ceasing mode begins from the ceasing of *craving*. This means that the items from the six senses to feeling are not included in the ceasing process. Another feature of this presentation is that it begins the series in the manner of discourses discussed in Chapter 3 (The Sense Spheres).

5.7. Beginning from *craving*

SN 12. 52 and its counterpart, SA 286, report the Buddha as saying:[131]

SN	SA
Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the flavour* (assādānupassino) in attaching phenomena (upādāniyesu dhammesu), *craving* (taṇhā) grows (pavaḍḍhati). Conditioned by *craving* is *attachment* (upādānaṃ); conditioned by *attachment* is *becoming*; conditioned by *becoming* is *birth*; conditioned by *birth* are *ageing-and-death, along with grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair*. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering. ...	Bhiksus, in one who *grasps at the flavour* (味著) in attaching phenomena (於所取法) whose mind longs for and attaches to them, that which conditioned by *craving* is *attachment* (取) grows; conditioned by *attachment* is *becoming*, and so on ... Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering. ...
Bhiksus, in him who abides *seeing the danger* (ādīnavānupassino) in attaching phenomena, *craving* ceases (nirujjhati). From the ceasing of *craving, attachment* ceases; [and so on to] Such is the ceasing of this entire mass of suffering. ...	Bhiksus, in one who *observes the impermanence* (觀察無常), in attaching phenomena, *arising-and-ceasing* (生滅), *fading away of desire* (離欲), *cessation* (滅盡), and *relinquishment* (捨離), the mind is without longing and attachment,

131 SN ii, pp. 84-85. T 2, p. 80b (CSA ii, p. 10); cf. the totally reconstructed Skt. version, Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 4, pp. 89-94.

	and thus *craving* ceases. From the ceasing of *craving, attachment* ceases, and so on ... Such is the ceasing of this entire mass of suffering. ...

The two versions here give the series beginning from *craving* to the end in both the arising and ceasing modes.[132] Apart from the different beginning points, the series is virtually identical with that examined above in the section "Beginning from consciousness".

For another example, we consider SN 12. 66, which states:[133]

> Bhiksus, whosoever, whether recluses or brahmins, now see whatever in the world seems lovely and attractive in form, as **permanent** (niccato), as **happy** (sukhato), as **self** (attato), as **health** (ārogyato), as **safety** (khemato), they grow in *craving* (taṇhā).
>
> Growing in *craving*, they grow in *basis* (upadhi); growing in *basis*, they grow in *suffering* (dukkha); growing in *suffering*, they are not liberated (na parimuccanti) from birth, ageing, death, grief, lamentation, pain, distress, despair. I declare, they are not liberated from *suffering*.
>
> ... Bhiksus, whosoever, whether recluses or brahmins, now see whatever in the word seems lovely and attractive in form, as **impermanent** (aniccato), as **suffering** (dukkhato), as **not-self** (anattato), as **disease** (rogato), as **fear** (bhayato), they get rid of (pajahanti) *craving*.
>
> Getting rid of *craving*, they get rid of *basis*; ... *suffering*. ... they are liberated from *suffering*. [The same is also said, in full, of such people in the past and in the future.]

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132 See also SN 12. 53-54: SN ii, pp. 86-87 = SA 285: T 2, p. 80a-b (CSA ii, pp. 8-9) (cf. SN 12. 10: SN ii, p. 10); SN 12. 57: SN ii, pp. 89-90 = SA 283: T 2, p. 79a-b (CSA ii, pp. 5-6) (cf. SN 12. 55-56: SN ii, pp. 87-89). SN 12. 60: SN ii, pp. 92-93 (no SA counterpart); SA 366: T 2, p. 101a-b (CSA ii, p. 82; counterpart of SN 12. 4-9: SN ii, pp. 5-9). For SA 283, 285, cf. fragmentary Sūtra 1 and reconstructed Sūtra 3 in Tripāṭhī, pp. 83-86, 89-94.

133 SN ii, pp. 109-111.

The SA counterpart, SA 291,[134] has almost the same general meaning, but with some differences in wording, as follows:

arising mode		*ceasing mode*	
SN	SA	SN	SA
permanent happy **self** health safety	**permanent** eternal peace-and-comfort health **self** **belonging to self**[135]	**impermanent** **suffering** **not-self** disease fear	disease swelling arrow lethal/pain **impermanent** **suffering** **empty** **not-self**[136]

Here the terms "happy, health, safety, peace-and-comfort" and "disease, fear, swelling, arrow, lethal" are expressions for "not suffering" and "suffering" respectively. "Eternal" in SA is another word for "permanent". The significant difference between the two versions is that in the ceasing mode SN has "impermanent, suffering, not-self", whereas SA has "impermanent, suffering, **empty**, not-self"; the SA version has the extra item *empty*. This is a common situation. We have earlier seen other cases where SA adds *empty* between *suffering* and *not-self*, while SN usually does not.[137]

As regards the causal sequence that results from failing to see *impermanence* etc., the two versions (SN 12. 66 and SA 291) agree in listing three factors: 1. craving (taṇhā 愛), 2. basis (upadhi 億波提), and 3. suffering (dukkha 苦). The term *upadhi* "basis" (rendered phonetically in the Chinese as *yiboti* 億波提) does not appear in the usual twelve-factored formula of paṭiccasamuppāda. Evidence presented by Bhattacharya indicates that *upadhi* is equivalent to *upādāna* (attachment).[138] If this is true, then the correspondence between the present listing (three factors) and the above-mentioned series beginning from *craving* to the end of paṭiccasamuppāda (five factors) is as shown:

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134 T 2, p. 82b-c (CSA ii, pp. 20-21). Cf. Tripāṭhī, fragmentary Skt. Sūtra 9, pp. 121-126, which is not entirely the same in structure.

135 常, 恆, 安隱, 無病, 我, 我所.

136 病, 癰, 刺, 殺, 無常, 苦, 空, 非我.

137 See Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 54-55, 92-97.

138 See Kamaleswar BHATTACHARYA, "Upadhi-, Upādi- et Upādāna- dans le Canon Bouddhique Pāli", *Mélanges d'Indianisme* (à la mémoire de Louis Renou) (E. de Boccard, Paris, 1968), pp. 81-95, especially p. 92.

Causal sequence from craving to the end

three factors	five factors
craving (taṇhā 愛)	craving (taṇhā 愛)
basis (upadhi 億波提)	attachment (upādāna 取)
	becoming (bhava 有)
suffering (dukkha 苦)	birth (jāti 生)
	ageing-and-death (jarāmaraṇa 老死)

"Birth, ageing and death" are often equated with "suffering".[139] "Becoming" has no exactly corresponding item in the three-factor formula; it may be that its meaning is implied in "basis" (upadhi).[140] Consequently, the two versions of the series beginning from *craving* are not significantly different.

5.8. From ignorance to feeling

SN 12. 19 reports the Buddha as saying:[141]

> For the fool (bāla), bhikṣus, covered by *ignorance*, associated with *craving*, this *body* (kāyo) has thus resulted (samudāgato). There is this pair: just this *body* and *externally* (bahiddhā) *name-and-material form* (nāma-rūpam). Conditioned by this pair there is *contact*, just *the six sense spheres* (or *the six contact-sense spheres*).[142] Touched by these, or one of them, the fool *feels* (paṭisamvediyati) *pleasant* and *unpleasant*.

The corresponding SA 294 states:[143]

> For the fool, the untaught common person, covered by *ignorance*, associated with *craving*, this *consciousness-body* has resulted (得此識身).[144] *Internally* there is this *consciousness-body* and *externally* there

139 E.g. SN 56. 11: SN v, p. 421.
140 Cf. PED, p. 142.
141 SN ii, pp. 23-24.
142 SN ii, p. 24, note 2.
143 T 2, p. 83c (CSA ii, p. 31). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 12, pp. 140-142.
144 The Skt. has: *sa-vijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ* samudāgataḥ, this body with consciousness ... (Tripāṭhī, p. 140).

is *name-and-material form* (內有此識身, 外有名色).[145] Conditioned by this pair there arises *contact* (觸);[146] touched by this contact of *the six contact-sense spheres* (六觸入所觸),[147] the fool, the untaught common person variously *feels* (受覺)[148] *unpleasant* and *pleasant*.

Both versions of the discourse then say that whereas the fool has not thrown off *ignorance* and *craving*, and therefore will be reborn, the wise man has thrown them off, and is thereby set free from *suffering*.[149]

There is some disagreement in the account of *contact* given in the two versions. According to the SN version, the pair which gives rise to *contact* is "just this *body* and *externally name-and-material form*"; according to the SA version, the pair is "*internally* ... this *consciousness-body* and *externally* ... *name-and-material form*".

The presence of *internally* (內) in SA as against its absence in SN is probably of no significance. The extra word was possibly added by the SA translator to show up the contrast with *externally*.[150] More serious is the fact that where SN has "body", SA has "consciousness-body". In other contexts "consciousness-body" (識身) signifies "consciousness-group", i.e. simply "consciousness";[151] but in the present case, the discrepancy with SN "body" suggests the meaning may be "body accompanied by consciousness". That this is indeed the case is confirmed by the Sanskrit version, which has *savijñānakaḥ kāyo*, "body with consciousness".[152] It remains, then, to

145 Skt.: ity ayañ cāsya savijñānakaḥ kāyo bahirdhā ca nāmarūpam evaṃ dvayam (there is thus this pair, the with-consciousness body and externally name-and-material form) (Tripāṭhī, p. 140).

146 Skt. sparśaḥ (p. 141).

147 Skt. ṣaṭ sparśāyatanāni.

148 Skt. praṭisamvedayati.

149 SN ii, pp. 24-25; T 2, p. 84a (CSA ii, pp. 31-32). Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 143-144.

150 The Skt. lacks *internally* (Tripāṭhī, p. 140).

151 This is the interpretation adopted by Yin Shun, 唯識學探源 [*Studies in the Origins of the Consciousness-Only School*] (= Miao-yun Ji (妙雲集), v. 10) (Zhengwen Chubanshe, Taipei, 1981), pp. 20-21.

152 Tripāṭhī, p. 140. Cf. also this wording in other texts: imasmiñ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu (this body with consciousness and all external objects) = 我內識身及外一切相 (my internal consciousness-body and all external objects). SN 18. 21: SN ii, p. 252; SN 22. 71-72, 82, 91-91, 124-125: SN iii, pp. 80-81, 103, 136-137, 169-170. SA 23-24, 198-199: T 2, pp. 5a-b, 50c-51a (= SN 18. 21-22 and 22. 91-92; CSA i, pp. 222, 31-32). See also MN iii, pp. 18-19, 36; AN i, pp. 132-133 (= SA 983: T 2, pp. 255b-256a; CSA iii, pp. 690-691), AN iv, p. 53. This is pointed out by WATSUJI Tetsurō, *Genshi Bukkyō no Jissen Tetsugaku* [Practical Philosophy of Early Buddhism] (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1971), pp. 228-231.

interpret the discrepancy between *body* in SN and *body with consciousness* in SA. The following considerations are relevant. Both versions speak of the body or the body with consciousness as having arisen from *ignorance* and *craving*; and since *craving* corresponds to *activities* (saṅkhārā 行), the sequence of factors compares with that of the usual twelve-membered list as follows:

SN 12. 19 = SA 294	12-membered series
ignorance	ignorance
craving	activities
body (SN) or body with consciousness (SA)	consciousness
name-and-material form	name-and-material form
six contact-sense spheres	six sense spheres contact
feeling	feeling

This clearly supports the SA version. It makes it likely that the Pāli *kāyo* "body", derives from an earlier *saviññāṇako kāyo* "body with consciousness", the adjective having been accidentally lost in the oral tradition.

On the other hand, it might be argued that *body* or *body with consciousness* is not necessarily related to *consciousness* as the third factor in the twelve-membered formulation. *Body* or *body with consciousness*, from which the present sequence begins, may refer to the *six (internal) sense spheres* (saḷāyatana 六入處). This is indicated by the fact that *name-and-material form* is spoken of as **external** in both traditions. That means that in SN 12. 19 and SA 294 *name-and-material form* refers to the *six **external** objects*, while *body* or *body with consciousness* refers to the *six **internal** sense spheres*, and *contact* is conditioned by the coming together of this pair: the *six sense spheres* and the *six external objects*.[153] It is frequently stated elsewhere that this pair gives rise also to the corresponding six kinds of *consciousness*, which would account for the term *body with consciousness* and

153 This point is discussed by N. Ross REAT, "Some Fundamental Concepts of Buddhist Psychology", *Religion* 17 (1987), pp. 15-28.

is in keeping with the frequent statement that *contact* is the coming together of these *three* phenomena (sense sphere, object, and consciousness).[154]

Whichever of these two suggested interpretations is adopted, there remains a natural correlation with the twelve-membered series. The two versions state that the series of conditioning runs from *ignorance* to *feeling*, which, in the case of the untaught common person, leads on to *birth* and the whole mass of *suffering*.

The suggestion made above, that *name-and-material form* is identical with the *six external objects*, deserves further discussion, since this identity is not directly stated in SN or SA. In the above quotations, *name-and-material form* is spoken of as located *externally* (bahiddhā). This implies that it is the external object of internal *consciousness* or of the *six internal sense spheres* – depending on which of the two proposed interpretations one adopts for *body* and *body with consciousness*. In either case, it is clear that in both versions of the discourse the components of *name-and-material form* are *external objects*. The *external objects*, which impinge on *consciousness* and the *six internal sense spheres* are frequently listed in other discourses as the following six: *visible forms*, *sounds*, *odours*, *tastes*, *tangible things*, and *mental objects* (dhammā 法). These fall naturally into the two categories, mental (nāma 名) and physical (rūpa 色), as shown:

external objects:	
visible forms sounds smells tastes tangibles	rūpa (material form)
mental objects	nāma (name)

Thus, the term nāma-rūpa 名 色 is an appropriate one for the external objects as a group. Counting against this interpretation is the lack of any direct textual statement equating *name-and-material form* with the external sense objects. Also a problem is the conflict with the definitions of *name-and-material form* recorded in SN 12. 2 and SA 298 (SN: name = feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention; SA: name = feeling, perception,

154 On the six kinds of *consciousness* as produced through the six *sense spheres* and their *external objects*, and on *contact* as the coming together of the three phenomena (sense sphere, object, and consciousness), see Chapter 3, p. 76, and this chapter, p. 180 (SN 12. 43-45: SN ii, pp. 71-75).

activities, consciousness).[155] For the present these problems must remain unresolved.

To summarise this section, the account of *arising by causal condition* given in SN 12. 19 and SA 294 follows the standard sequence from *ignorance* to *suffering*, but differs regarding the factors comprising *contact*. Examination of the descriptions given provides clues to understanding the nature of *name-and-material form*, and its relationship to *consciousness* and the *six sense spheres*.

5.9. From contact to feeling

In SN 12. 62 and its counterpart, SA 290, the doctrine of *arising by causal condition* is presented in terms of just two of the twelve factors, namely *contact* (phassa) and *feeling* (vedanā):

SN 12. 62[156]	SA 290[157]
Herein, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple reflects thoroughly and properly on *arising by causal condition*: This existing, that comes to exist ... that ceases. That is to say, bhiksus, *pleasant feeling* (sukhā vedanā) arises conditioned (paṭicca) by a *contact* making for pleasant feeling (sukhavedaniyaṃ phassaṃ). From the ceasing of that contact making for pleasant feeling, the pleasant feeling – which has arisen conditioned by a *contact* making for pleasant feeling – ceases, it is quenched.	The well-taught noble disciple properly reflects on *arising by causal condition*. That is to say, *pleasant feeling* (樂受) arises conditioned by a pleasant *contact* (觸).[158] When he feels pleasant feeling, he knows as it really is that he feels pleasant feeling. From the ceasing of that pleasant contact, the pleasant feeling – which has arisen conditioned by a pleasant contact – ceases, stops, becomes cool, is extinguished, disappears.

155 See pp. 162-163 in this chapter.

156 SN ii, pp. 96-97.

157 T 2, p. 82a (CSA ii, p. 18). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 8, pp. 120-121, which differs slightly from SA 290. Much of the content of Sūtra 8 presupposes Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 7, pp. 115-120, which is the counterpart of the rather similar SA 289: T 2, p. 81c (CSA ii, pp. 16-17), and of SN 12. 61: SN ii, pp. 94-95.

158 Skt. sparśa.

[and similarly for *unpleasant feeling* (dukkhā vedanā), and *neutral feeling* (adukkhamasukhavedanā)] ...	As with pleasant feeling, so also *unpleasant* (苦) ... *happy* (喜) ... *distressful* (憂) ... *disinterested feeling* (捨受) ... disappears.[159]
So seeing, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple is disgusted (nibbindati) with *contact* (phasse), ... with *feeling* (vedanāya), ... with *perception* (saññāya), ... with *consciousness* (viññāṇasmiṃ). Being disgusted, he is freed of desire (virajjati); from absence of desire (virāgā), he is liberated (vimuccati), and in liberation comes the knowledge of liberation (vimuttamhīti ñāṇaṃ). And he knows: Birth is ended, noble conduct is established, done is what was to be done, there is no more of further becoming.	So seeing, the well-taught noble disciple is liberated from *material form, feeling, perception, activities, consciousness*; he is liberated from birth-ageing-sickness-death, along with grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. I declare he attains liberation from suffering.[160]

The two versions discuss *arising by causal condition* in terms of *contact* giving rise to *feeling*. Where the SN version speaks of three kinds of *feeling*, the SA version speaks of five:

SN 12. 62	SA 290
pleasant (sukha)	pleasant (樂)
unpleasant (dukkha)	unpleasant (苦)
	happy (喜)
	distressful (憂)
neutral (adukkhamasukha)	disinterested (捨)

Each of these is conditioned by *contact* that makes for the corresponding *feeling*, so the types of *contact* are correspondingly three in SN and five in SA. In the ceasing mode, both versions say that through the ceasing of *contact* that makes for *feeling*, these three or five kinds of *feeling* cease.

159 Skt. saumanasya, daurmanasya, upekṣā vedanā. Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 7, pp. 117-119.
160 Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 7 and Sūtra 8, pp. 119, 121.

At the end of the discourse, the SN version says that the well-taught noble disciple, so seeing, is disgusted (nibbindati) with *contact* (phassa), *feeling* (vedanā), *perception* (saññā), *consciousness* (viññāṇa); and that from this disgust follow fading away of desire, liberation, and knowledge of liberation. The SA version, however, says that the well-taught noble disciple, so seeing, becomes liberated (解脫) from *material form* (色), *feeling* (受), *perception* (想), *activities* (行), *consciousness* (識);[161] and that liberation is freedom from suffering. Thus, the differences are as shown:

SN 12. 62	SA 290
contact	*material form*
feeling	*feeling*
perception	*perception*
	activities
consciousness	*consciousness*
fading away of desire	
liberation	liberation
knowledge of liberation	

Similar teachings but with not quite the same wording are found in SN 12. 61 and its counterpart, SA 289, as shown:[162]

SN 12. 61	SA 289
Herein, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple reflects thoroughly and properly on *arising by causal condition*: This existing, that comes to exist ... that ceases. That is to say, bhiksus, conditioned by *ignorance* are *activities*; conditioned by *activities* is *consciousness* ... Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering. But from the utter fading away and cessation of *ignorance*, *activities* cease; from the ceasing of *activities*, *consciousness*	The well-taught noble disciple properly reflects on *arising by causal condition*. That is to say, *pleasant feeling* (樂受) arises conditioned by a pleasant *contact* (觸). When he feels pleasant feeling, he knows as it really is that he feels pleasant feeling. From the ceasing of that pleasant contact, the pleasant feeling – which has arisen conditioned by a pleasant contact – ceases, stops,

161 The Skt. has *contact* instead of *material form*: sparśād ... vedanāyāḥ saṃjñāyāḥ saṃskārebhyo vijñānād (p. 121).

162 SN ii, p. 95; T 2, p. 81c (CSA ii, p. 17).

ceases ... Such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering.	becomes cool, is extinguished, disappears. As with pleasant feeling, so also *unpleasant* (苦) ... *happy* (喜) ... *distressful* (憂) ... *disinterested feeling* (捨受) ... disappears.
So seeing, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple is disgusted (nibbindati) with *material form* (rūpa), ... with *feeling* (vedanāya), ... with *perception* (saññāya), ... with *activities* (saṅkhārā) ... with *consciousness* (viññāṇasmiṃ). Being disgusted, he is freed of desire (virajjati); from absence of desire (virāgā), he is liberated (vimuccati), and in liberation comes the knowledge of liberation (vimuttam ñāṇaṃ). And he knows: Birth is ended, ... no more of further becoming.	So seeing, ... disappears. Thus, the well-taught noble disciple is disgusted (厭) with *material form, feeling, perception, activities, consciousness*; being disgusted, he is not delighted (不樂); being not delighted, he is liberated (解脫), having the knowledge of liberation (解脫知見) thus: Birth is ended, ... no more of further becoming.

The two versions (SN 12. 61 and SA 289) differ in regard to their statement of *arising by causal condition*. The SN version gives the usual twelve factors, whereas the SA version gives only two, *contact* and *feeling*, each of which is fivefold (pleasant ... disinterested), the context being similar to the above SA 290. The two versions agree, however, that the well-taught noble disciple becomes disgusted with the five aggregates (khandha 陰: material from ... activities, consciousness). In listing the five aggregates both versions differ from SN 12. 62 (above), which lists only four items: contact, feeling, perception, consciousness.

In any case, the series of *arising by causal condition* that specifies only *contact* and *feeling* (two of the usual twelve factors) is common to SN and SA.

5.10. Full sequence combined with the way to *knowledge of ceasing*

This teaching is found in SN 12. 23 (no SA counterpart).[163] The discourse records the Buddha as saying:[164]

> Now therefore, bhiksus, with the cause (upanisā) of ignorance are activities; with the cause of activities is consciousness; ... name-and-material form; ... the six sense spheres; ... contact; ... feeling; ... craving; ... attachment; ... becoming; ... birth; ... suffering (dukkha); with the cause of suffering is faith (saddhā); with the cause of faith is joy (pāmojja); ... delight (pīti); ... tranquillity (passaddhi); ... happiness (sukha); ... concentration (samādhi); ... knowledge-and-vision into things as they really are (yathābhūta-ñāṇadassana); ... disgust (nibbidā); ... fading away of desire (virāga); ... liberation (vimutti); with the cause of liberation is knowledge of ceasing (khaye ñāṇa).

Thus, this discourse, after listing the twelve factors that lead to dukkha, goes on to list a further eleven factors that lead to knowledge of ceasing: 1. faith, 2. joy, 3. delight, 4. tranquillity, 5. happiness, 6. concentration, 7. knowledge-and-vision into things as they really are, 8. disgust, 9. fading away of desire, 10. liberation, and 11. knowledge of ceasing.

The Chinese counterpart of this SN discourse is found not in SA, but in Madhyamāgama: MA 55.[165] The teaching is not found in any discourse in SA, so it is likely to be a relatively late development.

6. The middle way of arising by causal condition

This section will investigate how *arising by causal condition* is linked, in the two versions, with the teaching of *the middle way* based on *right view* and leading to the attainment of *nirvana*.

SN 12. 15 and its counterpart SA 301 report the following exchange between the Buddha and the monk Kaccāyana/Kātyāyana:

163 SN ii, pp. 29-32.
164 SN ii, pp. 31-32.
165 T 1, pp. 490c-491a.

SN 12. 15[166]	SA 301[167]
(1) Venerable Sir, it is said: "right view, right view" (sammādiṭṭhi). In what respect is it said "right view", Venerable Sir?	(1) World Honoured One, you speak of right view. What is right view? How does the World Honoured One define (施設)[168] right view?
(2) [The Buddha replied:] This world, Kaccāyana, mostly depends on two [extremes] (dvaya-nissito): existence (atthitā) and non-existence (natthitā).	(2) The Buddha said to Kātyāyana: This world, impelled by attachment (爲取所觸),[169] depends on two [extremes]: existence (有)[170] and non-existence (無).[171]
(3) Now, Kaccāyana, one who with right wisdom (sammappaññāya) sees the arising of the world as it really is, does not hold to the non-existence of the world. One who with right wisdom sees the ceasing of the world as it really is, does not hold to the existence of the world.	(3) Because one is impelled by attachment, one depends on either existence and non-existence. But if one is without attachment, mental obstinacy, and bias (若無此取者, 心境繫著、使),[172] not clinging to, not dwelling on, not attaching to "my self" (不取、不住, 不計我),[173] then, when suffering arises, it arises; when suffering ceases, it ceases (苦生而生, 苦滅而滅).[174] Of that one is not in doubt, is not uncertain (於彼不疑不惑).[175] One knows for oneself independently of others (不由於他而自知).[176] This,

166 SN ii, p. 17.
167 T 2, pp. 85c-86a (CSA ii, p. 41). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 19, pp. 167-170, which differs slightly.
168 Skt. prajñapayati (p. 168).
169 Skt. upadhyupādānavinibaddho.
170 Skt. astitā.
171 Skt. nāstitā.
172 Skt. upadhyupādānāni cetaso 'dhiṣṭhānābhiniveśānuśayān nopaiti (pp. 168-169).
173 Skt. nopādatte nādhitiṣṭhati nābhiniviśaty ātmā meti (p. 169).
174 Skt. duḥkham idam utpadyamānam utpadyate, duḥkhaṃ nirudhyamānaṃ nirudhyate.
175 Skt. na kāṅkṣati na vicikitsati.
176 Skt. aparapratyayaṃ jñāṇam evāsya bhavati.

	Kātyāyana, is right view; this is what the Tathāgata defines as right view.
(4) Surely, Kaccāyana, this world mostly is attached to methods, bound to biases (upāyupādānābhinivesavinibandho). But one who does not approach attachment to means, mental obstinacy, and tendency towards bias, who does not cling to it, he does not insist on "It is my self".[177] Then, [one knows]: when suffering arises, it arises; when suffering ceases, it ceases. One is not in doubt, is not uncertain. Here, one comes to have knowledge/insight (ñāṇam) independently of others. Thus this, Kaccāyana, is "right view".	(4) What is the reason for that? One who with right wisdom sees the arising of the world as it really is, does not hold to the non-existence of the world. One who with right wisdom sees the ceasing of the world as it is really, does not hold to the existence of the world.
(5) Kaccāyana, "Everything exists" (sabbam atthīti), this is one extreme. "Everything does not exist" (sabbaṃ natthīti), this is the other extreme. Kaccāyana, not approaching these two extremes, the Tathāgata (the Buddha) teaches you the Dharma by *the middle* [*way*] (majjhena):	(5) This is not approaching the two extremes, teaching the Dharma by *the middle way* (中道).[178]
(6) Conditioned by ignorance are activities; conditioned by activities is consciousness, and so forth. Thus arises this whole mass of suffering.	(6) That is to say, because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises. That is, conditioned by ignorance are

177 The PTS edition incongruously has here, "attā **na** me ti"; however, "attā me ti" (it is my self) is found at SN 22. 90: SN iii, p. 135, and at both corresponding locations in the Nālandā Devanāgarī edition (vol. 2, p. 17 = SN 12. 15 and vol. 3, p. 353 = SN 22. 90). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 169, note 1.

178 Skt. madhyamayā pratipadā (p. 170).

But by the total fading away and ceasing of ignorance, activities cease; from the ceasing of activities, consciousness ceases, and so forth. Thus ceases this whole mass of suffering.	activities, and so forth; thus arises this whole mass of suffering. By the ceasing of ignorance activities cease, and so forth; thus ceases this whole mass of suffering.

Thus, SN 12. 15 and SA 301 have almost the same content, though their wording and sequence are not entirely the same. Sections 3 and 4 of the SN version correspond to sections 4 and 3 respectively of the SA version. The translation of the SN term majjhena as "*by the middle* [*way*]" is justified by 中道 "*the middle way*" in SA. Again, the SA version (both Chinese and Sanskrit) confirms that the Pāli reading ought to be *attā me ti*, rather than *attā na me ti*. Between the two versions there is no unshared teaching. The shared points are principally the following:

1. The teaching of *arising by causal condition*, in both arising and ceasing modes, is *the middle way*. That is, it avoids the two extremes by affirming neither "existence" nor "non-existence", neither eternalism nor nihilism.
2. *Right view* consists in fully seeing *arising by causal condition* for oneself.

There are other discourses in SN and SA that characterise *arising by causal condition* as *the middle way*. They fall into two groups:

Group A. The teachings presented in SN 12. 17-18 = SA 302-303 and SN 12. 46 = SA 300 are essentially identical and may be summarised as follows:[179]

(1) It is not the case that *feeling* (sukha or dukkha) is *made-by-oneself* (sayaṃkataṃ), *made-by-another* (paraṃ-kataṃ), both *made-by-oneself* and *made-by-another*, or *arisen-from-no-cause* (adhicca samuppannaṃ).

(2) But *feeling* is not *non-existent* (natthi); it *exists* (atthi).

(3) It is not the case that "the one who acts and the one who experiences [the results] are the same one" (so karoti so paṭisamvediyatīti), or that "the feeling and the one who feels are the same one (sā vedanā so vediyati)" –

179 SN ii, pp. 18-23, 75; T 2, pp. 86a-c, 85c (CSA ii, pp. 41-44). For Skt. versions of SA 300, 302-303, cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtras 18, 20-21, pp. 165-167, 170-179. For other discourses, cf. SN 12. 24-25: SN ii, pp. 32-41= SA 343: T 2, pp. 93c-94a (CSA ii, pp. 45-47), whose Skt. version is Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 22, pp. 179-187; SN 12. 26: SN ii, pp. 41-42 (no SA counterpart); and SN 12. 47-48: SN ii, pp. 76-77 (no SA counterpart).

i.e. that *feeling* is *made-by-oneself*, amounting to *the eternalist theory* (vadaṃ sassatam).

(4) It is not the case that "the one who acts and the one who experiences [the results] are different one from the other" (añño karoti añño paṭisamvediyati), or that "the feeling and the one who feels are different one from the other (aññā vedanā añño vediyati)" – i.e. that *feeling* is *made-by-another*, amounting to *the annihilationist theory* (vadaṃ ucchedam).

(5) The Tathāgata, avoiding both extremes (*the eternalist theory* and *the annihilationist theory*), teaches the Dharma by *the middle [way]* (majjhena);[180] that is, he teaches *arising by causal condition* in both the arising and ceasing modes.

(6) To have such understanding is *to know* (jānāti) and *to see* (passati) *feeling* (painful or pleasant).

Thus, SN and SA agree that the Buddha rejects both eternalism and annihilationism, teaching instead by *the middle way* of *arising by causal condition.*

Group B. Further teachings on the *middle way* are contained in SN 12. 35-36 and their counterpart SA 297, and in SA 293 (no SN counterpart).[181]

In SN 12. 35-36 and their counterpart SA 297 the Buddha says:[182]

> In the view (diṭṭhi 見) that life (soul/self, jīva 命) and body (sarīra 身) are the same, there is no noble life (brahmacariyavāsa 梵行); and, bhiksus, in the view that life and body are different one from the other, there is no noble life.

The Tathāgata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma by *the middle way* of *arising by causal condition* in both arising and ceasing modes. The quoted sentence is the Buddha's response to the question "What is ageing-and-death, and whose is this ageing-and-death?" (katamaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ kassa ca panidaṃ jarāmaraṇanti), or "Who ages-and-dies? To whom does this ageing-and-death belong?" (彼誰老死？老死屬誰？).[183] The discourses in question then go backwards through the factors in the formula

180 The term "middle way", majjhimā paṭipadā, does not actually appear in the sutta.
181 SN ii, pp. 60-64; T 2, pp. 84c-85a, 83c (CSA ii, pp. 36-37, 25-26). For Skt. versions of SA 293, 297, cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtras 11, 15, pp. 137-140, 152-157.
182 SN ii, pp. 61, 63; T 2, p. 84c (CSA ii, pp. 36-37). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 15, p. 154.
183 SN ii, pp. 60-61, 63; T 2, p. 84c (CSA ii, p. 36). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 153: tatra ko jarāmaraṇaṃ kasya vā jarāmaraṇam.

for *arising by causal condition*, as far as *activities* (saṅkhārā): "What are activities and whose are these activities?"[184]

This again is the teaching on *the middle way* of neither sameness nor difference, based on *arising by causal condition* in both arising and ceasing modes. It is similar to the above-noted teachings on *the middle way* of neither sameness nor difference with regard to self and feeling, and of neither eternalism nor annihilationism.

However, the sutras in question here (SN 12. 35-36 and SA 297) also display a significant difference. SA 297 has the Buddha say that the teaching of *the middle way* of *arising by causal condition* is to be called "the dharma-discourse on **great emptiness**" (大空法經).[185] SN 12. 35-36 lack this statement. Thus, only the SA version makes the connection between *the middle way* of *arising by causal condition* and the notion of *emptiness*.

That connection is also made in SA 293, which has no SN counterpart:[186]

> I teach bhiksus this Dharma: **the noble** (賢聖),[187] **the supramundane** (出世),[188] **connected with emptiness** (空相應),[189] **according to the Dharma of arising by causal condition** (緣起隨順法).[190] That is to say: Because this exists, that exists; because this arises, that arises, namely: Conditioned by ignorance are activities ... Thus is the arising of the whole mass of suffering. [And similarly, in the ceasing mode, to] the ceasing of the whole mass of suffering.
>
> ... Profound (甚深)[191] is this, namely **arising by causal condition.** Even more profound, more difficult to see is this, namely the renunciation of all attachment, the extinction of craving, absence of desire, cessation, **nirvana** (一切取離、愛盡、無欲、寂滅、涅

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184 SN ii, pp. 62, 64; T 2, p. 84c (CSA ii, p. 37). Cf. Tripāṭhī, p. 154.
185 T 2, p. 84c (CSA ii, p. 36). Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 153, 157: mahāśūnyatānāma dharmaparyāyaḥ.
186 T 2, p. 83c (CSA ii, pp. 25-26). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 11, pp. 138-139.
187 Skt. āryāyām (p. 138).
188 Skt. lokottarāyāṃ.
189 Skt. śūnyatāpratisaṃyukta; not in the corresponding Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 11, p. 138.
190 Skt. pratītyasamutpādānulomatā; not in Sūtra 11, but found in Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 14, p. 149, which corresponds to SA 296: T 2, p. 84b-c (CSA ii, pp. 34-35) = SN 12. 20: SN ii, pp. 25-27.
191 Skt. gaṃbhīram (p. 139).

槃).[192] These two dharmas are namely **the compounded** and **the uncompounded** (有爲、無爲).[193]

The compounded is **arising, persisting, changing, passing away** (若生、若住、若異、若滅).[194] The uncompounded is **not arising, not persisting, not changing, not passing away** (不生、不住、不異、不滅). [195]

This discourse is mainly saying that the Dharma taught by the Buddha is profound, supramundane (i.e. dealing with nirvana), connected with emptiness, and based on the teaching of *arising by causal condition*. This text refers to these two profound dharmas, *arising by causal condition* and the way to *nirvana*, as *the compounded* and *the uncompounded* respectively.

Further on the subject of *arising by causal condition* as profound, at SN 12. 60 Ānanda says he finds that teaching easy to understand, but the Buddha responds that it is indeed *profound* (gambhīra).[196] Thus, this idea that the dharma of *arising by causal condition* is profound (甚深) is recorded both in SA 293 (above) and in SN 12. 60, neither of which has a counterpart in the other tradition.

To conclude, SN and SA agree that the teaching of *arising by causal condition* is *profound* and connected with the notion of the *middle way*. This *middle way* is also called *right view*, understood through the practice of insight, i.e. fully seeing (knowing) both the arising and the ceasing modes of *arising by causal condition*, and fully seeing conditioned phenomena as not-self or empty of self. *The middle way* (*right view*) in both versions is variously shown as avoiding the two extremes: fully seeing neither existence (arising) nor non-existence (ceasing) of the world and suffering, neither sameness nor difference of soul/self and body, neither sameness nor difference of self and feeling, or neither eternalism nor annihilationism with regard to self and feeling.

At the same time, some statements in SA are not shared with SN, namely: (1) the reference to the teaching on *the middle way* of *arising by causal condition* as "the dharma-discourse on **great emptiness** (大空法經)", and (2) the reference to both the middle way of arising by causal condition and

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192 Skt. sarvopadhipratiniḥsargas tṛṣṇākṣayo virāgo nirodho nirvāṇam.
193 Skt. saṃskṛtañ cāsaṃskṛtañ ca.
194 Skt. saṃskṛtasyotpādo 'pi prajñāyate vyayo 'pi sthityanyathātvam api.
195 Skt. asaṃskṛtasya naivotpādaḥ prajñāyate na vyayo na sthityanyathātvam.
196 SN ii, p. 92.

the supramundane (nirvana) as being **connected with emptiness**. It is possible that the fundamental teachings in early Buddhism did not emphasise the notion of emptiness in connection with *arising by causal condition*. It is characteristic of the SA tradition that it places more emphasis on the notion of emptiness than the SN tradition.

7. Karma and arising by causal condition

SN and SA agree in identifying a connection between *karma* (action) and *arising by causal condition*. For example, SN 12. 37:[197]

> This body (kāyo), bhiksus, is neither your own nor any others' (nāyam ... tumhākam na pi aññesaṃ). It, bhiksus, should be known and regarded (vedaniyaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ) as [a result of] former karma (purāṇam kammam), as made up (abhisaṅkhatam), as willed (abhisañcetayitam).
>
> Now here, bhiksus, the well-taught noble disciple gives his mind rightly and thoroughly to *arising by causal condition*. That is: "When this is, that is; this arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases." That is to say, conditioned by ignorance are activities ... Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering. But from the complete fading away and ceasing of ignorance, activities cease ... Such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering.

The corresponding SA 295 states:[198]

> This body is neither your own nor any others'. That is to say, the six contact-sense spheres (六觸入處) were brought about by former making up (本修), by karma (行), by volition (願), and are experienced as this body (受得此身).[199]

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197 SN ii, pp. 64-65.

198 T 2, p. 84a-b (CSA ii, p. 33). Cf. Tripāṭhī, Sūtra 13, pp. 144-147.

199 Cf. Tripāṭhī, pp. 144-145: "ṣaḍ imāni sparśāyatanāni pūrvam abhisaṃskṛtāny abhisañcetitāni / paurāṇaṃ karma veditavyam iti vadāmi" (These six contact-sense spheres are brought about by former making up, by volition; they are to be known as [results of] former karma, thus I say). For 受 the Skt. has veditavyam "is to be known" (p. 145), confirming my translation of the Pāli.

> What are the six? The contact-sense spheres of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. The well-taught noble disciple gives his mind rightly and thoroughly (善正思惟觀察)[200] to *arising by causal condition*: There are these six groups (or bodies) of consciousness (六識身), the six groups of contact (六觸身), the six groups of feeling (六受身), the six groups of perception (六想身), the six groups of volition (六思身).[201] That is to say, when these exist, then there exist in the future birth, ageing, sickness, death, grief, lamentation, distress and pain (生老病死、憂悲惱苦).[202] Such is the arising of the whole mass of suffering. This is called the arising of the world with cause, with condition (有因有緣).[203] That is to say, when this is not, there do not exist the six groups of consciousness, ... Such is the ceasing of this whole mass of suffering.

The two versions do not have entirely the same wording. However, they agree in saying that the body is "[a result of] former karma, made up, willed". It seems that the term *karma* is being used as a synonym for "making up" and "willing".

Both discourses explain the body thus brought about by saying that one should fully observe *arising by causal condition* in both arising and ceasing modes, but they differ in content. For example, in arising mode the SN version gives the usual series (in abbreviated wording) down to the whole mass of suffering, whereas the SA version names the six groups of consciousness, contact, feeling, perception, and volition, and then the whole mass of suffering.

Nevertheless, in both versions karma or volition is clearly portrayed as included within the notion of causal condition.[204]

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200 Skt. sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca yoniśaḥ pratyavekṣate (p. 145).

201 Skt. ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ, ṣaṭ sparśakāyāḥ, ṣaḍ vedanākāyāḥ, ṣaṭ saṃjñākāyāḥ, ṣaṭ cetanākāyāḥ.

202 Cf. Skt.: jāti-jarā-vyādhi-maraṇa-śoka-parideva-duḥkha-daurmanasya-upāyāsāḥ (birth, ageing, sickness, death, grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair).

203 Skt. sahetuḥ sapratyaya.

204 On other *believers in karma* (kammavādā), cf. also SN 12. 24-25: SN ii, pp. 33, 38 = SA 343: T 2, pp. 93b-94b (CSA ii, pp. 45-47); SN 12. 26: SN ii, pp. 41-42 (no SA counterpart).

8. Knowledge of dharma-status and knowledge of nirvana

In SN 12. 70 and its counterpart SA 347[205] the Buddha speaks of two kinds of knowledge, *knowledge of dharma-status* (dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ 知法住) and *knowledge of nirvana* (nibbāne ñāṇaṃ 知涅槃),[206] which are connected with the teaching of *arising by causal condition*.

In this discourse a newly ordained bhiksu, Susīma (須深), questions some elder bhiksus who have declared they have attained liberation. In the SN version he asks them whether they have attained in turn the psychic powers (abhiññā) up to the fifth, divine eye (dibba-cakkhu),[207] followed by "those *calmed emancipations* (santā vimokkhā) where materiality (rūpa) is transcended and non-materiality (arūpa) [is attained]".[208] In the SA version he asks whether they have attained in turn the four dhyānas and the *calmed emancipations* (寂靜解脫).[209]

In both versions the bhiksus reply that they have attained none of these things. Susīma asks how, without these *attainments* (samāpatti 正受) they could make such a *declaration* (veyyākaraṇa 記說), to which the bhiksus say that they are *wisdom-liberated* (paññā-vimuttā 慧解脫).[210]

Susīma, not fully understanding, goes to ask the Buddha. The Buddha says: "First, *knowledge of dharma-status* (dhammaṭṭhitiñāṇaṃ 知法住); afterwards, *knowledge of nirvana* (nibbāne ñāṇaṃ 知涅槃)."[211]

In the SN version the Buddha explains to Susīma that each of the five aggregates is to be seen as impermanent, suffering, and not-self, and that a noble disciple who sees them thus experiences in succession disgust, fading of desire, liberation, and knowledge of liberation. Then he explains *arising*

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205 SN ii, pp. 119-128; T 2, pp. 96a-98a (CSA ii, pp. 60-64).

206 SN ii, p. 124; T 2, p. 97b (CSA ii, p. 62).

207 The five are: 1. iddhi-vidhā (manifold forms of mystic power, such as producing multiple images of oneself; walking on water, etc), 2. dibba-sota (divine power of hearing), 3. cetopariyañāṇa (knowing other minds), 4. pubbe-nivās-anussati (knowing past lives), and 5. dibba-cakkhu (divine sight). SN ii, pp. 121-123.

208 SN ii, p. 123: "ye te santā vimokkhā atikamma rūpe āruppā te kāyena phusitvā viharathāti".

209 T 2, p. 97a (CSA ii, pp. 61-62).

210 SN ii, p. 123; T 2, p. 97a (CSA ii, p. 62). "Wisdom-liberated" as opposed to "liberated both ways" (P. ubhatobhāga-vimutta, 俱解脫). SN 8. 7: SN i, p. 191 = SA 1212: T 2, p. 330b (CSA iii, p. 201); Additional Translation of the SA 228: T 2, p. 457c; MA 121: T 1, p. 610b; EA 32. 5: T 2, pp. 676-677. Cf. also MN 70: i, pp. 477-478 = MA 195: T 2, p. 751b, which gives definitions of both *wisdom liberated* (paññā-vimutta) and *liberated both ways* (ubhatobhāga-vimutta).

211 SN ii, p. 124; T 2, p. 97b (CSA ii, p. 62).

by causal condition (with all twelve factors) in both arising and ceasing modes, and points out that knowing this does not entail the psychic powers and the *calmed emancipations*.[212]

The SA version omits the teaching on the five aggregates, proceeding directly to *arising by causal condition* (twelve factors). The Buddha points out that knowing this does not entail the four dhyānas and the *calmed emancipations*, and he says: "This is what is meant by 'First, *knowledge of dharma-status*; afterwards, *knowledge of nirvana*'."[213]

In both versions the main message is that liberation requires "knowledge of dharma-status", followed by "knowledge of nirvana", without need of the psychic powers (SN)/the dhyānas (SA) and the *calmed emancipations* (santā vimokkhā). The two versions imply that *knowledge of dharma-status*, from which follows *knowledge of nirvana*, consists in knowing and seeing the arising and the ceasing of *arising by causal condition*. The SN version includes also knowledge of the five aggregates as possessing the three characteristics (impermanence, suffering, not-self). The two versions therefore agree that knowledge of *arising by causal condition* is essential for liberation.

A significant difference between the two versions is that in SN the *attainments* (samāpattiyo) preceding the states of meditative concentration called *calmed emancipations* (santā vimokkhā) are the five psychic powers (abhiññā), while in SA they are the four dhyānas. The four dhyānas (SA) seem in better agreement with the context than do the psychic powers (SN), because "the state of *calmed emancipation* where materiality is transcended and non-materiality attained" is a more natural consequence of the four dhyānas than of the psychic powers. Thus, on this point the SA version is the more coherent.

9. Nutriment

A few discourses within the saṃyukta (SN 12. 11-12, 63-64; SA 371-378) link *arising by causal condition* with the concept of *nutriment* (āhāra 食).[214]

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212 SN ii, pp. 124-127.

213 T 2, p. 97b-c (CSA ii, pp. 62-63).

214 The SA discourses on *nutriment* are grouped at the end of the saṃyukta. In the commentary and in FSA they are reckoned as constituting an independent saṃyukta (食相應). See Appendix 1, p. 244, note 3.

For example, SN 12. 11 and its counterpart SA 371 report the Buddha as saying:[215]

> There are these four nutriments (āhārā 食), bhiksus, for the maintenance or support of creatures or beings seeking to become. What are the four? Material nutriment (kabaliṃkāro āhāro) whether coarse or fine, secondly contact (phasso), thirdly mental volition (manosañcetanā), [and] fourthly consciousness (viññāṇaṃ).

In arising mode, the SN version says the four *nutriments* arise conditioned by *craving*, which in turn arises conditioned by *feeling*, *contact*, and so on back to *ignorance*; and then it repeats the series in the forward direction down to the arising of the whole mass of suffering. The SA version says that the *nutriments* arise conditioned by *craving*, and so on in sequence back to the *six sense spheres*, and then repeats the series in the forward direction down to *craving*, *nutriment* and the whole mass of suffering. In ceasing mode, the SN version states that from the total fading away and ceasing of *ignorance* the rest cease in turn; the SA version states it from the ceasing of the *six sense spheres* to the end.[216] Hence, the notion of *nutriment* in both versions is clearly connected with the series of causal condition.

The other discourses mentioned above, namely SN 12. 12 = SA 372, SN 12. 63 = SA 373, and SN 12. 64 = SA 374-378,[217] all present the same set of four nutriments:

1. Material nutriment (kabaliṃkāra-āhāra 麤摶食)
2. Contact nutriment (phassāhāra 細觸食)
3. Volition nutriment (manosañcetanāhāra 意思食)
4. Consciousness nutriment (viññāṇāhāra 識食)

All indicate that these four are linked in some significant way with *arising by causal condition*. One of the discourses, SN 12. 63 = SA 373, provides a detailed explanation of each item. Briefly, the relevant teachings are as follows.[218]

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215 SN ii, p. 11. T 2, pp. 101c-102a (CSA ii, p. 88).
216 SN ii, p. 12. T2, pp. 101c-102a (CSA ii, pp. 88-89).
217 SN ii, pp. 12-14, 97-104; T 2, pp. 102a-103c (CSA ii, pp. 89-97).
218 SN ii, pp. 98-100; T 2, p. 102b-c (CSA ii, pp. 92-93).

1. In *material nutriment*, one should know the *desire* (rāga; or 貪愛 *desire and craving*) of the *five strands of sensuality* (pañca kāmaguṇa 五欲功德).[219]
2. In *contact nutriment*, one should know the *three feelings* (tisso vedanā 三受).
3. In *volition nutriment*, one should know the *three cravings* (tisso taṇhā 三愛).
4. In *consciousness nutriment*, one should know *name-and-material form* (nāmarūpa 名色).

The teachings on *nutriment* shared by the two versions indicate the importance of regarding material food as merely a means for supporting and maintaining living beings; and they identify the other three kinds of *nutriment* as factors in the series of *arising by causal condition*. In all cases the emphasis is on the role of sensual desire as a key causal factor making for continued rebirth or suffering.

10. Conclusion

Regarding the teaching of *arising by causal condition*, this chapter has shown there are, in the two versions – Nidāna Saṃyutta of SN and Yinyuan Xiangying (因緣相應) of SA – various accounts specifying varying numbers of factors. Of these different accounts, two are found only in SN, namely the causal series that goes from *name-and-material form* to the end and the full sequence combined with the way to *knowledge of ceasing* (see sections 5.4 and 5.10). Inconsistency between the two versions is found in the series that begins from the *six sense spheres* (see 5.6). These divergences raise questions regarding possible editing of the two collections, Nidāna Saṃyutta and Yinyuan Xiangying.

The remaining accounts of the causal series are shared by the two versions, though certain disagreements exist in regard to wording and content. This largely shared body of material suggests that the different accounts of *arising by causal condition* existed already at a historically early stage, i.e. at a time before the separation of the Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajjavāda traditions. They evidently represent various ways of presenting the teaching: in detail, in brief, or with different emphases. They would have been employed at different times as the teaching was presented to

219 That is, the desire associated with the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile senses.

different people (most of whom were bhiksus). Thus, the different accounts of the causal series shared by the two versions are unlikely to represent a progressive development, with some being earlier and others later. In other words, the comparative data revealed here do not provide evidence to support the speculative suggestion that there was just one original (or relatively early) account of the series, from which the other attested accounts developed later, either during or after the life-time of the Buddha. The data do not indicate that one might be able to perceive, among the various accounts of the series, one that constitutes the most "rational" presentation of the teaching and is therefore likely to be "original". It is unlikely that the teaching on *arising by causal condition* was established by the Buddha all at once in a certain simple and complete form (the "original" form), and that he just kept repeating the same thing throughout his forty-five years of teaching activity. More likely is that he adapted the teaching according to his audience and that this is reflected in the variety of existing accounts.

CHAPTER 7. THE PATH

The path of practice that leads to enlightenment, or to the cessation of suffering, is the main subject matter of the Mahā-Vagga (Great Section) of SN and of its SA counterpart Dao-pin Song (道品誦 Path Section). Both the SN and SA versions have ten saṃyuktas belonging to Sūtra-aṅga.[1] However, one of the ten, the Xue Xiangying (學相應)[2] of SA has no counterpart in SN, its contents being found in AN instead; and another, the Sacca-Saṃyutta of SN, has its SA counterpart, the Di Xiangying (諦相應), located in the Zayin Song (雜因誦 Causal Condition Section). There are, therefore, eleven topics, all of which will be discussed in this chapter.

Each of these saṃyuktas deals with teachings relating to one aspect of the path of practice. Of the eleven topics, the first seven are well known as the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā (菩提分法),[3] a recognised set of "things contributing to enlightenment". In SA the seven appear in the familiar sequence, beginning with the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and ending with the Noble Eightfold Way.[4] In SN the sequence is different:

(1) The Noble Eightfold Way
(Magga Saṃyutta; its SA counterpart is called 聖道分相應 Shengdaofen Xiangying, "Noble Path-factor Saṃyukta")
(2) The Seven Factors of Enlightenment
(Bojjhaṅga S.; 覺支相應 Juezhi X.)
(3) The Four Stations of Mindfulness
(Satipaṭṭhāna S.; 念處相應 Nianchu X.)
(4) The Five Faculties
(Indriya S.; 根相應 Gen X.)
(5) The Four Right Efforts
(Sammappadhāna S.; 正斷/正勤相應 Zhengduan/Zhengqin X.)

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1 On the discourses and their locations, see Chapter 1, p. 19, and Appendix 1, pp. 245-246, 250-251.

2 Skt. Śikṣā Saṃyukta.

3 Skt. bodhipakṣya-dharmāḥ. This set, as represented in the Pāli tradition, is the subject of an in-depth study: R. M. L. GETHIN, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyā Dhammā* (Brill, Leiden, 1992).

4 The usual sequence is: satipaṭṭhāna, sammappadhāna, iddhipāda, indriya, bala, bojjhaṅga, magga; e.g. SN 22. 101: SN iii, pp. 153-154; SA 263: T 2, p. 67a-b (CSA i, pp. 58-59). On the sequence found in SN vol. v, see the comments by CAF RHYS DAVIDS in *The Book of the Kindred Saying*, Part v (PTS, London, 1979), pp. v-vi.

(6) The Five Powers
(Bala S.; 力相應 Li X.)
(7) The Four Bases of Supernormal Power
(Iddhipāda S.; 如意足相應 Ruyizu X.)

In keeping with the practice adopted in earlier chapters, the SN sequence will be followed here. The other four topics discussed in this chapter are:

(8) Mindfulness by in- and out-breathing
(Ānāpāna S.; 安那般那念相應 Annabannanian X.)
(9) Training
(學相應 Xue X.; Sikkhā S. lacking in SN, but its contents found in AN 3.)
(10) Stream-entry
(Sotāpatti S.; 不壞淨相應 Buhuaijing X.)
(11) The four noble truths
(Sacca S.; 諦相應 Di X.)

(1) The Noble Eightfold Way

The Magga Saṃyutta of SN and the corresponding Shengdaofen Xiangying of SA deal mainly with the *noble eightfold way* (ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo 八聖道). The two versions agree in identifying the eight items of the *noble eightfold way* as follows:[5]

1. right view (sammādiṭṭhi 正見)
2. right thought (sammāsaṅkappo 正志)
3. right speech (sammāvācā 正語)
4. right action (sammākammanto 正業)
5. right livelihood (sammāājīvo 正命)
6. right effort (sammāvāyāmo 正方便)
7. right mindfulness (sammāsati 正念)
8. right concentration (sammāsamādhi 正定)

However, they differ to some extent in their definitions or analyses (vibhaṅgā) of the individual items. In SN 45. 8, which has no SA counterpart, the Buddha explains them thus:[6]

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5 E.g. SN 45. 1: SN v, p. 2 and its counterpart SA 749: T 2, p. 198b (CSA ii, p. 369).
6 SN v, pp. 8-10. Cf. MN 141 Saccavibhaṅga Sutta; DN 22 Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

And what, bhiksus, is *right view*? It is knowledge (ñāṇaṃ) of suffering (dukkhe), knowledge of the arising of suffering, knowledge of the ceasing of suffering, and knowledge of way leading to the ceasing of suffering. This, bhiksus, is called *right view*.

And what, bhiksus, is *right thought*? It is thought of detachment (nekkhammasaṅkappo), thought of non-malice (abyāpādasaṅkappo), thought of non-harming (avihiṃsāsaṅkappo). ...

And what, bhiksus, is *right speech*? It is abstaining (veramaṇī) from lying speech (musāvādā), abstaining from defamatory speech (pisuṇāya vācāya), abstaining from abusive speech (pharusāya vācāya), abstaining from frivolous speech (samphappalāpā). ...

And what, bhiksus, is *right action*? It is abstaining from destroying life (pāṇātipātā), abstaining from stealing (adinnādānā), abstaining from non-noble conduct (abrahmacariyā).[7] ...

And what, bhiksus, is *right livelihood*? Herein, bhiksus, the noble disciple, abandoning wrong livelihood, carries on his life by right livelihood. ...

And what, bhiksus, is *right effort*? Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu arouses will, makes effort, begins to strive, applies and lays hold of his mind (chandaṃ janeti, vāyamati, viriyam ārabbhati, cittam paggaṇhāti padahati), for preventing the arising (anuppādāya) of *evil, unprofitable states* (pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ) that have not arisen; ... for giving up (pahānāya) of *evil, unprofitable states* that have arisen; ... for generating (uppādāya) *profitable states* (kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ) that have not arisen; ... for consolidating (ṭhitiyā), for non-confusion (asammosāya), for increasing (bhiyyobhāvāya), for full development (vepullāya), for cultivating (bhāvanāya), for fulfilment (pāripūriyā) of *profitable states* that have arisen. ...

And what, bhiksus, is *right mindfulness*? Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu abides in body contemplating body (kāye kāyanupassī viharati),

7 Referring to unchastity, sexual activity.

> strenuous, aware, mindful, by restraining in the world covetousness and distress (ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyyaloke abhijjhādomanassaṃ). He abides in feelings contemplating feelings (vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati) ... He abides in mind contemplating mind (citte cittānupassī viharati) ... He abides in phenomena contemplating phenomena (dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati), strenuous, aware, mindful, by restraining in the world covetousness and distress. ...
>
> And what, bhiksus, is *right concentration*? Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu, separating (vivicca) himself from sensual pleasures (kāmehi), separating himself from evil dharmas (akusalehi dhammehi), abides attaining **the first dhyāna** (pathamaṃ jhānam), which is possessed of thought (savitakkam) and investigation (savicāraṃ), is detachment-born (vivekajaṃ), and is joyful and pleasant (pītisukham).
>
> By the calming down (vūpasamā) of thought and investigation, he abides attaining **the second dhyāna** (dutiyaṃ jhānam), in which there is inner tranquillity (ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ), one-pointedness of mind (cetaso ekodibhavam), and which is without thought, without investigation, concentration-born (samādhijaṃ), joyful and pleasant.
>
> By the fading away of joy (pītiyā ca virāgā), he abides disinterested (upekhako), mindful and aware (sato ca sampajāno), and experiences pleasure with the body (sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti), of which the Noble Ones say "equanimous, mindful, abiding in pleasure (upekhako satimā sukhavihārīti)", and he abides attaining **the third dhyāna** (tatiyaṃ jhānam).
>
> Through the giving up of pleasure and pain (sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā), through the ceasing of previous happiness and sorrow (pubbeva somanassa-domanassānam atthagamā), he abides attaining **the fourth dhyāna** (catutthaṃ jhānam), which is free of pain and pleasure (adukkham-asukham), and possessed of disinterested mindfulness and purity (upekhā-sati-pārisuddhiṃ). ...

As mentioned above, this discourse has no SA counterpart. Conversely, explanations of the eight items are found in two discourses of Shengdaofen

Xiangying of SA, namely SA 784 and SA 785;[8] but for the former the SN counterpart SN 45. 21 lacks explanations,[9] and for the latter, the counterpart is located in the Majjhima Nikāya rather than in SN.[10] The explanations given in SA 784 and SA 785 differ from those quoted above in five cases: *right view, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration*. In SA 784 they are as follows:

Right view: "holding that there are charity, teaching, and discipline; there are good conduct, evil conduct, and results of good and evil conduct; there are this world and the other world; there are parents and the arising of beings; there are arhants who are well arrived, well directed, who exist in this world and the other world, who abide fully knowing for themselves and declare: Birth is ended, noble conduct is established, done is what was to be done, there is no more of further becoming."

Right livelihood: "seeking clothing, drink and food, lodging, [and] medicine in accordance with Dharma, not contrary to Dharma."

Right effort: "arousing will and making effort, applying effort to keep aloof, being energetically capable, constantly cultivating and not backsliding."

Right mindfulness: "being mindful, following mindfulness, neither unaware nor vain."

Right concentration: "abiding with stable mind, firmly controlled, calm, samādhi, one-pointedness of mind."

SA 785 generally agrees; however, it adds an extra dimension, stating that each item of the *noble eightfold way* is of two kinds.[11] The first kind is "worldly, having influxes, having attachment, leading to good birth" (世俗, 有漏, 有取, 轉向善趣); for this type the explanations are as in SA 784, above. The other kind is "noble, supramundane, without influxes, without attachment, rightly ending suffering, leading to the ending of suffering" (聖, 出世間, 無漏, 無取, 正盡苦, 轉向苦邊). For this second kind the definitions are as for the first kind with this addition that in each case the practitioner knows and reflects on suffering, the arising of suffering, the ceasing of suffering, and the way leading to the ceasing of suffering. That is, each is accompanied by *right view* as defined in SN 45. 8 (quoted earlier).

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8 T 2, pp. 203a-204a (CSA ii, pp. 389-393).
9 SN v, pp. 17-18.
10 MN 117: MN iii, pp. 72-78. See also another Chinese counterpart, MA 189: T 1, pp. 735b-736c.
11 T 2, pp. 203a-204a (CSA ii, pp. 390-393).

The definitions of the five items (*right view, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration*) given in SA 784-785 are clearly different in wording from those given in SN 45. 8, but the differences do not represent any sharp sectarian disagreement, except in the case of *right view*. For example, the explanations of *right effort, right mindfulness* and *right concentration* in SN 45. 8 are also applied to the *four right efforts*, the *four stations of mindfulness*, and the *four dhyānas* respectively at other locations in both the SN and SA traditions.[12] As regards *right livelihood*, the SA version is more specific than the SN, but not in disagreement with it. However, regarding *right view*, the definition given in SN 45. 8 appears to be applicable to monks, while that given in SA 784 appears to be for lay people. The paired definitions in SA 785 cover both cases: worldly right view is as in SA 784; noble right view is as in SN 45. 8. This does not constitute disagreement between SN and SA, since the sutras in question are not counterparts of each other.

Another SA sutra, SA 769, records the Buddha as saying to Ānanda that the *noble eightfold way* is "the right dharma-discipline vehicle", "the deva vehicle", "the noble vehicle", "the great vehicle", which is "able to conquer the affliction-army".[13] The corresponding SN 45. 4 says that the *noble eightfold way* in this dharma and discipline (dhammavinaya) is "the noble vehicle" (brahmayāna), "the dharma vehicle" (dhammayāna), which is "unsurpassed for its conquest in the fight" (anuttara-saṅgāma-vijaya).[14] Here, the SA version uses the term great vehicle (大乘), i.e. mahāyāna, while the SN version does not. Thus, the SA discourse appears to show here a feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism.[15]

(2) The Seven Factors of Enlightenment

The Bojjhaṅga Saṃyutta of SN and the the Juezhi Xiangying of SA deal mainly with the *seven factors of enlightenment* (satta bojjhaṅgā 七覺支/分), which they consistently list as follows:[16]

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12 See pp. 221-222, 215-216 in this chapter, and pp. 123-124 in Chapter 4.
13 T 2, pp. 200c-201a (CSA ii, p. 380).
14 SN v, p. 5.
15 CSA i, "RESA", p. 59.
16 E.g. SN 46. 37 = SA 705, and SN 46. 51 (cf. SN 46. 2) = SA 715: SN v, pp. 94, 102-107 (cf. pp. 64-67); T 2, pp. 189b, 192a-193a (CSA ii, pp. 330, 340-342).

1. Enlightenment-factor of mindfulness (sati-sambojjhaṅga 念覺支/分)
2. Enlightenment-factor of investigating dharma (dhammavicaya-sambojjhaṅga 擇法覺支/分)
3. Enlightenment-factor of effort (viriya-sambojjhaṅga 精進覺支/分)
4. Enlightenment-factor of zest (pīti-sambojjhaṅga 猗覺支/分)
5. Enlightenment-factor of tranquillity (passaddhi-sambojjhaṅga 喜覺支/分)
6. Enlightenment-factor of concentration (samādhi-sambojjhaṅga 定覺支/分)
7. Enlightenment-factor of equanimity (upekhā-sambojjhaṅga 捨覺支/分)

There is no clear explanation of the seven items in either version. The best available is in SN 46. 51 and its counterpart SA 715, which explains the *nutriment* (āhāra 食) of the seven enlightenment-factors, as follows.[17]

SN 46. 51	SA 715
(1) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness* that has not arisen, or for the cultivation and fulfilment of the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness* that has already arisen? There are, bhiksus, *things on which* the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is to be based* (satisambojjhaṅgaṭṭhāniyā dhammā). Thoroughly practising attention (yoniso manasikārabahulīkāro) to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness* ...	(1) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness*? It is the *four stations of mindfulness*. Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness* that has not arisen, leads to the growth of the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness* that has already arisen. This is called *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness*.
(2) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment*	(2) What is *nutriment* for the

17 SN v, pp. 103-105. T 2, pp. 192c-193a (CSA ii, pp. 341-342).

for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of investigating dharma* ...? There are, bhiksus, *dharmas that are good and bad* (kusalākusalā dhammā), *blameworthy and not blameworthy* (sāvajjānavajjā), *mean and exalted* (hīnapaṇītā), [and] *unequalled darkness and light* (kaṇhasukkasappaṭibhāgā). Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of investigating dharma* ...	*enlightenment-factor of investigating dharma*? There is *investigating dharmas that are good and investigating dharmas that are bad*. Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of investigating dharma* ...
(3) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of effort* ...? There is, bhiksus, the *dhātu of attempt* (ārambhadhātu), the *dhātu of exertion* (nikkamadhātu), the *dhātu of endeavour* (parakkamadhātu). Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of effort* ...	(3) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of effort*? It is the *four right efforts*. Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of effort* ...
(4) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of zest* ...? There are, bhiksus, *things on which* the *enlightenment-factor of zest is to be based* (pītisambojjhaṅgaṭṭhāniyā dhammā).. Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of zest* ...	(4) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of zest*? There is *zest* and the *realm that is zest*. Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of zest* ...
(5) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of tranquillity* ...? There are,	(5) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of tranquillity*? There are *tranquillity of body* and *tranquillity of mind*. Having paid

bhiksus, *tranquillity of body* and *tranquillity of mind* (kāyapassaddhi cittapassaddhi). Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of tranquillity* ...	attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of tranquillity* ...
(6) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of concentration* ...? There are, bhiksus, the *sign that is calm* and the *sign that is not bewildered* (samathanimittam avyagganimittam). Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of concentration* ...	(6) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of concentration*? It is the *four dhyānas*. Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of concentration* ...
(7) And what, bhiksus, is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity* ...? There are, bhiksus, *things on which* the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity is to be based* (upekhāsambojjhaṅgaṭṭhaniyā dhammā). Thoroughly practising attention to these, this is *nutriment* for the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity* ...	(7) What is *nutriment* for the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity*? There are *three dhātus*. What are the three? They are the *dhātu of elimination* (斷界), the *dhātu of fading of sensual desire* (無欲界), the *dhātu of cessation* (滅界). Having paid attention to these leads to the arising of the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity* ...

The two versions have rather different wording and explanations, particularly for bojjhangas (1), (3), (6), and (7), for which the *nutriments* are said to be:

SN	SA
(1) *things on which* the *enlightenment-factor of mindfulness is to be based*	(1) the *four stations of mindfulness*
(3) three *dhātus*: *attempt, exertion, endeavour*	(3) the *four right efforts*
(6) the *sign that is calm and not bewildered*	(6) the *four dhyānas*
(7) *things on which* the *enlightenment-factor of equanimity is to be based*	(7) *three dhātus*: *elimination, fading of sensual desire, cessation.*

These differences, though substantial, show no evidence of representing sectarian disagreements.

The two versions agree in frequently identifying the *seven factors of enlightenment* as the means for overcoming the *five obstacles* (pañca nīvaraṇāni 五障/五蓋), which are *afflictions of mind* (cetaso upakkilesā), and *weaken wisdom* (paññāya dubbalī-karaṇā). The five obstacles are: 1. sensual desire (kāmacchanda 貪欲蓋), 2. ill-will (byāpāda = vyāpāda 瞋恚蓋), 3. stolidity and drowsiness (thīna-middha 睡眠蓋), 4. over-balancing and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca 掉悔蓋), and 5. doubt and uncertainty (vicikicchā 疑掉). Many discourses in the two versions oppose these *five obstacles* to the *seven factors of enlightenment.*[18]

(3) The Four Stations of Mindfulness

In the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta of SN and the Nianchu Xiangying of SA the main teachings relate to the *four stations of mindfulness* (cattāro satipaṭṭhānā 四念處). The two versions agree completely in their identification of the four.

For example, SN 47. 2:[19]

> A bhiksu should dwell *mindful* (sato) and *aware* (sampajāno). This is our instruction to you.

18 Examples are: SN 46. 38: SN v, pp. 94-96 = SA 707: T 2, p. 189c (CSA ii, p. 331); SN 46. 51 (cf. SN 56. 2): SN v, pp. 102-107, 64-67 = SA 715: T 2, pp. 192a-193a (CSA ii, pp. 340-342), etc.

19 SN v, p. 142.

> And how, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *mindful*? Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu abides in body contemplating (or looking at) body (kāye kāyanupassī viharati), strenuous, *aware*, mindful, restraining covetousness and distress in the world (ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ). He abides in feelings (vedanāsu) contemplating feelings ... in mind (citte) contemplating mind ... He abides in phenomena (dhammesu) contemplating phenomena, strenuous, aware, mindful, restraining covetousness and distress in the world. Thus, bhiksus, is a bhiksu mindful.
>
> And how, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *aware*? Herein, bhiksus, a bhiksu in going forth and in returning is *acting with awareness* (sampajānakārī). In looking in front and looking behind he is *acting with awareness*. In bending or relaxing he is *acting with awareness*. In wearing his robe, in bearing bowl and outer robe he is *acting with awareness*. In eating, drinking, chewing and tasting he is *acting with awareness*. In easing himself he is *acting with awareness*. In going, standing, sitting and sleeping, in waking, speaking and keeping silence he is *acting with awareness*. Thus, bhiksus, is a bhiksu *aware*.

The corresponding SA 622 gives the same explanation of *mindfulness* (正念) and *awareness* (正智), though it reverses the order, putting *mindfulness* second.[20]

In both versions *mindfulness* is equated with practice of the *four stations of mindfulness* (*body, feeling, mind, phenomena*);[21] *awareness* is described as applied in all bodily postures and movements, and appears to be covered by the first of the four aspects of *mindfulness*. No mention is made of *awareness* with respect to *feeling, mind,* and *phenomena*. This suggests that the practice based on the *body* is intended as an example equally applicable for *feeling, mind,* and *phenomena*. Or it is possible that the teaching of *awareness* is a practice different from *mindfulness*, but closely linked to it. These teachings on *mindfulness* and *awareness* are common to the two traditions.

The teachings on *mindfulness* and *awareness*, or the *four stations of mindfulness*, are connected, in both traditions, with training in *morality* (sīla) and with *concentration* (samādhi). Regarding the connection with

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20 T 2, p. 174a (CSA ii, p. 260).
21 SN 47. 1: SN v, p. 141 = SA 607: T 2, p. 171a (CSA ii, p. 236).

morality, SN 47. 16 reports the Buddha as teaching the venerable Uttiya thus:[22]

> ... In this case, Uttiya, you must purify the *fundament in good states* (ādim eva visodhehi kusalesu dhammesu). And what is the *fundament in good states*? It is morality that is truly pure, and straight view (sīlañca suvisuddhaṃ diṭṭhi ca ujukā). Now, Uttiya, when your morality becomes truly pure and your view is straight, then, *leaning on morality* (sīlam nissāya), *established in morality* (sīle patiṭṭhāya), you should cultivate (bhāveyyāsi) the *four stations of mindfulness*. What four? ...

The corresponding SA 624 has almost the same.[23] Thus, both versions say in common that *morality* is a foundation for practising the *four stations of mindfulness*.

Regarding the connection with *concentration*, SN 47. 4 states: [24]

> Bhiksus, those bhiksus who are novices, not long gone forth from home, late-comers, into this *dharma* and *discipline*, should be encouraged for, advised for, and established in, the cultivation (bhāvanāya) of the *four stations of mindfulness*. What four?
>
> Here, friends, you abide in body contemplating body, strenuous, aware, *one-pointed* (ekodibhūtā), with *tranquil mind* (vippasanna-cittā), *concentrated* (samāhitā), with *one-pointed mind* (ekaggacittā), for knowledge of body as it really is (kāyassa yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇāya). You abide in feelings (vedanāsu) contemplating feelings ... in mind (citte) contemplating mind ... You abide in phenomena (dhammesu) contemplating phenomena, strenuous, aware, *one-pointed*, with *tranquil mind*, *concentrated*, with *one-pointed mind*, for knowledge (ñāṇāya) into phenomena as they really are.

Much the same is then said of bhiksus who are in training (sekhā), and of bhiksus who are arhants (arahanto). However, while novices do it for

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22 SN v, p. 166 (cf. SN 47. 15: SN v, p. 165).

23 T 2, p. 175a (CSA ii, p. 264). See also SN 47. 15: SN v, p. 165 = SA 625: T 2, p. 75a (CSA ii, p. 264); SN 47. 3 = SA 610 and 624: T 2, pp. 171b, 175a (CSA ii, pp. 239, 264).

24 SN v, pp. 144-145.

knowledge of things as they really are (yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇāya), trainees do it for comprehension (pariññāya) and arhants are released (visaṃyuttā). Here, where the usual account of the four stations has "strenuous (ātāpī), aware (sampajāno), mindful (satimā)", the SN discourse just quoted has "strenuous, aware, one-pointed (ekodibhūtā), with tranquil mind (vippasannacittā), concentrated (samāhitā), with one-pointed mind (ekaggacittā)." Mindfulness is replaced by concentration. The corresponding SA 621, while otherwise essentially identical, differs slightly at this same point. It reads: "strenuous, vigilant, mindful (正念), aware (正智), calmed (寂) and concentrated (定) or tranquil (靜) mind".[25] Nevertheless, the two versions share the teaching that the practice or cultivation of the *four stations of mindfulness* goes together with concentration (samādhi).

In summary, SN and SA agree regarding the following: the composition of the *four stations of mindfulness*; the connection between *mindfulness* and *awareness* (sati, sampajañña); the importance of training in *morality* (sīla) as the basis or fundament (ādi) for *mindfulness*; and the status of *concentration* (samādhi) as a state of mindfulness.

(4) The Five Faculties

Comparison of Indriya Saṃyutta of SN and Gen Xiangying of SA can only be partial, because the first part of the SA version is lost (it was located in the missing fascicle 25).[26] The surviving part deals mainly with a set of *five faculties* (pañca indriyāni 五根), to be discussed shortly. In addition to these, the SN version records the following sets:[27]

1. Faculties of femininity, of masculinity, and of vitality (itthindriyam purisindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ) (SN 48. 22)
2. Faculties of knowing the unknown, of insight/knowledge, and of perfect insight (anaññātaññassāmītindriyaṃ aññindriyam aññātāvindriyaṃ) (SN 48. 23).
3. Six sense faculties (cha indriyāni) (SN 48. 25-30)
4. Faculties of pleasure, of discomfort, of happiness, of distress, and of neutrality (sukhindriyaṃ dukkhindriyaṃ somanassindriyaṃ domanassindriyaṃ upekhindriyaṃ) (SN 48. 31-40)

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25 T 2, p. 173c (CSA ii, pp. 259-260).
26 See Chapter 1, p. 19 and Appendix 1, p. 245. CSA ii, p. 292, note 1.
27 SN 48. 22-23, 25-42: SN v, pp. 204-218.

5. Five sense faculties (without the mental faculty of the six sense faculties) (SN 48. 41-42)

Of the discourses containing these five sets, only that for No. 2 has an SA counterpart – SA 642. Its corresponding set of *faculties* is slightly different: the faculties of knowing the unknown, of insight/knowledge, and of the **unknown** (未知當知根, 知根, 無知根).[28]

In the two versions of the saṃyukta the most common teaching is the following set of *five faculties* (pañca indriyāni 五根):[29]

1. Faith-faculty (saddhindriya 信根)
2. Effort-faculty (viriyindriya 精進根)
3. Mindfulness-faculty (satindriya 念根)
4. Concentration-faculty (samādhindriya 定根)
5. Wisdom-faculty (paññindriya 慧根)

The explanations or definitions of these five are consistent in the two versions, except in the case of the *faith-faculty*.[30] For this two definitions are found:

The first definition, found in SN 48. 9-10, reads as follows:[31]

> Herein, bhiksus, the noble disciple has faith (saddho). He has faith in the wisdom of the Tathāgata (tathāgatassa bodhiṃ), thus: He, the Exalted One (Bhagavā), is arhant (arahaṃ), perfectly enlightened (sammāsambuddho), complete in knowledge and practice (vijjā-caraṇasampanno), well gone (sugato), world-knower (lokavidū), unsurpassed (anuttaro), charioteer of men to be tamed (purisa-dammasārathi), teacher of devas and humankind (satthā deva-manussānaṃ), wakened (buddho), exalted (bhagavā). This, bhiksus, is called *faith-faculty*.

In the corresponding SA 647 it reads:[32]

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28 T 2, p. 182a (CSA ii, pp. 292-293).
29 SN 48. 1: SN v, p. 193 = SA 643: T 2, p. 182a (CSA ii, p. 293), etc.
30 SN 48. 8 and 9-10: SN v, pp. 196-199 = SA 646 and 647: T 2, p. 182b-c (CSA ii, pp. 294-295).
31 SN v, pp. 196-197.
32 T 2, p. 182b (CSA ii, p. 294).

> A bhiksu has a mind of pure faith in the Tathāgata, fundamentally firm, [such that] all other devas, Māras, brahmas, recluses, brahmins, and other worlds [of beings] are not able to harm his mind [regarding his definite faith in the Tathāgata]. This is called *faith-faculty*.

The two versions differ here in wording, employing different stock phrases; but they agree in stating that *faith-faculty* is definite faith in the Buddha.

In the second definition, the SN equates *faith-faculty* with the *four limbs of stream-entry* (cattārī sotāpattiyaṅgāni), while SA equates it with the *four definite faiths* (四不壞淨).[33] Neither version of the discourse explains what these two four-membered sets are, but explanations can be found in another saṃyukta, namely the Sotāpatti Saṃyutta and its counterpart Buhuaijing Xiangying (不壞淨相應). They indicate that the two sets are equivalent.[34]

For the remaining four of the *five faculties* the two versions agree completely in relating them to the following sets: [35]

2. Effort-faculty: the *four right efforts* (sammappadhānāni 四正斷)
3. Mindfulness-faculty: the *four stations of mindfulness* (satipaṭṭhānāni 四念處)
4. Concentration-faculty: the *four dhyānas* (jhānāni 四禅)
5. Wisdom-faculty: the *four noble truths* (ariyasaccāni 四聖諦)

With regard to the relative importance of the *faculties*, SN 48. 52 states:[36]

> Bhiksus, as long as *noble knowledge* (ariyañāṇa) has not uprisen in the noble disciple, there is no stability (saṇṭhiti) of the [other] *four faculties*, there is no steadfastness (avaṭṭhiti) of the [other] *four faculties*. But when *noble knowledge* has uprisen in the noble disciple, then, bhiksus, there is stability of the [other] *four faculties*, there is steadfastness of the [other] *four faculties*.

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33 SN 48. 8: SN v, p. 196 = SA 646: T 2, p. 182b (CSA ii, p. 294). For the term *definite faith* (不壞淨) the corresponding Pāli is avecca-pasāda (Skt. avetya-prasāda); see (10) Stream-entry in this chapter, p. 229.

34 See (10) Stream-entry, pp. 228-235.

35 SN 48. 8: SN v, p. 196 = SA 646: T 2, p. 182b (CSA ii, p. 294). The two versions have almost the same content in SN 48. 9-10: SN v, pp. 197-199 = SA 647: T 2, p. 182b-c (CSA ii, pp. 294-295).

36 SN v, p. 228.

The corresponding SA 654-656 agree, stating that, among the *five faculties*, "*wisdom* is the head, because it comprehensively stabilises [them]" (慧爲其首,以攝持故).[37] Thus, the two versions report in common that the cultivation of *wisdom-faculty* is fundamentally important for the development of the other four *faculties*. Although last in the order of listing the *five faculties*, *wisdom-faculty* is the chief.

In its explanations of the *five faculties*, SA 659 employs a word not found in the corresponding SN 48. 50, namely *bodhicitta* (菩提心):[38]

> What is *faith-faculty*? If a noble disciple generates *bodhicitta* (菩提心) with regard to the Tathāgata to attain a mind of pure faith, this is called *faith-faculty*. What is *effort-faculty*? [If] he generates *bodhicitta* with regard to the Tathāgata to strive with effort, this is called *effort-faculty*. ... *mindfulness-faculty*. ... *concentration-faculty*. What is *wisdom-faculty*? [If] he generates *bodhicitta* with regard to the Tathāgata to give rise to wisdom, this is called *wisdom-faculty*.

The SN counterpart lacks the word *bodhicitta*. For example in the case of *faith*, it simply states: "... a noble disciple who is utterly devoted to faith (ekantagato abhippasanno) in the Tathāgata, ... who has faith (saddhassa) ..."[39] The presence in the SA version of the term *bodhicitta*, much used in Mahāyāna Buddhism, is likely to represent a relatively late addition.[40]

In summary, except for the case of the term *bodhicitta*, there is no major difference in the teachings on the *five faculties* in the two versions. The various other sets of *faculties* recorded in SN are likely to have had counterparts in the missing part of the extant SA.

(5) The Four Right Efforts

The Sammappadhāna Saṃyutta of SN deals mainly with the *four right efforts* (cattāro sammappadhānā).[41] As noted in Chapter 1, the section of SA

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37 T 2, p. 183b-c (CSA ii, p. 299). See also SN 48. 51, 54-55, 67-69: SN v, pp. 227-228, 231, 237-238; SA 657-659: T 2, pp. 183c-184a (CSA ii, pp. 300-301).

38 T 2, p. 184a (CSA ii, p. 301). SN v, pp. 225-227. *Bodhi* is rendered phonetically as 菩提 puti.

39 SN v, p. 225.

40 Cf. CSA i, "RESA", p. 59. On "bodhicitta", see TAKASAKI Jikidō (ed.), *Bukkyō Indo Shisō Jiten* [Dictionary of Buddhist and Indian Thought] (Shunjūsha, Tokyo, 1987), p. 413.

41 SN v, pp. 244-245.

containing the corresponding Zhengduan Xiangying is lacking (it was in the missing fascicle 25).[42] Consequently, a full-scale comparison cannot be undertaken here. However, the corresponding term, *si zheng-qin* (四正勤) or *si zheng-duan* (四正斷) does occur elsewhere in SA,[43] and the principal relevant contents are found at SA 647 and 877-879.[44] On the basis of these, a few broad comparative observations will be briefly made.

Regarding the definition of the *four right efforts*, the SN and SA agree on the contents but differ regarding the sequence. In SN the four are listed as:[45]

1. right effort in preventing evil states that have not arisen,
2. right effort in eliminating evil states that have already arisen,
3. right effort in generating good states that have not arisen,
4. right effort in consolidating good states that have already arisen.

SA 647 and 877-879 reverse the positions of the first two in the listing.[46]

(6) The Five Powers

The contents of Bala Saṃyutta of SN and Li Xiangying of SA are vastly different. Of the 110 "discourses" in SN Bala Saṃyutta the first presents a list of the *five powers*, while the remainder are devoid of significant content.[47] The forty-two discourses of Li Xiangying of SA contain various information about the *five powers*. Twenty of them have Pāli counterparts, but they are located in the Aṅguttara Nikāya rather than in SN.[48] The present comparison is correspondingly limited in scope. SN and SA agree in listing the *five powers* (pañca balāni 五力) as follows:[49]

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42 See Chapter 1, p. 19 and Appendix 1, p. 245. CSA ii, p. 281, note 1.

43 *Si zheng-qin* at T 2, pp. 14a, 19c, 87c; *si zheng-duan* at T 2, pp. 176c, 182b, 183b, 184a, 185c, 186a, 188a, 192b, 213c, 221a-b.

44 T 2, pp. 182b-c, 221a-b (CSA ii, pp. 294-295; iii, pp. 539-540). SA 647, mentioned earlier on pp. 219-220 and in note 35, belongs to Gen Xiangying, the SA counterpart of Indriya Saṃyutta.

45 E.g. SN 49. 1-12: SN v, pp. 244-245.

46 T 2, pp. 182b-c, 221a-b (CSA ii, pp. 294-295; iii, pp. 539-540).

47 SN v, pp. 249-253.

48 T 2, pp. 184a-189a (CSA ii, pp. 302-327).

49 SN 50. 1, 56-57, 110: SN v, pp. 249, 251-253 (no SA counterparts). SA 673-676: T 2, p. 185b-c (CSA ii, pp. 310-311), where the counterparts of SA 673 and 675 are AN 5. 13 and 15: AN iii, pp. 10-12; and SA 674, 676 have no Pāli counterpart.

1. Faith-power (saddhābala 信力)
2. Effort-power (viriyabala 精進力)
3. Mindfulness-power (satibala 念力)
4. Concentration-power (samādhibala 定力)
5. Wisdom-power (paññābala 慧力)

The *five powers* are therefore the same as the *five faculties* (indriya 根) dealt with above.[50] The essential identity of the two sets is stated in Indriya Saṃyutta: SN 48. 43.[51]

(7) The Four Bases of Supernormal Power

For the Iddhipāda Saṃyutta of SN the counterpart in SA is the Ruyizu Xiangying, which, as mentioned above, is entirely lost.[52] Consequently, the following discussion is based on the SN version. It examines briefly the main teachings on the cattāro iddhipādā, the *four bases* (literally *feet*) *of supernormal power*. SN 51. 1 identifies the four as:[53]

1. the base of supernormal power (iddhipāda) that is *intention-concentration* (chanda-samādhi) endowed with the activity of striving (padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgata).
2. the base of supernormal power that is *effort-concentration* (viriya-samādhi) endowed with the activity of striving.
3. the base of supernormal power that is *mind/thought-concentration* (citta-samādhi) endowed with the activity of striving.
4. the base of supernormal power that is *investigation-concentration* (vīmaṃsā-samādhi) endowed with the activity of striving.

The terms *chanda-samādhi, viriya-samādhi, citta-samādhi,* and *vīmaṃsā-samādhi* (intention-concentration etc.) are explained at SN 51. 13 in terms of *cittassa ekaggataṃ* (one-pointedness of mind). Also, *padhāna-saṅkhārā* (the activities of striving) is explained in terms of the *four right efforts*.[54] Thus, each of the *four bases of supernormal power* is a twofold practice:

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50 SN 48. 43: SN v, pp. 219-220. SA 675: T 2, p. 185c (CSA ii, p. 311); cf. also SA 666: T 2, p. 184c (CSA ii, p. 306).
51 SN v, p. 219.
52 See Chapter 1, p. 19 and Appendix 1, p. 245. CSA ii, pp. 283-289.
53 SN v, p. 254.
54 SN v, pp. 268-269.

development of *supernormal power*, intimately connected with cultivation of the meditative state of concentration (samādhi). Although the counterpart SA discourses are missing, the term corresponding to cattāro iddhipādā, namely *si ruyizu* (四 如 意 足), can be found elsewhere in SA,[55] and an explanation similar to the one quoted above from SN is also found elsewhere in SA.[56] The basic teachings on the *four bases of supernormal power* are, therefore, certainly shared by the two traditions.

SN 51. 19 provides four relevant terms: (i) *iddhi* (supernormal power), (ii) *iddhipāda* (basis of supernormal power), (iii) *iddhipādabhāvanā* (cultivation of the bases of supernormal power), and (iv) *iddhipādabhāvanā-gāminī paṭipadā* (the way leading to cultivation of the bases of supernormal power). They can be summarised as follows:[57]

(i) *Iddhi*: The term *iddhi* is explained as referring to the first of the cha abhiññā, the six "supernormal knowledges", namely iddhi-vidhā, manifold forms of psychic power.[58]
(ii) *Iddhipāda*: This is "that way, that practice (yo maggo yā paṭipadā) which leads to receiving of, obtaining of iddhi."
(iii) *Iddhipādabhāvanā*: This refers to the cultivation of the *four bases of supernormal power*, or "the four samādhis" (chanda-samādhi, viriya-samādhi, citta-samādhi, and vīmaṃsā-samādhi).
(iv) *Iddhipādabhāvanā-gāminī paṭipadā*: This is identified as the *noble eightfold way* (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga).

Regarding cultivation of the *four bases of supernormal power*, SN 51. 20 provides some details. It indicates that for each of the four the meditator practises so that he is:[59]

not over-sluggish (na atilīna); not overstrained (na atipaggahīta); not inwardly cramped (na ajjhattaṃ saṅkhitta); not outwardly confused (na

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55 T 2, pp. 14a, 19c, 87c, 147b, 176c, 184b, 186c, 188b, 213c, 221c, 288c, 317b.
56 SA 561: T 2, p. 147b (CSA iii, p. 453).
57 SN v, p. 276. See also SN 51. 27-30: SN v, pp. 285-288.
58 The cha abhiññā are referred to at SN 51. 20-21 (cf. SN 51. 14): SN v, pp. 281-282 (cf. p. 271); and the six are described at SN 51. 11: SN v, pp. 264-266. The remaining five are: 2. dibba-sota (divine power of hearing), 3. ceto pariya-ñāṇa (reading other minds), 4. pubbe-nivāsānussati (recollecting past lives), 5. dibba-cakkhu (divine sight), and 6. āsava-khaya (destruction of influxes).
59 SN v, pp. 277-281.

bahiddhā vikkhitta);[60] conscious of what is behind and before him (pacchāpuresaññī); aware of the body as enclosed by skin and full of various impurities; cultivating the four bases (iddhipādā) by night just as by day; cultivating his mind to shining (sappabhāsaṃ cittam bhāveti).[61]

To summarise, although the texts comprising Ruyizu Xiangying of SA are entirely lost, the corresponding term, *si ruyizu* (四如意足) and enumerations of the four can be found elsewhere in SA. Thus, the *four bases of supernormal power* are common to the two traditions. Regarding the status of details provided in SN, such as the set iddhi, iddhipāda, iddhipādabhāvanā, and iddhipādabhāvanāgāminī paṭipadā, and the method for cultivating the four, no conclusions can be drawn.

This completes the survey of the seven sections that correspond to the bodhipakkhiya-dhammas. The remaining four sections will now be examined in turn.

(8) Mindfulness by in- and out-breathing

The Ānāpāna Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart, Annabannanian Xiangying of SA, deal mainly with *mindfulness by in- and out-breathing* (ānāpānasati 安那般那念).

The practice of *mindfulness by in- and out-breathing* is portrayed in both traditions as a technique in seated meditation for the development of *concentration* (samādhi 三昧). In SN 54. 1 the Buddha describes it thus:[62]

> Bhiksus, in this connection, a bhiksu, going to the forest or going to the root of a tree or going to an empty/lonely place, *sits cross-legged* (nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ), *holding the body straight* (ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyam), *setting up mindfulness in front of him* (parimukhaṃ satim upaṭṭhapetvā), *mindfully breathes out and mindfully breathes in* (sato va assasati sato va passasati).
>
> As he breathes out a long breath, he knows (pajānāti): A long breath I breathe out. As he breathes in a long breath, he knows: A long breath I breathe in. As he breathes out a short breath, he knows: A

60 SN v, pp. 277, 279-280.
61 SN v, pp. 278-280.
62 SN v, p. 311.

> short breath I breathe out. As he breathes in a short breath, he knows: A short breath I breathe in. ...

The corresponding SA 803 differs slightly in wording, but the main content is as above.[63] The terms, "sitting cross-legged, holding the body straight (nisīdati pallaṅkam ābhujitvā ujuṃ kāyam 端身正坐), setting up mindfulness in front of him (parimukhaṃ satim upaṭṭhapetvā 繫念面前)", clearly relate to seated meditation. SN 54. 7 and its counterpart SA 806 indicate that this practice of *mindfulness by in- and out-breathing* in seated meditation is cultivation of *concentration* (samādhi 三昧), resulting in "no wavering or shaking of body, and no wavering or shaking of mind" (neva kāyassa iñjitattaṃ vā hoti phanditattaṃ vā na cittassa iñjitattaṃ vā hoti phanditattaṃ vā; SA: 身心不動 "no movement of body or mind").[64]

Following the above teaching, both versions list a series of sixteen practices. The SN version states:[65]

> He trains himself (sikkhati): Feeling/experiencing through the whole body (sabbakāyapaṭisamvedī), I shall breathe out and in; calming down the bodily activity (passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāram), I shall breathe out and in.
>
> He trains himself: Feeling joy (pītipaṭisaṃvedī), I shall breathe out and in; feeling pleasure (sukhapaṭisaṃvedī), I shall breathe out and in.
>
> He trains himself: Feeling the mental activity (cittasaṅkhārapaṭisamvedī), I shall breathe out and in; calming down the mental activity (passambhayaṃ cittasaṅkhāraṃ), I shall breathe out and in; feeling the mind (cittapaṭisaṃvedī), I shall breathe out and in; gladdening the mind (abhippamodayaṃ cittam), I shall breathe out and in; composing the mind (samādahaṃ cittaṃ), I shall breathe out and in; detaching the mind (vimocayaṃ cittam), I shall breathe out and in.
>
> He trains himself: Observing impermanence (aniccānupassī), I shall breathe out and in; observing fading of desire (virāgānupassī), I shall

63 T 2, p. 206a-b (CSA ii. p. 413).
64 SN v, p. 316; T 2, pp. 206c-207a (CSA ii, p. 416).
65 SN v, pp. 311-312.

breathe out and in; observing cessation (nirodhānupassī), I shall breathe out and in; observing renunciation (paṭinissaggānupassī), I shall breathe out and in.

The SA counterpart (SA 803) has almost the same,[66] differing only in the final section, as shown:

SN	SA
impermanence (anicca)	impermanence (無常)
fading of desire (virāga)	abandoning (斷)[67]
cessation (nirodha)	fading of desire (無欲)
renunciation (paṭinissagga)	cessation (滅)

The observations (anupassanā 觀察) listed are slightly different, but the overall progression in insight is the same. This final section indicates that the teaching of *mindfulness by in- and out-breathing* links the practice of *concentration* to insight and liberation. It moves from the practice of mindfully knowing the bodily breathing in seated meditation, through calming of bodily and mental activities, to observing impermanence and so on.[68] These main teachings are shared in common by the two versions.

(9) Training

For the Xue Xiangying of SA, there is, as noted above, no "Sikkhā Saṃyutta" in SN; most of the discourses of Xue Xiangying have their Pāli counterparts in the Tika-nipāta of AN.[69] The following comparison is therefore limited to just the main teachings on the subject of *training*.

Regarding what is meant by *training* there is no substantial difference between the two traditions. SA 817 and 832 and their counterparts AN 3. 89 and 88 agree that there are *three forms of training* (三學 tisso sikkhā):[70]

66 T 2, p. 206a-b (CSA ii, p. 413). Cf. also SN 54. 10: SN v, pp. 323-325 = SA 813: T 2, pp. 208c-209a (CSA ii, pp. 424-425).

67 = pahāna.

68 Regarding this practice linking various stages of concentrative meditation and liberation from the āsavas, see SN 54. 8: SN v, pp. 316-320 = SA 814: T 2, p. 209a-b (CSA ii, pp. 425-426).

69 See Chapter 1, pp. 19, 22 and Appendix 1, p. 246. CSA ii, pp. 429-447. AN i, pp. 101-300.

70 T 2, pp. 213c, 210a-b (CSA ii, pp. 445-446, 431-432). AN i, pp. 235-236 (cf. p. 64).

(1) the *training of higher morality* (增上戒學 adhisīla-sikkhā)
(2) the *training of higher mind* (增上意學 adhicitta-sikkhā)
(3) the *training of higher wisdom* (增上慧學 adhipaññā-sikkhā)

Apart from a difference in AN 3. 89 regarding (3), the sources agree in explaining the three, as follows:

(1) The *training of higher morality*: A bhiksu lives moral (戒 sīlavā) and restrained (saṃvutto) with the restraint of the Obligations (波羅提木叉律儀 pātimokkha-saṃvara); proficient in following the practice of right conduct, seeing danger in the slightest faults, he trains himself conforming to the *rules of training* (受持學戒 samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu).

(2) The *training of higher mind*: A bhiksu, remote from sensual desire (欲 kāma) and evil unskilful dharmas, abides attaining (the first dhyāna ... and so on to) the fourth dhyāna.

(3) The *training of higher wisdom*: A bhiksu knows suffering as it really is, its arising, its ceasing, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering as it really is.

AN 3. 89, however, explains (3) as follows:[71]

> Herein a bhiksu, by destroying the influxes (āsavānaṃ khayā), in this very life, himself [comes] to know thoroughly the mind-liberation, the wisdom-liberation (ceto-vimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ), which is without influxes (anāsavaṃ), [and] abides having realised and attained it.

This wording differs only in placing emphasis on the cessation of suffering. Hence the two versions basically agree in their account of the three forms of *training*.

(10) Stream-entry

The Sotāpatti Saṃyutta of SN and its SA counterpart, Buhuaijing Xiangying deal mainly with a set of four qualities, called *limbs of stream-entry* (sotāpattiyaṅgāni 入流分), though in SA the more usual term is *definite*

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71 AN i, p. 236.

faiths (不壞淨). At SN 55. 16-17 and their counterpart SA 836 the four are given as:[72]

1. definite faith (aveccappasāda) in the Buddha (佛不壞淨)
2. definite faith in the Dharma (Dhamma) (法不壞淨)
3. definite faith in the Saṅgha (僧不壞淨)
4. noble morality (ariyakanta-sīla "morality loved by the noble ones", 聖戒)

Possession of *definite faith* in Buddha-Dharma-Saṅgha is clearly connected with the notion of the three refuges (saraṇa).[73] Although only the first three of the four items include the term "definite faith", the SA version usually calls the set the *four definite faiths* (四不壞淨). Also, in both SN and SA the first of the *five faculties*, *faith-faculty* (saddhindriya 信根), is explained either as the *four limbs of stream-entry* or as the *four definite faiths*.[74] This suggests that the *definite faith* of the first three limbs is to be thought of as continuing into the fourth, possession of *morality*.

In SN 55. 1 (counterpart of SA 835)[75] and SA 848 (counterpart of SN 55. 35)[76] the four are explained as follows:

SN	SA
1. Herein, bhiksus, a noble disciple is possessed of *definite faith* in the Buddha, [thus:] He, the Exalted One, is arhant, perfectly enlightened ... awakened, an exalted one. (as on p. 219).	1. A noble disciple reflects (念) on the matter of the Tathāgata (如來事) thus: He, the Tathāgata, is a worthy one/arhant, ... (same as SN).
2. He is possessed of *definite faith* in the Dharma (Teaching), [thus:] The Dharma is well proclaimed (svākkhāto) by the Exalted One, seen in	2. Bhiksus, a noble disciple reflects on the matter of the Dharma (法事) thus: The right Dharma and discipline spoken by the Tathāgata

72 SN v, pp. 364-365; T 2, p. 214b (CSA ii, p. 451). The term 入流分, which corresponds to sotāpattiyaṅgāni, is found at SA 843: T 2, p. 215b (CSA ii, p. 456), counterpart of SN 55. 5: SN v, pp. 347-348.

73 E.g. SN 55. 37: SN v, p. 395 and its counterpart, SA 927: T 2, p. 236b (CSA iii, p. 621).

74 See (4) The Five Faculties, p. 220, above.

75 SN v, p. 343 (= T 2, p. 214a-b; CSA ii, p. 451).

76 T 2, p. 216b-c (CSA ii, pp. 459-460) (= SN v, p. 393).

this very life (sanditthiko), timeless (akāliko), inviting one to come and see (ehipassiko), leading onward (opanayiko), individually to be known by the wise (paccattam veditabbo viññūhīti).[77]	is seen in this very life, leads away from all affliction-burning, does not involve time, leads on to nirvana, invites one to see, and is to be individually realised and known.
3. He is possessed of *definite faith* in the Saṅgha (Assembly), [thus:] the *assembly of disciples* (sāvaka-saṅgho) of the Exalted One is practising righteously (suppaṭipanno), practising uprightly (ujupaṭipanno), practising in the right path (ñāyapaṭipanno), practising in the proper course (sāmīcipaṭipanno), namely the *four pairs of persons*, the *eight sorts of persons* (cattāri purisayugāni aṭṭhapurisapuggalā).[78] That is the assembly of disciples of the Exalted One. They are worthy of honour, worthy of reverence, worthy of offerings, worthy of salutations with clasped hands (añjalīkaraṇīyo) – an unsurpassed field of merit for the world (anuttaram puññakhettaṃ lokassa).	3. Bhiksus, [a noble disciple] generates right reflection (正念) on the matter of the Saṅgha (Assembly) (僧事) thus: The *assembly of disciples* of the Exalted One is righteous, upright, worthy of honour, reverence, and offerings – an unsurpassed field of merit.
4. He is possessed of morality/precepts (sīlehi) that are loved by the noble ones (ariyakantehi), unbroken, faultless, unspotted, unblemished, giving freedom, praised by the wise, untarnished, conductive to *concentration* (samādhi-saṃvattanikehi).	4. Bhiksus, a noble disciple reflects on himself in all matters of morality/precepts (所有戒事), and thinks thus: I am possessed of morality that is unbroken, faultless, unspotted, praised by the wise, not disgusting to the wise.

77 Nālandā (SN vol. 4, p. 291) has "viññūhīti" for PTS "viññāhīti" (SN v, p. 343).

78 The *four pairs of persons* are Sotāpanna (stream-enterer), Sakadāgāmi (once-returner), Anāgāmi (non-returner), and Arahant (supremely worthy one). The *eight sorts of persons* are the four pairs in two divisions: [ones who are practising the] paths (maggā) and [ones who have attained the] fruits (phalāni).

Thus, the two versions give similar accounts of the four.

SN 55. 28-29 and their counterparts SA 845-846 provide information on the specific contents of *Dharma* and *morality*, the second and fourth of the four qualities, as follows.

In SN 55. 28-29 the Buddha teaches a lay person (SN 55. 28) and a group of bhiksus (SN 55. 29), about three notions:[79]

- *calming the fivefold guilty dread* (pañcabhayāni verāni vūpasantāni)
- *possessing the four limbs of stream-entry* (catuhi sotāpattiyaṅgehi samannāgato)
- *seeing well the noble method and penetrating it by insight* (ariyo ñāyo paññāya sudiṭṭho supaṭividdho)

In the corresponding SA 845-846 he teaches, to bhiksus only, a slightly different set of three:[80]

- *calming the fivefold guilty dread* (五恐怖、怨對休息)
- *definitely not doubting three things* (三事決定不生疑惑)
- *seeing, as it really is, the noble right way* (如實知見賢聖正道)

The *three things* that are *definitely not doubted* are Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha.[81]

The *calming* of the *fivefold guilty dread* refers to the absence of guilty dread that comes with keeping the five precepts: abstaining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, and intoxicating liquor.[82]

The SN version speaks of "seeing with insight the noble method"; this refers to fully seeing *arising by causal condition* (paṭiccasamuppāda) in both arising and ceasing modes (in twelve factors).[83] The SA version, however, speaks of "seeing, as it really is, the noble right way"; this refers to fully knowing the four noble truths, the noble eightfold way, and arising by causal condition in both arising and ceasing modes (in twelve factors).[84] Here SA has two items more than SN.

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79 SN v, pp. 387-389.
80 T 2, pp. 215c-216a (CSA ii, pp. 457-459).
81 T 2, p. 216a (CSA ii, p. 458).
82 SN v, pp. 387-388; T 2, p. 216a (CSA ii, p. 458). Cf. SN 55. 7: SN v, pp. 353-355 = SA 1044: T 2, p. 273b-c (CSA iii, pp. 756-757).
83 SN v, pp. 388-389.
84 T 2, p. 216a (CSA ii, pp. 458-459).

The following are further examples of references to the same four items:

(1) SN 55. 13 (cf. SN 55. 4) report Sāriputta as instructing Ānanda thus:[85]

> Friend, by abandoning four *things* (dhammānam), by possessing four *things*, human beings (pajā) are thus proclaimed by the Exalted One as *stream-enterers*, of a nature not to decline, assured, bound for enlightenment (sotāpannā avinipātadhammā niyatā sambodhi-parāyanā).

The *four things* are the above-named four qualities. The counterpart, SA 844, has similar wording, except that it refers to the Buddha as "the Tathāgata who is a worthy one/arhant, perfectly enlightened", and adds:

> Having been born seven times in heavens and human [worlds], he then attains the complete ending of suffering.[86]

This statement about seven births is not found in any discourse in the SN version (Sotāpatti Saṃyutta).[87] The two versions are, nevertheless, agreed that those who are possessed of the four qualities are "*stream-enterers* ... bound for enlightenment".

(2) At SN 55. 30 the Buddha says to a layman:[88]

> Also, Nandaka, possessed of these *four things*, the noble disciple is blessed (connected, saṃyutto) with long life, both heavenly (dibbena) and human (mānussena), blessed with beauty, blessed with happiness, blessed with good name, blessed with sovereignty, both heavenly and human.

This discourse mentions five blessings (connections), both heavenly and human. The corresponding SA 833 adds a further five: visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, and tangible things, both heavenly and human. It is possible that these five extra items in SA 833 are a later addition.[89]

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85 SN v, pp. 362, 364 (cf. 346-347).

86 T 2, p. 215c (CSA ii, p. 457), counterpart of both SN 55. 13 and 4.

87 But this statement is found in AN 3. 86: AN i, p. 233.

88 SN v, p. 390.

89 T 2, pp. 213c-214a (CSA ii, p. 450). Cf. other benefits of possessing the *four things* listed at SN 55. 44 = SA 834: "Bhiksus, the noble disciple who is possessed of the *four things* is called 'rich, very rich, having great possessions, great fame' (aḍḍho mahaddhano

(3) At SN 55. 1 the Buddha says:[90]

> Bhiksus, although a noble disciple lives on gathered scraps and wears rags, he is possessed of *four things*, and then is released (parimutto) from hell (niraya), from the realm of animals (tiracchayoniyā), and from the realm of ghosts (pittivisayā). He is released from evil-rebirth, from the woe-realm, from downfall (apāya-duggati-vinipātā). (The *four things* are then listed.)

Similarly, SN 55. 16-17 report the Buddha as telling bhiksus that they should give advice to appropriate people so that they become established in the *four limbs of steam-entry*, because if a person is possessed of the four,

> it is an absolute impossibility that such a person should be reborn in hell, the realm of animals, or in the realm of ghosts (nirayaṃ vā tiracchānayoniṃ vā pittivisayaṃ vā).[91]

The corresponding SA 835 (= SN 55. 1) and SA 836 (= SN 55. 16-17) record the same teaching.[92]

Accordingly, despite certain differences in expression, the two versions agree regarding the benefits for those who possess of the four qualities. This indicates that encouraging faith, as well as morality, was part of the early Buddhist teaching.

(4) In SN 55. 34-35 and their counterparts SA 847-848 the Buddha calls the four qualities the *four deva-paths to the heavens* (cattāri devānaṃ deva-padāni 四種諸天天道).[93] They then add that the noble disciple reflects (paṭisaṃcikkhati 念) thus:[94]

> What is a *deva-path to the heavens* (devānaṃ devapadan)? He knows (pajānāti) thus: Now indeed I hear the devas who have non-malice (abyāpajjha 無恚) as the highest (parame 爲上). So then I am also without malice (na byābādhemi 不起瞋恚), whether fearful or

mahābhogo mahāyaso)." (SN v, p. 402) "Bhiksus, the noble disciple who is possessed of the *four definite faiths* is not living in a poor life among humans, not leading an indigent life, naturally rich." (T 2, p. 214a; CSA ii, p. 450)

90 SN v, p. 342.

91 SN v, pp. 365-366.

92 T 2, p. 214a-b (CSA ii, pp. 451-452).

93 SN v, pp. 392-394; T 2, p. 216a-c (CSA ii, pp. 459-461).

94 SN 55. 35: SN v, p. 393; cf. its counterpart SA 848: T 2, p. 216b-c (CSA ii, p. 460).

> steady (tasaṃ vā thāvaraṃ vā 若怖若安).[95] I surely abide *possessed of the dharma of the deva-path* (devapada-dhamma-samannāgato).

Thus, both versions emphasise non-malice in connection with the four qualities. They also agree in referring to the four as the *four deva-paths to the heavens*.

SN 55. 31 identifies the four qualities as being "four merit-yields, goodness-yields, happiness-nutriments (cattāro puññābhisandā kusalābhisandā sukhassāhārā)".[96] SN 55. 32 is similar, but equates the merit-yields etc. with the three faiths (in Buddha-Dhamma-Saṅgha) together with generosity and *charitable giving* (dāna):[97]

> Then again, bhiksus, the noble disciple **lives at home** (agāram ajjhāvasati) with heart free from the taint of stinginess (vigata-malamaccherena cetasā); he is munificent/generous (mutta-cāgo), pure-handed (payata-pāṇī), delighting in donation (vossagga-rato), accessible to begging (yāca-yogo), delighting in sharing and charitable giving (dāna-saṃvibhāga-rato).

The corresponding SA 838 (= SN 55. 31) and SA 840 (= SN 55. 32) have similar teachings.[98] Accordingly, in the two versions (SN 55. 31-32 = SA 838, 840) the four qualities and the notion of *charitable giving* (dāna 施) are "merit-yields, goodness-yields, happiness-nutriments". Here, both SN and SA replace *morality* with *charitable giving* when referring to the life of a lay-person (agāra).[99]

To summarise, the Sotāpatti Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart Buhuaijing Xiangying of SA record in common a set of four items, called the *four limbs of stream-entry* (in SN) or the *four definite faiths* (in SA), and also known as *deva-paths to the heavens*. The explanations of the four components or qualities are very similar in the two versions, including the specific details of *Dharma* and *morality* (sīla).

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95 PED: pp. 298, 309 also translates "tasa-thāvarā" as "movable (animal) and immovable (vegetable) beings (world)". Here, "whether fearful or steady" (tasaṃ vā thāvaraṃ vā) is preferable for both versions.

96 SN v, p. 391.

97 SN v, p. 392.

98 T 2, pp. 214c-215a (CSA ii, pp. 453-454).

99 This term implies the state of a lay-person, as opposed to anagāra, the state of a homeless mendicant (cf. PED, p. 3.)

A major concept presented here is that of faith (pasāda). The verbal form of this word is pasīdati, which means not only "to have faith", but also "to be clear and calm; to become of peaceful heart; to be purified, reconciled or pleased".[100] So, pasāda appears to signify "calmed faith". As mentioned in section (4) The Five Faculties, the *faith-faculty* is equated with the *four limbs of stream-entry* or the *four definite faiths* of the present section. The *faith-faculty* is shown to be essentially governed and stabilised by the *wisdom-faculty*, connected with individually full understanding of the *four noble truths*.[101] Thus, "faith" in these discourses clearly refers to something very different from fanatical or blind faith.

It is found that where the *four limbs of stream entry* or the *four definite faiths* are expounded, the Buddha is mainly teaching bhiksus, not lay-people. Thus, it is likely that this teaching was an advanced one, primarily for bhiksus, though lay-people are also sometimes included among the listeners.

(11) The four noble truths

The Sacca Saṃyutta of SN and its counterpart Di Xiangying of SA deal mainly with the *four noble truths* (cattāri ariyasaccāni 四聖諦).[102]

(a) The two versions agree completely in listing the four *truths* as follows:

1. The noble truth of suffering
   (dukkham ariyasaccaṃ 苦聖諦)
2. The noble truth of the arising of suffering
   (dukkhasamudayam ariyasaccaṃ 苦集聖諦)
3. The noble truth of the cessation of suffering
   (dukkhanirodham ariyasaccaṃ 苦滅聖諦)
4. The noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering
   (dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ 苦滅道跡聖諦)

Explanations of the *four noble truths* are found only in the SN version of the saṃyutta, for example in SN 56. 11 but not in its counterpart SA 379.[103] The four are explained as follows:

100 PED, p. 447.
101 See pp. 220-221, above.
102 Their locations relative to other saṃyuktas are different in the two collections; see Chapter 1, p. 19 and Appendix 1, pp. 244, 251.

1. Suffering: birth, decay, sickness, death, grief, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair; being conjoined with things one dislikes (appiyehi sampayogo), being separated from things one likes (piyehi vippayogo); not getting what one wants (yam p'icchaṃ na labhati); in short, the *five aggregates of attachment* (pañcupādānakkhandhā).[104]

2. The arising of suffering: Craving (taṇhā) that leads to re-becoming (ponobhavika), along with delight and desire (nandī-rāga), finding pleasure (abhinandinī) here and there, namely: craving for sensuality (kāmataṇhā), becoming (bhavataṇhā), and non-becoming (vibhavataṇhā).[105]

3. The cessation of suffering: The remainder-less fading away and cessation (asesa-virāga-nirodho) of this craving, giving up (cāgo), renunciation (paṭinissaggo), liberation (mutti), non-attachment (anālayo).[106]

4. The way leading to the cessation of suffering: The *noble eightfold way*.[107]

Two other SN discourses, both lacking SA counterparts, give the same explanations for the second to fourth Truths, but differ regarding the first: SN 56. 13 says only that suffering is the *five aggregates of attachment*, while SN 56. 14 says it is the *six internal sense spheres* (cha ajjhattikāni āyatanāni).[108]

Although these explanations of the *four noble truths* are not found in the SA version of the saṃyukta, content similar to that given in SN 56. 11, above, regarding suffering, its arising, its ceasing, and the way, is found elsewhere in SA, as seen in previous chapters.

(b) In his well-known first discourse the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, SN 56. 11 and its counterpart SA 379, the Buddha teaches the *four noble truths* in three aspects. The two versions agree in content but differ in sequence, as shown in the table below:

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103 SN 56. 11 and 12 are counterparts of SA 379: T 2, pp. 103c-104a (CSA ii, pp. 106-109).
104 SN v, p. 421.
105 SN v, pp. 421, 425-426. On taṇhā, see also Chapter 6, pp. 165-167.
106 SN v, pp. 421, 425-426.
107 SN v, pp. 421, 425-426.
108 SN v, pp. 425-426.

SN	SA
- First truth - First truth is to be known (pariññeyya) - First truth has been known (pariññāta) - Second truth - Second truth is to be eliminated (pahātabba) - Second truth has been eliminated (pahīna) - Third truth - Third truth is to be realised (sacchikātabba) - Third truth has been realised (sacchikata) - Fourth truth - Fourth truth is to be cultivated (bhāvetabba) - Fourth truth has been cultivated (bhāvita)	- First truth - Second truth - Third truth - Fourth truth - First truth is to be known (當知) - Second truth is to be eliminated (當斷) - Third truth is to be realised (當作證) - Fourth truth is to be cultivated (當修) - First truth has been known (已知) - Second truth has been eliminated (已斷) - Third truth has been realised (已作證) - Fourth truth has been cultivated (已修)

Thus, the SN shows each truth in three ways, whereas the SA shows the four truths in each way. This way of teaching the *four noble truths* is called *three-turned, twelvefold* (tiparivaṭṭaṃ dvādasākāraṃ 三轉十二行).[109]

(c) The knowing of the *four noble truths*, as part of the practice is made clearer in SN 56. 25 and its counterpart SA 384. The SN version records the Buddha as saying:[110]

> Bhiksus, I declare that *extinction of* the *influxes* (āsavānaṃ khayaṃ) is in one who knows (jānato), who sees (passato), not in one who does not know, who does not see.

109 SN v, p. 422. T 2, pp. 103c-104a (CSA ii, pp. 106-107).
110 SN v, p. 434.

> Bhiksus, in one who knows, who sees "this is suffering, this is the arising of suffering, this is the cessation of suffering, this is the way leading to the cessation of suffering," there is *extinction of* the *influxes*.

The corresponding SA version states:[111]

> If by a bhiksu the noble truth of suffering has been known, has been understood; the noble truth of the arising of suffering has been known, has been eliminated; the noble truth of the cessation of suffering has been known, has been attained; the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering has been known, has been cultivated, then such a bhiksu is called arhant, he has extinguished the *influxes* ...

The two versions differ in expression, but they say in common that knowing (wisdom) or seeing (insight) refers to knowing or seeing the *four noble truths;* and knowing or seeing is essential in the practice, leading the mind to liberation from the *influxes*.

For knowing or seeing the *four noble truths*, both traditions encourage the practice of concentrative meditation. In SN 56. 1 the Buddha says:[112]

> Bhiksus, practise (bhāvetha) *concentration* (samādhim). The bhiksu who is concentrated (samāhito) knows (pajānāti) [things] as they really are (yathābhūtam). And what does he know as they really are?
>
> In this connection, he knows as it really is: this is suffering, this is the arising of suffering, this is the ceasing of suffering, this is the way leading to the ceasing of suffering.

Similarly, in SN 56. 2 he says "Bhiksus, apply yourselves to solitary *meditation* (paṭisallāne yogam āpajjatha).[113] The corresponding SA 429 and 428 have almost the same content.[114] Thus, both versions indicate that practising concentrative meditation is a means to knowing or seeing the *four noble truths*.

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111 SA 384: T 2, p. 104c (CSA ii, pp. 111-112).
112 SN v, p. 414.
113 SN v, p. 414.
114 T 2, p. 112a-b (CSA ii, pp. 144-145).

(d) Regarding how to fully know the *four noble truths*, there is a disagreement between the two versions. SN 56. 30 (no SA counterpart) says that whoever sees (passati) one of the *four noble truths* also sees the rest of them.[115] By contrast, SA 435-437 say that one must first fully know the *noble truth of suffering*, and then come to fully know the rest of them in order; they also say that one must come to fully know the *four noble truths* in sequence, step by step.[116] SA 435 has no SN counterpart. The counterpart of SA 436-437 is SN 56. 44, but it states only that by fully knowing the *four noble truths*, one will make a complete end of suffering.[117] Thus, the SN tradition indicates here that to know one of the *four noble truths* is to know the rest of them as well, whereas the SA tradition indicates that the *four* must be known in sequence.

(e) There are discourses in both versions of the saṃyukta that mention the teaching of *the middle way* (majjhimā paṭipadā)[118] in connection with the *four noble truths*, namely SN 56. 11 (but not its counterpart SA 379), and SN 56. 8 = SA 408.[119]

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the main teachings contained in the Māha-Vagga of SN and its counterpart Dao-pin Song (道品誦) of SA. It has covered seven saṃyuktas corresponding to the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā, followed by a further four saṃyuktas on related topics. The comparison has revealed that, while most of the main teachings are shared, there do exist some unshared elements, which may reflect sectarian differences. The principal unshared elements between the two versions are as follows.

- The terms "great vehicle" (mahāyāna) and "bodhicitta" are found in SA 769 and SA 659 respectively, but not in their SN counterparts, SN 45. 4 and SN 48. 50 – see sections (1) and (4).
- In references to the *seven factors of enlightenment* some disagreements exist, though these possibly do not represent any significant sectarian division – see section (2).

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115 SN v, pp. 436-437.
116 T 2, pp. 112c-113b (CSA ii, pp. 148-150).
117 SN v, pp. 452-453.
118 SN v, p. 421.
119 SN v, pp. 421, 418; T 2, p. 109a-b (CSA ii, p. 132); SA 379, the counterpart of SN 56. 11-12, makes no mention of *the middle way* (T 2, pp. 103c-104a; CSA ii, p. 107).

• In respect of teachings on the *four noble truths,* the two versions differ in their presentation of them as *three-turned, twelvefold* (tiparivaṭṭaṃ dvādasākāraṃ 三轉 十二行). Also, SN says that to know one of the *four truths* is likewise to know the rest of them, while SA says that the *four* must be known in order – see section (11).

Conclusion

This comparative study of the Sūtra-aṅga portion of the Pāli Saṃyutta Nikāya and the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama (雜阿含經) has, among other things, identified which main teachings are shared by the two texts and which are unshared. The Saṃyuktas covered in Chapters 2 to 6 – the five aggregates, the sense spheres, feeling, the realms of nature, and causal condition – can be seen as generally concerned with theory or doctrine, whereas those covered in Chapter 7 – the noble eightfold way, the seven factors of enlightenment, the four stations of mindfulness, and so on – deal with practice, or the path. As regards these main teachings, the two versions have been shown to be largely in agreement, but some significant disagreements have also been found.

The specific similarities and differences identified need not be restated here. More significant is to note the efficacy of the method employed. It has been demonstrated how comparison of the two versions provides the means for distinguishing shared doctrinal components from unshared, and thus for distinguishing, with some confidence, between teachings that probably date from the period before the two schools diverged and teachings that developed subsequently. While the inferences that can be drawn from application of this methodological principle are not always unambiguous, it is clear that any study of the early phases of Buddhist doctrine ought to take account of the principle. Any attempt to identify the doctrines of early Buddhism ought to be based not only on the Pāli texts, but also on their Chinese counterparts.

The work presented here is therefore more than a study of important Buddhist teachings; it is a demonstration of how the comparative method employed here can help elucidate the relative antiquity of specific pieces of Buddhist teaching. To date, such comparison has been used by only a few researchers and only on a limited scale. It should become standard practice.

As regards its treatment of the SN and SA, this study has shown up several areas in which further research is particularly needed, namely the following.

(1) The comparative work has focused on the contents of each saṃyukta: the five aggregates, the sense spheres, and so on. Little attempt has been made here to bring these different topics together, to study their relationships to one another. There is clear evidence that in some cases close connections exist; for example, much of the material in the saṃyukta on sense spheres also has to do with causal condition. Further research into such connections should be undertaken.

(2) This study has been restricted to the Sūtra-aṅga portion of SN and SA. The other two aṅgas, Geya and Vyākaraṇa, despite their limited doctrinal content, deserve to be made the subjects of a similar study.

(3) The available fragmentary Sanskrit counterparts of portions of the Chinese SA have not been included in this study. Whether or not these extant Sanskrit texts represent the version of SA from which the Chinese translation was made, much might be revealed by including them in a more comprehensive comparative study.

(4) The structure of the Sūtra-aṅga portion of SN and SA bears certain resemblances to the structure of three Abhidharma books: the Pāli *Vibhaṅga*, the *Abhidharma-dharmaskandha-pāda-śāstra* (阿毘達磨法蘊足論) of the Sarvāstivāda, and the *Śāriputra-abhidharma* (舍利弗阿毘曇論) of the Dharmaguptaka school.[1] These three Abhidharma works are thought to be descended from a common source text, dating from before the third council.[2] It is therefore possible that that source text was based on the Sūtra-aṅga portion of the early SN/SA, having been intended as a systematic annotated summary of the teachings it contained. Comparative study of the five works might well clarify how their present structure has developed.

It is hoped that this study will attract more scholarly attention to the Chinese counterparts of the Pāli canonical books, with a view to advancing the study of early Buddhism. Comparative Pāli-Chinese study, such as that presented here, is clearly a key to understanding the relationships among the early Buddhist schools. Any attempt to identify the teachings of "original Buddhism" must entail comparison of all available *sectarian texts*. The Pāli Saṃyutta Nikāya and the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama are particularly important, given the probably central position of the ancestral SN/SA in the formation of the early Buddhist canon. The principal contribution of the present study is, therefore, to have demonstrated the effectiveness of such comparative study, and to have made accessible some of the more important doctrinal information it reveals.

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1 Or at least of some Sthavira school other than the Pāli and Sarvāstivāda. See Appendix 2, which shows how the Sūtra-aṅga topics of SA/SN match those of the Abhidharma texts.

2 Cf. Erich FRAUWALLNER, *Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995), pp. 19-21, 39-41; Johannes BRONKHORST, "Dharma and Abhidharma", *BSOAS*, vol. 48 (1985), pp. 308-309.

APPENDIX 1. TABLES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE THREE AṄGAS IN SA AND IN SN

(For explanations of the tables see Chapter 1, pp. 16-18)

Table 1: Distribution of the three aṅgas in the reconstructed SA[1]

(1) 五陰誦 (Wuyin Song "Five Aggregates Section"):

相應 (Xiangying "Saṃyukta")	Fascicle and discourse Numbers in Taishō Tripiṭaka (vol. 2)	Fascicle and discourse Numbers in Foguang Tripiṭaka (vols. 1-4)	Aṅga (Classification)	Total of discourses
陰相應 (Yin Xiangying)	fascicle 1, discourses 1-32	fascicle 1, discourses 1-32	Sūtra	112
	10, 256-272	2, 33-49		
	3, 59-87	3, 50-78		
	2, 33-58	4, 79-104		
	5, 103-110	5, 105-112		
羅陀相應 (Luotuo X.)	6, 111-129, *130-132	6, 113-131, *132-134 [2]	Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)	22
見相應 (Jian X.)	6, 133-138	6, 135-140		39
	7, 139-171	7, 141-173		
斷知相應 (Duanzhi X.)	7, 172-187	7, 174-189		16

1 Cf. *Formation*, pp. 676-683; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 44-52; FSA (Foguang Tripiṭaka, SA) i, pp. 9-12; and Akira MUKAI, "The Vastusaṃgrahaṇī", pp. 18, 27-41 (see INTRODUCTION, p. 9, note 31).

2 The three discourses marked * are set apart as 斷知相應 (Duanzhi X.) in FSA, but not in CSA. See CSA iii, pp. 492-493. Cf. CSA i, "RESA", p. 49; CSA iii, pp. 513-530.

(2) 六入處誦 (Liuruchu Song "Six Sense Spheres Section"):

入處相應 (Ruchu X.)	8, 188-229	8, 190-231	Sūtra	131
	9, 230-255	9, 232-257		
	43, 1164-1177	10, 258-271		
	11, 273-282	11, 272-281		
	13, 304-342	12, 282-320		

(3) 雜因誦 (Zayin Song "Causal Condition Section"):

因緣相應 (Yinyuan X.)	12, 283-303	13, 321-341	Sūtra	57
	14, 343-364	14, 342-363		
	15, 365-370, *371-378	15, 364-369, *370-377 [3]		
諦相應 (Di X.)	15, 379-406	15, 378-405		65
	16, 407-443	16, 406-442		
界相應 (Jie X.)	16, 444-454	16, 443-454		22
	17, 455-465	17, 454-464		
受相應 (Shou X.)	17, 466-489	17, 465-488		24
舍利弗相應 (Shelifu X.)	18, 490-500	18, 489-499	Vyākaraṇa (Śrāvaka)	11
目揵連相應 (Muqianlian X.)	18, 501-503	18, 500-502		34
	19, 504-534	19, 503-533		
阿那律相應 (Analü X.)	19, 535-536	19, 534-535		11
	20, 537-545	20, 536-544		
大迦旃延相應 (Dajiazhanyan X.)	20, 546-555	20, 545-554		10
阿難相應 (Anan X.)	20, 556-558	20, 555-557		10
	21, 559-565	21, 558-564		

3 The eight discourses marked * are set apart as 食相應 (Shi X.) in FSA, but not in CSA. See CSA ii, pp. 88-97. Cf. CSA i, "RESA", p. 50; *Formation*, p. 688.

質多羅相應 (Zhiduoluo X.)	21, 566-575	21, 565-574		10
天相應 (Tian X.)	lacking[4]	22, lacking	Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)	12
	31, 861-872	23, 575-586		
修證相應 (Xiuzheng X.)	31, 873-891	23, 587-605		19
入界陰相應 (Ru-jie-yin X.)	31, 892-901	23, 606-615		10
不壞淨相應 (Buhuaijing X.)	31, 902-904	23, 616-618		3

(4) 道品誦 (Dao-pin Song "Path Section"[5]):

念處相應 (Nianchu X.)	24, 605-639	24, 619-653	Sūtra	35
	lacking[6]	25, lacking		
正斷 or 正勤相應 (Zhengduan or Zhengqin X.)	lacking	lacking		
如意足相應 (Ruyizu X.)	lacking	lacking		
根相應 (Gen X.)	lacking	lacking		19
	26, 642-660	26, 654-672		
力相應 (Li X.)	26, 661-703	26, 673-715		43
覺支相應 (Juezhi X.)	26, 704-711	26, 716-723		44
	27, 712-747	27, 724-759		

4 Fascicle 23, 604 is from Aśokāvadāna, not part of SA. In Foguang Tripiṭaka it is moved to Appendix I.

5 Or "Enlightenment-part Section" (菩提分誦 Skt. Bodhipakṣya Varga). Cf. CSA i, "RESA", pp. 43-44.

6 Fascicle 25, 640-641 are from Aśokāvadāna, not part of SA. In Foguang Tripiṭaka they are moved to Appendix II.

聖道分相應	28, 748-796	28, 760-808		53
(Shengdaofen X.)	29, 797-800	29, 809-812		
安那般那念相應(Annabanna-nian X.)	29, 801-815	29, 813-827		15
學相應	29, 816-829	29, 828-841		17
(Xue X.)	30, 830-832	30, 842-844		
不壞淨相應	30, 833-860	30, 845-872		43
(Buhuaijing X.)	41, 1121-1135	31, 873-887	Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)	
大迦葉相應	41, 1136-1144	31, 888-896		11
(Dajiaxie X.)	32, 905-906	32, 897-898		
聚落主相應 (Juluozhu X.)	32, 907-916	32, 899-908		10
馬相應	32, 917-918	32, 909-910		10
(Ma X.)	33, 919-926	33, 911-918		
摩訶南 or 釋氏相應 (Mohenan or Shishi X.)	33, 927-936	33, 919-928		10
無始相應	33, 937-939	33, 929-931		20
(Wushi X.)	34, 940-956	34, 932-948		
婆蹉種相應 (Pocuozhong X.)	34, 957-964	34, 949-956		8
外道出家相應	34, 965-969	34, 957-961		15
(Waidaochujia X.)	35, 970-979	35, 962-971		
雜相應	35, 980-992	35, 972-984		18
(Za X.)	47, 1241-1245	36, 985-989		
譬喻相應 (Piyu X.)	47, 1246-1264	36, 990-1008		19

病相應 (Bing X.)	47, 1265-1266	36, 1009-1010		18
	37, 1023-1038	37, 1011-1026		
業報相應 (Yebao X.)	37, 1039-1061	37, 1027-1049		23

(5) 八衆誦 (Bazhong Song "Eight Assemblies Section"):

比丘相應 (Biqiu X.)	38, 1062-1080	38, 1050-1068	Geya	22
	39, 1081-1083	39, 1069-1071		
魔相應(Mo X.)	39, 1084-1103	39, 1072-1091		20
帝釋相應 (Dishi X.)	40, 1104-1120	40, 1092-1108		21
	46, 1222-1225	41, 1109-1112		
剎利相應 (Chali X.)	46, 1226-1240	41, 1112-1127		21
	42, 1145-1150	42, 1128-1133		
婆羅門相應 (Poluomen X.)	42, 1151-1163	42, 1134-1146		38
	4, 88-102	43, 1147-1161		
	44, 1178-1187	44, 1162-1171		
梵天相應 (Fantian X.)	44, 1188-1197	44, 1172-1181		10
比丘尼相應 (Biqiuni X.)	45, 1198-1207	45, 1182-1191		10
婆耆舍相應 (Poqishe X.)	45, 1208-1221	45, 1192-1205		16
	36, 993-994	46, 1206-1207		
諸天相應 (Zhutian X.)	36, 995-1022	46, 1208-1235		108
	22, 576-603	47, 1236-1263		
	48, 1267-1293	48, 1264-1290		
	49, 1294-1318	49, 1291-1315		
夜叉相應 (Yecha X.)	49, 1319-1324	49, 1316-1321		12
	50, 1325-1330	50, 1322-1327		
林相應 (Lin X.)	50, 1331-1362	50, 1328-1359		32

Table 2: Distribution of the three aṅgas in SN [7]

(1) Sagātha Vagga (Verse Section):

Saṃyutta	Discourse Numbers in PTS edition (vols. 1-5)	Aṅga (Classification)
1. Devatā Saṃyutta	1-81	Geyya
2. Devaputta S.	1-30	
3. Kosala S.	1-25	
4. Māra S.	1-25	
5. Bhikkhunī S.	1-10	
6. Brahma S.	1-15	
7. Brāhmaṇa S.	1-22	
8. Vaṅgīsa-thera S.	1-12	
9. Vana S.	1-14	
10. Yakkha S.	1-12	
11. Sakka S.	1-25 [8]	

(2) Nidāna Vagga (Causal Condition Section):

12. Nidāna S.	1-93	Sutta
13. Abhisamaya S.	1-11	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
14. Dhātu S.	1-39	Sutta
15. Anamatagga S.	1-20	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
16. Kassapa S.	1-13	
17. Lābhasakkāra S.	1-43 [9]	
18. Rāhula S.	1-22	
19. Lakkhaṇa S.	1-21	Veyyākaraṇa (Sāvaka)

7 *Formation*, pp. 684-702; CSA i, "RESA", pp. 53-57.
8 SN 11. 3 is the counterpart of SA 981, which belongs to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata) (CSA iii, pp. 688-689).
9 SN 17. 35-36 are counterparts of SA 1064, which belongs to Geya (CSA iii, p. 3).

20. Opamma S.	1-12 [10]	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
21. Bhikkhu S.	1-12 [11]	Geyya

(3) Khandha Vagga (Aggregates Section):

22. Khandha S.	1-158 [12]	Sutta
23. Rādha S.	1-46	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
24. Diṭṭhi S.	1-96	
25. Okkantika S.	1-10	
26. Uppāda S.	1-10	
27. Kilesa S.	1-10	
28. Sāriputta S.	1-10	Veyyākaraṇa (Sāvaka)
29. Nāga S.	1-50	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
30. Supaṇṇa S.	1-46	
31. Gandhabbakāya S.	1-112	
32. Valāha S.	1-57	
33. Vacchagotta S.	1-55	
34. Jhāna S.	1-55	

10 SN 20. 9 is the counterpart of SA 1083, which belongs to Geya (CSA iii, pp. 28-29).

11 CSA i, "RESA" p. 56; *Formation*, p. 701. SN 21. 1-2 do not contain verses, and SN 21. 1 and 3 are counterparts of SA 501 and 503, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Śrāvaka) (CSA iii, pp. 397-400).

12 SN 22. 3-4 are counterparts of SA 551-552, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Śrāvaka) (CSA iii, pp. 441-443). SN 22. 87-88 are counterparts of SA 1265 and 1024, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata) (CSA iii, pp. 725-728, 732-733).

(4) Saḷāyatana Vagga (Six Sense Spheres Section):

35. Saḷāyatana S.	1-207 [13]	Sutta
36. Vedanā S.	1-29 [14]	
37. Mātugāma S.	1-34	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
38. Jambukhādaka S.	1-16	Veyyākaraṇa (Sāvaka)
39. Sāmaṇḍaka S.	1-16	
40. Moggallāna S.	1-15	
41. Citta S.	1-10	
42. Gāmaṇi S.	1-13	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)
43. Asaṃkhata S.	1-44	
44. Avyākata S.	1-11	

(5) Mahā Vagga (Great Section):

45. Magga S.	1-180	Sutta
46. Bojjhaṅga S.	1-175	
47. Satipaṭṭhāna S.	1-102 [15]	
48. Indriya S.	1-185	
49. Sammappadhāna S.	1-54	
50. Bala S.	1-110	
51. Iddhipāda S.	1-86 [16]	
52. Anuruddha S.	1-24	Veyyākaraṇa (Sāvaka)
53. Jhāna S.	1-54	Veyyākaraṇa (Tathāgata)

13 SN 35. 74-75 and 87 are counterparts of SA 1025-1026 and 1266, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata) (CSA iii, pp. 733-736, 728-730).

14 SN 36. 7-8 and 21 are counterparts of SA 1028-1029, and SA 977, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata) (CSA iii, pp. 736-738; 677-679).

15 SN 47. 12 is the counterpart of SA 498, which belongs to Vyākaraṇa (Śrāvaka) (CSA iii, pp. 391-393). SN 47. 30 is the counterpart of SA 1038, which belongs to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata) (CSA iii, pp. 745-746).

16 SN 51. 15 is the counterpart of SA 561, which belongs to Vyākaraṇa (Śrāvaka) (CSA iii, p. 453).

54. Ānāpāna S.	1-20	Sutta
55. Sotāpatti S.	1-75 [17]	
56. Sacca S.	1-131	

17 Seventeen discourses in SN 55. 1-75 have SA counterparts, which belong to Vyākaraṇa (Tathāgata), namely, SN 55. 54, 48, 36, 50, 46, 31-32, 41 = SA 1122-1125, 1127, 1131, 1133-1134 (CSA iii, pp. 563-568); SN 55. 21-24, 37 = SA 930, 935-936, 927 (CSA iii, pp. 624-625, 630-632, 621-622); SN 55. 27, 53, 3 = SA 1031, 1033-1034 (CSA iii, pp. 740-744); and SN 55. 7 is the counterpart of SA 1044 (CSA iii, pp. 756-757).

APPENDIX 2. CONTRAST TABLE OF SŪTRA AṄGA PORTION (SA/SN) AND THE THREE EARLY ABHIDHARMAS (DHARMASKANDHA, VIBHAṄGA, AND ŚĀRIPUTRA-ABHIDHARMA)

SA[1]	SN	Dharmaskandha[2]	Vibhaṅga[3]	Śāriputra-.[4]
skandha	22. khandha	19. skandha	1. khandha	1.3. skandha
āyatana	35. saḷāyatana	18. āyatana	2. āyatana	1.1. āyatana
pratītyasamutpāda	12. nidāna	21. pratītyasamutpāda	6. paccayākāra	2.5. pratītyasamutpāda
satya	56. sacca	10. āryasatya	4. sacca	1.4. āryasatya
dhātu	14. dhātu	20. dhātu	3. dhātu	1.2. dhātu 2.1. dhātu
vedanā	36. vedanā			
smṛtyupasthāna	47. satipaṭṭhāna	9. smṛtyupasthāna	7. satipaṭṭhāna	2.6. smṛtyupasthāna
samyakpradhāna	49. sammappadhāna	7. samyakpradhāna	8. sammappadhāna	2.7 samyakpradhāna
ṛddhipāda	51. iddhipāda	8. ṛddhipāda	9. iddhipāda	2.8. ṛddhipāda
indriya	48. indriya	17. indriya	5. indriya	1.5. indriya
bala	50. bala			
bodhyaṅga	46. bojjhaṅga	15. bodhyaṅga	10. bojjhaṅga	1.6. bodhyaṅga
āryamārga	45. magga		11. magga	2.10 mārga
ānāpāna-smṛti	54. ānāpāna			
śikṣā		1. śikṣāpada	14. sikkhāpada	1.10. upāsaka
avetyaprasāda	55. sotāpatti	2. srotāpattyaṅga 3. avetyaprasāda		
		11. dhyāna	12. jhāna	2.9. dhyāna
		12. apramāṇa	13. appamañña	
		14. samādhibhāvana		4.10. samādhi

1 SA as on p. 19 (Chapter 1) and Appendix 1.

2 *Abhidharma-dharmaskandha-pāda-śāstra* (Sarvāstivāda tradition). T 26, No. 1537, pp. 453-505.

3 Pāli tradition.

4 *Śāriputra-abhidharma*. T 28, No. 1548, pp. 525-701. This abhidharma is divided into four sections: 1. Sapraśnaka (問分), 2. Apraśnaka (非問分), 3. Saṃgraha-Saṃprayoga (攝相應分), 4. Prasthāna (緒分). Erich FRAUWALLNER (1995: p. 97) suggests it probably belongs to the Dharmaguptaka school, whereas Yin Shun (1968: pp. 20-21; cf. pp. 13-14) suggests it belongs also to other schools within the Sthavira tradition: Vātsīputrīya, Saṃmitīya, Dharmottarīya, Bhadrayānīya, Ṣaṇṇāgarika; Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya, and Dharmaguptaka.

			15.paṭisambhidā	
		4. śrāmaṇyaphala		
		5. pratipada		
		6. āryavaṃśa		
		13. ārūpya		
		16. kṣudravastuka		
				1.7. akuśalamūla
				1.8. kuśalamūla
				1.9. mahābhūta
				2.2. karma
				2.3. pudgala
				2.4. jñāna
				2.11. kleśa
				3.1. saṃgraha
				3.2. saṃprayoga
				4.1. pratyaya
				4.2. hetu
				4.3. nāmarūpa
				4.4. saṃyojana
				4.5. saṃskāra
				4.6. sparśa
				4.7. citta
				4.8. 10 akuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ
				4.9. 10 kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ

Appendix 3. SA: Chinese-Sanskrit-Pāli-Tibetan counterparts

Chinese #	Sanskrit[1]	Pāli	Tibetan[2]
30 (CSA i, pp. 38-39)	Poussin 1907	SN 22. 49	
232 (CSA i, pp. 276-277)	Lamotte 1973	SN 35. 85	
252 (CSA i, pp. 302-304)	Hoernle 1916; Waldschmidt 1957c, 1958, 1959b	SN 35. 69	
253 (CSA i, pp. 305-308)	Waldschmidt 1980a	SN 35. 133	
254 (CSA i, pp. 309-312)	Waldschmidt 1952,1968, 1972	AN 6. 55	
283 (CSA ii, pp. 5-6)	Waldschmidt 1957a, b; Tripāṭhī 1, 1962	SN 12. 57 (cf. 55-56)	
284 (CSA ii, pp. 6-7)	Tripāṭhī 2	SN 12. 58-59	
285 (CSA ii, pp. 8-9)	Tripāṭhī 3	SN 12. 53-54 (cf. SN 12. 10)	
286 (CSA ii, pp. 9-10)	Tripāṭhī 4	SN 12. 52	
287 (CSA ii, pp. 11-12)	Levi 1910; Tripāṭhī 5, 1962; Cooper 1980; Fukita 1982	SN 12. 65	
288 (CSA ii, pp. 13-15)	Tripāṭhī 6	SN 12. 67	
289 (CSA ii, pp. 16-17)	Tripāṭhī 7	SN 12. 61	
290 (CSA ii, pp. 17-18)	Tripāṭhī 8	SN 12. 62	
291 (CSA ii, pp. 19-21)	Tripāṭhī 9	SN 12. 66	
292 (CSA ii, pp. 22-24)	Tripāṭhī 10	SN 12. 51	

1 For sources or publications, see Bibliography.
2 Text numbers in Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

293 (CSA ii, pp. 25-26)	Tripāṭhī 11		
294 (CSA ii, pp. 31-32)	Tripāṭhī 12	SN 12. 19	
295 (CSA ii, p. 33)	Tripāṭhī 13	SN 12. 37	
296 (CSA ii, pp. 34-35)	Tripāṭhī 14	SN 12. 20	
297 (CSA ii, pp. 36-37)	Tripāṭhī 15; Lamotte 1973	SN 12. 35-36	
298 (CSA ii, pp. 38-39)	Waldschmidt 1957a; Tripāṭhī 16	SN 12. 1-2	
299 (CSA ii, p. 40)	Tripāṭhī 17		
300 (CSA ii, p. 41)	Tripāṭhī 18	SN 12. 46	
301 (CSA ii, pp. 41-42)	Tripāṭhī 19	SN 12. 15	
302 (CSA ii, pp. 42-43)	Tripāṭhī 20	SN 12. 17	
303 (CSA ii, pp. 43-44)	Tripāṭhī 21	SN 12. 18	
335 (CSA i, p. 414)	Lamotte 1973		
343 (CSA ii, pp. 45-47)	Tripāṭhī 22	SN 12. 24-25	
344 (CSA ii, pp. 49-52)	Tripāṭhī 23	MN 9	
345 (CSA ii, pp. 53-54)	Tripāṭhī 24	SN 12. 31-32; Sn. 5. 2. verse 7	
346 (CSA ii, pp. 56-58)	Waldschmidt 1957a, b; Tripāṭhī 25	AN 10. 76	
348 (CSA ii, pp. 65-66)	Waldschmidt 1932: 207-225; Sander 1987: 179-192	SN 12. 22	
366 (CSA ii, pp. 82-83)	Waldschmidt 1956a, b	SN 12. 4-9	
371 (CSA ii, pp. 88-89)	Waldschmidt 1956a, b	SN 12. 11	

379 (CSA ii, pp. 106-108)	Waldschmidt 1932: 54; Gnoli 1977: 134-139	SN 56. 11-12	747, 1003
393 (CSA ii, pp. 117-118)	Waldschmidt 1959a: 18-19, 24-25	SN 56. 3-4	
403 (CSA ii, pp. 126-127)		SN 56. 21	982
583 (CSA iii, pp. 247-248)	Waldschmidt 1970: 180-183	SN 2. 9	758, 997 (757 = SN 2. 10)
684 (CSA ii, pp. 314-317)	Waldschmidt 1932	SN 22. 58; AN 10. 21	
701 (CSA ii, p. 325)	Levi 1910; Waldschmidt 1932, 1958	AN 10. 21	
726 (CSA ii, pp. 352-353)	Waldschmidt 1955	SN 45. 2	966
813 (CSA ii, pp. 424-425)	Pischel 1904	SN 54. 10	
829 (CSA ii, pp. 442-443)	Pischel 1904	AN 3. 83	
830 (CSA ii, pp. 443-444)	Pischel 1904	AN 3. 90	
966 (CSA iii, p. 664)	Pischel 1904; cf. Hosoda 1989		
967 (CSA iii, p. 665)	Pischel 1904	AN 10. 96	
968 (CSA iii, pp. 665-667)	Pischel 1904	AN 10. 93	
969 (CSA iii, pp. 667-669)	Pischel 1904	MN 74	
970 (CSA iii, pp. 670-671)	Pischel 1904	AN 3. 64	
971 (CSA iii, pp. 671-673)	Pischel 1904		
972 (CSA iii, p. 673)	Pischel 1904	AN 4. 185	
981 (CSA iii, p. 689)	Waldschmidt 1932: 43-53, 1959a: 8-18, 21-23; Sander 1987: 135-145	SN 11. 3	959

983 (CSA iii, pp. 690-691)	Enomoto 1985: 81-83	AN 3. 32. 2	
984 (CSA iii, pp. 691-692)	Enomoto 1985: 81-83	AN 4. 199	
993 (CSA iii, pp. 211-213)	Enomoto 1985: 85-87		
995 (CSA iii, p. 219)	Enomoto 1985: 90-91	SN 1. 10	
1077 (CSA iii, pp. 18-20)		MN 86	879
1110 (CSA iii, pp. 59-61)	Waldschmidt 1959a: 1-8, 20-21	SN 11. 4	
1136 (CSA iii, pp. 571-572)	Hoernle 1916	SN 16. 3	756 (?)
1176 (CSA ii, pp. 345-347)	Waldschmidt 1978	SN 35. 202	
1172-1173 (CSA ii, pp. 333-334)	Enomoto 1985: 83-84	SN 35. 197	
1212 (CSA iii, pp. 199-202)	Hoernle 1916; Enomoto 1985: 88	SN 8. 7	
1255 (CSA iii, pp. 716-717)	Hoernle 1916	SN 20. 5	
1226 (CSA iii, pp. 83-84)	Gnoli 1977: 182-183	SN 3. 1	962
1282 (CSA iii, p. 290)	Enomoto 1985: 89		
1299, 1329 (CSA iii, pp. 307-308; 339-345)	Enomoto 1982: 79-85 (963-957)	Sn. 1. 9 (= SA 1329)	996 (= SA 1299)

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